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An international maritime labour market study, the thesis focuses on the Dutch naval labour market, analysing wartime Zeeland admiralty crews.  The research is based primarily on unique naval pay sources.  Analysis of crew compositions has not been made on this scale in the period before.

The 1667 Dutch Medway Raid is the starting point, where a few British played a leading role – amongst many others reported on the Dutch side.  Pepys and Marvell primarily blamed their joining the enemy on the lure of superior Dutch payment.  The thesis asks how many British there were really, how they came to be in Dutch service, and whether this involvement occurred, as indicated, at other times too. 

Part One is thematic and explores the background mechanisms of the maritime environment in detail, determining causation.  First, the two naval recruitment systems are compared and completely reassessed in the light of state intervention in the trade sphere.  Two new sets of ‘control’ data – naval wages and foreign shipping – are amongst the incentives and routes determined.  British expatriate communities are examined as conduits for the supply of naval labour and civilian support.  British personnel are compared and contrasted with other foreigners, against the background of Anglo-Dutch interlinkage and political transition from neutrality through conflict to alliance.

Part Two is chronological, covering four major wars in three chapters.  Micro-case studies assembled from the scattered record streams enable analysis of the crews of particular officers and ships.  Seamen were an occupation that made them a very little known group: the thesis examines the different career types of British personnel of many different ranks, shedding light on their everyday lives.
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Methodology & Samples; Definitions; Conventions

The Dutch admiralties: the Zeeland payroll sources 













The seat of the North Quarter was rotated regularly between the rival towns of Enkhuizen and Hoorn.  One-third of the Friesland admiralty’s financial contributions actually came from the province of Groningen.
Unfortunately, most of the ships’ payrolls have been destroyed – by fire, or even used as toilet paper.  Little evidence survives for the Friesland and three Holland admiralties – what does exist is overwhelmingly confined to the eighteenth century, with only the tiniest handful surviving from the seventeenth.  The Zeeland admiralty payrolls, however, are almost intact and survive – having been kept in the spacious roof of the Abbey at Middelburg and fortunately moved underground before the Nazi bombardment of 1940.  They are now at the Zeeuws Archief, Middelburg, part of the provincial Rekenkamer (Treasury) archives.  Zeeland admiralty payment records are complete for most of the seventeenth century; the only serious gap being 1649-64, so that the First Anglo-Dutch War is missing.​[1]​  Much of the payrolls have been analysed and already published by Commander P. F. Poortvliet, Royal Netherlands Navy (retired); he is also constructing a database incorporating his ongoing research.​[2]​  In addition to the payrolls, though, there are petitions and passports from payments made to individual personnel or their agents; together, these form part of the acquitten or receipts.  These enabled the Ontvanger-Generaal (Receiver-General) to compile the rekeningen or main accounts for each year (see below).




We must note some important aspects of the Zeeland sources.  First, during 1642-9, group payments (i.e., those covering the whole crew) were sparse: the payrolls covered long periods – usually two to three years.  The men survived the time in between the payments by individually petitioning for their arrears, perhaps on average every four months. (The individual issue of arrears, though, continued in times of more frequent group payments).  The intense frequency of sampling in Chapters 7 and 8 (where group crew payments were common) cannot be applied during 1642-9: ‘snapshots’ of the same crew at particular intervals are impossible without databasing every man – Dutch included – in each of the micro-case studies.  Second, all the ‘advances’ (actually, arrears) paid against the petitions were summarised, grouped crew by crew, in the Receiver-General’s accounts (rekeningen) for each particular year.  These name the individual men, with their petitions in date order, but – overwhelmingly – do not list the men’s origins.​[3]​  Nonetheless, some men that have already been identified from the receipts (acquitten) either side of the 1649-64 gap can indeed be tracked through the gap, by using the summaries in the rekeningen – particularly where a man stayed in the same ship, or with the same commander, or in the same rank above that of seaman (so he can be easily identified), or where – simply – he happened to possess an unusual and easily recognisable name.  I have made some progress on the rekeningen for the years 1650-4 and – to a lesser extent – for 1658-9, so that British personnel from the 1642-9 episode can be brought forward into the 1649-64 gap – especially during the First Anglo-Dutch War – and a few men from 1664 and after can be drawn back into it.  I have not, however, yet been able to apply this method to other foreigners.  Those British from 1642-9 continuing in service into 1649-54 are naturally only part of those present and comprise only an absolute minimum; the further we move forward from 1648-9, the value of using these veterans as the only empirical measure of the British group degrades ever more rapidly.  Any ‘new’ British personnel joining during the gap cannot, of course, be identified with certainty; names alone can sometimes give an extra impression, but are nowhere near sufficient.




This study looks at maritime personnel only: all types of sea-going employees from the highest admiral down to the youngest ship’s boy.  Soldiers and marines have not been included.  These did not form part of a warship’s permanent crew anyway, even in the periods of greatest wartime strain and crew shortages, when they were heavily relied upon to make the complements up to full strength.  Even when they were aboard and used at sea, by far the most part of each soldier’s wage was paid from the army budget, not by the Zeeland admiralty – except a small ‘sea-pay’ (marinegeld) top-up (usually 3fl or about another third on top of the standard army wage) paid by the admiralty from at least as early as 1665.  This may have been introduced as a result of soldiers’ discontent over the differential between their wages and those of the seamen; an early example of the trouble this caused was aboard Johan Evertsen’s flagship in 1664.​[4]​  As a result of the army’s primary responsibility, the admiralty records of soldiers’ and marines’ sea-pay disbursements are relatively few, and – in any case – do not list the men’s origins.
In a reflection of the wider changes in naval warfare in the early part of our period, up to the late 1640s crews in the payrolls was still often divided into two functions.  The term busschieter – ‘gunner’ – denoted crew who could handle the heavy guns, but (confusingly) was sometimes also used more generally elsewhere for ‘seaman’.  On the other hand, the term musketier denoted those handling small arms.  At least as late as the 1640s, the two terms were still used in the lists, though they were fast fading to be replaced by the term matroos (‘seaman’) and seem to have disappeared completely in the 1650s.  Whilst the two functions might seem to replicate a difference between sailors and soldiers, the separate terminology of busschieter and musketier does not raise any difficulties in definitions or standardisation for our study: there was very much interchange of personnel between the two functions.  Both, moreover, performed maritime tasks and were considered fully maritime personnel, as is often stressed on the title pages of the 1640s pay sources.  Musketiers have therefore been included in the 1642-9 data here.




The Dutch divided the ranks above common seaman into, on the one hand, officieren (officers – the captain and lieutenant/s), and on the other, onderofficieren (usually translated as ‘petty officers’, though meaning NCOs) – everyone else.  The latter group was subdivided, however, with the ranks of master, navigator, clerk, surgeon and officer cadet comprising the dekofficieren or hogere-onderofficieren – warrant officers.  Occupants of these ranks were also often of higher social status than those holding ranks below, with clerks, surgeons and cadets often titled ‘mister’.  The boatswains, gunners, carpenter, sailmaker, armourer, cook, cooper, master-at-arms and the rest, with the mates, were the lagere-onderofficieren – petty officers.  This study, then, classifies officers below lieutenant for convenience into two groups: ‘warrant officers’ and ‘petty officers’.​[5]​
In 1636 the navigator was next in seniority to the captain, and outranked both the lieutenant and master (schipper)  This changed around the First Anglo-Dutch War: the master was now the senior of the onderofficieren.​[6]​  In Zeeland, the earlier situation may not have been the case: firstly, there were no lieutenants in Zeeland – certainly not before 1675 and they were probably not introduced until the late 1680s.  Secondly, even during the 1640s, the master was always listed next in rank after the captain in the payroll.​[7]​  Promotion to captain was invariably from the rank of master – this process is particularly easy to spot during the heavy casualties amongst the captains and frequent promotions during the Second Anglo-Dutch War.
Stierman/stuurman​[8]​ is usually rendered into English as ‘master’s mate’, but the latter was a petty officer in the British system of naval ranks – rather than a warrant officer, as in the Dutch case.​[9]​  I have used ‘navigator’ here instead.  There was also sometimes a junior navigator (derde waak – ‘third watch’) in addition to, or in place of, one of the navigators.  Furthermore, to avoid confusion with usage, we should differentiate between a ‘navigator’ and a ‘pilot’ (loods): here a ‘navigator’ is a true deep-sea expert, at least one of which was always borne aboard.  On the other hand, ‘pilot’ is a local/inshore pilot; excepting one or two instances, such men were never on the ships’ books and were hired locally and temporarily only when required or available.  He does not equate to the conventional ‘leadsman’ (a senior seaman skilled in the use of the lead and line, but not employed for his knowledge of inshore navigation).
Sometimes, the designation of ranks can be confusing.  The ‘second master’ (tweede schipper) was always a junior master, but some ranks were normally duplicated and sometimes assigned numbers – so that the three gunners might be listed as ‘first’, ‘second’, ‘third’, but this was only for convenience: there was no difference in rank between them and the numbering did not entail formal seniority.  To confuse matters further, a rank was sometimes duplicated and designated tweede (‘second’), but this could mean either an equal or junior grade.  Thus ‘second surgeon’ (tweede chirurgijn) could be either equal in rank to the chirurgijn or a junior.  The only way to tell for certain is by looking at the pay rate.  The mates of a particular function were sometimes titled with the prefix onder-, so that the surgeon’s mate (chirurgijnsmaat) was sometimes called onderchirurgijn.  The variations may have been down to the clerks’ preferences.  The situation was more complex on the larger ships – especially those belonging to the Holland admiralties.
De Jonge maintained that ‘all’ officers, ‘with few exceptions’, and ‘most’ petty officers were Dutch.​[10]​  Bruijn’s research addressed this directly, but did not cover warrant officers, so that the (albeit much rarer) foreigners of these ranks are not included.  Whilst the petty officers and seamen are clearly the most important to study, a number of important foreign warrant officers are missed by this method.​[11]​  We shall see a number of British navigators (Chapter 4), but there were also surgeons, clerks and cadets.  Foreigners amongst the commissioned officers (who for us are mainly captains, there being very few lieutenants) were very rare, but there were some: the Irishman Tobiaszoon at Amsterdam, and in Zeeland the Scot Bastiaan Senten (though he was not an admiralty captain) during the First and Second Anglo-Dutch Wars, the third-generation English immigrant Richard Wood, as well as a British ‘second captain’ in 1674, and the Southern Netherlander Bastiaan Thijssen.




































Following Bruijn’s lead, special attention is paid consistently in the micro-case studies to foreigners amongst the petty officers, comparing these with the overall level of foreigners in the crew as a whole.  Warrant officers – where foreigners were much rarer – are dealt with much more loosely.
The Dutch flag rank schout-bij-nacht is rendered here as its equivalent, Rear-Admiral, but the senior flag rank, Lieutenant-Admiral, has been left as it stands. 

Identification of personnel origins as given in the payrolls

The seamen’s geographical birth origins were written down by the muster masters in the Zeeland naval bases, using Dutch names that are sometimes barely recognisable today.  The clerks and commissioners clearly possessed extensive and detailed geographical knowledge; occasionally, though, it seems that they were stumped and had to resort to hurried phonetic transliterations.  The main reference work used to identify personnel origins was Damsteegt’s invaluable book,​[12]​ but this covers the places on the actual coastline only (and omits the Mediterranean): many seamen came from places slightly or further inland.  Other principal tools included a huge Gemeentearchief Amsterdam online source, which has been assembled from Simon Hart’s vast research in the city’s notarial archives and marriage registers.​[13]​  Five contemporary atlases were also used: Blaeu,​[14]​ Goos,​[15]​ Colom (two),​[16]​ and Donker.​[17]​
Very occasionally, I have included British names, though born outside Britain in the Dutch Republic: principally where these have been shown to be early generations after migration, or where the British form was still being used.  For instance, the sailor and warrant officer usually given in the payrolls as ‘Arij Grun’ immediately aroused suspicions, but was only identified after much more research – from two signatures in an obscure account from 1672, where he signed himself as ‘Henry Graham’ (see Chapter 8).​[18]​  I have included, however, only a handful of such individuals in my analysis. 

General Methodology: cumulative sampling

The Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars – unpublished sections of the Rekenkamer payrolls – were catalogued and organised into micro-case study streams, so that the crews of a particular commander and/or ship could be followed in detail, and the movement of personnel tracked according to these criteria.  Commander Poortvliet’s published material for 1642-9 and 1688-97 was examined and arranged similarly if necessary,​[19]​ but many sources were examined independently, especially the earlier period, which is overwhelmingly original manuscript work.
Individuals were often promoted or demoted during the period covered by the pay source, so that the same person occupied more than one position in the same piece.  All such duplicated appearances of individuals, Dutch and foreign, have been eliminated within each of the payrolls.  Such treatment has not been possible across the whole sample, as this would require databasing every single man – Dutch and all foreigners – otherwise the results would be skewed by treating the British personnel differently.  Databasing everyone is an attainable future target, but for the present study the samples here are cumulative aggregates: the same man may be recorded several times as he appears in the payrolls – in one of the consecutive streams of the micro-case studies, or in two or more different ships.  This reflects the length of his service, which would be missed if it was a straight head-count: here the man who served over six payrolls counts the same as six men in one payroll.  Length of service and sheer frequency, therefore, are both catered for: these are explored further in Part Two.




A principal aim of this study was to increase the size, and hence accuracy, of crew samples.  Table 0.1 below shows the sample sizes used here.

Table 0.1: Crew samples, 1642-97












The first sample is of 23 payrolls, mainly concentrated 1643-8, but one payroll starts in 1642 and three others end January-March 1649 – well after ratification of the Treaty of Westphalia: demobilisation was not immediate.  Only the larger warships – those with nominal complements of 50 men and above (i.e. large for that time) – have been examined, but most of those in service have been sampled: six of the nine large warships based at Flushing; five of the six based at Veere, and both of the two based at Zierikzee.  These ships’ combined nominal complement, 1643-8, was around 980 men annually; the sample amounts to over half the Zeeland total manpower – even at its peak during 1644-6.
The Second Anglo-Dutch War sample, 1664-7, presents more of a problem because the increase in manpower requirement and the associated shortages of crew, together with heavy casualties amongst the captains and senior officers, and heavy losses of ships, meant that incomplete crews were amalgamated, officers moving from ship to ship as vacancies were filled whilst preserving seniority, or those earmarked for fast-track leapfrogged their way up the pecking order.  Crews sometimes moved with their commander into his new ship, sometimes not.  Because of the resultant asymmetric nature of the source streams, it is not easy to give an annual figure through the war for the sample, but 61 payrolls have been examined; for 1665 the sample covers six of the seven ships over 40 guns (i.e., the capital ships), and three of the six ‘frigates’ around 30-34 guns (total over 2200 men).  The operational intensity was matched by intensity in incidence of payment, which permits a much more frequent sampling: about once every four months for most of this period, rather than the once in every two or so years that we saw during 1642-9.  Four of the five flag officers’ crews are covered in their entirety.
Research on the peacetime interlude is only at the preliminary stage: streamed micro-case studies or yearly snapshots are therefore not yet possible.  Initial payroll data amounts only to a sample of under 400 men on 5 ships (all but one were cruisers) in six payrolls from the end of 1667 to late summer 1669.
During the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-February 1674, many of the streaming problems of the previous war are replicated and exacerbated.  Though there were fewer commander casualties to force changes, there were far more inter-ship drafts because of manning problems, with ships often stripped to fill others.  Nonetheless, 77 payrolls were analysed; a cross-section at 1672 covers almost all of the warships and most of the light craft – including all six capital ships at Solebay and two of the three frigates.  The two senior flag officers are comprehensively tracked throughout the war (after the death of Jan Matthijssen in 1673, the position of Rear-Admiral was not filled until 1675);​[20]​ most of the ships in the Atlantic expedition of Cornelis Evertsen de Jongste are also examined.​[21]​
Seven ships are in the 1674 sample; including all five major units (four capital ships) on the Martinique and Biscay expeditions as well as another two capital ships.  Taken as a whole, the wartime samples 1664-7 and 1672-4 cover at least 75% of the total manpower.
The 1688-97 sample, the largest here, also includes all capital ships involved in the three major operations: the 1688 expedition (three, 900 men), Beachy Head (four, 1300 men) and Barfleur (four, plus one frigate, 1900 men).  

Names of British personnel & British origins

The names of British personnel identified by this research have been re-Anglicised in the text.  Where individual payments (petitions and passports) are cited in the references, the name is given as first mentioned in the source.  Origins, which are always re-Anglicised in the text and references using the reference sources detailed above, are always given where known, translated in parenthesis if given in the same source, or in square brackets if known from another source.  

Dutch place, ship, and officers’ names

Place names are in the modern format, except where there is/was an English form in common use: Flushing for Vlissingen, The Hague for Den Haag, Brill for Den Brielle.  The exception is ‘Zeeland’, given thus instead of ‘Zealand’, to avoid confusion with Sjæland in Denmark.  Ship names are in the modern format, with any definite article dropped: Kampvere, Camphier, Vere is given as Veere; het Hoff van Zeeland is Hof van Zeeland; Swanenburgh is Zwanenburg.  Personal names are given where possible in modern Dutch form, but with English conventions on capitalisation: Cornelis Evertsen de Jongste for Cornelis Evertsen the Youngest.

Currency & exchange rates













This study deals mainly with the wars which involved Britain and the Dutch simultaneously – either as enemies (the three Anglo-Dutch Wars) or allies (the Nine Years’ War).   It also looks at the end of the Eighty Years’ War, when Britain was neutral.  Most current estimates of the size of the Dutch maritime labour market are for peacetime.  The Dutch, however, were either at war – or had the navy at combat strength – almost continually, with only short interludes.  During many of the remaining years, sizeable expeditions were sent against the Barbary States, or large fleets set out in expectation of war, such as in 1671.  The years 1679-88 were the only period of any real length without a major war.  The Dutch fought wars against Spain (to 1648), Britain (1652-4, 1664-7, 1672-4, and invasion of Britain, 1688), against France (1672-8, 1688-97, 1702-13), and Portugal (1657-61).  In addition, there were major naval interventions in the Baltic (1644-5, 1656, 1658-60, 1675-7, 1683, and 1700), and large expeditions against the Barbary states (for example, in 1655-7).  During the lull, 1679-88, there was a major North Sea/Baltic expedition in 1683, but otherwise only ‘sporadic efforts’ were made against the Barbary corsairs.​[23]​









































































Some attention is paid to real wages through the use of a Consumer Price Index (CPI).  Much recent work is available: both Robert C. Allen and Jan Luiten van Zanden have constructed new CPIs for London/Southern England to replace the now outdated Phelps Brown and Hopkins Index.  Both have also produced CPIs for Amsterdam and Holland/western Netherlands.​[24]​  The two pairs are shown in Figures 0.1 and 0.2 below, here covering the period during which comparative British and Dutch naval wages are investigated in Chapter 4.





Dutch usage of ‘English’ and ‘British’







British serving with the Dutch at the Medway Raid, 10-14 June 1667 (De Tocht naar Chatham, 20-24 June 1667)​[25]​

The starting point for this research was the Dutch naval raid up the Medway in June 1667 – one of the greatest humiliations in British military history: three of the largest great ships – Royal Oak (76 guns), Royal James (82) and Loyal London (92) – were burnt and destroyed.  A fourth, the fleet flagship Royal Charles (86) was captured.  Three more capital ships were burnt.  Trade was brought to a standstill and London blockaded; Dutch command of the sea was flaunted off the English coasts in the Channel and North Sea – ‘a dishonour never to be wiped off’.​[26]​  


Pieter Cornelisz van Soest, ‘Dutch Attack on the Medway, June 1667’, c1667.​[27]​

Once familiar as the third of a triple-whammy of disasters, the Medway shame followed the Great Plague of 1665 and the Fire of London, 1666.  Yet, if the Medway was one of Britain’s greatest disgraces, conversely, as Geyl encapsulated, 

‘never did the Dutch State make a more powerful appearance in the world than in the expedition to Chatham’.​[28]​

The proud symbol of this apogee of Dutch naval power still hangs today in the Rijksmuseum at Amsterdam: the Stuart royal arms from the stern of Royal Charles.  


Royal Charles, stern-piece.​[29]​ 

It might surprise us today, then, on both sides of the North Sea, that the Dutch officer credited with first boarding and taking possession of Royal Charles was actually an Irishman – Thomas Tobias, though his surname is usually ‘Dutchified’ to Tobiaszoon.​[30]​  The States General and the Holland States showered awards on the leading officers: Tobiaszoon was also honoured, receiving a gold medal and chain for his part in the victory.​[31]​  Commanding the Dutch warship Bescherming (54) at the Medway, he had been refused a commission in the Royal Navy at the Stuart Restoration in 1660.​[32]​  

But Tobiaszoon was not an isolated British subject aboard the Dutch fleet.  The 3-4,000 Dutch marines were commanded by a politically-motivated Englishman, the Republican Colonel Thomas Dolman – a veteran in Dutch service since 1643.  He led the landing force of marines at Sheerness during the Medway Raid – and again at the abortive Dutch attack at Harwich that followed soon after.​[33]​  Meanwhile, two English pilots were serving aboard Admiral De Ruyter’s flagship Zeven Provinciën (80) – one of whom was a true religious ‘fanatick’; the other, apparently, was on the run from the law having been ‘stealing the Kings customes’ in England.​[34]​  The British Secretary of State heard that one of these two men proved indispensable when De Ruyter’s Vice-Admiral ran aground during the Harwich operation; the accident was ‘a great hindrance […] and long detained them’ – he had to be sent aboard to bring her off.​[35]​  A British naval captain even deserted to the Dutch during the Raid

Yet these notable figures were said to be just the tip of the iceberg in terms of numbers, and their evident professional or ideological motivations were, according to contemporaries, not the norm for the bulk of the British personnel in the Dutch navy at that time; most wished simply to earn their daily bread.  The British Navy often gave its sailors ‘tickets’ (promissory notes, basically IOUs) instead of hard cash.  In what Pepys thought the ‘worst consequence’ of the Raid, two eyewitnesses reported that there were many English aboard the Dutch ships: they were heard calling out to each other in English 

‘Heretofore we fought for tickets, now we fight for dollars!’ 

So, whilst in the British navy they were not paid and given bits of paper instead, the renegade sailors were paid in cash by the Dutch.  In more conversational tones, the English sailors shouted greetings and asked after each other.​[36]​  Another eyewitness told Pepys that some – defiantly – said that they had had their tickets countersigned, held them up to prove it, and would get the cash paid on them before they left.​[37]​  Pepys, as Clerk of the Acts on the Navy Board, was well-placed to receive testimony.  He was, however, undoubtedly a biased commentator, enthusiastically recounting all that which was not to courtiers’ credit – though the Diary was, of course, not for public consumption.  Nonetheless, the renegades’ camaraderie and bitter humour in Pepys’ account rings true.
Pepys may have been eager to criticise, but it was not just he who reported the involvement of British renegades and the ticket issue: an unknown writer told the day after that 

‘many English are aboard the Dutch ships, who said that they came for money for their tickets’.​[38]​

Awareness of the presence of large numbers of British in the Dutch fleet was not limited to those present during the attack, or the administration – it was common knowledge in the maritime community:

‘Indeed the hearts as well as affections of the seamen are turned away; and in the open streets of Wapping, and up and down, the wives have cried publicly ‘This comes of your not paying our husbands …’ Most people that I speak with are in doubt how we shall do to secure our seamen from running over to the Dutch; which is a sad but very true consideration at this day’.​[39]​

Ludlow – though another biased source – pointed out that ‘some’ British seamen went into Dutch service before the Medway.​[40]​  Andrew Marvell, poet and MP, had no doubts of the reasons for the sailors’ enlistment with the Dutch navy, their heavy desertion from the British, or refusal to fight – money: 

‘Our Seamen, whom no danger’s shape could fight,
Unpaid refuse to mount their ships, for spite:
Or to their fellows swim, on board the Dutch,
Who show the tempting metal in their clutch’.​[41]​

Marvel, of course, was another biased commentator.  Almost 250 years later, at the time of Anglo-German naval rivalry, Kipling also wrote on the subject: in his day an exhortation to vigilance and against corruption and mismanagement, the collapse in payment was to blame.  From the point of view of the British sailors 

We cannot serve you if we starve,
And this the Dutchmen know!​[42]​

If the disgrace of the defeat could not be swept away, the prominent British in Dutch service were soon forgotten – for instance by Sir Arthur Bryant, though the rank and file could not be swept under the carpet.​[43]​
Yet in the continued chaos of the immediate aftermath, a deeply depressed Pepys came to the conclusion that all English seamen ‘would, if they could, go over and serve the King of France or Holland rather than us’.​[44]​  Pepys’ melancholy complaint was backed up three weeks later: POWs returning from France reported that the French fleet at Brest had ‘many English on board’.​[45]​  British seamen, then, were also joining other enemy forces.  The sustained proximity of the Dutch fleet off the British coasts in itself presented opportunities for transfer: four men from Deal went aboard the Dutch fleet on 27 June/7 July (the reason unknown), and were thrown in jail on their return.  The author of the report concluded that naval wage arrears lay at the heart of the crisis – ‘all would yet be well, if the seamen were paid and encouraged’.​[46]​  He reminded Arlington’s secretary two days later ‘His Majesty will never want seamen, if they do not lack pay’.​[47]​  
Arlington heard soon after the descent that former prisoners of war, now released and returning from the Dutch Republic, had reported the enormous figure of 3000 English and Scots in the Dutch fleet, with more signing on every day – because

‘they have soe much encouragement there and soe little here’.​[48]​  

Wages, then, were again the problem.  Moreover, if anywhere near correct, this figure would indicate that well over 10% of Dutch naval manpower was composed of British seamen – the enemy.  Such a statistic, if it can be proven, must stand out in the history of warfare, especially given the operational circumstances.

This is our starting point: an instance in historical literature of large numbers of British seamen in service with the Dutch navy, one aspect to be tested by this thesis.  Were there really thousands of British serving in the Dutch navy?  If so, why did they do so?  Was it because they were not paid regularly in Britain?  How many exiles and dissidents were there?  Besides these, were there many politically-motivated seamen in the British communities in the Republic?  Were British POWs newly-released in the Republic enlisting?  Was this a ‘one-off’ event, possibly due to special factor(s) at the time – or were British personnel regularly in Dutch service during our period?
Or was the whole issue a fabrication around the involvement of a couple of British figureheads – merely a easy ‘stick’ with which to bash the Government?  After all, service with the enemy was a convenient excuse for anyone to tar political opponents as ‘traitors’; always some of the easiest propaganda to make.  In early 1652, for instance, with Anglo-Dutch hostility growing, the Leveller Lieutenant-Colonel Lilburne, then in exile in Amsterdam, was rumoured to have been given command of Dutch warship by the Holland States.​[49]​  Some biting Dutch propaganda in the Third Anglo-Dutch War tried to exploit growing anti-French feeling after the latest failure of the combined Anglo-French fleet to defeat the Dutch:

‘Some of the English prisoners were so indignant at the behaviour of the White (French) squadron, that they had asked Admiral de Ruyter to let them serve in the Dutch fleet, on condition that they would only have to fight against this squadron and not against the Blue or the Red’.​[50]​

A ridiculous story, or could ‘betrayed’ British POWs actually have plead this case?  Another recurring theme then and now was the blowing up of a ship by igniting the magazine – whether as an act of heroic sacrifice to avoid capture, or as dastardly treachery, depending on one’s standpoint.  According to a colourful account given by the Governor of Sheerness, a Scots prisoner taken had been more than willing to give his life spectacularly for the Dutch cause.  When the British regained control of Royal Katherine at Solebay in 1672, a Scots member of the Dutch prize crew was taken prisoner in the magazine – he had tried to blow up Royal Katherine single-handed and was caught ‘match in his hand’.​[51]​  The ship afterwards went to Sheerness,​[52]​ so the governor probably did talk to the crew (the officers were taken prisoner when the Dutch boarded), though they could have told him a fancy yarn.  

Before looking at how the thesis relates to the wider literature and its structure, we will quickly clarify the motivations of some of the prominent men involved in the Medway Raid; we have a good idea of these – professional and ideological, though there was some cross-over.

Prominent British: Tobias; Dolman; Holland; Lester; (Raven)











Tobiaszoon was a close intimate of admirals Michiel de Ruyter and Cornelis Tromp;​[59]​ he was certainly well-thought of.  In 1673, during the next Anglo-Dutch conflict, the Irishman was Tromp’s flag captain in Gouden Leeuw, where their respective sons also served together on the lower deck as able seamen.  More importantly for us, J. R. Bruijn has already pointed out there were a large number of foreigners – including British subjects – in the crew (see Chapters 5 and 8).​[60]​  Despite the high degree of de facto religious tolerance in the Dutch Republic, the commissioning of any Catholic naval officer must have been very unusual (though this was relatively common in the army, with officers drawn also from the Dutch southern inland provinces), but particularly one who achieved such high status and close connections with the very top of the Dutch naval elite.  This must surely have implications for the history of religious toleration in the Republic.  According to James, Duke of York, Tobiaszoon’s exemplary service in the Dutch navy led to a general anticipation of his promotion to admiral – he ‘being mightily valued’ – but it was thought that William III would veto his advancement to flag rank; purely because of his Catholicism, ‘though the States never mind the business of religion’.​[61]​  Toleration had its limits: certainly, Tobiaszoon never reached flag rank, though he was well-off enough to own a number of paintings; tellingly, in view of his Royalist privateer days, these depicted the Americas.​[62]​
After the Medway, we would expect the Irishman to have been infamous in Britain, but this was not the case.  Tobiaszoon was certainly recognised in 1668 – in Van de Zaan’s squadron off Cadiz, as the ‘Irish captain … preferred for coming up the river of Chatham’.​[63]​  With war imminent in spring 1672, two British captains were sent into the Republic; intelligence-gathering was one objective.  Silas Taylor travelled extensively in south Holland and Zeeland, whilst his contact Aston went to Amsterdam.  At Amsterdam during the early stages of naval preparations, it was noted that the captain of Oudshoorn (ex-Swiftsure, captured in 1666)

‘has a name like a Dutch name, though confidently reported an Irishman, being called Thomas or Tobias Tobiason, being manned most with English, Scots, and Irish’.​[64]​

The fact that he was given a prestigious prize ship shows the favour in which he was held.  Taylor had already passed on reports of the composition of Tobiaszoon’s crew: 340 English and Irish – only 60 men short of his complement – but failed to get his name.​[65]​  Aston found

‘the Swiftsure is there best man’d of any of them; but these are English, Scots and Irish; commanded by an Irishman whose name I could not learne’.​[66]​

Though these numbers were almost certainly exaggerated, Tobiaszoon was undoubtedly gathering British subjects around him in his crew during the following war.  The presence of British seamen was not merely confined to the Medway.
As he was not a sea-officer, we shall not dwell on Colonel Thomas Dolman.  Dolman was a former Interregnum officer, friend of St John and close confidant of the brothers De Witt.  A Republican, Dolman was politically-motivated, but had been in Dutch army service since 1643, and was instrumental as a diplomat in the early stages of the peace negotiations in 1653.  He was made commander of one of the veteran English regiments in the Dutch army, then in 1664 of the newly constituted Dutch marines (3-4,000 strong), leading elements in the landings at Sheerness and Harwich.​[67]​
Philip Holland, though, was a naval captain during the Interregnum and Restoration, commissioned since 1648.​[68]​  Holland was one of the leading officers by the close of the Interregnum: he was Montagu’s flag-captain in the Baltic in 1659 and initially a friend of Pepys.  A non-conformist himself, Holland’s mother-in-law was a ‘great zealot’ and a Quaker; Holland had ‘turned almost a Quaker’ by 1663, at which time – beset by financial problems having bought a ship – he once attempted suicide.  Capp equated this man with a merchant master of the same name, labelled a ‘fanatic’ after a dispute with Admiral Allin’s flagship in 1663.​[69]​  After deserting and joining the Dutch during the course of the Medway Raid, Holland settled in the Republic afterwards, leaving his family in England.  At Amsterdam in early 1672, Holland wanted a pardon and to return to Britain in exchange for providing naval intelligence.  After initial confusion – where he was thought to be a Dutch spy – Holland provided the British with a ‘true list’ of the Dutch fleet, which they received 2/12 May; in advance of the opening fleet engagement at Solebay.  Holland himself returned 14 June, was pardoned, and was soon confident enough to petition for a position in the RN.​[70]​  
There has been confusion amongst historians, and at the time apparently, because, as Capp pointed out, two (three) other naval officers shared the same surname.​[71]​  There was Thomas Holland, whom Tedder was criticised for confusing with Thomas Dolman.​[72]​  Rogers gives Robert Holland, of Boston, Lincolnshire, as an Interregnum naval captain who emigrated to the Dutch Republic having been refused promotion after the Restoration.  He was the ‘most notorious’ of those fighting for the Dutch.​[73]​  On the other hand, a report apparently from the British peace delegation then at Breda also noted that Robert Holland, ‘a Scotsman, who is a sworn enemy of his Majestie’, helped bring the Dutch up the Medway.​[74]​
Philip Holland’s example shows that even notorious public treachery in enemy service could be forgotten and the ideologically-suspect miscreant reemployed, but only provided they had enough to offer.  For the Medway Raid, the Dutch leadership sought British personnel with skills and ideological motivation: Johan de Witt made ‘special efforts’ to recruit English deserters alongside Dutch mariners experienced in English waters and Cromwellian refugees.​[75]​  Use of the latter group was nothing new: British intelligence identified British political exiles in the Dutch navy over two years earlier – long before the war was even declared, during the long period of escalation in 1664.​[76]​  Many British political and religious exiles in the Republic were apparently in the 1667 expedition: a letter from Rotterdam written at the time of the Dutch attack reported that ‘many of the discontented are gone with noble Dulman [Thomas Dolman] and Groves’.​[77]​  
Not involved at the Medway, Samuel Raven, formerly one of the senior shipwrights assisting Pett at Woolwich, had already been killed in Dutch service.  Perhaps the highest profile English shipwright in Dutch service, Raven had been turned out of his position even before the Restoration – after a survey into radicals identified him as an ‘Anabaptist’.  More dockyard personnel were removed again when the oaths were taken in 1660.  Raven emigrated to Holland in 1662, settled in Rotterdam and advised on the massive Dutch building programme.  He had second thoughts though: he turned down a contract to build two ships and later asked to return to England in 1665 – but only on the condition that he would be allowed liberty of conscience; an impossible request.  Urging an attack on Harwich, Raven was aboard De Ruyter’s flagship Zeven Provinciën during the great fleet battles of summer 1666: after the Four Days Fight he made a reconnaissance of the Foreland – overconfident in his aim to stir up popular revolt in concert with a landing by Dutch troops.  Raven was back with De Ruyter and mortally wounded in the stomach at the St James Day Fight, 4 August; he died of his wounds as he was carried ashore at Flushing.​[78]​  It was noted that

‘the only man of the Phanatick party that Monsieur de Witte doth now make most use of, and releys most upon his informations, is [-] Raven, who served in Crumwels Army, he lives at Rotterdam and plays the phisician there, he was in all hast sent for to Amsterdam and de Witte intertained him a long time on the last day of February’  

It is fairly well-known that the British government ignored various pieces of intelligence in 1667 about the forthcoming Medway Raid.  In 1666, Raven – with remarkable prescience and accurate assessment of naval wage arrears and strategy – had told Johan de Witt that Charles II 

‘would be [over]throwed ere the last of June next; that the King would not be able to sett out his fleet before the States fleet, because the marriners refuse to goe to sea till they are payed of their arrears, which the King is not able to doe, for he owes them sixteen months pay’.​[79]​

Instructions to British spying for the Dutch stressed the involvement of English Republicans in future Dutch naval attacks.  In 1666 the former Cromwellian captain Thomas Woodman hatched a plan to sink blockships in the Thames: after much discussion with Johan de Witt and Dolman, they promptly sent him aboard the fleet, accompanied by Sidrach Lester – ‘a notorious rogue’.​[80]​  Philip Holland may have been one of the two pilots with De Ruyter at the Medway, but Lester was definitely the other.​[81]​  Lester’s opinion of Charles II was that

‘it was a pity such a whoremaster rogue should govern the kingdom’.

His motivations are fairly obvious.  A dissident involved in exile plots, Lester was a Poole merchant master trading with Rotterdam, and transported weapons to Britain for a potential uprising.  He was captured at Poole in December 1663, but quickly escaped to Holland.​[82]​  
Lester is not the only shadowy figure.  In summer 1666 there were six British subjects noted aboard De Ruyter’s flagship, which were probably just the notable or obvious ones – rather than any common seamen.  The six including ‘the Cornett which conducted the leatt king to his tryells, and Crumwells Carpenter’.​[83]​  The latter was probably intended for Samuel Raven, above, but the former was Cornet George Joyce, rumoured to have been one of the two masked axe-men at Charles I’s execution.  He and his family were in exile in Rotterdam by 1661.​[84]​ 

A few prominent British individuals did play an integral role in the British defeat.  There were clearly some British seamen as well.  The Medway, however, was not the only example of British in Dutch service.  With maritime labour internationalised, together with the close proximity of Britain and the Dutch Republic at the core, it is not surprising that the issue comes to attention fairly often in the literature, but there are indications of service not only in the periods either side of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, but throughout the wars themselves.
The British crew on a Dutch warship in 1634 were just one example of ‘considerable numbers’ serving in the Dutch navy.​[85]​  In 1635 Boswell, the British Ambassador in The Hague estimated – ‘upon the most credible informacion’ – that 20% or more of Dutch crews were English and Scots.​[86]​  There were even some seamen who wanted to swap sides actually during the middle of a fight: during a 1654 action between the British and Dutch in the Persian Gulf, 60 English seamen took a ship’s boat and tried to join the Dutch.​[87]​  
By late 1664 the British Ambassador, Sir George Downing, was well aware of the Dutch desire to recruit from the long-established English and Scots communities in the Republic.​[88]​  Sir Keith Feiling noted that there were ‘hundreds’ of destitute British seamen at Amsterdam in spring 1665; many enlisted with the Dutch to avoid starvation.​[89]​  The Dutch naval command was also particularly eager to recruit English POWs,​[90]​ especially pilots with experience of the Thames and Medway.  The States General issued instructions to that effect.​[91]​  Bad prison conditions may have prompted many to enlist.
In the Third Anglo-Dutch War, whilst Tobiaszoon was enlisting British personnel at Amsterdam in spring 1672, British seamen returning from there reported that the Dutch ‘have some hundreds of English, Scotch, and Irish’.​[92]​  A Dutch contact at Rotterdam noted that few men, overall, had enlisted, but the English and Scots proportion was as high as one third of the crews.​[93]​
After the Anglo-Dutch Wars, we know there were occasional complaints in Parliament: in May 1677 the government (Williamson) complained in the Commons – ‘it is difficult to get seamen; many are gone into the service of the French, Dutch etc’.​[94]​  Sir John Ernly agreed: ‘the Dutch and French have got them from us’.​[95]​
There are even a few contemporary estimates of the numbers of British in Dutch service.  These are summarised in Table 1.1 below.​[96]​

Table 1.1  Contemporary Estimates of British in Dutch service, 1652-1713
			Maritime sector part
			
1652	First Anglo-Dutch War	5-6000 British	All
1667	Second Anglo-Dutch War	3000 English & Scots	Navy
1672	Third Anglo-Dutch War	1000 English  1500 Scots	Navy
1688-97	Nine Years’ War 	-	-
1702-13	War of the Spanish Succession	3000 English  2000 Scots	All

All of these estimates would suggest that (very roughly indeed) around 10% of the Dutch maritime sector or the navy was manned by British.  Contemporary statistics were problematic, and a couple of these sources are plainly open to doubt; they must all be inaccurate and/or exaggerated, but taken as a whole they do suggest some element of truth – that is, large numbers were involved throughout our period.​[97]​  





Whilst the British and Dutch were adversaries the Dutch navy provided, in theory, the ideal vehicle for British opponents of the domestic government (whether dissidents at home or in exile) to fight for regime-change at home – most of the small group of leaders identified above plainly wished to topple the ‘ungodly’ restored Stuarts.  A decade before, though, for Royalists the First Anglo-Dutch War was an opportunity to eject the Cromwellian ‘usurpers’ – even though the advantage of Orange and Stuart dynastic linkage had already been reduced (by the death of the Stadholder William II in 1650 and the subsequent ascendancy of Dutch Republicanism).  The exiled Charles II eagerly anticipated conflict between the Commonwealth and the Dutch Republic – bases abroad would then be available for the navy to desert to, ‘it being notoriously known that most of the seamen are very loyally affected to us.’​[100]​  
That proved illusory, but on the outbreak of hostilities in 1652, Charles even asked for a personal Dutch command, again with the aim of inducing Commonwealth seamen to desert and rally to the figurehead of their exiled king.  The States General refused him – to keep both the door open for a settlement with the British and to quiet the domestic Orangist faction; this still being early days for the new Dutch regime.  Steven Pincus has pointed out that, in spring 1652 – well before the outbreak of war – ‘many’ Dutch warships were flying ‘the King of Scots colours on their topsails’.  This provocation was probably down to the largely Orangist Dutch naval officer corps, but during the war, according to Pincus, there were ‘large numbers of British political exiles’ in the Dutch fleet.​[101]​  Most of Pincus’ sources, though, were organs with propagandist overtones; some other verification is needed.  The British political exiles have been studied, though.  Ginny Gardner has thoroughly examined the Scots exile ‘community within a community’, 1660-90.  Seamen, though, do not figure as actors here.​[102]​
When first embarking on this research, I did so with the ideological motivations of the Medway leaders and prominent actors uppermost – hoping that clear evidence could be found of similar inspiration on the sailors’ part, or at least a ‘sense of betrayal’ at their treatment in terms of pay.  As Nicholas Rodger points out, Charles II is not a popular figure amongst many historians, and my own former bias resulted in eagerness to find an underlying resentment against the somewhat easy target of the ‘Merry Monarch’.  There is also, however, the background of turbulent regime change and ideological developments in Britain, 1639-60 and beyond, that colours our period.  
Even with a dispassionate outlook, though, the sailor is a figure about which we know very little, by his nature being both poor and mobile, he simply does not leave much evidence of any kind in the sources, disappearing into the largely anonymous mass of society’s lower strata.  A very meagre few left any written account of their lives – the memoirs of men like Edward Barlow, Edward Coxere and John Esquemeling are exceptional.​[103]​  Assessing the seaman’s ideology and opinions is, then, inherently fraught with difficulty.  The religion and politics of the British navy’s officer corps in the tumultuous period of transition over the Interregnum and Restoration stimulated the well-known ‘Gentlemen or Tarpaulins’ debate long ago; Bernard Capp and J. David Davies have thoroughly examined this area – which Davies also takes through the 1688 Revolution.  Capp found some evidence of ideological commitment lower down the ranks, but this is limited to a few warrant and petty officers; the general impression is that the seamen were largely indifferent to religion and its subtleties.  
Politically, though, things were perhaps different.  Capp stresses such motivations in the 1648 naval revolt against Parliament, but also that these mirrored the current popular climate ashore – which was largely of war-weariness and desire for a negotiated settlement.  This rather mitigates against extremist attitudes amongst seamen.  It is also apparent that crews were not unanimous even where defections of ships took place, and, moreover, that the men had ‘perennial grievances over pay which agitators might seek to exploit’.​[104]​  Centrally for us, Davies stresses that British seamen took service with foreign powers, and that – critically – there was ‘widespread willingness to serve an enemy power in wartime’; these men, however, were driven by prospects of better pay.  Davies balances the logical consequence that ‘many seamen were not concerned with political issues’ with the possession for many of a ‘simple but strong patriotism’.  The latter was coloured by distaste for government ministers, administrators and gentry (which in turn suggests that such patriotism and enemy service were not necessarily totally incompatible).  Material grievances over wages and conditions, though, dominated.​[105]​  These complaints led to dissatisfaction with the status quo at precisely those times when political change was in the offing: new regimes and changes of allegiance always offered the hope (usually a vain one) that pay arrears would improve.
For our study, the principal sources offer very little insight into the political or religious attitudes of seamen.  The vanguard proletarian solidarity and collective resistance postulated by Marcus Rediker is certainly nowhere in sight; there were, of course, sometimes protests and mutinous crews – but, in any case, these do not in themselves justify Rediker’s theory.​[106]​  It is rather the attachment of crew to particular officers demonstrated by Rodger for the British navy that is in evidence – quite simply through those long-serving personnel that become obvious in the micro-case study streams.​[107]​
With the lack of evidence on seamen’s opinions, we must be wary of inferring or ascribing ideological motivations to the appearance in the records of a seaman at or near a particularly crucial moment.  For instance, if a British subject appears – seemingly for the very first time – on a Zeeland ship near the outbreak of one of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, it does not necessarily mean that he was ideologically motivated – whether by religion, politics, or nationalism.  He could have come from another warship not yet sampled, from another type of ship (such as a merchantman), from the service of another, third state – or merely have been ashore beforehand for some reason.  His being a dissident or refugee is just one of many possibilities, most of which would have been related to the available employment at the time and nothing to do with ideology.  These situations also apply if, on the other hand, he simply disappears from the record at the outbreak of war.​[108]​ 
Similarly, we must be wary with literacy.  Because the seaman’s work took him away from his affairs ashore, he had to assign his property and wages, as well as acknowledge debts: he was therefore much more liable than others in his social position to be functionally literate.  Aptitude and/or repetition over time surely might produce a good signature; such signatures should not be taken in themselves as evidence of education – that flimsy assumption leads thence logically to another: that the seaman is really more than he seems to be.  That he is an educated dissident or rebel choosing to serve as seamen in order to fight for a cause is, again, only one of many possibilities.​[109]​  Literacy does suggest, though, that the consequences and implications of service with the enemy would be understood.
The mere presence of British on the Dutch side during the Anglo-Dutch Wars, it must be emphasised, is not enough to justify ideological causation.  Foreign service in a fully internationalised maritime labour market was completely normal: service with the enemy, though, is the acid test of internationalisation.

The Wider Relevance of this Thesis

The presence of British personnel in Dutch naval service is directly related to a number of themes, including the corpus of literature on European migration, principally that on the North Sea region and the Dutch Republic in particular as its focus.  Here it can be seen particularly as a case study in migration in a specific employment sector, as one of many in the Dutch Republic, bilaterally with Britain, and more widely.  This study is primarily relevant directly to the maritime and naval sphere in the ongoing studies of the international and Dutch maritime labour markets, and looks at the role of the state in these areas; here it is also related to diplomacy and international relations, whilst illuminating actual conditions and mobility in the maritime environment during wartime.  In closely examining naval recruitment in the age of the naval/military revolution, it relates not just to these themes, but also to the state’s interaction with trade.  In examining foreign sailors in one Dutch province, it comments on their regional variation across the Dutch Republic, this study is also pertinent to such differences in trade specialisation and outlook.  Through the examination of maritime wages (nominal and real) it is also related to wider economic developments and themes, whether on the domestic Dutch, Anglo-Dutch, or on the wider European stages.  In examining sailors careers, it sheds light on many aspects of a large group that was of central importance to warfare, trade and economic development, but that was also one of the least-known sections in early modern society, so is relevant in wider social history.

Background: Demography; Migration; Wages





The leading economic and commercial state during the ‘Golden Age’ of the seventeenth century, the Dutch were also the preeminent maritime power for much of that time.  Dutch success, however, was achieved with only a small fraction of the population available to Britain and France: around 1700, only about two million compared with roughly 10 and 20 million respectively.  C. R. Boxer described Dutch success as a ‘lodestar’ – pulling in foreign migrant poor looking for every kind of work; especially the case across the enormous Dutch maritime sector.​[110]​  As Jan de Vries and Adriaan van der Woude pointed out, migrants were drawn by sheer labour demand, a relatively high standard of living, and religious toleration.​[111]​  The maritime provinces were all pull-areas, but the core of economic growth – heavily urbanised Holland – was the principal centre of attention.  
Demographic changes in the Republic were a factor in labour demand.  De Vries and Van de Woude found that, overall, the Dutch population grew rapidly until about 1650, when a combination of factors caused stagnation and slow decline until around 1800.​[112]​  Israel points to rapid growth up to 1672, followed by marginal increase lasting until 1688.​[113]​  Regionally though, there was a marked distinction from the 1640s onwards: the population grew vigorously up to 1672 in areas of economic expansion – principally Holland (except the North Quarter and Westfriesland) whilst decreasing in the depressed areas.  Rapid Dutch urbanisation, overall, was interrupted in 1672 and went into long-term decline after 1688.​[114]​  Recently, Van Zanden has shown that in the main powerhouse, Holland, population continued to grow rapidly until around 1670, when slow decline set in.​[115]​  Generally, whilst the maritime provinces declined, the inland provinces in the south and east continued to grow.  At the same time, though some parts of the economy stagnated, others continued to expand – such as, in the maritime sector, whaling and the VOC.  The changes caused restructuring of labour (especially by disruption of seasonal activities, of which merchant shipping was a part) at the same time as increased labour demand; the demographic changes increased the need for foreigners whilst also shifting domestic recruitment to the east.​[116]​  

Before moving on, we need to categorise migrants: Jan Lucassen and Rinus Penninx identify four types of migrant: refugees; seasonal migrants (also termed ‘migrant labourers’) who worked in the host country for a perhaps a few months per year; labour migrants, who might stay for an extended period up to a few years; and permanent migrants who settled.  Transmigrants can also be included.
Jan Lucassen has shown that the North Sea coast, running from the Pas de Calais area through the maritime provinces of the Dutch Republic and East Frisia to around Bremen, was a pull-area attracting seasonal labour.​[117]​  The economic core zone of the developed western Republic (primarily the province of Holland) attracted migrants from distant parts of Europe, but most came from the countries around the North Sea.​[118]​  The numbers of permanent migrants were enormous: Lucassen estimated there were around 500,000 during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.​[119]​  New work by Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen shows that the foreign proportion of the Republic’s population rose from 6% in 1600, peaked at 8% around 1650, then declined slowly – falling to 5% by 1800.​[120]​  In the Holland cities, migrants made up even larger proportions, especially at Amsterdam.  The Dutch Republic was also important because of its large-scale outmigration (predominantly through the Dutch East India Company, VOC, see below), but the flow of foreign labour into the Republic exceeded that of Dutch going abroad.​[121]​
Overall, British do not have a high profile in these activities: other groups of migrants were more numerous, important and prominent.  The large numbers of Southern Netherlands refugees during the Eighty Years’ War included many of the merchant elite – providing expertise, trading networks, and boosting the Dutch economy.  (And more besides: the Banckert naval family, for instance, originated from Oudenaard in East Flanders.​[122]​)  Germans fled the devastation of the Thirty Years War.  Huguenot refugees came to the Republic in large numbers, especially after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 1685.  Amsterdam especially attracted Northern European migrants: Simon Hart showed that nearly 60% of the seamen at Amsterdam were foreigners, mostly Germans and Norwegians.​[123]​  Generally, Germans and Scandinavians were the most important in the north.  Migration historians such as Solvi Sogner and Erika Kuijpers note seamen as important categories in their studies of migrant Norwegians and Amsterdam, respectively.​[124]​
Whilst it must be stressed that the British were relatively unimportant in terms of numbers compared with the major groups of migrants, there were regional variations: the southern Holland and Zeeland cities contained ‘especially many English and Scots’.​[125]​  Taking Holland alone, at the peak of British immigration (centred on 1650), they only comprised 6% of all foreign migrants, and 2% of the total population.  For the same time, these figures were slightly less for Amsterdam, but higher in the south: 6.1% for Rotterdam, The Hague and Delft combined.​[126]​  Douglas Catterall has studied the large Scots community in Rotterdam, whilst other literature focuses on particular groups, such as Ginny Gardner’s examination of the Scots exile community and Esther Mijers’ study of Scottish students.​[127]​  Study of the appreciable British military presence is mainly confined to the Scots brigade.​[128]​
There has been little attention on the British presence in Zeeland, especially in main centre of Walcheren.  Part of the reason for this is loss of or difficulty with notarial and population sources.  Keith Sprunger examined the British churches in Zeeland as part of a wide Dutch survey.  Victor Enthoven has studied the Scots trade staple at Veere, but most of the literature on this is otherwise very old.​[129]​




Dutch and British Wages

Wages are essential to understanding migration in general, no less so in the international maritime labour market: 

‘sheer [labour] demand is not enough: favourable wage differentials are necessary as well in order to set migration streams in motion’.​[131]​

Wages are one of the principal foci here.  This thesis also related, through comparison of Dutch and British naval wages (nominal and real), to wage developments not only in the Republic, but also to the most developed pair of regions (southern England and the western Netherlands), and in the wider European perspective.  Wage data is very limited: evidence has hitherto been confined primarily to the construction sector, with agriculture some way behind; except where noted below, these are the wages referred to.  Labourers rather than skilled workers are usually taken as the principal measure, though the gap between skilled and unskilled (skill premium) is also a topic in the literature.  Maritime wage data, however, is even more scant, and is usually left out of the wider surveys.
De Vries and Van der Woude contended that, in the long term, Dutch real wages grew by around 40% over the period 1600-1750.  In the medium-term, they crashed in the 1620s, to recover and peak between the 1680s and 1730s.  Decline set in thereafter.​[132]​  In more recent research, however, Van Zanden contends that in the long-term, real wages remained stable between 1580 and 1680 (the Dutch Golden Age) and even between the 1580s and 1760s.​[133]​  Using long 50-year periods, Allen notes real wages in Amsterdam (expressed as welfare ratios) became the highest in Europe; on closer examination his figures show a slow increase, 1600-1749.​[134]​
It is the comparison with (southern) England which concerns us even more intimately: De Vries and Van der Woude contend that real wages in the western Netherlands outstripped those in southern England, opening up an ‘enormous gap’.​[135]​  Lucassen, then, found it strange that English migrant numbers in the Republic were so low, even though Dutch wages were best.​[136]​  Van Zanden, on the other hand, argued more recently that real wages in southern England and Holland were ‘almost identical’ in 1530/50 and again in 1730/50, and that therefore the wide differential in De Vries and Van der Woude’s material ‘does not give a reliable impression’ of the differences in real wages.​[137]​  Allen shows that there was, in the wider European perspective, ‘little difference’ between real wages (expressed as welfare ratios) in Amsterdam and London during 1500-1750/1800.​[138]​
Very recently, Jelle van Lottum and Christiaan van Bochove tackled real wages in relation to migration and economic integration, respectively, in the North Sea region.  In the wider European field, their work reinforces the clear ‘pull’ factor for migrants of better Dutch living standards evident in Allen’s work.  Van Lottum, again looking at the long-term, shows that – despite English nominal wages outstripping Dutch after about 1650 – English and Dutch real wages were at a ‘relatively similar level’ throughout 1600-1800; ‘a small wage differential in favour of England existed only occasionally’.​[139]​  Van Bochove has extended Allen’s European scope (to include data for Stockholm and Copenhagen), and has a more detailed perspective in medium-term, 25-year periods.  Expressed as comparative welfare ratios, Van Bochove shows that real wages in London and the western Netherlands were indeed almost exactly in parity, 1625-1799; the greatest variation being a 6% deficit in London during 1625-49.​[140]​  
Both scholars have introduced Dutch and English maritime (merchant) wages to bolster some of their arguments – showing the lack of Dutch pull factor for England and the isolation of England from the Dutch migration field, and wage convergence, respectively – but their nominal merchant data does not take into account wartime wage increases, and they have resisted converting these into real wages.

Dutch maritime sector literature

The success of the Dutch, the huge number of their ships and size of the Dutch maritime labour market seemed at odds with the small native population compared with Britain and France.  Lucassen and Bruijn first estimated the size of the Dutch maritime labour market in 1977, with revisions shortly afterwards.​[141]​  Van Royen made slight adjustments about ten years later.​[142]​  Very recently, Lucassen and Van Lottum have completely revised the earlier estimates.​[143]​  All these historians stress that their figures, which are at widely spaced intervals, remain estimates – but all show very rapid growth in the early seventeenth century, followed by slow-down, stagnation or decline for the rest of our period (see Chapter 2).  From the outset it was clear that, as population stagnated, the growth in the labour market must have been taken up in part by foreigners.​[144]​  It is worth noting that the navy is probably the one single subsector where the annual manpower could still be determined with reasonable accuracy over long periods, as Rodger has done for the British navy.
Dutch historians have shown that the Dutch labour market, overall, after earlier flexibility and the changes noted above became increasingly segmented and consolidated in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.​[145]​  Within the maritime labour market, this translates into a dual-segmented model: an internal segment, ‘containing a core of labourers with more-or-less regular ties to particular employers’, and an external segment comprising a ‘flexible mass’ of casual and migrant labour.​[146]​  The subsectors do not, though, divide neatly between the two segments (not least because of the differing pay of the various ranks); for the seamen, some from the merchant and whale fishery subsectors were in the internal segment – the rest were in the external segment with the other subsectors – the navy, WIC and VOC.​[147]​  Very broadly, maritime employment can be distributed according to the following criteria:

‘as a rule, the longer the voyage, the lower the payment, the worse the labour conditions, the bigger the risks (especially to health), and the more foreigners on board’.​[148]​

Of all parts of the Dutch maritime sector, study of the VOC has been most prominent: because of its global reach, the scale of manpower involved on a continual basis, the flow of migrants both into the Republic to service the demand for men and the out-migration to Asia, and rapid expansion in the seventeenth century causing a drain of seamen.  Additionally, the greater survival of sources than for other subsectors facilitates research, though before about 1700 sources are more sparse.  Over the VOC’s lifetime (1602-1795) almost one million Europeans embarked on the company’s outbound ships; almost half a million were foreigners.  Most failed to return to Europe.​[149]​  The high mortality on the ships and in Asia was not exclusively to blame, but did give rise to the expression ‘Holland is the graveyard of Germany’, and the VOC being seen as the ‘last resort’ for only the most desperate.
With labour history coming to the fore from the 1960s, Charles Boxer stressed the multi-national mix of both sailors and soldiers in the VOC and WIC, and the involvement of English, Scots and French in the early seventeenth century, but used anecdotal evidence only.  He also emphasised that Germans and Scandinavians were the largest groups (in general) and that the VOC originally debarred foreigners from its crews, but was unable to realise this.​[150]​  Following up their wider investigations in the late 1970s, J. R. Bruijn and Jan Lucassen brought De Hullu’s much earlier work on the VOC to light; their volume included analysis of manpower sources with G. J. A. Raven’s decennial breakdown of sailors and soldiers into simple native/foreign components.  In line with the surviving sources, this analysis was of more limited scope prior to around 1680.  Foreign seamen from coastal regions increased rapidly from around 1640, peaked in the 1660s, but then crashed reaching a low roughly about 20% around 1690.  Foreign sailors from inland regions increased appreciably after about 1720; these were more likely to be inexperienced.​[151]​  This study was later extended by Bruijn and Femme Gaastra et al; there were French, Southern Netherland and German refugees during the seventeenth century, but foreign seamen were mainly drawn from the coasts of Scandinavia, German and Baltic; later increasingly from inland Germany.  The authors mooted competition from developing shipping in the sailors’ native countries as a factor.​[152]​    
Recently, Herman Ketting focused on labour relationships from the Voorcompagnieën (the predecessors of the VOC) up to around 1650.  His crew analyses (urban/rural, core recruitment zones, coastal/inland) shows that early manpower expansion was taken up by foreigners; these ranged along the coast – from the Southern Netherlands to Germany and Denmark, before later incorporating Norway and spreading to inland Germany.  Ketting also differentiated between the Amsterdam and Zeeland chambers, showing important regional differences in foreign composition.    He also made the point that some foreigners came from crews in the international trade centred in the Republic.​[153]​   
The deep interest in the VOC has extended to specific groups of foreign nationals in the crews: Roelof van Gelder (Germans) and Erik Goebel (Danish subjects).  Southern Netherlanders were studied by Stefan Deconinck, and together with others more recently in a wide collection under the direction of Jan Parmentier.​[154]​  Deconinck’s research, 1602-60, also included other foreigners.​[155]​

Compared with the VOC, the navy has suffered from lesser survival of sources, especially in the seventeenth century, the years of its glory.  It must be stressed that at this time, naval manpower far outstripped that of the VOC during wartime, and as we saw earlier, the Dutch were at war for as much time as they were at peace.
Contemporaries recognised that the greatest numbers of seamen, and foreign seamen, were in the Dutch Republic.  There were enormous exaggerations though.  In 1687 British commanders thought that only 25% of personnel in the Dutch maritime sector were Dutch.​[156]​  Some informed men thought most foreigners were in the navy: Ambassador Temple noted that Holland seamen were mostly in merchantmen, but the warships were 

‘manned by mariners of all nations … especially those of the Eastland coasts of Germany, Swedes, Danes, and Norwegians’.​[157]​  

In wartime, Ambassador D’Estrades noted the ‘foreigners, who, in the spring, come from all parts to be hired’.​[158]​  This suggests seasonal migration and, probably, wartime increases in the overall labour supply; the latter, is conceived as likely, as noted in the Methodology above.
The nineteenth-century Dutch master naval historian De Jonge had access to the vast payrolls and other material lost by fire; unfortunately for us today, historiography then had little place for the common seaman.  Nonetheless, De Jonge emphasised that between the First and Second Anglo-Dutch Wars, crews included many Lübeckers, Danes, Norwegians and Swedes – partly because of the proximate Dutch operations – as well as numbers of Germans, French, and – of central interest for us – ‘even English and Irish’.  De Jonge suggested that Amsterdam was best supplied with foreigners: certainly, in 1659 the Amsterdam admiralty remarked on the ‘large proportion of foreign seamen’ in the fleet.​[159]​  Despite the presence of so many foreigners, De Jonge thought that Dutch naval petty officers were ‘almost exclusively’ Dutch.​[160]​  
Bruijn’s broadly themed naval studies centred first on the Amsterdam admiralty in the first half of the eighteenth century; his crew analyses showed that half were foreign, overwhelmingly Germans and Scandinavians.  Bruijn then explored much more widely, both in the other admiralties – mainly Zeeland – and chronologically, showing that the foreign element in the Dutch navy increased in the eighteenth century; foreigners dominating from around 1730-40.  For the eighteenth century the results in terms of the types of foreigners were very similar to before; in Zeeland the same two groups were present around the turn of the seventeenth century, but nowhere near as large as they later became.  He also showed that other groups were very important here: Southern Netherlanders and British, especially around 1600.  Regional variation was again apparent.  Specifically addressing the petty officers throughout, Bruijn found – completely disproving De Jonge’s position – that many were foreigners.​[161]​  Bruijn also investigated health in the navy in the eighteenth century.  Aside from the obvious danger of death in action, disease was sometimes very severe.  Together with low pay, this high mortality has been perhaps overstressed in wider work.​[162]​  This gives the impression that the navy was similar to, or as bad as the VOC in this respect, which does not seem to have been the case, at least for the seventeenth century.
By the late 1990s, Commander Poortvliet’s enormous research on Zeeland admiralty crews was becoming available.  Johan Francke utilised this resource as a comparison in his wide study of Zeeland privateering during the Nine Years War, showing appreciable differences with Bruijn’s work for the same period.  There is virtually no muster evidence available at all, however, for privateer crews.  In wider views of the navy, Germans and Scandinavians are seen as the largest groups.​[163]​  
In contrast to the VOC and navy, sources for merchant crews are extremely rare.  Van Royen’s detailed study, 1700-10, combated this by extracting data from notarial sources (perhaps also showing that such an approach may be possible elsewhere).  He paid most attention to internal developments, but showed that foreigners formed a large part of the crews, from 40% in Amsterdam ships to half that in those from other ports; Van Royen stressed these regional variations in great detail.  Most foreign personnel originated from Scandinavia, the German coasts of the North Sea and Baltic, and Schleswig-Holstein.  In contrast to what Bruijn showed for the navy, foreigners found it very difficult to rise through the ranks in merchantmen.​[164]​  Piet Boon also directly addressed the debate over depopulation and the quantity of seamen in North Holland (West Friesland).  Masters and crews were linked strongly by locality, still maintained a seasonal labour cycle in the countryside, and moved between the subsectors with better pay and conditions whilst resisting employment in the external segment containing the navy, VOC and WIC.​[165]​
For the fisheries – Greenland whaling, the herring and other sea fisheries – crew sources are similarly poor.  A. P. van Vliet has reconstructed a sample of the Zeeland sea fishery up to 1648, showing foreigners were only a miniscule part.​[166]​  Whaling varied wildly, though, from large proportions of Basques in the early seventeenth century, to even larger groups of North Frisians and Germans after 1700.​[167]​
Very recently, Van Lottum has integrated all the literature on the various subsectors into an overview of foreign labour across the maritime sector, fitting it into the framework of employment estimates above.​[168]​  This does depend sometimes on guesstimates and interpolation (see Chapter 2).

Taking the navy to one side, the segmentation theme bears directly onto migration and sailors careers: the particular types of migrants involved, and (for native Dutch too) the length of career and seamen’s attachment to particular officers and/or the navy itself as an employer.  Bruijn points out that in the eighteenth century, ‘breaks between voyages prevented the natural growth of loyalty to captain or ship’ and that this was in contrast to the situation in the British navy, as well described by Rodger.​[169]​  In the seventeenth century, Bruijn maintained that when recruiting, each commander ‘had to start from scratch’, but he was not entirely convinced: the ‘New navy’ (after 1652) was manned by ‘crews who largely had no bond with the navy, although the frequency of naval campaigns would suggest otherwise’.  The last point may be the crucial one for our period.  Without intensive research in the payroll sources, this question cannot be answered.
Generally, naval recruitment was thought to be fairly easy: loosely up to around 1680, Lucassen was adamant that there were no ‘serious complaints about shortage of seamen’, giving – in the case of the navy – the example of the 21,600 men in the Dutch fleet in April-May 1665; this was assembled ‘with relatively little difficulty’.​[170]​  Bruijn contrasted the relative ease with which men were found in the seventeenth century against the much more difficult conditions in the eighteenth.  Both the trouble that was taken to secure the men, and the difficulties experienced, during the earlier period were not fully explored.

The developments outlined above have naturally and logically coloured the methods of analyses, some of which we have already noted: comparison of coastal/inland, town/countryside, inter-provincial, as well as simple Dutch/foreign comparatives and various methods of breaking down the foreign contingent, which can also be classified as coastal/inland, by relative proximity to the Dutch host, national, regional, or by sovereignty.    I have not used most of the analytical tools listed above: because the state is the primary actor in regard to navies – and will be quickly seen in this thesis to be more active with respect to naval labour, by the naval powers, at least – sovereignty is the primary method used here to categorise foreigners.  This explained more fully, necessarily at length, at the end of this Introductory chapter, so it is clear from the outset.

The market for soldiers

The international labour market for sailors paralleled another – larger, more prominent and perhaps better-known – for soldiers.  The two can be more closely related where both sailors and soldiers were recruited by the same organisation: such as the VOC and WIC; the latter certainly actively recruited soldiers in England.  All European armies in our period contained enormous numbers and proportions of foreigners.  In just one example, mercenaries made up 90% of Gustav II Adolf’s army.​[171]​  That army was then the most renowned military machine in Europe, and at the forefront of the Military Revolution in tactics, techniques and expertise.  During the Eighty Years War, the Dutch in particular relied on them; the Republic was the ‘schoole of war’.​[172]​  For the Dutch, such reliance increased with the rapid growth of the army to face the new strategic situation of the French challenge after 1672.  Such soldiers serving in foreign armies are termed mercenaries, a label that usually carried a negative meaning – from medieval times to the ecorcheurs and condottieri lambasted by Machiavelli and Erasmus, to the increase of their use under powerful military entrepreneurs during the Eighty and Thirty Years Wars.​[173]​ 
Jeremy Black emphasises the variations in recruitment methods, force and voluntary enlistment, which aspect is directly comparable with navies; gentlemen commanders also recruited mercenaries from amongst ‘their traditional connections – from clients, retainers, and tenants’, which is exactly what Rodger found sometimes occurred in the eighteenth century British navy.​[174]​  Jan Glete argues that while mercenaries and professional armies grew in importance and militias declined in the early modern period, the growing aspect of naval service was more in the form of a militia – seamen had a duty to serve the state.  In contrast to the training needed by raw soldier recruits, skilled seamen were already available in an open market.​[175]​  The soldier may or may not be a professional, but proper drill ‘could transform a ploughboy rapidly into an adequate infantryman’.​[176]​  It was, however, impossible to produce a sailor in this way.
Other aspects are more difficult to compare, such as quality of personnel and the loyalty of mercenaries to their employers – one seaman was perhaps as prone to desert as another.  For mercenaries, promptness of payment was the crucial factor in countering desertion, mutiny and atrocity (the sack of Magdeburg for example), or (rarely) even swapping sides during or around a battle.  Though, as discussed above, the sources prohibit examination here of seamen’s ideology, it was to have been an issue with mercenaries too: Black points out that during the Wars of Religion and Dutch Revolt, mercenaries fighting on each of the sides ‘appear to have displayed a considerable degree of identification with the confessional issues’.​[177]​  Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean have shown Scots identification with the Protestant cause in Europe.​[178]​  Another aspect shared was migration itself: Geoffrey Parker emphasises that soldier migrants were of different types: some transient ‘swallows’, others settled permanently.​[179]​
I feel this study needs to be distanced from the market for soldiers.  Though definitions of ‘mercenary’ centre on soldiers,​[180]​ seamen have sometimes been considered mercenaries in the same way as soldiers.​[181]​  This was a puzzling question sometimes put to me in the early stages of this research.  The equation of the two groups probably makes sense for the assentisti employed in Italy (contracted in a similar way to condotierri), but should we consider migrant seamen serving in foreign navies to be mercenaries – at least in northern and western Europe?  (Maritime recruitment conditions here varied from the Mediterranean in other respects, such as the latter’s use of slave and mass forced-convict labour.)  What is exactly a mercenary?  Even amongst mercenary specialists, however, as Thomson points out, ‘there is no consensus on how a mercenary should be defined’, but Thomson also effectively defines one as someone enlisting in a foreign army.​[182]​  This, though, puts the British brigades in Dutch service (for just one example) as mercenaries – when they were a virtually permanent fixture of the Dutch army and the personnel were settled and assimilated (and also diluted).  Singer perhaps sums up the essential difference: ‘although soldiers often serve to prevent wars, mercenaries require wars’.​[183]​  Foreign sailors – or indeed native sailors – do not require wars per se. 
I will venture to make some distinctions, though these are not definitive, and it is difficult to generalise.  The soldier is not inherently mobile as part of his work: he may travel to another country to enlist or be transported to another country after enlistment in his own, but the travel itself is not part of his work.  He has no reason to be abroad other than to be a soldier.  The civilian or unemployed soldier may intend to enlist when he arrives abroad, but does not ‘become’ a soldier until he enlists.  The mercenary is usually recruited by agents travelling to his own country.  For the sailor, on the other hand, travel itself comprises by far the greatest part of his work: his work while travelling constitutes nearly all of what he is paid for, and his work takes him abroad by its very nature.  The foreign sailor is not distinct from the native in these respects.
The soldier’s business can only be war; the sailor’s business is not solely war.  Unless forcibly recruited, the civilian chooses (leaving economic pressures aside) to be a soldier and engage in the business of war.  The sea was indeed often a place of violence, much more so outside the degree of safety in north-western European waters in peacetime – but the sailor is primarily concerned with trade – many times more seamen served in trade than in the navy during peacetime.  And even when employed by a combatant state during wartime, the foreign sailor may still often work in a ‘peaceful’ way (that is, not aboard a warship or privateer), though such opportunities were more limited for all seamen, natives included.  Although, if attacked, he may be forced to fight to defend himself and his ship, in most circumstances the merchantman does not stand any chance against any well-manned warship or privateer larger than the smallest sizes: surrender is preferable.  There were, however, often restrictions to trade, so that the seaman was interrupted in the normal course of his work and ‘forced’ to serve and fight instead – migrants of whatever foreign category alongside native seamen.
Primarily, the mercenary is part of a formal group under a separate leader; together with others, he hires himself to or is recruited by an agent/officer, and is under contract as a separate group distinct from the rest of the army in which the unit serves; mercenaries may even perform different operations, stipulating their exclusion from certain tasks.  The foreign seaman in a navy (or privateer), in contrast, does not belong to a separate cadre and is just another employee in the crew, with the same pay and conditions as everyone else of the same rank.  Various groups of foreigners (national, regional or even family) might want to stay together rather than be dispersed, but this is the same for native seamen.  (See the micro-case studies in Part 2 for the mix of nationalities across the warships.)




Part One of the thesis, consisting of Chapters 2-5, is thematic: it seeks to more accurately describe the workings of and conditions in the maritime environment, especially in wartime, that led to British and other foreign (that is, non-Dutch) seamen entering Dutch naval service.  Though the main focus is on British personnel, other foreigners are contrasted.  Recruitment techniques and the state interference in trade, as well as sets of data for two of the other major factors operating on foreign personnel, foreign shipping and wages, are all explored in detail.  The foreign groups in Zeeland admiralty crews are then explored in a series of chronological episodes, which equate principally to the major wars.

Part Two, consisting of Chapters 6-8, presents the detailed micro-case studies upon which the overall crew samples in the Chapter 5 overview are based.  Some 10 years ago, Davids called for more micro-level research; this was to solve specific internal problems in the Dutch maritime labour market, such as local depopulation and changing labour patterns.​[185]​  As previously stated, that is not the aim of this thesis.  Nothing like these case studies has been produced for any seventeenth century navy.  Random sampling may produce accuracy if intensive enough, but it will produce neither length of service nor career structures, unless a few by accident.  As seamen usually joined a particular officer (though he might transfer to another ship, with or without the crew), the studies were streamed and arranged by commander and ship so that individual seamen and the foreign composition of a particular crew can be traced over time. 
Can we determine the types of migrant by this method?  As with sailors’ ideology above, the mere appearance and disappearance in the Zeeland admiralty payroll and other payment sources does not fix their entry and exit from the Dutch Republic – this would remain the case even if those sources were known inside-out.  Transients, therefore, can only be suspected, but the long-serving semi-permanent ‘labour migrants’ and permanent migrants can be positively identified.
Each micro-case study is presented with a comprehensive breakdown of the various foreign groups.  To address the promotion and preferment to positions for foreigners and enemy subjects I have broken down the petty officers (not the warrant officers), comparing the overall foreign element with that in the whole crew.  The long-term view is also needed to see career profiles, where a seaman is promoted in his prime and then demoted with age.  We also need to see the static careers of long-serving seamen: some were willing to accept long service without promotion.
A very brief operational overview introduces each chapter; some relevant details are included on the particular sections.  Unless we see what the warships were doing, we cannot tell whether men were recruited abroad, or at sea, perhaps from foreign ships – or even enemy subjects or others from prizes.  These factors become more important on the few long-range admiralty operations.  Without some operational details and episodes from battles, moreover, we have no context.    
The micro-case studies are not just important for the reason that the reasons given above – or simply because they have not been done before.  Individuals identified here may be followed up in future research of whatever type; for instance, sailors from small ports with extant local records may be particularly easy to find – for example the Scots from the little Fife ports – enabling the construction of basic biographies, so that age and social/family background, previous employment (whether maritime or not) would all enhance our knowledge of sailors careers and life-patterns.

Chapter 2 closely compares the British and Dutch naval recruitment systems, which are usually seen as opposites: compulsion and voluntarism respectively.  From the mostly ideological emphasis of the leaders at our Medway starting point, coupled with the unanswered question of whether some at least of the sailors shared these motivations, the perceived difference between the two recruitment systems could be assumed, quite logically, to have made British sailors more willing to serve a foreign or even an enemy power – especially if other negative factors, such as wages, already filled them with resentment.  The British press was, after all, often challenged even by some in the establishment as an affront to liberty.   If the Dutch system was truly voluntary, then we can suspect any British enlisting during Anglo-Dutch conflict of having ideological motives.  We will see, rather, that the two systems shared vital aspects, thereby eliminating any attraction to Dutch service on that account, but – more importantly – that the Dutch system dragooned or siphoned seamen of all nationalities from trade into the Dutch navy.  At worst, most men on the enormous number of merchant ships in Dutch ports had no choice but to enlist in the navy.  
Chapter 2 also examines how the state continually tried to control its subject seamen serving abroad, how effective those efforts – proof in themselves of the international nature of maritime labour – actually were, and how the sailors reacted.  It also looks at if and how miscreant seamen were punished, in theory and practise, if caught in foreign or enemy service.  Wartime employment options, and sailors’ mobility in wartime are also examined. 

Having established that trade was the principal mechanism by which men entered Dutch naval service, Chapter 3 should – logically – examine the crews of merchant shipping trading from and into Dutch ports, both Dutch and foreign.  The available sources severely hinder this task.  Because the focus of the thesis is Zeeland admiralty personnel, the crew compositions of Zeeland merchantmen would be the target, but these – as with the vast bulk of Dutch merchant ships – are not extant.  Van Royen’s analysis of merchant ships and crews, 1700-1710 (the one large-scale comprehensive study of its kind) is summarised and shown, unfortunately, to be inapplicable in Zeeland, because of the difference between the trade specialisations and focus of the regions covered by Van Royen and those of Zeeland.  This does, however, introduce another major aspect of the thesis – regional differences within the Republic, here in trade, that will also manifest in Zeeland warship crew compositions.  Chapter 3 is forced to fall back on a substitute: though the crew compositions of foreign merchantmen coming into Zeeland are not known – the nationalities of most of those foreign ships are.  The make-up is determined in detail as the first ‘control’ – an indicator of the types and numbers of foreign seamen coming in, and therefore of those moving from foreign merchantmen into Zeeland warships in wartime.
As trade stimulated the growth of migrant communities in Dutch ports, including foreign merchants as well as sailors, Chapter 3 then looks more closely at the British communities in Zeeland.  Again, the available sources hinder study; however, the activities of British merchants as part of the Dutch war effort – no matter whether there was Anglo-Dutch conflict or peaceful relations – is an indicator of the importance of the community as a whole, as well as the attitudes of British seamen: employment and livelihood came first.  The British churches are examined, to explore ideological factors further, particularly those of sailors in the memberships, if possible.  Methodologically, the church sources can also help mitigate the gap in the Zeeland payroll series, 1649-64, the central source for the thesis.  Finally, Chapter 3 examines the extent of literacy and marriage within the British personnel identified, as indicators of awareness of the consequences of illegal enemy/foreign service, and of permanent settlement.  

Chapter 4 examines basic wage levels and the incidence of their payment in both navies.  We have already seen that the failure to pay wages properly was an issue at the Medway.  If a British naval seaman was badly in arrears and desperate, how did his other employment options compare?  Were the actual wage rates better in one job than in another?  How did the two navies especially, and more broadly, the two British and Dutch maritime sectors as a whole compare in these respects?  In a detailed analysis including the charting of developments in the short-term, the thesis produces a (partial) naval wage series as a second ‘control’ and shows that naval real wage differentials differed from the established view of wages in construction – Dutch (Zeeland) superiority produced an considerable incentive for transfer of British personnel.

Chapter 5 summarises the previous Zeeland admiralty crew studies, the detailed analysis of my overall research results, organised into six episodes: 1642-9; 1664-7; 1667-70; 1672-4; 1674; 1688-97.   These equate mainly to periods of war/peace (taking into account naval mobilisation as war conditions) and/or Anglo-Dutch peace/conflict: first the end of the Eighty Years War (with some continuation after Westphalia); the pre-war escalation and Second Anglo-Dutch War; from the cessation of hostilities in Europe until 1670; the pre-war escalation and Third Anglo-Dutch War; from the Treaty of Westminster, February 1674, until the end of the year; the preparation of the 1688 expedition and Nine Years’ War.  The conditions and two sets of control data (foreign shipping and wages) established in Part One are compared with the crew analysis, looking for causation.  Comparisons are made with other crew analyses – from other admiralties (where available) – or the VOC.  The British are then treated separately, as absolutes rather than percentages, related to the changes from Anglo-Dutch conflict to peace through 1664-74, and an overview made of service patterns.

Chapter 6 covers 1642-64, but concentrates on the period 1642-8, the end of the Eighty Years War (with attention to the Brazil expedition of 1646-7), for which the payroll sources are extant.  Though there are no comprehensive crew sources during 1650-63, the gap is addressed by other means (see Methodology).  Notable British personnel from 1642-8 and others are tracked through the First Anglo-Dutch War, with attention to casualties and NCOs; the careers of a selection of British veterans serving during 1649-64 are also described.  Some others serving from this episode into the Second Anglo-Dutch War are examined in Chapter 7.

Chapter 7 covers the Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1664-7.  Particular attention is given to ships lost in battle, and to the Surinam expedition, 1666-7.

Chapter 8 covers the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-4, and the Franco-Dutch War up to the end of 1674.  Special attention is given to the Surinam/New York expedition of 1672-4. 

I had originally planned to cover the Nine Years War in a similar fashion, but time and space have not permitted.  Overall analysis of crews for this episode can be found in the Chapter 5 overview.

Classification of Foreigners: Political Sovereignty 

For the most part, the only really consistent set of data we have on seamen is their birthplace (origin); technically, the recording of their birthplaces was a legal requirement in the navy.​[186]​  But such data on international origins of foreigners has hitherto been presented variously – usually a mix based on the abovementioned demographic and migration structures and developments, together with a broader and often inconsistent geographical scope.  Many of the categories usually seen in maritime labour analysis will not feature here (partly because Dutch personnel, apart from the captains and flag officers, are not covered in any way).
My purpose in the categorisation of foreigners is simply to determine which state they were the subjects of.  The amount of foreigners in the Dutch navy must have affected, to some degree at least, the labour supply available for the other naval powers – certainly bilaterally, even if one only needed crews for trade, and certainly if mutual naval preparations were being made around the same time.  The Dutch employment of Norwegian seamen, for instance, was clearly a loss of resources for the Danish-Norwegian navy.  The reported figures of thousands of British seamen in Dutch service were (if true) foremost a disastrous drain on the British navy at critical times; other considerations are secondary here.  Moreover, Chapter 2 will show that, although political sovereignty over states’ subjects within maritime labour did not equal full or effective control of that labour, at the root, nonetheless, the right to press or conscript seamen for the state’s warships – or to recall them from abroad – was conferred by sovereignty.  The state was the primary actor, and had the legal right to command them as subjects.  Similarly, it was sovereignty that entitled the laying of embargoes on the state’s merchant seamen (though this could also apply to foreigners, as we shall see).  Prize law also related sovereignty directly to sailors – in sailors’ nationality: for example, the presence of enemy subjects in the crew of a neutral merchantman could render it legal prize.​[187]​  With the state as the primary actor in maritime warfare, and the importance of its subject seamen to the prosecution of that warfare, quite simply, ‘whose seamen were they?’ is the first question that needs to be answered.
There are some distinct disadvantages in the application of the usual categories to international naval labour.  Sometimes, important conglomerate states ruled by a single monarch have been either split up into their constituents or sacrificed altogether.  Ketting, in his recent study of the VOC,​[188]​ split Denmark-Norway – grouping Denmark with the German Bight on the one hand, whilst classifying Norway not only with the remainder of Scandinavia, but with the rest of the Baltic coasts too.  This was to show the expansion of the recruitment zone.  This is of no use here, where all subjects liable to serve in the Danish-Norwegian navy need to be identified.  Norwegians may not have been very keen to serve in the Danish-Norwegian navy, but they were still answerable as Frederik III’s subjects.  Whilst Ketting kept Great Britain together, Francke subdivided both Britain and Denmark-Norway into their constituents.  Whilst this is extremely useful for more detailed studies with tighter scope, at the wider European level here in comparing the many different groups of foreigners in Dutch service, it is necessary first to describe all of Frederik III’s or Charles II’s seamen as one group, or at least to make it clear that there was a link between them.  As the British together formed 6% of Zeeland admiralty crews in his sample, making them the second-largest foreign group, Francke missed a significant aspect of his Zeeland warship crew analysis by not adopting this method (see also Chapter 5).
‘Baltic’ as a category may be attractive, but it was nearly a Swedish lake in territorial terms, and so raises immediate problems when used in tandem with ‘Scandinavia’ or ‘Sweden’.  Use of the ‘Baltic’ category also raises difficulties over Denmark – in the most basic geographical terms, is Denmark part of the Baltic, the German Bight, or Scandinavia?  These inconsistencies are greatly magnified when ‘Scandinavia’ is combined with ‘Baltic’, as Bruijn has sometimes done.​[189]​  Doing so lumps together the rival powers of the Swedish Empire, Denmark-Norway and Poland-Lithuania in one category.  Yet the first two of these were not only deadly enemies, but also important second-rank naval powers (and mercantile actors) that need to be considered separately here.  Similar inconsistencies occur when both ‘Germany’ and ‘Baltic’ are used: to which do we allocate the German Baltic coast?
The ‘German North Sea coast’ and ‘German Bight’ categories mix Danish territory (Jutland, Oldenburg after 1667) with Swedish (the secular bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, formal Swedish possessions 1648-1721), as well as German – East Frisia (not yet annexed to Prussia), Hamburg, and the city of Bremen.  In our period then, a virtually contiguous band of the Bight littoral, stretching from the Dutch Republic round to independent Hamburg, was mostly controlled by the two northern naval powers.  The ports and regions in the Swedish-controlled German North Sea coast (most importantly, Stade and Freiburg in the bishopric of Bremen) do not, admittedly, figure prominently in our study, but probably do in the crews of the northern Dutch admiralties.
Swedish sovereignty means changes on the German Baltic coast: the Swedish possessions of Pomerania (including Stralsund and Stettin) and Wismar in Mecklenburg are rather more obvious in this study, in what would normally be termed either ‘German’ or ‘Baltic’.  To the east of Pomerania, ‘Baltic’ breaks under examination: the term especially neglects Poland-Lithuania with the important trading port of Danzig, and – to a lesser extent – Elbing.  Windau in semi-autonomous Courland is much fainter in our study here, but still needs to be grouped with Polish ports.  Where does ‘Baltic’ become ‘Scandinavia’, or ‘Sweden’?  If, heading east and then north along the coast, one stops at the Gulf of Finland, because ‘Scandinavia’ lies on the other side, what about Swedish Estonia, Livonia and Ingria on the south shore of the Gulf?
Other studies have used the sovereignty criterion: in his study of Danes in the VOC, Erik Goebel looked at Danish subjects – in all Danish territorial possessions.​[190]​  Goebel included inhabitants of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, along with Norwegians, Icelanders and Faeroese.  On the other hand, Van Royen categorised Schleswig-Holstein together, but separately from Denmark and Norway.​[191]​  The problem here is that the duchies were divided in a patchwork of territorially separated strips and enclaves between the Danish Crown and the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp (some were jointly administered).  The latter prince strove for independence – which was first recognised, with Swedish support (allied from 1654), in 1658.  This study treats ‘Holstein’ as a separate group after that date.​[192]​





During the rapid changes of the frontier between France and the Spanish Netherlands from the middle of the seventeenth century, inhabitants were often given the choice to stay and become French, or move to stay in Spanish territory.​[194]​  It is not clear how far this was possible, or actually grasped.
My approach in this study, therefore, has been to determine – at the time of each payroll – which state had de jure political sovereignty over the territory in which the men were born.  Strictly adhering (as far as possible) to sovereignty entails tracking moving borders as states contracted and expanded: although increasing complexity, this is absolutely essential, as adding or losing territories naturally added or subtracted from the labour pool available – for naval purposes here, but also for mercantile ends.  Political or economic ‘domination’ has been ignored here.  Rostock in Mecklenburg, for instance, may have been under effective Swedish domination through the imposition of a shipping toll at Swedish-occupied Warnemunde at the mouth of the Warnow, but was not under formal Swedish rule.  Similarly, German cities near the Dutch border, such as Emden, Wezel and Emmerik, were not under Dutch sovereignty, despite the presence of Dutch garrisons.
In tracking political changes in our period, Sweden’s expansion needs particular attention.  In 1645 she acquired from Denmark-Norway the mainland provinces of Halland (including the ports Halmstad and Falkenberg) and in 1658 Scania (Malmö, Kristianstad, Hälsingborg, Landskrona), and Blekkinge from the Danish kingdom – and Bohuslän (Marstrand, Uddevalla) from Norway.  These territories cannot be regarded as Swedish before their annexation.  The change in sovereignty of most of these places might have had limited effects in this survey at the actual time of transfer (excepting Marstrand, which figures much more than the others), but the changes are surely more important for study of seamen in the more northern-orientated centres of Holland.  
The sovereignty approach does raise its own difficulties when ethnicity is considered, of course: one example is the seaman Jan de Vilder, born at Falkenberg in Halland and a Danish subject before 1645.  Ethnically, in line with the rest of the southern provinces,​[195]​ he was probably Danish.  The following year we find him in Zeeland aboard Veere bound for Brazil in Joos Banckert’s squadron, quickly promoted to officer cadet and then paid off in Brazil shortly after arrival.  Under the definitions of this study, in 1645 this man became a Swedish subject who was needed in the Swedish navy.  
There are occasional difficulties when sovereignty changes during a man’s service.  For example, the seaman Thomas Heijndricksen, born at Wismar in Mecklenburg, served aboard Hollandia from August 1646 until October 1648.​[196]​  At the start, Heijndricksen is for us a German, in one source covering this time; near the end of his service he became a Swedish subject by the Treaty of Westphalia.  Because there is only one source here, instead of many ‘snapshots’, there is no natural cut-off where his nationality can be changed.  As he started German, he must continue as such, though this chimes with the change in sovereignty occurring only late in his service.  If he appears after this time during subsequent research he would be designated Swedish.
A Pomeranian, Thomas Syss of Stettin, served aboard Delft in 1667.​[197]​  We do not know how old he was then, or in 1648 – if he had even been born by that time – or whether he resented Swedish rule.  Nevertheless, he was a Swedish subject, liable for service in the Swedish navy and a valuable resource for Karl XI.  Sovereignty, then, is the starting point of certainty, a fixed reference; other angles can be explored later.  

Classification of Foreigners: concessions to other methods

In classification, though, I have had to make a couple of concessions; one is to a geographical abstraction – Germany.  The immense regional fragmentation of sovereignty impedes this method; the growing power of Brandenburg is worth taking account of, but the volume of personnel is too small in Zeeland in our period to warrant the adoption of Brandenburg as a class.  The great Hansa ports would be one method, but the effective end of the Hansa in 1669 mars this – besides which there is too much overlap with other categories, most being already accounted for – particularly of the North Sea and Baltic coasts above.  Here, ‘Germany’ is everywhere within the Holy Roman Empire not already in other categories.





To complicate matters, progressive French conquests absorbed more parts of the southern and western Spanish Netherlands through our period: first Artois and then parts of Hainault and Flanders, though some parts were clawed back.  These movements are traced.  Also, Flanders then was an ethnic/cultural expression that crossed state boundaries, as it still does today.  Roland Baetens emphasises that the coastal population from Dunkirk to Flushing was in a cross-border ‘alliance’ where regular migrations, both permanent and temporary, took place – such as that from Ostend after the Dutch lost the place in 1604.​[199]​  Some Zeeland officers (commissioned and warrant) serving 1642-9 were born at Ostend, and may have been old enough to have taken part in the exodus: Bastiaan Thijssen, Zeeridder’s captain, served before June 1643 but died that November,​[200]​ and Claes Dieme, Veere’s master, served from at least as early as 1644 until 1648.​[201]​
After Dunkirk changed hands twice in 1658 and 1662, many residents moved to Ostend, ‘where it seems that the town of Dunkirk has emigrated’.​[202]​  We do not know whether migrants were temporary or permanent, or whether they changed naturalisation: sovereignty of the territory must remain the measure.  Migrants that were seamen would otherwise have been at the disposal of France and were her loss.  Nonetheless, despite the migrations, Dunkirk was probably the Southern Netherlands’ most serious loss of manpower – probably around 700-1000 seamen lived there between 1659 and 1676.​[203]​


French acquisitions from the Spanish Netherlands, 1659-78

The Spanish loss of Dunkirk was not only a loss of territory, trade and revenue, as well as a naval and privateering base, but also a loss of maritime labour that was the means of much of these assets.  These men would have been available to the authorities in Brussels had Spain retained sovereignty.  Spain’s loss was France’s gain.  To complicate matters, we shall see that the Zeelanders even recruited in Dunkirk during wartime.  In almost all cases, we cannot know whether Dunkirk-born Zeeland personnel, for instance, had migrated permanently to Zeeland, or back into the Southern Netherlands after 1646 (or 1658, or 1662) – or if they were transients ordinarily still resident in their hometown (see Chapter 3).  For instance, Antheunis Poulaert and Remeeus Raulee, two Dunkirkers serving with Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge during 1664-7,​[204]​ may have fitted into any of these categories, but we do know where they were born.

Summary of Foreign Categories

This study does not list an ‘unknown’ category; there are relatively few in any case and have been left outside the foreign section – to err on the side of caution for the present.  Italy, although not very important for us, was starting to grow slowly and was probably of some influence for all Dutch and British warships on extended Mediterranean operations.  Yet ‘Italy’ includes the Venetian and Genoese Republics – the former of which was still an important regional power and probably worthy of independent consideration – as well as the independent duchies of Savoy and Tuscany, and the Papal States.  Large swathes of Italian territory, however, were under Spanish rule – Milan, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia: in this study such seamen are grouped with those of their Spanish overlord.  Other Italian areas are in the ‘All others’ group here.​[205]​
I have not systematically differentiated between the Three Kingdoms in this study.  ‘Britain’ comprises England, Scotland and Ireland, plus the Channel Islands, Man, and all overseas territories.  ‘British’ personnel in the thesis are simply those from these territories.  More tightly focussed studies, of course, will need to differentiate national, sub-national and regional groups.

Table 1.2: Foreign categories & standard colour-scheme
			Category	Notes
				
			Britain	England, Scotland, Ireland, Channel Islands
			Southern Netherlands	Spanish Netherlands; Bishopric of Liège
			France	
			Germany	Parts of Holy Roman Empire not in other categories
			Denmark-Norway	Iceland & Faroes; Oldenburg (after 1667)




			Holstein	Holstein-Gottorp (after 1658 only)







Chapter 2.  The Seaman’s Environment: 




To determine how and why British and other foreign seamen ended up in the Dutch navy we first need to examine the characteristics of the two states’ naval recruitment practices.  The Dutch is still persistently characterised as a purely ‘voluntary’ or ‘free’ system;​[206]​ although the British is now recognised as a mixed free/unfree system, the famous press still colours assessments of British practice in comparative studies.  Unwary application of these comparisons could easily lead us to immediately hypothesise that the (perceived) differences between them might have lead British seamen to flee the ‘tyrannical’ pressgang and take refuge with the ‘freedom-loving’ Dutch.  This motivation would then be a continual background factor in our study.  If the Dutch system was truly voluntary, then all British enlisting during the Anglo-Dutch Wars may be justifiably suspected of ideological motivation, because they exercised – if so – freedom of choice.  
But current evaluations of the two systems remain over-simplified and/or outmoded.  The Dutch are said to have eschewed the press and the use of force by our period; this needs to be qualified: a few instances of force (use of the press for ships and/or men) remained; some were direct, others perhaps indirect.  Besides these, more importantly, by our period the Dutch recruitment system was overwhelmingly centred on trade embargoes: but, effectively, the removal of alternative employment options meant that most seamen in the Dutch Republic were forced to enlist in the navy – simply in order to subsist.  This still amounts to force – indirect, but still force.  Other aspects of Dutch naval labour contained elements of forced labour:​[207]​ principally a quota levy extracted from trade in return for release from, or non-enactment of, embargo – but also certain other regulations and conditions relating to the men’s service and their families.
The British navy has been recently shown to have been manned by a dual press/volunteer system; i.e. mixed free/unfree.  If there was then little ‘ideological’ difference between the British and Dutch systems, they were technically similar too – fundamentally, the British system had a third aspect.  The Dutch use of trade embargoes as the main means of recruitment is reasonably well-known; secondary material on their use in Britain, however, is exceedingly scant and usually fails to tackle the issue anything more than cursorily.  Incredibly, in his standard work on English merchant shipping, Davis does not even mention embargoes.  At another extreme, for Sir George Clark, the embargo was a major part of the British system, supplementing the ‘very erratic’ press.​[208]​  Only Clark has referred specifically to the British and Dutch sharing their use;​[209]​ Jones mentions separately that both used embargoes, but does not make a connection.​[210]​  We shall quickly examine the British system’s embargo component to show similarities with Dutch methods.  The two are traced in some detail over time for accurate comparison.  The convergence of practice and trends was, at the very least, parallel development – if not a fully ‘conscious imitation of the Dutch’​[211]​ in their naval recruitment techniques, as in so much else.  This further reinforces the lack of any ‘ideological cause’ engrained in the comparative systems to push British into Dutch service.  
Beyond perceptions, and aside from the issue of indirect or covert force, this is the mechanism by which the Dutch deliberately swept up their own and foreign seamen from their own trade; foreign seamen (and some Dutch) from the trade of foreign states – neutrals – were also caught up in the embargo.  Therefore, we also need to look at Dutch embargo in detail to see how it may have applied to foreigners, both in the Dutch maritime sector and in foreign vessels.  In the nineteenth century De Jonge very roughly sketched its development,​[212]​ but this sketch is not only totally inadequate for our purposes – very little indeed has been added since.  The complexities of wartime maritime employment options are crucial for us, but, as we saw, the sector structure has so far only been mapped for peacetime – and then only at wide intervals.  The coverage (extent of application across the maritime sector), timing and duration of embargoes all need examination; all are crucial in determining sailors’ actual mobility and therefore their employment options.  These factors also interacted with sub-sector sailing seasons and port ice conditions.​[213]​  For example, any domestic sub-sectors – or neutrals – that were exempt might offer alternative employment to those in embargoed branches.  Short measures might be ridden out; endured with tightened belts.  Measures laid too late – after normal sailing times – would ‘miss’ their usual targets: so some embargoed sub-sectors might be only nominally proscribed.
The theme of this chapter is broader than the embargo: it concerns other state attempts to influence the labour market.  Starting with how the state viewed the international labour market, we move through the embargo to the state’s attempts to recall its seamen from service abroad to serve in the navy.  How offenders were actually punished is an integral part of how such seamen reacted to these measures, as is the seaman’s environment and his mobility during wartime.
First we have to briefly tackle embargo definitions: there were so many different types – the best known having nothing to do with naval recruitment.​[214]​  The type that concerns us is a ban on ships in one’s own ports leaving those ports.  Applying this to all – or nearly all – ships entailed a general embargo. 

Recruitment systems and the Use of Trade Embargoes

Before the emergence of permanent navies, a combination of embargoes and compulsion to procure both ships and men for the state was probably widespread: in Britain men were taken up with their ship,​[215]​ as in the northern Netherlands before the Dutch Revolt.  The start of our period was at the transition from temporary to permanent navies, from Medieval to Early Modern forms.  At the time, British methods were seen sometimes as cheap and efficient – in one view, they did not have to resort ‘to the tedious process of recruitment’.​[216]​  Elsewhere, conscription, another form of compulsory recruitment, was common.  In the third of the triad of first-rank naval powers, France, Colbert is said to have replaced the press with the conscription navale.​[217]​  The press, however, was still used in times of severe difficulties.​[218]​ 
Despite the differences in recruitment methods stressed by maritime historians, the trade embargo was one means shared – it was in common use in Europe.  British authors recognised the use of the general embargo in England as early as 1678.​[219]​  It was used commonly by other naval powers: France,​[220]​ Sweden,​[221]​ and Spain.​[222]​  Yet contemporary maritime and commercial literature did not specifically associate the embargo with naval recruitment;​[223]​ probably because it came in various forms, emphasising different purposes.  The main means in economic warfare was to seize or stop enemy ships in one’s own ports: the former was overt hostility – whereas stopping the putative enemy along with other foreigners in a pre-war general embargo was not.  During the early stages of the Anglo-Dutch Wars (the Second and Third, at least), a Dutch general embargo was laid before any formal declaration of war.  When the diplomatic situation reached a certain point, the embargo was then followed by Dutch seizure of British ships in port.  These British seamen could then be classed as ‘enemy’ and were in a different and much more vulnerable situation than any others, and consequently had a greater temptation to enlist.  They did not have the community support open to Dutch and those British (and other) emigrant seamen resident in the Republic; these groups might avoid enlisting for some time.  The vulnerability of British-based seamen, of course, continued during the Anglo-Dutch alliance, when they were just another group of foreign-based seamen.  These seizures were a major reinforcement of other routes of British entry into Dutch wartime service.  Around the time of the Second Anglo-Dutch War some 100 Scots and ‘countless’ English ships passed through Rotterdam every year (see Chapter 5).  Catterall put the Scots volume at around 120-130.​[224]​  In March 1672 British ships were seized pre-war in reprisal for British seizures and attacks on Dutch ships; principally the Smyrna convoy.  At Rotterdam ‘about 30’ English and Scots ships were seized: some hundreds of British seamen would have lost their jobs here alone.​[225]​  This was an important factor in the British component reported aboard the Dutch warships at Rotterdam and Amsterdam in Chapter 1.  At Flushing 60 English and Scots vessels were seized: a Dutch correspondent reported that the Zeeland admiralty 

‘will not permitt any of the men to come away, but keep them there designing to necesitate them into theire service’.​[226]​

Destitution forced many to enlist ‘for want of meat’.​[227]​  We shall see the effects on Zeeland manning in Chapter 8.
The embargo might also catch the unwary, naïve or ill-informed by surprise: sometime in March 1672, 70 Scots left their ship at Delfshaven looking for work in the well-paid Greenland whale fishery.  Finding this option embargoed and ‘they wanting money’, the men took the ship’s hoy to Rotterdam and joined the navy en masse.​[228]​

The shared international labour market: 
Contemporary views & enemy service

Dutch recruitment of foreigners was in part a consequence of political alliance and geographical location of military operations, particularly the long Danish alliance from 1649, which formally granted the Dutch permission to recruit in Danish territories.  In retaliation for the 1665 Dutch general embargo, Frederik III revoked this right and recalled Danish subjects from Dutch service – ‘directly contrary to the good amity and the clear text of the Alliance’.​[229]​  At that time over 50% of Dutch fleet manpower was thought to be foreign, and the navy particularly vulnerable to a recall of Danish subjects:

‘halfe of them at least are forreigners of severall nations and of these forreigners most Danes and Norweighers which if comanded out of their service would make a great hole’.​[230]​

Though the Danish recall of seamen was unpopular with the States General, the men themselves seem to have known nothing of it for some time.​[231]​  The Danes refused Dutch requests to lift their recall because ‘this [Dutch] State had done the like here in regard of them’.​[232]​  British contemporaries certainly thought the Danish recall caused the Dutch manning difficulties.​[233]​  The measure, however, had no effect on Zeeland crew compositions (see Chapter 5 and the micro case studies in Part 2).  Amsterdam, with much larger numbers of Danish subjects, may have suffered a reduction, but this is unknown and impossible to establish at present.  Danish requests for modifications to the 1672 Dutch recall stressed the ‘great number’ of Danish subjects in Dutch service: perhaps a veiled threat that these might be recalled in retaliation.  Then neutral, Frederik maybe had more leverage to keep the ‘few’ Dutch he claimed to have in his service, but – significantly – the States General asked for the Amsterdam admiralty’s recommendations only.​[234]​  
Frederik’s 1665 recall did, though, also chime with his indecision over which side to take in the approach to and the early part of the war: recalls of seamen were part of the diplomatic negotiations between Britain and Denmark in 1664-5; Frederik had also already agreed this action previously with the British ambassador, Talbot.  British efforts to secure Swedish support also aimed to get Sweden to recall her subjects from the Dutch Republic.​[235]​  (See below on recalls.)
The international maritime labour market was recognised by some advanced contemporaries as a shared, finite resource, though, of course, this married easily with the mercantilist world-view.  In 1665, five major naval powers were preparing their fleets, to various degrees: Britain, the Dutch, France, Denmark-Norway, and Sweden – how far this high demand affected the labour market as a whole still needs to be determined.​[236]​  Some British also considered depriving the enemy of this manpower by recruiting it first.  After the outbreak of war in early 1665, some Privy Councillors suggested that the British Mediterranean trade sail with a heavy naval escort 

‘before the Holland fleet assembles, as the Hollanders will have difficulty to find men in the general call for sailors’.​[237]​

This emphasises the contemporary awareness of a common labour market.  More specifically, the foreign seamen usually found in certain areas of Britain were an especial target: in 1664 Sir William Coventry suggested that 

‘seamen may be obtained from Guernsey or Jersey, and thus French and Flanders seamen may be engaged on the King’s side, which otherwise will be engaged for the Dutch’.​[238]​  

These high-level examples also strongly suggest that the British navy used more foreign labour than has been hitherto recognised.  The international labour pool might also influence higher strategic concerns: the ‘great many seamen’ at neutral Ostend in early 1665 eagerly anticipated lucrative employment on Zeeland privateers.  The Zeeland States maintained that, if privateering commissions were not quickly issued, this labour would ‘imediatly […] transport themselves for England’.​[239]​  Even if the intention here was merely a pretext, Ostend captains did take British privateering commissions and Southern Netherlands labour was a major component of Zeeland naval manpower – as we shall see in Chapters 5-8.  On the other side of the taking of prizes, multinational Dutch merchant crews were seen as a deliberate ‘trick’ to evade capture.​[240]​ 
A nation’s own subjects serving the enemy were an extreme example of the shared resource.  The Dutch feared this too – Dutch sailors, after all, served in Dunkirk ships at times during the Eighty Years’ War.​[241]​  In winter 1664/5, the Zeeland States’ lobbying for privateering commissions was couched in extreme terms

‘the animosityes which are generally observed in our inhabitants to be against the enemy will returne upon this State itself, by reason of the bad opinion they will take […] so many of the seamen will run over to the enemy [… to] gett booty’.​[242]​ 

Echoing our Medway starting-point, in 1653, the Amsterdam admiralty worried that dissatisfaction with poor payment of wages would drive its crews ‘to take refuge with our adversaries, who would gladly receive them’.​[243]​  This may have been overstated, or deliberate exaggeration to impress on the government, but the idea that manpower was a vulnerable asset that might flow away to the enemy may have been very common.  In summer 1653, the States General believed that 5-600 Dutch deserters in States Flanders ports intended to make for Southern Netherlands ports in order to join the British navy.​[244]​  Alternatively, this may have been paranoia, or strident emphasis added to ensure quick action to recover badly needed men, but not necessarily – given the then desperate Dutch economic and political situation.  Dutch crews stranded in England, whose ships had been seized or taken pre-war at the end of 1664, were given some money by Ambassador Van Gogh for passage home – otherwise they would be unable to leave ‘and through want be forced to take service there’.​[245]​  With British prisons crammed to overflowing with Dutch crews in the wake of the 1665 Lowestoft defeat, Van Gogh feared the spread of the plague would force more Dutch prisoners to join the British

‘as those who have done so bring home money in their pockets and accounts of their good entertainment’.​[246]​

Service with the enemy also took place on privateers: in 1674, Dutch seamen had to be specifically forbidden from serving on French privateers.​[247]​  Such measures probably made no difference (see below).​[248]​
From the British perspective, reports from those who had actually seen for themselves are revealing.  In 1665 Downing wanted more done to help British subjects return from the Republic, or else ‘besides the loss of so many brave men to his Majestie, necessity would inforce them to take on in the service of this [Dutch] State’.​[249]​  Taylor, just returned from the Republic in 1672, reported 

‘It is believed by the most knowing of the English there, that could there be found means to draw away his Majesty’s subjects now in [Dutch] service, it would lessen them much both by land and sea’.​[250]​

The following day he emphasised the matter: ‘could his Majesty’s subjects be drawn from their service it would pinch them’.​[251]​  The importance of British seamen in the Republic as a significant manpower resource to either side is clear: in 1672 the Dutch placed an injunction against their leaving the Republic and deployed a yacht off The Brill to search any outbound vessels.​[252]​  
During the later Anglo-Dutch alliance, those British seamen in Dutch service were, of course, no longer aiding an enemy – but they were still a resource lost to the British navy.  Moreover, high-level concern over the numbers involved prompted the Privy Council itself to ask the Lord High Admiral how these British might be recruited for the RN.  The plan was to offer two months’ wages as a bounty, but the result is unknown.  It is unlikely to have had much effect.​[253]​  Despite the alliance, securing the return of native seamen from even an allies’ fleet could be difficult.​[254]​

Foreigners in the British maritime sector

It was common knowledge for the contemporary elites that the Dutch navy recruited many foreigners.  In a meeting of diplomats that took place in France during the competition for manpower – and the climax of the 1665 diplomatic wrangling over the Dutch general embargo (see below) – the British admitted that ‘the States have many Frenchmen, Germans, Flemings, English and Scots, but [Charles II] has no foreigners in his service’.​[255]​  The open admission that British sailors were in Dutch service is telling – when the two states were at war – but the latter part was not the case: though the British navy seems to have recruited far fewer foreigners than the Dutch, some foreigners were, nonetheless present.  The proportion has not been consistently determined and their presence has not been recognised fully by Lucassen, though it has by Earle.  Earle’s necessarily limited sample of sailor deponents in Britain (excluding Ireland), 1665-1720, however, gives only 4.8% foreigners, but the sample is only 1500 men and composed, moreover, of those resident in Britain.​[256]​  Temporary migrants and transients are therefore excluded, thereby eliminating the very category that responded to changes in demand during wartime – when the Navigation Acts’ restrictions on foreigners (limiting them to 25% of merchant crews) were often suspended; for example, for virtually the entire course of the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars.​[257]​  The use of foreigners was such that it was said in the Commons before the end of the war in 1674 ‘we employ all foreigners for [merchant] shipping’.​[258]​  In 1666, for example, many foreigners embarked at Ostend for British merchant service.​[259]​  Foreign crews raised doubts for some: having lost all their British personnel to the navy, the owners of 14 small London merchantmen thought it unsafe to sail with crews entirely comprised of foreigners.​[260]​  Nonetheless, in 1666 about one quarter of one English merchant crew were enemy subjects – Dutch and Danes; they later refused to join the British navy and were thrown in jail.​[261]​  For the most part though, foreigners must have been eagerly sought after: on seasonal naval partial demobilisation, foreigners discharged from the navy were required for trade.​[262]​  From the opposite view to ours, then, the British were also prepared to use enemy subjects board their warships.  
Employment of foreigners also entailed advantages.  When all press protections (seamen’s certificates exempting them from the press) were revoked in 1672, merchantmen and privateers could legally carry any foreign seamen ‘they can procure’; all such foreigners would also be exempt from the press.  All merchantmen and privateers not crewed by foreigners were embargoed, so there was ample incentive to employ foreigners.​[263]​  Suspensions of the Navigation Acts continued in the eighteenth century: Earle has shown that, during the wars of 1739-48 and 1756-63, 25% and upwards of merchant crews were foreigners possessing press protections.​[264]​
So a few foreigners in the British navy during in wartime were probably normal, drawn in by British embargoes, but some at least served in peacetime, when manpower demand was low.​[265]​  In 1707, foreigners who had served two years in British warships were allowed access to Greenwich Hospital:​[266]​ suggesting that foreigners were both usual and sought-after.

British Naval Recruitment: the Press and foreign ships

The volume of British serving abroad was sufficient enough for the press to be extended to foreign merchantmen and even foreign warships.  The early Stuarts and the Commonwealth pressed British subjects out of foreign ships.​[267]​  Initially, the idea was – as far as possible – not to offend allies and neutrals: in 1635 British captains were to inquire, but not search all foreign ships for British subjects who had disobeyed their sovereign’s recall.​[268]​  In 1640, in similarly poorly framed orders, captains were to ascertain the presence of British on foreign ships without using search parties, and then somehow ‘cause his Majesty’s subjects to be taken forth’.  Dutch ships were specifically targeted in 1625 and 1640.​[269]​  We shall see examples from the 1640s and 1650s in Chapter 6.  The practise was institutionalised after the Restoration: James, Duke of York’s General Instructions to Captains, 1663, spelt out that any foreign ship met with was to be searched for English seamen;​[270]​ a practice that might embroil the British with neutrals.  In 1664, the Swedish Resident intervened for the release of the carpenter Arthur Rose, pressed out of Charles of Gothenburg.  Although English-born, Rose had been a citizen of Gothenburg for 14 years, his wife and children lived there. He was consequently ‘a true subject to the kingdome of Sweden’.​[271]​  Similarly, the naturalisation status of migrants caused problems in May 1694: two seamen were pressed out of the merchantman Ollaburg of Stockholm – ‘notwithstanding their being Sweads and never was in England before’.  The master, pilot and steward, though, were all British.​[272]​
More dangerously, in the Downs, January 1694, a party of four British seamen from Garland boarded Hope – a Swedish warship.  The Swedish crew forcibly ejected them.  Later, by way of reprisal, the Swedish lieutenant, Nils von der Wyk (the senior officer in the absence of the captain in London), was lured ashore, severely beaten by the British captain Robbeson and then imprisoned.  Hope’s remaining officers had her main battery loaded for action.​[273]​
With Anglo-Dutch relations improved from the late 1670s, more tact and sensitivity might produce the desired result: Captain Wyborne told Pepys around 1680 that he had found 52 Englishmen aboard a large Dutch warship – a very large proportion – ‘which (according to practice) he demanded as our King’s subjects from her captain’.  The latter was willing to surrender all his English crew, but 30 or more had wives in Holland: Wyborne ‘thought it reasonable to leave them’ and only took about 20 men.​[274]​  The practise continued during the Anglo-Dutch alliance.  The seaman John Richard (Newcastle), for example, was pressed out of the Zeeland capital ship Vlissingen in 1706.​[275]​

British Naval Recruitment: Trade Embargoes

Embargoes had been used as required – in England at least – since the Middle Ages, to procure both the ships as well as the men to which the monarch was entitled under feudal obligation.​[276]​  Clowes implied that embargoes were often used around our period, but only as a means of procuring ships; he did not mention them as a method of recruiting men.​[277]​  Capp maintained that embargoes were ‘often’ laid, until either the navy was manned or ‘the merchants’ clamour forced the government to lift the ban’.​[278]​  This suggests embargoes were frequently effective, but Davies states that they were rarely successful and instead merely angered the trading interest.​[279]​  Merriman maintained that embargoes failed to produce ‘more than a trickle of volunteers’.​[280]​  Gradish affirmed that, during the mid-eighteenth century, embargoes were of predominantly short duration, but also very frequent.​[281]​  Rodger mentions embargoes briefly, but does suggest they were sometimes an integral recruitment measure, and implies their regular use in the wars of 1652-4 and 1664-7.​[282]​  Earle recognised they were used ‘often’, but thought they were largely unproductive as the men hid ashore: the press was the ‘most effective’ method.​[283]​  Yet many sources mention that seamen ran and hid at the first rumour of any press, which would not seem to make the press any more effective than the embargo, whilst more sources show that the press was the cause of seamen hiding, rather than the embargo.​[284]​  Olive Anderson thought both methods were both ‘ineffective expedients’.​[285]​  Pincus, whose focus is not primarily maritime, stresses the importance laid on the embargo in 1664, but neither he nor maritime specialists have followed this up.​[286]​
Ehrman, in more depth than most, gave embargoes as a ‘standard’ means of British naval recruitment, but stressed inherent drawbacks – arguing that it was the Treasury rather than the navy that ordered embargoes, and that political pressure was applied on the government to cancel any imposed: direct intervention by the trading companies, leverage exerted by the City, and parliamentary backing of damaged local interests.  He maintained that the comprehensive general embargo later used by the Dutch was therefore rarely used in Britain – instead, a haphazard system emerged.  Individual types of trade and certain ports would be targeted, or regular bans imposed on some trades for definite periods, or placed at short notice for uncertain periods, with duration determined by Order in Council.​[287]​   
	This raises a number of questions.  The Dutch Republic was inherently more vulnerable to pressure from merchant interests because those interests wielded more clout in government via the regent class in Holland.  Were British merchant interests more successful than their Dutch counterparts in opposing embargoes?  This seems unlikely, but cannot be answered here.  During Charles II’s reign, British embargoes were laid at high level by the Privy Council,​[288]​ suggesting that then, naval priorities would have been emphasised.  Jones mentions British embargoes only twice – but this is enough to raise their importance.  First, the British failure to prepare a battle fleet in 1667 enabled them to lift ‘the previous embargo’; the usual manpower was not required.  Subsequently, mercantile protests over the general embargo of 1672 were ‘brusquely rejected’.​[289]​  Certainly, by Anne’s War, control lay in the admiralty’s hands.​[290]​  In any case, despite William III’s more army-centred priorities, 1691 saw a severe domestic stop and 1692 a full general embargo.​[291]​  At this time, Robert Crosfeild, author of England’s glory revived (1693), complained of ‘the great evil that attended the frequent embargos upon shipping’.​[292]​  He later complained that Britain had ‘seldom been free from an Embargo’.​[293]​  Though probably less so than by the Dutch, foreign ships were usually included,​[294]​ principally for their British crewmembers, but were sometimes allowed to leave – provided they had none – or exempted later on during a particular set of measures.​[295]​
One difference to Dutch practice was a biannual pattern of measures in late winter/spring and autumn/early winter; this pattern seems to have continued throughout our period.​[296]​  At least under the early Stuarts, the British recruited during the winter because of competition for manpower from merchantmen when trade began in earnest in the spring.​[297]​  The British were attempting to drive trade at the same time as a summer naval campaign, whereas the Dutch embargo often lasted through the summer; the consequences of this should be studied.
More generally, however, the overall trend was actually an increase in extent and duration which closely mirrored developments in the Dutch Republic.  British embargoes in the earliest part of our period were local affairs or very short.​[298]​  In 1652, though, the embargo was general, lasting one month and foreigners were included.​[299]​  The Second Anglo-Dutch War marks a major change.  From then on, much longer general embargoes were often used, with only a couple of sub-sectors exempted: principally the East India trade and fisheries, though the latter were often included.​[300]​  The autumn 1664 measures, with a couple of very brief breaks but also progressive severity, were applied over more than five months.  This embargo was part of the long period of pre-war escalation: its renewal and extension matched intensifying escalation – even the fisheries were stopped.​[301]​  Yet this was not just coincidence; the pattern was now established.  If sometimes the British embargo appears composed initially of sporadic measures, applied locally and/or to specific trades and nationalities, then suspensions were brief and the different strands often coalesced into a full general embargo.​[302]​  As with the Dutch, many individual exemptions might be granted, compromising efficiency, but recipients of the Duke of York’s passes had to give security to return for the following spring campaigning season.  If early in an episode there was leakage, passes were stopped at the request of the naval command when the advancing season made timely return impossible to guarantee.​[303]​  Overall, the post-1664 trend clearly demonstrates the subordination of trading to naval interests.​[304]​  Later in Charles’ reign, the spring general embargo tended to shift to a later slot, the timing and/or duration more closely approaching the Dutch model: February-May 1672;​[305]​ and March-June 1678.​[306]​  Both cases, however, need further study.​[307]​
It is clear that at the innovative stage in its development in 1664, the embargo was regarded at the highest levels, both in the naval administration and command, as the principal means of recruitment.  Sir William Coventry was convinced that 

‘Nothing will conduce to the manning of the fleet than the strict observation of the embargo, granting few passes to the contrary’.​[308]​

As Pincus pointed out, within two weeks ‘a general embargo through the whole kingdom’ was imposed.​[309]​  Some ‘prevalent in Council’ were against it, but without the embargo, it would be ‘hard work to get men’.​[310]​  By April 1665 James noted that the British flag officers were ‘universally […] against’ removing the embargo: they cited the mere example of that of the ‘sensible’ Dutch as one to be followed and a principal reason to continue the British embargo.​[311]​  By May, Coventry was convinced that lifting the embargo would be disastrous to fleet manpower – recruitment would stop and desertion increase for more lucrative employment.​[312]​  In the hectic summer of 1666, some sections of British opinion thought that following the Dutch example would mean better manning.​[313]​
Long before the Anglo-Dutch alliance, then, Dutch methods had been closely imitated.  Writing around 1703, and with experience from as far back as the early 1680s, Josiah Burchett saw the press and embargo working in tandem, so that the latter was laid ‘very often’.​[314]​  General embargoes were used during Anne’s War.​[315]​  Certainly, the centrality of the embargo to British recruitment continued after our period: the full embargo on all outbound traffic was used in 1739 and 1740, when Sir Robert Walpole himself stressed ‘the most efficacious Method of manning our Fleets, […] is that of suspending our Commerce by an Embargo’.​[316]​  Even while merchants protested to Parliament over the same measures, they still paid lip-service to ‘embargoes and pressing’ as twin necessities.​[317]​  Embargoes continued to be used through the great French wars until 1815.​[318]​




Dutch Naval Recruitment: the Press & Force

Though it had been used earlier, by our period the naked use of force was deemed incompatible with the Dutch concept of freedom.​[323]​  There are also less obvious aspects of the Dutch system where the element of force needs to be explored.
In the outmoded Dutch ‘old navy’, the system was still largely that of the medieval temporary navy: in wartime both men and ships had to be raised.  Crews with the Directors (municipal navies extant until 1656) were sometimes given as ‘pressed’.​[324]​  Merchant ships were ‘pressed’ (as well as hired) into naval service at least as late as 1652.​[325]​  What exactly happened to their crews is unclear; but it seems that, with the other constraints in operation, they would most likely have entered too, if only by default.  Even if merchant ships were only hired instead of pressed, how truly ‘free’ were their crews to move elsewhere?  What about VOC crews in Indiamen included in the fleet in 1653 and 1665?  
More explicitly, in the desperate circumstances of 1653 it was said that Baltic trade seamen were to be pressed.​[326]​  Some plans to reintroduce open force came to nothing – like De Witt’s project to introduce the press in 1665,​[327]​ but in the crisis of 1672, the Holland States planned to conscript inhabitants of coastal villages and islands for sea service.​[328]​
In 1667, during the alliance with France, Ambassador D’Estrades sought permission to press (arrêter) French seamen in the Dutch Republic.  Incredibly, the States General even agreed to assist French officials: the Dutch were clearly willing to sacrifice their principles if circumstances demanded it – albeit here concerning foreigners.​[329]​

Dutch naval recruitment: 
Trade embargoes and other elements of the use of force

The British and Dutch naval recruitment systems are usually classified as fundamentally opposite: the British method as ‘unfree’ compulsion and the Dutch as ‘free’ or voluntary.​[330]​  This assessment is based on surface perceptions of, on the one hand, the infamous British press and on the other, the Dutch method of recruiting by shutting down alternative employment through the use of embargoes on trade.  In the British case, this flawed view ignores the heavy component of volunteers that has been conclusively demonstrated by Rodger, Capp and J. David Davies.​[331]​  Jan Lucassen recognised the British system as mixed free/unfree – and even placed more emphasis on the free element in British recruitment, because he thought that pressed men could be categorised as forced for usually only one campaign.​[332]​  This viewpoint, however, completely overlooks the frequent use of the turnover (draft into another ship) at the end of the campaigning season.  Unchecked, the rosy view of Dutch recruitment is dangerous: it has led one leading historian to hint that force was not needed, simply because the Dutch navy developed ‘not as a policy of state but out of the spontaneous needs of the maritime communities’.​[333]​
Van Royen simplified the British system down to the press and emphasised the difference between it and the Dutch ‘free will of the individual sailor’.​[334]​  Lucassen, too, described sailors entering through embargoes as ‘voluntary’.​[335]​  This is a drastically over-simplified evaluation.  Yet doubt is implicit in some assessments.  Glete initially agreed with the voluntary assessment – noting in passing the Dutch use of embargoes.​[336]​  Later, he recognised these were ‘a mild form of compulsion’.​[337]​  Davids appraised Dutch naval recruitment as ‘essentially voluntary’ – using embargoes and quota levies – ‘rather than outright coercion’.​[338]​  The foremost modern Dutch naval historian makes a passing subtle, but important, distinction on embargoes: through their use, the Dutch authorities thereby ‘cleverly created circumstances in which such men were made more willing to consider naval service’.  In the Dutch language Bruijn is more explicit: in wartime the Dutch 

‘amply disposed of means to get seamen into naval service.  They made it impossible for them to do their normal work’.​[339]​

Boxer also stopped somewhat short: embargoes were a means to ‘induce’ naval service – as the only way to earn a living.​[340]​  De Jonge, however, let the mask slip: the 1690-2 embargoes were laid ‘in order to thus force these [seamen] to go into the state’s service’.​[341]​  The Dutch master, however, seems to have gone unnoticed in this respect.  In effect, closing off other employment options amounts to nothing less than the use of force, however indirect: join the navy or starve.  Whilst Dutch seamen naturally tried to hold out as long as possible before enlisting in the low-paid navy, this was not possible for most or for very long in what was a subsistence occupation.  Naval manpower shortages were largely alleviated by the admiralties raising their wages (see Chapter 4), but the existence of ‘the carrot’ does not nullify the use of ‘the stick’.  Such implications have not sufficiently penetrated maritime historiography: instead, it has been left for a historian outside the maritime specialism to point out that crews came aboard Dutch ships ‘under the lash not of the press but of penury and need.’​[342]​
The views of contemporaries are instructive for our purposes.  Whilst a few might maintain that the mere absence of the press entailed a ‘voluntary’ system,​[343]​ most English opinion, however, agreed with Rowen’s assessment above: 

‘because they are a free state, they may not presse to sea, but by all wayes oppresse them [the seamen] soe as to constraine them to sea’​[344]​

Downing concurred: ‘they will inforce them […] to take on in their service or starve’.​[345]​  Rowland Gilbert, of English parentage and long-term residence in Holland, served aboard a Dutch warship and was captured by the British at the battle of Lowestoft (1665).  Originally, Gilbert had joined a Dutch merchantman bound for Spain: in his plea for release, Gilbert emphasised that he had been ‘forced’ into naval service.  The emphasis on compulsion worked – he was released on the recommendation of Barbara Villiers, Countess of Castlemaine, Charles II’s mistress.​[346]​  
Yet this view of the Dutch system was not confined to victims or opponents: as the Dutch fleet prepared for sea yet again in late summer 1666, allied (French) observers were convinced there would be no lack of crews.  The great number of seamen in Holland

‘would necessarily be forced to go to serve on the warships because of destitution and the need to feed their families’.​[347]​

Comparing the European naval recruitment systems well after the Anglo-Dutch alliance, the Sailors Advocate of 1728 agreed 

‘as their men are never […] subsisted during an embargo, they are forced to go into the States service for a maintenance’.​[348]​

So, the embargo was indirect coercion, but coercion all the same.  Francke mentions, but does not describe, certain ‘draconian’ recruitment measures.​[349]​  The embargo was certainly supported by more unpleasant measures: at least from 1665, pressure was also applied to sailors’ dependents – seamen and their families were denied poor-relief if the former did not serve in the fleet.​[350]​
	Another Dutch recruitment method was a quota levied from merchant ships.  Again, maritime historiography does not associate this with force – even though this means was (indirect) conscription.​[351]​ 
Once enlisted through unemployment and destitution, or the quota levy, the sailor was held in service until released.  This raises the question of how long a sailor was supposed to serve for.  During the 1640s at least, there was variation in terms of service – some sailors signed on for certain fixed times (equating perhaps to seasons) of which 6 or 12 months were probably the most common – or flexible terms.​[352]​  Other elements of force in the Dutch system, though, include the compulsory retention of seamen in service during winter.  Bruijn suggests that Dutch sailors were always paid off at the end of the campaigning season for the winter.​[353]​  This was often not the case in wartime or crisis, when the naval powers naturally tried to keep as much of their naval strength operational as long as possible.  De Jonge, too, maintained that, under De Witt (1653-72), they were kept ‘only once’ during the winter.​[354]​  In fact, with war in Europe imminent at the end of 1664, the States General ordered the admiralties to retain all their sailors throughout the winter of 1664/5 – in order to be ready as soon as required the following year.​[355]​  Downing reported that the Dutch were to be paid half-pay during winter 1664/5,​[356]​ but the Zeelanders – at least – were all on full wages during that time and continuously until autumn 1667.​[357]​  In 1666, De Ruyter and the fleet deputies concluded at an early stage – after the St James’ Day defeat in August – that the crews should be retained during winter 1666/7.​[358]​  These measures were very unpopular.  Instead, a permanent winter force of men was introduced in the 1690s, paid by a retainer (loopgeld) until the big ships were fitted out in the spring; 10,500-strong in 1696.​[359]​  Bruijn points out that the idea of a permanent peacetime corps was floated in 1659, but ‘only partially implemented’.​[360]​  The winter retainer, however, was being used in Zeeland at least as early as the winter of 1671/2.​[361]​
This was done, as is confirmed by the accounts of the chief magistrates at Flushing and Veere through that winter.  Besides Dutch and other deserters searched out, arrested and thrown in jail for short periods by these magistrates and their constables on a day-to-day basis, at the end of December 1666, two unnamed Scots sailors slipped away from the frigate Zeeridder in the Veere road (a few days away from sailing with Crijnssen across the Atlantic to Surinam, the West Indies and Virginia) and went ashore.  They were released from custody by the Admiralty Council on the intervention of their landlady and ordered instead aboard the frigate Delft.​[362]​  Delft was not part of the Atlantic expedition – the upcoming long and dangerous voyage aboard Zeeridder may have been a factor in the men’s decision to desert, the landlady’s successful intervention is noteworthy, but the failure to punish them at all severely is the crucial point.  Executions of deserters seem to have been very rare.​[363]​ 
Additionally, survivors of sunken or captured warships remained ‘engaged in service’ and did not receive their wage arrears unless they joined another ship.​[364]​  Like the British turnover, the Dutch drafted men from ship to ship.  Seamen usually joined the ship of a particular officer, and as in Britain, Dutch transfers caused discontent and confusion; crews had to be reminded that drafts were necessary.​[365]​  The Dutch prescribed the death penalty and forfeiture of wages for desertion.​[366]​  As in Britain, in practice such severity often had to be modified: from the end of 1666 deserters subsequently found in merchantmen were to be punished – for the first offence – by forfeiture of wages and public scourging in a halter.  It was death on the second.​[367]​  But can recruitment really be considered truly ‘free’ if death was proscribed for desertion?

The Dutch maritime sector: estimated employment





The totals of the two main sets of estimates are shown in Figure 2.2 above.​[371]​  The Dutch maritime sector was rather more sophisticated than the British, and unfortunately virtually no merchant or fishery musters are extant.  Thanks to the work of the abovementioned Dutch historians, as well as Van Bochove and Van Zanden, though, we have estimates of the whole maritime employment structure.  I have chosen to keep the older estimates in the framework here, rather than rely on interpolation from the new 1635 and 1694 estimates exclusively – because the gap in the latter encompasses almost our entire period.  A combination of the new and old estimates applicable to our period is shown in Table 2.1 below.​[372]​  














The size of the peacetime navy in 1670, and also that it constitutes the main difference in the total from 1680, is interesting.​[373]​  The size of the navy in 1694 is, however, very inaccurate (see Figure 2.3 below).  Privateering manpower has not yet been fitted into this structure; this option is eliminated for the peacetime estimates (1670 and 1680), but the wartime estimates of 1635 and 1694 would greatly benefit from this.​[374]​

Foreigners in embargoed Dutch maritime sub-sectors

We have seen from the British examples above that embargoes varied in their application across the different sub-sectors; this affected the total manpower rendered employed.  In Chapters 3 and 5 we shall see more of the foreign components of these sub-sectors, here the overall level of foreigners concerns us.  The most important sections vis a vis naval recruitment – as ‘fuel’ for the navy via embargo or levy – are the merchant sub-sector and the Greenland whale fishery.  Van Royen has shown that merchant crews averaged a 24% foreign component, 1700-1710, and that most of these foreigners were employed outside the safer short-range trades (which especially included the core Baltic and Norway trades).​[375]​  Extending this percentage, as a very rough guide, over the whole merchant sub-sector would give us up to around 6,000 foreigners during the Anglo-Dutch Wars; virtually the same estimated by Van Lottum for 1694.  I have applied this percentage across our period, as a very rough indicator, though Van Lottum has taken a very different approach, using guesstimate and interpolation.​[376]​  The composition may, though, have changed radically, as did the Greenland fishery between 1612-39 (30% foreigners), 1640-64 (6% foreigners) and 1700-1825 (65%).​[377]​  Applying the middle figure to 1670 would give us only about 500 foreigners.  From the 1680s, however, there was a large influx of foreigners.​[378]​  Interpolating, assuming linear progression, at 1680 would give us about 26%, or about 2,400 foreigners, close to Van Lottum’s figure for 1694 (2,200).​[379]​  The sea fishery is much less important for us here.  Sources are even sparser: the Zeeland sea fishery, at any rate, shows a negligible foreign component, 1.7%, up to 1650.​[380]​  Projecting this across the subsector at 1670 would yield only about 100 foreigners.




Figure 2.3 above shows the rise, peak, and decline of Dutch strength.​[381]​  The navy’s interaction with the rest of the maritime sector cannot be traced without looking at how embargoes and other methods of naval recruitment ‘fed’ off the remaining subsectors, which may explain why wartime maritime sector analysis has been mostly avoided hitherto.
Contemporary estimates of manpower in the different sub-sectors may have been inaccurate, but not wildly so, and were sometimes close enough to actuality.   In 1665, the Rotterdam and Zeeland admiralties were confident that the embargo on trade and whale fishery alone would easily supply enough men for the fleet.​[382]​  Modern estimates (for 1670) would give around 32,000 men in those sub-sectors – easily enough, in theory, to man a planned fleet of up to 25,000.  Whether the headroom was known, the Dutch leaders were confident that the twin combination of embargo and wage increases would fully man the fleet.​[383]​  
British intelligence, meanwhile, recognised the 1665 Dutch embargo as a vital means: Downing reported seamen enlisting in ‘great numbers’; specifically due to the embargo.  Once extended to the sea fishery, others thought 

‘the prohibition on commerce […] the Greenland fleet and herring fishery gives them 30,000 men’.​[384]​

This compares fairly well with the modern estimate (for 1670) of about 38,500 men.  The whale fishery was thought to yield the ‘maine force’.​[385]​  Van Bochove and Van Zanden’s recent work on employment in the fisheries clearly shows the drastic operation of the wartime embargoes, especially during the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars, but they have not connected this with deliberate state action.​[386]​  The sheer size of the Dutch merchant marine gave the impression of abundant supply – ‘neare 3,000’ ships were reported idle off Amsterdam in spring 1672.​[387]​

Dutch Naval Recruitment: current views on development of methods

Where trends in Dutch practice are touched on at all, it seems that the present view (established by De Jonge in the nineteenth century) is that half-measures before the Second Anglo-Dutch War – with only the whale fishery periodically embargoed – proved ‘defective’, so that the navy was ‘much worse-manned than the British’​[388]​  From 1665, however, embargoes covered the merchant sub-sector and the herring and Greenland fisheries.​[389]​  Bruijn makes no mention of these changes in practice, but does give the VOC and coastal fishery as the only exemptions.​[390]​  Jones implies that embargoes were used only from the Second Anglo-Dutch War onwards – to meet the new manpower demands – but still mentions a major example elsewhere from the earlier period.​[391]​
As for timing, Bruijn gives the embargo as starting in March or spring, lasting through the summer for the campaigning season, and taken off in the autumn.​[392]​  The embargo and laborious process of recruitment often started much earlier than March, especially when war seemed imminent.  Even De Jonge, working in some detail on 1665, gave the embargo as starting in April – when, in fact, it started in January and – in some sub-sectors – the previous December.​[393]​  Recently, Francke showed the 1691 measures started in January.​[394]​  In 1690, though, the embargo was laid late – in July.​[395]​
A naval quota was also levied from trade in return for release from embargo.  The first instance mentioned by both De Jonge and Bruijn was in 1659, when the Greenland trade was excused the embargo in exchange for a levy of 1200 men.​[396]​  This, however, is given as a fixed amount, and not – as it always was subsequently – by proportion: the levy was termed the ‘third-’, ‘fourth-’, or ‘fifth man’, depending on the ratio of men to be supplied.  From De Jonge, the next instance seems to be much later, in August 1690, when the embargo was taken off in exchange for the supply of every fourth man.​[397]​  Instead, a levy of the fourth man was tried over 20 years before 1690 (see below).  Bruijn does not talk of a chronological pattern, mentioning only generally that the levy of the ‘third or fifth man’ was also used ‘in later times’.​[398]​  


The Dutch Embargo: early development, 1644-53

Like the British, Dutch measures very early in our period were much shorter than they later became, and more sub-sectors were exempted.  Early in our period, a Dutch embargo of spring 1644 stopped the Baltic and Norway trades for almost five weeks.​[399]​  In 1652 the embargo was short-lived and preceded the war, running for just one month.  All outbound ships were stopped, except the Baltic trade and the herring and Greenland fisheries, though the Baltic was subsequently included, with the Norway trade only, in a brief extension.​[400]​  According to De Jonge, during the war no embargoes were placed – ‘neither trade, nor the fishery were embargoed, the whale fishery only excepted, and this only for a short time’.​[401]​  This view is in drastic need of revision.  It is true that only temporary stops took place in summer 1652.​[402]​  Another series of temporary stops were imposed in early 1653.​[403]​  These brief measures were to marshal trade for convoys: aimed at trade protection, these types of stop – generated by the strangling effect of British seapower in home waters on Dutch trade – complicate the issue.  However, the Baltic and Norway trades were stopped for two months, March-May 1653.​[404]​  This major decision was initiated just before the battle of Portland was joined and finalised before the disastrous outcome was known: recruitment must have been the objective.  After the Gabbard defeat of June 1653, as Jones has mentioned, all outbound traffic was embargoed: the primary aim was recruitment.​[405]​  As for the Greenland fishery, discussion was also begun before Portland; in the aftermath the admiralties were unanimous on crucial importance of embargo: the Greenland fishery was stopped in March 1653 – for the whole year.​[406]​  A major change in practice, then, took place during 1653; a first stage in the development of still harsher measures.  The product of the new policy can be clearly seen in the increased manpower in 1653 in Figure 2.1 above.

The turning point: the Dutch embargo, 1664-5

Like the British, winter 1664/5 marks a radical change; the Dutch introduced much longer, deeper and more comprehensive measures.​[407]​  From autumn 1664, foreigners were included in one of the other, not recruitment-related types of embargo – a measure preventing the export of war materials.​[408]​  All trade, however, was stopped in December,​[409]​ bringing in many more foreigners and causing new French and Swedish protests.​[410]​
The general embargo was restated in late January 1665: the whale fishery was stopped for the whole year.​[411]​  Foreigners were hit very hard.  French protests first secured the release of some French-built ships only, then 20 small ships.  Swedish and Portuguese protests were categorically denied.​[412]​  On the whole, the embargo seems to have strictly imposed, though the admiralties granted a few passes: in March, two months in, measures on the whale fishery were tightened – the projected battle fleet was still 3,000-3,500 men short – ‘notwithstanding all their boasting and shouting’; all the fisheries were embargoed.  In April, French, Spanish and Swedish protests came to nothing.  In the first two cases, the protests were also against the seizure and appropriation of major warships being built for those states and nearing completion in Dutch yards.​[413]​  The seizure of the medium-sized warships St Jean Baptiste and Alette Marie, bought for the French East India Company at Amsterdam, was the final straw: France stopped all Dutch ships in French ports.  Back in Amsterdam, the 90 French seamen sent to sail the Indiamen home were all now jobless.​[414]​  Requesting their release, the French protested that the Amsterdam admiralty ‘seduced’ (recruited) these men, or else had them bribed and otherwise ‘chased away’.​[415]​  One early concession was the French West India Company Susanne – allowed to sail from Zeeland, but only ‘manned all with French crew’.​[416]​  At the end of April the French were the first neutrals released from the rigorous embargo,​[417]​ but only in ballast (so any goods laden would have to be sold) and only with their original inbound crews, who should only be French subjects.  Wrangling over the cargoes merely delayed the ships’ release: three more Compagnie de l’Occident ships at Amsterdam were not released until June.  Only ballast was permitted, and only their original inbound crews – despite D’Estrades’ claim that their crews were entirely French anyway.​[418]​  The Zeelanders certainly ‘strictly’ searched outbound foreign (French) ships, removing all Dutch and any foreign personnel not on the inbound crew musters.​[419]​  The concession to the French opened the way for others.  Karl XI of Sweden immediately complained to the Dutch, who very quickly relented and released all Swedish ships under the same conditions: only in ballast, crewed only by those Swedish subjects borne when inbound.​[420]​  In May, after long discussion, the States General released all remaining neutrals on the same conditions.​[421]​
So, the French were released after three months, other foreigners after almost four months of forced inactivity: a long, uncertain time, when many merchant seamen must have either deserted in search of employment elsewhere or been laid off.​[422]​  Yet release from embargo did not result in freedom of movement for all foreign sailors: the examination of all merchant crew musters prohibited any Dutch subjects or any new foreign crewmembers whatsoever; it allowed only original inbound crew that were the same nationality as the ship – any other original foreigners were also banned.  Thus, a Swedish seaman inbound on a French ship could not go out on her, nor a Frenchman aboard a Danish vessel.  Perhaps more importantly – in terms of numbers of men – these regulations stopped any foreigners working in the Dutch sector from leaving: a large surplus of foreign manpower was stranded in the Republic, whilst Dutch sailors had the option of foreign service shut off.
The Dutch legislation therefore went beyond simple state blanket interference in the labour market: using the minutiae of trade, it was a sophisticated attempt to control the workings of the internationalised labour market – differentiating it into segregated national compartments, whilst sieving off the excess international labour.  




The labour supply, which was actually expanding with the constant return of Dutch merchantmen from abroad, was not yet mitigating manpower shortages.​[426]​  The embargo was not enough: the Amsterdam admiralty reported that the flow of seamen had dried up entirely.  Wage increases were now the only solution (see Chapter 4).​[427]​  This was itself an admission that many skilled seamen were still resisting enlistment – some three months after the imposition of the embargo; ‘notwithstanding the stop to all trade, fisheries and otherwise’.  Yet problems continued: the VOC contingent was particularly short.  Besides requesting more soldiers, the States General blamed the manpower shortage on privateers ‘seducing’ men already enlisted in the fleet.  Privateers were supposedly stopped from sailing altogether until the fleet was manned and out.​[428]​  The 1665 embargo was ground-breaking for its duration as well as for its extent: the core Baltic and Norwegian trades were not permitted until November – almost one year after the measure was first imposed.​[429]​ 
The 1666 measures closely followed those of 1665: a full general embargo on all Dutch and foreigners, who were again hit hard – even allies.​[430]​  The Greenland fishery was stopped at the beginning of 1666; the other fisheries were also affected.​[431]​  Measures were tightened against leakage, and the embargo reinstated after the enormous summer battles, showing strategic flexibility.​[432]​  Despite difficulties enforcing the measures,​[433]​ and though there were still manpower shortages,​[434]​ the Dutch got to sea after the St James Day defeat, having suffered enormous casualties during the year.  The French now formally allied, the embargo was continued through more French complaints in September; trade was not opened until October, with the same conditions on the crews of foreign ships as before.​[435]​

Dutch recruitment 1667-1702: embargo & merchant quota levy

The pattern established in 1665 was largely continued until William’s War, but with an important innovation in 1667.  That innovation was used in a dual system from the early 1690s.  As we saw, by this time merchant sub-sector employment had fallen to about 22,500 men; applying Van Royen’s data to this gives us about 5,400 foreigners.
In 1667 no embargo was laid because of reduced manpower requirement.​[436]​  A different approach was indeed taken in 1667: all trade except the whale fishery was opened.  Merchant masters, however, were required to inform themselves on their crews and fined 100fl for every man found to be a naval deserter.​[437]​  The biggest change was a development of the system tried in 1659: the ‘fourth man’ quota levy was imposed on the remaining sub-sectors in December 1666.​[438]​  After some initial confusion, neutrals did not escape the measures: as under the embargo, from February 1667 they were mustered on their arrival in port and again on departure; any extra crew found aboard were taken off.​[439]​  The levy of the fourth man should have yielded around 6,000 men from the Dutch sector for the navy, of which perhaps 1500 were foreigners – if levied on an equal basis (i.e., without prejudice) with native Dutch seamen.  Together with the 8,000 unemployed by the Greenland embargo, the total figure of 14,000 rendered available for the navy is actually lower than the naval manpower for 1667 in Figure 2.3 above, and is a massive reduction on those theoretically available in 1665 (Figure 2.4).  This is one of the special aspects of 1667.




In just over four weeks, first the Greenland fishery was stopped for the whole year;​[441]​ swiftly extended to the Baltic and Norway trades.​[442]​  The embargo became general, bringing in foreigners, before Holmes attacked the Dutch Smyrna convoy.  Before the French declaration of war, French ships were released from the general embargo,​[443]​ presumably as a desperate (but, of course, totally hopeless) goodwill gesture.​[444]​  The embargo pattern was very similar in 1673.​[445]​
In some quarters the importance of the Dutch embargo after 1672 was entirely missed,​[446]​ perhaps because, in the far less desperate times after forcing Britain out of the war, it seems the embargo was more narrowly applied.​[447]​  The herring fishery was still often stopped, but also often released in midsummer.​[448]​




As for the subsequent fifth man, of 32 men levied from over seven owners for the Zeeland warships Middelburg and Konink Willem, 11 (34.4%) were foreigners – including three British (9.4%).​[452]​  Although a miniscule sample, this is the best we have so far from this type of source; the foreign level is higher than Van Royen’s Zeeland merchant figures (26%).​[453]​  The severity of the measure was diluted, however, in winter 1691/2 by the introduction of an owners’ option to redeem the obligation for a token payment.​[454]​  But the timing hints at a possible cross-fertilisation from British practise; William’s War may have seen the use of early winter embargoes.​[455]​  In combination with the general embargo,​[456]​ the levy was much-used during William’s War.​[457]​  The latter, as in 1667, was extracted from neutrals – and now even allies: the British complained rather belatedly (1702) that, whenever the Dutch imposed a quota levy, they also took ‘the fifth man’ out of all English ships – or had money in his place.​[458]​  Taken together, from 1691, the dual system and possible winter option may have opened more of a window for trade during the late summer and autumn (barring the season of the fleet action in 1692), though this needs further exploration.  The ratio was increased to the fourth man in 1696.​[459]​  Certainly, the measures were successful – naval manpower peaked again that year at almost 25,000 men, matching the era of Dutch glory (see Figure 2.2 above).  Use of the embargo continued in 1702.​[460]​

Dutch naval recruitment: Privateer quota levies and restrictions

Though they were sometimes included in particular embargo legislation, because they were very often dealt with by independent measures, privateers are best dealt with separately – not least because they were also often competing with the navy for the same manpower rendered jobless by the embargoes.​[461]​  Privateering was a natural alternative for merchant owners stopped by embargo, whilst for seamen, privateers’ great advantages in prize money (see Chapter 4 for basic wages) and safety over the navy were a constant magnet.
So, to restrict this competition with the navy for manpower, Dutch privateering was usually stopped for the campaigning season, and any vessels out recalled: at least in the middle and later part of our period, privateers were cautioned to return by the spring.​[462]​  With these regulations, according to Bruijn, privateering generally peaked between the autumn and early spring.​[463]​  This might work as a general rule, but needs qualification.  
Firstly, privateering operational periods varied.  In 1665, for example, privateers competed for manpower with the navy for some months until stopped in May, provided they surrendered a quota (see below).  Privateering was reopened in September 1665.​[464]​  In June 1667, although hostilities continued until August in European waters (and longer further away), the Zeelanders, at least – and about to miss the Medway Raid through manpower shortages – stopped all their privateers and searched them for naval deserters.​[465]​
Secondly, regulations were often limited in their application – or either bent or ignored.  Officially, Dutch privateering was more heavily restricted during 1672-4 than in 1665-7: it was banned, at first supposedly for the whole year, but in the end only until the end of July 1672, banned again in March 1673 and not re-opened until September 1673.  It is clear, however, that privateering continued during the bans, though at lower levels.  More accurately, the ban on privateers going out and recall of those already at sea did not apply to those already or intending beyond the Tropic of Cancer or to the Mediterranean.​[466]​  These were the very hunting grounds that offered some of the richest pickings, and cruised by the heaviest privateers with the largest complements.​[467]​  These geographical bounds on the regulations seem to have applied thereafter.  Also, in practise, the theoretically strict regulations of March 1673 were relaxed after a petition by the owners of 13 Zeeland privateers: all Zeeland privateers were subsequently permitted to go to sea – albeit under caution of a heavy financial penalty.​[468]​
As for naval desertion to privateers, Bruijn does not illuminate any instances.​[469]​  In early 1665, seven Amsterdam admiralty warships in the Wielings lost many men deserting to Zeeland privateers.​[470]​  Later in the spring, desertion from the navy to go in privateers was said to be a ‘daily’ occurrence.​[471]​  On the other hand, though Zeeland warships suffered in what was the major European centre of privateering – evidenced not least by the repeated legislation against desertion – at this particular time (spring 1665), naval desertion in Zeeland was relatively low, and only one specific instance of loss to privateers is obvious.  In the few weeks from the issue of privateering commissions until he complained to the admiralty, the Zeeland naval captain Jan Banckert lost six deserters from the frigate Delft (5% of her seamen); probably all to the local privateer captain Jan Diemissen (Zeemeeuw).  Yet this rate was lower than her heavy average rate, 12.4%, May 1664-September 1665.​[472]​  We would expect the opposite.  But this is not the only case where the rate decreased whilst the privateering ‘window’ was open in early 1665: the Zeeland flagship’s overall rate of desertion, again heavy at 13.2%, June 1664-September 1665, fell to about 3% in this period.  In this case the deserters included three British seamen.​[473]​  Nonetheless, these losses to privateers are still appreciable.
	Was privateering itself a magnet for foreign migrant workers?  With the Dutch reputation, it must have been; unfortunately the sources offer us virtually nothing directly (see Chapter 5).  Yet privateering may have increased the overall size of the wartime labour market.  Just before the declaration of war and extension of the embargo in early 1665, Zeeland, when pressing for the issue of privateering commissions, (which was to result in simultaneous recruitment by both privateers and the navy) suggested the possible levy of every seventh or eighth man from privateer crews to reinforce the embargo.  The Zeelanders were totally overconfident of an abundant labour supply, maintaining that failure to set privateers loose would in itself lead to unemployment and lead to the drying up of the ‘great multitude’ of migrant seamen from abroad: directly implying these were normally drawn in by privateer employment prospects.​[474]​  Even if the Zeelanders’ assertion was foremost a pretext, the foreign component of Zeeland privateer crews was perhaps 16% during William’s War.​[475]​  Conversely, all the men above who deserted Jan Banckert were Dutch (Zeelanders), when we might expect one or two foreigners because they made up 16% of his crew (see Chapter 7).  It is probable that, as with the best merchant jobs, native Dutch seamen had preference.  Considerable numbers, however, of French naval seamen deserted and joined Zeeland privateers; the latter were forbidden to recruit French deserters at the end of 1666.​[476]​ 
As part of the restated January 1665 embargo, Dutch privateers had to levy one man for the navy for each man in their crews.​[477]​  Downing rightly predicted that ‘that will faile to be sure Zealand will not keepe their Capers to any such rule’.​[478]​  In the spring, the stream of legislation repeating the measure was a sure sign of its evasion: owners were to be more ‘exactly constrained’ to follow the regulations.  In Zeeland, owners’ securities were called in to enforce the levy, but the admiralty even reduced the proportion to their earlier proposal of the eighth man.​[479]​  The States General soon refused another Zeeland formal request for the eighth man only, insisting on one-for-one.​[480]​  Subsequently, the Zeeland privateers had to supply the admiralty with ‘as many men as they usually carry’.​[481]​  A heavy penalty for contravention was introduced: a 100fl fine per man unsupplied – which proclamation ‘doth sufficiently declare their want of seamen’.​[482]​  Nonetheless, for at least one month when the navy was still short of crews and both combatants were racing to get to sea first, eight men were joining Zeeland privateers for every one joining the navy – with admiralty sanction.  Besides leakage from ships evading the embargo and men’s reluctance to enlist in the navy, competition from privateers must go some way to explain the gap we saw between the number of men embargoed and the navy’s actual manpower.  Even under the centrally-authorised measures, in theory privateers could split the available manpower down the middle with the navy.  The only answer was to stop privateers from recruiting altogether – enacted in July 1665.​[483]​
In late 1666, privateer owners had to give security that, the following year, they would supply the fleet at one-for-one.​[484]​  The quota levy continued under William III, but was reduced so that privateers supplied the same proportion as merchantmen: the fifth man was taken in 1691.​[485]​  This continued in 1692, but privateers – like the merchant owners, again, above – were given the option to redeem the obligation at 100fl per man from January 1692.​[486]​  This must have severely diluted the measure’s effectiveness.

Dutch recruitment abroad: enlistment of foreigners in situ

Besides the large numbers of foreign subjects joining in the Republic – both migrants and those in foreign ships caught by embargo – one route by which foreigners entered Dutch service was by direct recruitment abroad. Naval operations in neutral or allied areas meant this manpower resource could be tapped in situ.  Otherwise, agents were based abroad to do this work.  A Briton, Dennis Connor, was a recruitment agent at Hamburg (see below).​[487]​  It is interesting to note that here one type of foreigner was given the job of recruiting yet more, different, foreigners.  
There are a number of wartime instances of raising crews from allies or benevolent neutrals: recruitment was intensive in France in summer 1652, via the Dutch agent at Calais.​[488]​  Crews were recruited there again in 1659.​[489]​  In 1666, Dutch requests to recruit in French Atlantic ports were not actually opposed, but the French claimed there were no seamen to be had.​[490]​  The Dutch recruited in Norway, 1656,​[491]​ whilst during the Dutch Baltic intervention in 1658, Denmark supplied men, in some numbers, directly to the Dutch fleet.​[492]​  In 1666 Frederik III agreed that the Dutch could recruit the enormous figure of 3,000 seamen ‘in Norway and Jutland’.​[493]​
The regional cross-border labour market on the Flanders coast was a resource on the Zeelanders’ doorstep that they actively tapped at source.  In April 1672, Rear-Admiral Matthijssen’s clerk and navigator recruited in the neutral Spanish Netherlands (Flanders and Brabant).​[494]​  In May, one Barent Barentsen recruited secretly for Dirk Jobssen Kijella in the Vlaemsche quartieren.  Not only in the Spanish Netherlands at Bruges, Ostend, and St Donaes, Barentsen even recruited in enemy French territory at Dunkirk, well after the declaration of war.  After taking three mates at Bruges, he returned with 18 men after a seven-day journey.​[495]​  In early 1672 Vice-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen twice sent his navigators to enlist men at Ostend and Bruges.​[496]​  In early 1673, Adriaan Banckert de Jonge’s master returned from far down the coast at Nieupoort, almost certainly from a recruitment mission.​[497]​  We shall see in Chapter 5 that the Southern Netherlands component in Zeeland crews, always appreciable, increased during this episode. 
From the opposite perspective, the Dutch labour market was so large that allied or friendly powers were sometimes given permission to recruit seamen in the Republic.  In 1678, for instance, Denmark was allowed to recruit 800 seamen.​[498]​  Dutch diplomats emphasised that the Danes had to recruit many seamen in the Republic.​[499]​  In times of stress the Dutch banned the practice – for example in autumn 1665, spring 1695 and in 1700.​[500]​  Wartime bans could be aimed at allies: in late 1666 the French allies were allowed to raise 400 seamen, but these had to be non-Dutch – i.e. foreign.​[501]​  Other bans were aimed at foreign privateers.​[502]​

State Recalls and other measures against foreign-serving seamen

In times of war or imminent crisis naval powers reacted to the foreign service of large proportions of their native seamen by issuing official recalls of seamen abroad.  This repeated legislation is itself evidence of the internationalisation of maritime labour.  In addition, the recalls were indicators of imminent war, if not actually part of the escalatory process itself.  For the British, French and others, recalls were ‘frequent Practice’.​[503]​  In the Dutch case, the legislation was sometimes actually part of the embargo measures:​[504]​ the recalls were clearly seen as an integral part of a larger package.  Generally, these periodic measures had little effect on the overall international character of the labour market: J. Ehrman pointed out that internationalisation was ‘too widespread and deep-rooted a custom to be prevented by an occasional proclamation’.​[505]​  Internationalisation continued, for sure, but neither the measures themselves, nor seamen’s responses to them have been properly investigated.  The recalls’ limited overall effect might seem surprising as both the British and Dutch, at least, routinely specified death – and loss of property, so sailors’ families were also hit – for non-compliance.​[506]​  Dutch recalls sometimes spelt out that offenders’ destitute families would be at the mercy of the state: the church deacons were to deny poor relief, and other means of support for their wives and children were also stopped.​[507]​  Whilst the recalls were not universally obeyed, we shall see that neither were they monolithically ignored.
Firstly, from the other side of our study, Dutch recalls specifically targeting their sailors in enemy service in themselves signify that men were in such service.​[508]​  Tellingly, specific bans were aimed at particular countries or trades that came to the fore.  In 1674 Dutch seamen were forbidden to sail on foreign Indiamen.​[509]​  The same trades were targeted in 1680 – peacetime.​[510]​  The Dutch seem to have issued recalls annually during wartime; perhaps more frequently than the British.​[511]​  Again, development took place in administration: the Dutch recall of February 1652 was well in advance of both hostilities and the belated Commonwealth recall of September, but seems particularly poorly thought out.​[512]​  The measures may have been very ineffective: in 1673 offenders were threatened with prosecution – as if this was unusual.​[513]​  The recalls, of course, also applied to naturalised (foreign-born) Dutch subjects and those descended from such migrants.
The recalls were answered by some: before the outbreak of war in early 1665, Dutch seamen taken on prizes and afterwards released streamed ‘daily’ from England to Zeeland.​[514]​  Francke notes those returning from French service in 1689.​[515]​  But others clearly ignored the recalls and bans.  In November 1666, the French West India Company Europa (400 tons) left the Texel under Flemish colours with a totally Dutch crew.​[516]​  In April 1667, Dutch subjects had to be specifically forbidden from entering Swedish service or taking Swedish citizenship in order to work on Swedish ships.  Many were migrating to Sweden permanently, taking their families.​[517]​  With Dutch trade under more normal conditions in 1667, seamen probably started to try to exercise choice: another general recall had to be issued in May, just before the climax of the war.​[518]​
To return to Britain, British monarchs issued recalls, starting well before our period.​[519]​  The Interregnum regimes did likewise; the Scottish Privy Council issued additional recalls of its own aimed specifically at Scots seamen.​[520]​  Recalls were not strictly confined to wartime.​[521]​  The death penalty was always specified.  
The 1650 Act gave all ‘English’ seamen only four months to return.  Given the realities of distance, these terms were unrealistic in the extreme.​[522]​  In May 1652, just days before Blake and Tromp clashed off Dover, but some three months after the Dutch had issued their own recall, the Admiralty Committee was instructed to prepare a new recall Act.​[523]​  The government were clearly already aware of large numbers of British serving with the Dutch: in early June Blake was instructed to send all the seamen taken on his Dutch prizes back to Holland – except any English found aboard.​[524]​  In mid-June, just before the diplomatic negotiations were finally broken off, the Venetian diplomat Lorenzo Paulucci, met Sir Oliver Fleming (the Commonwealth’s Master of Ceremonies) ‘unexpectedly’: 

‘He [Fleming] assured me that in the event of open war from 5,000 to 6,000 English sailors will be recalled from the Dutch service and made to enter that of their own country’.​[525]​

Because of the spontaneous nature of the men’s encounter, in assuming the matter-of-fact return of these seamen, Fleming was probably exhibiting nothing more than the casual over-confidence of a layman in naval matters, especially with the recall then in preparation.  One of the principle objectives, however, of the recently passed 1651 Navigation Act was to stimulate the number of English seamen, so that – in addition to the recall in preparation – the subject of the overall numbers and distribution of those seamen was a matter that had long been circulating in government.  Perhaps the amount estimated to be in the Republic – doubtless inaccurate and exaggerated by the difficulties in contemporary statistics – was even a contributing factor in Fleming’s ‘ostentation’ about the Dutch need to placate England and, more crucially, maybe even in the Commonwealth’s tough negotiating stance.
The early months after the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War seem to have been both a rude awakening for the Commonwealth and of legislative paralysis: evidence continued to mount, but the recall remained not passed.  In July, a servant of Scots merchants spoke to ‘several Scotchmen and English’ serving aboard Tromp’s flagship.​[526]​  In August, Appleton, the British commander in the Mediterranean, reported that 200 English and Scots seamen were aboard the warships of the Dutch Mediterranean squadron.​[527]​  No progress had been made by September, by which time the Council of State had received (unspecified) foreign intelligence ‘of great concernment to the service of the Commonwealth’.  The President himself (John Bradshaw) presented the intelligence to Parliament, also moving for the recall, which was ‘of great importance to the service and safety of the Commonwealth’.  Finally, the next day, 9 September, a new recall was issued.​[528]​  
Parliament lamented that, despite the 1650 Act, many ‘English’ seamen continued in foreign service and more had gone since.  These, nonetheless, were pardoned.  The new deadline to return was sensibly adjusted to account for geographical distance from home.  Offenders were to forfeit any property – to hit their families.​[529]​  It was claimed seven weeks later that the recall 

‘so wrought upon [the English in Dutch service] that they begin to look homeward, and many of them have passed [through Rotterdam] lately to Flanders for England’.​[530]​

This was probably wishful thinking: more likely factors than the recall were releases of POWs and falling morale in the Dutch fleet after the defeat at Kentish Knock.  Having eventually issued the recall, early in 1653 the Commonwealth was angered – and even seemed genuinely surprised – when large numbers of British were found amongst the Dutch prisoners taken at the Battle of Portland: Roman-style decimation was suggested:

‘you will find many Scots, Irish, and English among the seamen that you have taken, whether it were not fitting to cause martial law to be executed on some of them for example’s sake, and put them to fling the die that one out of them may suffer for it, for there hath past one or two Acts of Parliament for their return home to serve the State and not to serve any foreign State upon the pain of death.’​[531]​

Amongst the Dutch prisoners there were enough British to place the issue near the very top of the Government agenda.  First, Scott was to move Parliament for a decision on the ‘several English, Scotch, and Irish that were taken prisoners aboard the Dutch ships and in their service’ at Portland.​[532]​  Parliament passed the buck back to the Council of State.  The government then investigated legal procedure for trials; lists of the British prisoners were ordered prepared, but the further course of the affair is unclear.​[533]​  Olive Anderson may have made an error by including this episode of British prisoners taken in enemy naval service in her study dealing only with British prisoners from rebel privateers.​[534]​  The legal status of both groups was looked at anew in October 1653: the Admiralty Commissioners were to insert them in the Articles of War, to be tried by Council of War.​[535]​  Again, this was after hundreds of prisoners had been taken in battle at Scheveningen; the measure has to be seen as a way of bypassing normal legal procedure and administering quick executions.  Soon after, the government restated the 1649 treason ordinances and did so again in 1654.  These listed all crimes classed as high treason – included those subjects that ‘shall adhere unto any forces raised by the enemies of the Parliament or Commonwealth’.​[536]​
After the Restoration recalls were handled once more by royal proclamation; those for the next two Anglo-Dutch wars were issued before formal hostilities.  Charles II’s recall of June 1664 should have set Dutch alarm bells ringing;​[537]​ that of January 1672 was too short-notice.​[538]​  Some later recalls especially reflect the political situation: with invasion imminent in 1688 James issued a flurry of measures: initially a general recall, then two more specifically from Dutch service, all British, then explicitly Scots.​[539]​  The practice continued under William and Anne.​[540]​

The fate of ‘traitors’

For both British and Dutch seamen the penalty for serving the enemy or ignoring the recalls was theoretically death.​[541]​  Ogg wrote, regarding the 3,000 English and Scots reported in Dutch service in 1667, of ‘the certainty of hanging when caught by their compatriots’.​[542]​  How were such men actually dealt with?  How were they recognised?  This might be extremely difficult, as the learning of foreign languages was often a consequence of the sailor’s work, and probably an inherent one for migrants.  For instance, the Dover sailor Edward Coxere, himself an embodiment of the internationalisation of maritime labour, was captured in Dutch service in 1652.  A polyglot after extensive experience abroad, he was mistaken for a Fleming and later escaped.​[543]​ 
From the Dutch perspective, examples remain elusive of what actually happened to men captured in the enemy service, but some men continued in safer and more profitable employment on neutral ships and were discovered.​[544]​  The Zeelanders searched all foreign ships in the Vlack at the end of 1666 for Dutch subjects and naval deserters.  A ‘considerable number’ of Dutch seamen were found on the large number of Flemish merchantmen arrested.  The Zeeland admiralty quickly recognised that to imprison so many was too ‘expensive, inconvenient and difficult’.​[545]​  Very quickly under pressure from the men’s wives and friends – the men must have been Zeeland-based – the admiralty allowed their pleadings of ‘ignorance’ of the statute and ‘relaxed the severity’ of the punishment.  The punishment was reduced to a token fine of one month’s wages and gaoler’s costs.​[546]​  On Christmas Day, six Hollanders were dragged out and put aboard the Zeeland Rear-Admiral, Jan Matthijssen.  Over the following few days many more Dutch subjects were found – including 42 taken by force on just one day (in the evening on New Year’s Eve) – and thrown straight in prison.​[547]​  (The incident brought more foreign service to light.  The French Consul at Middelburg intervened on behalf of French seamen on the arrested ships; the ships were ordered to be searched once again and French seamen allowed off – they were to be permitted to join Matthijssen.​[548]​  This was probably a quid pro quo for the ban on Zeeland privateers recruiting French seamen.)  Short punishment, though, did not deter many Dutch seamen from ignoring the recalls.  Large numbers aboard Flemish merchantmen were again encountered in 1673.​[549]​  In 1667, Willem Pieterssen (Enkhuizen) was navigator on the Swedish merchantman Postruiter.  He was unlucky enough to be found when she was taken by a Zeeland privateer, but was released after some time in jail.​[550]​ 
From the British side, Olive Anderson looked at British prisoners captured on rebel privateers; the treatment of them varied, but the whole question introduced the issue of piracy, through the guerre de course, into the legal argument.​[551]​  During the Interregnum, British subjects found on foreign privateers were dealt with severely – transported to the Plantations.​[552]​  In the separate naval sphere, Clowes noted the Council of State’s ‘reluctance’ to hang the abovementioned British POWs taken at Portland, 1653, and that this was due to the then dire manning situation of the British navy.​[553]​  This probably sets the general tone for the actual treatment of common seamen during most of our period.  We can only wonder whether clemency was sought by the unnamed Scot who gave away a plot to escape by his fellow Dutch POWs at Shields.​[554]​  Rowland Gilbert above was released by Castlemaine’s intervention, but this is only one case.  Just a few days after the British victory at the St James’ Day Fight in 1666, it was decreed that all British subjects taken prisoner in the future were to be hung ‘as rebels and traitors’.​[555]​  The timing indicates that enough such men must have been found amongst the large haul of prisoners to warrant such an instruction.  The rising political star Sir Thomas Clifford MP – a close intimate of Secretary of State Arlington – was aboard the flagship Royal Charles as a volunteer during the battle and seems to have been present at initial interrogations of prisoners immediately afterwards.​[556]​  Most, if not all, of the Dutch prisoners came from the two large warships ships taken: Sneek (66, Friesland admiralty) and Tholen (60, flagship of Adriaan Banckert, then Vice-Admiral of Zeeland).  Tholen certainly had British crew aboard (see below and Chapter 7); some escaped with Banckert in the final moments before she was taken, others were killed or taken prisoner.  
But even the periodic emphasis of death sentences for non-compliance probably remained merely theoretical – it must have been just as impractical to execute every man taken as it was to make an example of every deserter and mutineer.  (Although a few of the latter were chosen by lot and executed as examples.​[557]​)  Also, these men were simply too valuable a resource to kill.  British naval captain’s instructions issued after the 1664 recall suggest British subjects found on foreign (neutral) ships were still treated leniently.​[558]​  Enemy service, though, was a different level of disobedience.
The Scots navigator Andrew Dougal (Wemys) was captured aboard Wapen van Zeeland at Lowestoft in 1665, yet seems to have been released fairly quickly afterwards in exchanges of POWs – unless he escaped from prison (more difficult for him, a one-armed man). Already a long-serving veteran, he certainly reappears aboard in early 1666 as Banckert’s navigator, only to be killed in action aboard Tholen that August (see Chapter 7).​[559]​  Sir George Downing, the Dutch-hating British ambassador at The Hague, had enquired just days after Lowestoft whether ‘there [were] no English nor Scotch taken on board any Dutch ship to make examples [of]?’​[560]​  Again, after a major battle, the issue of punishment of those in enemy service was raised.  Despite this high-level prompting, it seems that not a single one of the five British captured aboard Wapen van Zeeland was executed.  We know about Dougal: of the other four, one died in prison and one escaped some months later.  Another, Andrew Thomson (Anstruther), was still in prison 18 months later; plenty of time for his identity to be discovered (see Chapter 7).
It is not yet clear whether Dougal was specifically prioritised by the Zeelanders for immediate POW exchange, but it is highly likely.  His subsequent position as one of the Vice-Admiral’s navigators surely marks his importance.​[561]​  Other captured British personnel were certainly earmarked for quick return: the surgeon Robert Chapman was captured in early 1665 with Cornelis Evertsen de Jongste aboard the privateer Eenhoorn.  The Admiralty Council did prioritise Chapman for POW exchange.​[562]​  When the Dutch choose those to be exchanged, it is clear that some British personnel were considered valuable enough to take precedence over their own people.
Other British personnel were captured, but were not executed and later served again aboard Zeeland warships.  The veteran boatswain Robert Spens (Kirkcaldy) was wounded and captured with Cornelis Evertsen de Oude (Zeeuwsche Leeuw, 30) at Scheveningen/Ter Heide in August 1653.  He is not shown in a list of officers (including gunners, boatswains and carpenters) taken prisoner; he was surely trying to conceal himself.  He was still recovering from his wounds in England in April 1654, so had been open to discovery for nine months.  Spens certainly returned to Zeeland, serving until 1688 in a remarkable career.​[563]​  
Aboard Tholen, John Ramsen (Aberdeen) was initially listed killed, but was taken prisoner with David Drompel (Leith), both reappeared in Zeeland service after the war.  George Morris (Leith) was wounded aboard Tholen but escaped with the Vice-Admiral.  He was captured at some later date.  Morris survived his imprisonment: either escaping or exchanged, he was back aboard Zeeland warships in early 1667.​[564]​  Did Dougal, Thomson, Chapman, Spens, Ramsen, Drompel and Morris all pass for Dutchmen, shielded by their shipmates and knowledge of the language, or was their nationality discovered and simply ignored?
The ultimate impotence of the state in this regard is further evidenced by the desperate flotation of an idea mooting the death penalty for any captured Dutch captain found to have British subjects in his crew.​[565]​  In 1675, with Britain now neutral, two Englishmen served with the French privateer Cheline, taking a Dutch ship in Dublin roads and looting three British ships.  Other issues aside, the chief admiralty judge considered they could only be fined and imprisoned for being illegally in foreign service.​[566]​  
After the Anglo-Dutch alliance, the treatment of British subjects captured in enemy (French) service varied.  It seems that, by the Treaty of Limerick, October 1691, Irish personnel captured in French service may have been treated as ordinary POWs and exempted from trial, as this feature was withdrawn for Jacobite privateer commanders in September 1692.​[567]​  Francke cites the 1692 example of the hanging of three English seamen taken on a French privateer.​[568]​  The sheer impact of privateering once the French switched over to guerre de course may be responsible for a much more severe attitude to subject POWs.  In the case of Jacobite privateers, the absence of privateering commissions issued by a legal sovereign opened new legal avenues – trial for piracy.  
In late 1693 special courts of Oyer and Terminer were set to try all English, Scots and Irish ‘taken at sea’.​[569]​  Olive Anderson notes that, besides two Jacobite privateer crewmembers hung for piracy, one Golding was hung, drawn and quartered for treason.  Golding seems to the same man as John Golden, captain of the Jacobite privateer Sun, which engaged the British warship James Galley; he maintained that he was French, and then ‘carried out of Ireland to Brittany […] so young, that he knew not his parentage in any other nation’.  Golden and two crewmembers, Thomas Jones and John Gold, whose origins were not mentioned, were hung, drawn and quartered for treason.​[570]​  Two Irish commanders of French privateers, Thomas Vaughan and John Murphy, were executed for treason in 1696.  Vaughan had tried to prove that he was born in Martinique, and so was a French subject.​[571]​  No Irish personnel captured in French service were being prosecuted, 1702-1703.​[572]​  Commanders, though, probably presented the ideal example: after his dismissal in 1703, the former RN captain Thomas Smith entered French service as a privateer captain.  He was captured and hanged as a traitor in 1708.​[573]​

Seamen’s responses to recalls

Individuals’ responses to the state recalls must have been as varied as their circumstances and attitudes.  Motivations amongst those obediently leaving Dutch service might also be rather different than loyalty to king or country: one Scots officer veteran of the VOC returned to Britain stressing that he would not serve against Charles II, ‘though it were but for name’s sake’ – his name too, was Stuart.​[574]​  In autumn 1664 a skipper outbound from Bordeaux reported ‘many English and Scotch’ in all 300 ships of the Dutch wine fleet.  He also came across 28 English seamen – ‘as proper men as ever hee saw’ – aboard a French frigate out of St Malo.  They must have formed a heavy proportion of her crew, even if she was a large warship with a couple of hundred men aboard.  He asked them

whether they tooke notice of the Kings Proclamation or noe.  They repleyd that they tooke service there [i.e. France] when they could have none in England [, but] when this voyage was done they would consider of it.​[575]​

For these men, clearly, the need to work took priority over obeying the decrees of their king.  As a corollary to this attitude, or the anti-Stuart motivations (whether implicit or explicit) of some British personnel, others did very belatedly answer the recall home to fight the enemies of their sovereign – or at least they decided to make a run for it once hostilities became formal.  On the other hand, in 1672 explicit fear of punishment kept some British seamen from returning, even though they were free because the Dutch had paid them off.​[576]​  They had reason to be afraid, too: the British authorities kept in custody the men that ‘daily quit foreign service’ and returned on the packet-boats;​[577]​ an extraordinary step – hardly an encouragement to return and surely counter-productive.
Varying attitudes are apparent from the Zeeland warship payrolls.  With war imminent in December 1664, some reluctant British personnel were released from the flagship of the Lieutenant-Admiral of Zeeland, Johan Evertsen, Hof van Zeeland.  Others stayed (see Chapter 7).​[578]​  

Wartime mobility: Opportunities to return to Britain?

But what opportunities existed for those wanting to return to actually do so in wartime?  Wartime voyages between the countries were usually limited to packet boats for post and passengers, and vessels specially licensed for bulk exchanges of prisoners of war or priority goods – or luxury merchandise for the elite.  The packets kept up wartime contact between England and the Republic, plying between Brill and Harwich.  (The Nieupoort-Dover and Calais-Dover routes were also kept open.)  At least as early as the Third Anglo-Dutch War, the British and Dutch mutually guaranteed the packets, though they were occasionally intercepted and ‘basely treated’ by Dutch privateers; sailing was then suspended for a time.​[579]​  The Dover-Nieupoort packet master was instructed to ship all English seamen wanting to return – i.e., those obeying the recall and leaving Dutch service, as well as released POWs – and to give the destitute necessary relief, and put this on account.  The government also promised to pay the packet master the same rate per seaman as for ordinary passengers.​[580]​  This route was closed for unknown reasons – by state action or otherwise – in autumn 1652.​[581]​
Downing wrote at the turn of 1664/5 that English seamen in the Republic were unable to return home, suggesting that a ship be sent to fetch them – otherwise destitution would force them to sign on with the Dutch fleet.  He added that Scots seamen had already done exactly that.  Within two weeks Downing started personally issuing passports and small amounts of money – just one ducaton each (a silver coin worth just over 3fl) – to English and Scots seamen who wanted to return; they had served aboard the Dutch fleet for six months from early summer 1664.  Two seamen told him that 24 English and Scots were on their ship.  If true, the British – again – must have formed a heavy proportion of her crew, even if she was a large warship.​[582]​  Downing gave 18 boys released at Amsterdam half a ducaton each and tried to negotiate a special passage rate on the packet, otherwise they would be forced ‘to take service here for want of bread’.​[583]​  Yet the Harwich packets seem to have disregarded Downing’s passes for a period, and – more importantly in the long term – the cost of passage home on the Dutch packet boats on the Brill-Harwich route had doubled from the normal 6fl to 12fl by at least as early as June 1665.  That was a whole month’s wages and must have been beyond many: many of the men to whom Downing had given passes resolved to beg their way through Flanders in the hope of returning via the Nieupoort packet to Dover.​[584]​  The Englishman Thomas Gray may have had to beg, and had to return via Ostend.  He had served with the Dutch for two years before deserting to answer the recall; he lost 18 months’ pay.​[585]​ 
Even this haphazard means of helping the seamen to return ended within just a few months on the end of Downing’s embassy and his recall to England.  Otherwise seamen simply had to take their chances, risking interception and captivity: Dennis Connor was in Hamburg recruiting for the Dutch fleet at the beginning of the war – a post of some importance – but decided to return as a loyal subject in accordance with the latest royal proclamation.  The Dutch captured him on his homeward voyage: they kept him aboard for two months, before leaving him at Heligoland ‘in a most miserable condition’.​[586]​  
At times British seamen crowded the packets, many were destitute.​[587]​  A steady flow of seamen returned on the Harwich and Dover packets.  In spring 1672 the seamen of some Hull ships were lucky to be helped out of Holland by generous British merchants who got them aboard the packet boat home.​[588]​  On the other hand, there were accusations of profiteering at Dover over charging British POWs for passage home, whilst the Dover-based packet refused to bring back British POWs, claiming it was too risky.​[589]​  Mobility was also restricted by naked force.  The Dutch arrested about 80 of 127 destitute British seamen at The Brill and sent them to the Rotterdam prison under heavy guard.  They were released just as they were about to enter the gates – on a countermand arriving – but they had ‘neither meat, money, nor worke’.​[590]​  Otherwise, individual seamen were sometimes prevented from leaving with the packets.​[591]​




There was no ideological contrast between the two recruitment systems sufficient enough to persuade British personnel to transfer to Dutch service.  The two systems shared more methods than separated them.  We have seen that, rather than the neat compartmentalisation of distinct recruitment methods and practice, the British and Dutch systems shared characteristics.  
As far as the issue of force goes, the British system relied only in part on force – whilst the press component itself has been shown elsewhere to oscillate between subtle and consensual aspects on the one hand, and on the other showing its naked ugly side only in times of extreme difficulty.  The Dutch ‘ordinary’ use of naked force continued into the early part of our period, and needs to be explored more thoroughly, both for its extent and chronology.  Certain ugly, but hidden, aspects of coercion only show themselves when we look at the men’s families.  More subtly, the Dutch quota levy, associated with the embargo, plainly amounted to indirect conscription – though the practical workings at the grass roots level of the merchant master and levied seaman, again, need exploration.  The embargo itself, overall remarkably similar in both countries, was primarily responsible for the considerable overlap in methods from the perspective of experience of force.
If there was no enormous contrast of experience between the two systems, it was the main Dutch method, the embargo, which was itself the entry route for many British and other foreigners.  These men came from embargoes on the huge Dutch maritime sector increasingly from 1653, with a surge in duration and extent in 1664-5.  The latter saw the first long application to foreign traffic, increasing the numbers of foreigners embargoed.  From 1691, the embargoes’ duration were reigned in, but they were probably just as severe through more uniform application; more flexibility was offered by the introduction of the complementary quota levy, again applied to foreigners, even the British allies.  We shall see correlation with numbers of foreign seamen in Chapter 5. 
The frequent restatement and tightening of embargo measures suggests a certain amount of evasion and leakage; this is further intimated by the number of Zeeland passes issued and the mass sailing of 150 Holland merchantmen in 1666, but needs further examination.  We shall see in the micro case studies in Part 2 some instances of individuals entering via the embargo, but the effect and impact on the individual or small community needs to be illuminated much more – perhaps through church or notarial sources.
In the wider perspective, the British development of more stringent embargoes (in terms of both extent and duration), clearly paralleled, though not matching exactly, Dutch extensions in coverage and duration.  The Dutch were clearly the model, even explicitly, as the British flag officers admitted in 1665.  With the accession of William III on both sides of the North Sea, the methods converged very closely and rapidly, especially regarding the quota levy.  The key actor or actors in this convergence need to be determined: was William himself important?  Or were influential Dutch politicians, such as Witsen, more so?  Perhaps most interesting – in view of the Dutch subordination to the British in terms of actual command of the allied fleets – would be the possible influence of Dutch admirals and naval administrators.  Were the joint naval councils responsible?  The parallel development of the embargo was perhaps like an arms-race: each side was driven to extend measures in response.  Besides the naval arms-race in warship size and armament, there was also one in recruitment technique – all these measures were forced upon adversaries by the increased manpower requirements of the new giant permanent navies composed of ever larger warships.
The embargo offers us some quirks.  The Dutch hurtled into the modern naval system around 1665, finally adopting British battle tactics, warship design ethos, and squadron organisation.  Yet, in return, the British took the principal feature of the Dutch recruitment system.  Even when the British very belatedly (1702) considering the Dutch imposition of the quota on British ships to be against the Treaty of Breda, 1667, they were, however, willing to continue surrendering the quota, as long as the right was reciprocated.​[595]​  That the quota issue was quietly passed over again forces us to question William’s influence.









Having established that there were foreigners entered into the Dutch navy in wartime and that they were swept up from merchant crews, we need to look at the merchant marine, the primary labour ‘fuel’ for the navy.  Who were these foreigners working in trade?  Unfortunately, very little evidence is available – or at least, has been brought to light so far – on merchant crew compositions.  Van Royen, working just after the end of our period, 1700-10, has shown that most foreigners were Scandinavians and Germans.  Van Royen’s data, though, was overwhelmingly related to those very areas of the Dutch Republic with the most trade links precisely to these eastern and northern regions – and geographically most proximate.  My results for Zeeland in Chapter 5 and Part 2 will be a shock in comparison to Van Royen’s study – unless regional distinctions within the Dutch Republic are made.   
If in Zeeland we have no musters for the merchant ships and no notarial evidence (precisely the kind of sources that Van Royen was able to use in the absence of musters), then the Zeeland import records we could fall back on are not exclusively for Dutch ships.​[596]​  To get a ‘pure’ source we have to look elsewhere.  In Chapter 2 though, we also saw that Dutch embargoes targeted foreign ships, so that we do have one measure of the foreign labour supply direct to the navy.  Foreign ships trading with Zeeland were also an indirect supply – outside the embargoes, or in peacetime, the crews on these ships were able to jump ship and look for better work.  Foreign shipping also informs us of linkage and contact through reciprocal trade with Zeeland, in the case of the developed and proximate Britain, France and Southern Netherlands.  
British communities in Zeeland resulted in part from these trading links, with permanent migrant merchants and seamen, with an additional flow of transient sailors passing through.  It is also probable that the British merchants based here were heavily concerned in the ‘Dutch’ shipping trading with Britain.  The permanent members of these communities were integrated and assimilated, communities which were both a reservoir and conduit for British service in the Dutch navy.   
First we will look quickly and broadly at the general situation in the expatriate British churches.  Most of these were Presbyterian, so were theoretically opposed to the Stuart regime.  Returning to the few prominent ideologically-motivated individuals at the Medway – in the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars, were the churches packed full of strident dissidents aching for the overthrow of a ‘crypto-Catholic’ British regime? What was the situation during the Civil Wars and First Anglo-Dutch War?  Crucially for us, were there dissidents or exiles actually working on Zeeland warships?  How did the Dutch view them?  We cannot be sure, though, that just because a sailor was a member of a Presbyterian church he was ideologically motivated to fight Britain.
Of the groups in the British communities, the merchants are very visible to us.  Thomas Cunningham, the Scots Conservator at Veere, is known to have supplied arms to Scotland during the Civil Wars.  But other British merchants supplying weapons were an important part of the Dutch war effort – even during the Anglo-Dutch Wars.  This also informs us on the attitudes of the seamen.  If selling the weapons to fight their own country did not matter to British merchants, then why should it have done to the common seamen doing the actual fighting?  In this respect, the activities of Cunningham’s Dutch-assimilated family were even more interesting than his.
Through the British churches, we also get glimpses of the service of some British sailors.  Importantly for us, the church records may inform us to a degree on the gap in the Zeeland payrolls, especially for the First Anglo-Dutch War.  Literacy is important in general social terms as a guide to basic education and career potential, but here it must also go some way to reflecting how fully the men understood, in time of war, the implications and possible consequences of disobeying a state recall.  Although, even if sailors marry in a foreign port, as Lucassen points out, ‘it is by no means certain that they were true permanent migrants’,​[597]​ for us marriage is an indicator suggesting permanent migration, or at least long-term labour-migration – especially in tandem with other sources.  In this way also, we may be able to determine or comment on labour market segmentation into sedentary and non-sedentary migrants.

The Dutch merchant sub-sector: structure

Whether or not the distribution of foreigners in Dutch merchant crews bore any relation to the distribution of the particular branches of Dutch European trade (that is, excluding the VOC, WIC and other West Indies traders), we must start with these links.  For skilled foreign sailors, these ships were both employment opportunities and one of the primary means of migration.  We shall first look at the structure of the Dutch merchant sub-sector – by proportion of the manpower in each branch of trade.  Compositions were affected by political events.  Dutch ships trading with Spain after the end of the Truce in 1621 had to sail mainly with foreign crews – ‘which forced thousands of Dutch seamen out of the carrying trade’; Israel noted the expanding navy and the then new WIC as alternate options for Dutch personnel.  The Portugal salt trade, for instance, was then manned by French and especially Scots.​[598]​












Van Royen’s sample is weighted by the trade specialisations of those (north and eastern) Dutch regions that are the basis of his sample: the core Norway trade has shrunk to tiny size, whilst the Baltic is twice as large as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.  The North Russia trade has also doubled.  

The Dutch merchant sub-sector: crews





With very little source material available, little empirical work has been done, apart from Van Royen’s comprehensive survey of Dutch merchant crew compositions for the period 1700-1710.  Estimates of the numbers of foreigners vary.  Van der Woude put the figure at 40%, but Van Royen has shown that the proportion differed from region to region: there were indeed 43% foreigners on Amsterdam ships, but much less on those from elsewhere, for an average of 24%.​[607]​  Van Royen’s overall crew analysis is summarised in Figure 3.4 above.​[608]​  The total and overwhelming domination of the foreign contingent by Scandinavians and Germans is clear.  But, alongside these groups, for instance, where are the French seamen – as well as British – that De Jonge emphasised were in the navy?















The small size of the English/British branch in Van Royen’s results is then, in part at least, due to the nature of the sample.  Rapidly growing Rotterdam was orientated largely towards Britain and France: it was ‘far and away the most active port’ in trade with Britain, primarily for the coal trade.​[613]​  We saw estimates of the volume of shipping in Chapter 2.  Collectively, the Maas ports were primarily orientated towards Britain in the eighteenth century.​[614]​  Rotterdam had plenty of British merchants and ‘numerous British seamen’.​[615]​  Douglas Catterall identifies around 60 Scots sailors in the Scots community in Rotterdam, but the specific sub-sector of only few: of nine men, six served with the Rotterdam (Maze) admiralty, two with the VOC.​[616]​  Most though, in peacetime, were probably working in the merchant sub-sector.
The volume of British ships trading with Rotterdam and British crews aboard those ships was sufficient to draw illegal attention.  We have seen that the British pressed British subject seamen from foreign ships in British ports and, if possible, at sea.  After the Anglo-Dutch alliance, in 1691 a ‘highly displeased’ William III had a British captain twice reprimanded for pressing Scots seamen from Scots ships in the port at Rotterdam.  The practise was ‘contrary to all methods, and in open breach of the laws of all nations’.​[617]​  The Rotterdam council ordered the 25 pressed men released.  Heinsius informed them that William would have Kirke ‘severely corrected’.​[618]​  Doubtless William’s anger was due to the theft of the Dutch navy’s strained manpower resources from under their very noses, as much as the infringement of the stronger of his two territories on the weaker.









In Zeeland, foreigners comprised at least 22% in the 1630s, increasing, like at Amsterdam in the 1640s – rising to 30%.  There the similarity ends: the various foreign groups in the Zeeland crews were much more equally sized.  From Figure 3.8, the British look to have expanded to a very appreciable 6%, but Ketting does make it clear that their 1630s level was actually little different from that in the 1640s – which would have made the British the largest group in the earlier period.
The closeness of trade links with the west were exemplified by the fact that the Zeeland admiralty muster masters usually easily identified British and French place names given by their crew members with such origins, compared with, as Lex Heerma van Voss points out, the difficulties that Danes recording the Sound toll registers had with these same places.​[622]​

Zeeland trade and merchant crew compositions

Zeeland trade was primarily western- and southern-orientated: Zeeland was the centre for French wine (as the town arms of Flushing attest), but subsequently overtaken by Rotterdam.​[623]​  The province also had large interests in salt.​[624]​  Zeelanders were not, however, involved in the Baltic trade.​[625]​  This had political effects: for example, Zeeland opposition to the conclusion of peace in 1648, sensitivity to relations with France, as well as general disinterest in Baltic affairs and reluctance to commit forces there.  The outlook to the west and south was manifest in the naval protection given: Britain, France, Southern Netherlands, Iberia and the Mediterranean were by far the most regular destinations for convoys with warship escorts – at least up to the mid-1660s.​[626]​  Arjan Otte has already specified this, albeit for a limited period, 1651-5.​[627]​  At the end of 1620s, 20% of the Zeeland convoy duty was from trade with England.​[628]​  Without the 40% of trade taken up by the Baltic and Norway in the overall Dutch picture, the structure of Zeeland’s trade, then, must have differed radically from the overall situation above – and so that without these links to the north and east, the composition of foreign seamen in Zeeland may have been very different from that in North Holland, the North Quarter and Friesland.  Very little data, however, has hitherto been presented.  




The French, Iberian and Mediterranean branches dominate here.  A Zeeland college of the Levant Company had just been established in 1698, but the Baltic and Norway trades were still ‘modest’ at this time.​[630]​  Where is the British trade?  Zeeland merchantmen were certainly convoyed to Britain by Zeeland warships in the 1690s; Scotland was particularly mentioned in this respect at that time.​[631]​  Surely the absence is a freak of the low sample size.
























Overview of Foreign shipping in Zeeland: the Ankeragegelden





Broadly speaking, how far does this correlate with long-term developments?  The regional economic slowdown from the 1650s is reflected here, though.  Naturally, the Anglo-Dutch Wars severely disrupted the British trade, drastically curtailing it, though the plague probably had an impact in the early 1660s.  Nonetheless, despite the interruption of Anglo-Dutch conflict, British shipping still maintained a very low level during peacetime in these years.  The two peaks either side – during neutrality and alliance respectively – then, were periods when the influx of British seamen consistently far outstripped the supply of other foreign sailors coming in on foreign shipping.  The supply of British fell during the Anglo-Dutch conflict phase, but did continue, sustained almost throughout.​[640]​

British Communities in Zeeland; Immigration

British emigrant communities in the Republic were established long before our period. These were stimulated primarily by the opportunities – so close at hand – for trade at the world economic core; this was more important even than the settling of large numbers of the English and Scots troops in Dutch service during the Revolt against Spain.  There were also those seeking the advantages of Dutch religious tolerance.  Geographical proximity and sea communications facilitated the communities’ development.  English churches could be found at The Hague, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Dordrecht and Den Bosch, a Scots kirk at Rotterdam.

Zeeland had close trade links with Britain in the mediaeval era.  These intensified after the Treaty of Nonsuch, 1585 – with the transfer of cautionary towns to English control until 1616 and the arrival of English garrisons.  The churches in Middelburg – to where the Merchant Adventurers transferred their seat – and Flushing were the oldest English churches in all the Republic.  Besides Rotterdam, a Scots kirk was established at the Scottish staple port of Veere.​[641]​  The Scots Conservator here was ‘arguably the most important Scottish commercial agent in Europe’.​[642]​
The stricter form of Calvinism (Voetian faction) more popular in Zeeland than Holland brought them confessionally closer to the Scots.​[643]​  The predominant Dutch view, though, of Scots Calvinism was that it was too fanatical – ‘the epitome of theological inflexibility and puritanical zeal’.​[644]​  Keith Sprunger clearly elucidated the various origins of the British churches in Zeeland, also pointing out that the English churches at Middelburg and Flushing always included Scots members, and each had a Scots minister during the seventeenth century.​[645]​  He also gave a balanced assessment of the disagreement when the Glaswegian Covenanter William Spang (minister at Middelburg 1652-64, former minister of the Veere Scots church, 1630-52) called the Middelburg church a ‘British’ and even a ‘Scottish’ church.​[646]​  As explained in the Church Acts, ‘the magistrates settlement is of an English church’.​[647]​  Even Sprunger, however, may have missed pertinent evidence on Spang and David Anderson, minister at Flushing: each referred to their nationality as ‘Scoto-Britannus’.​[648]​  
I have not systematically analysed the respective memberships, but close examination of the sources in our period certainly shows that Scots very much outnumbered English in new memberships as well as in admittance as passengers at both English churches.​[649]​  The English churches (I have not looked at the membership of the Veere Scots church) also took in Dutch members as well as British migrants from the Atlantic seaboard and elsewhere in the Republic, besides soldiers transferred from other Dutch garrisons.  Some new members were unusual: Anthony Draggij, born at Barbados, had been a slave in Surinam.  He gave ‘such satisfactory answers’ before the Flushing consistory that he was baptised the following day, 7 July 1675.  Intriguingly, there was no mention whatsoever of his colour or race.​[650]​
In the case of the Rotterdam Scots, Douglas Catterall has already conclusively demonstrated the assimilation of these British communities into Dutch society whilst simultaneously retaining their own identity.  Catterall details numerous examples of these Scots serving across the Dutch maritime sector.  As seen in Chapter 2, at times poor relief was withheld from the families of all sailors who had not served in the fleet.  Catterall has shown that, at Rotterdam in 1653, the distribution of Dutch poor relief to the families of Scots seamen was made dependent on whether they had served in the fleet.  If not, then the (poorer) Scots church was liable to provide relief.​[651]​  The position regarding issue of poor relief after the embargo-associated curtailment of poor relief (enacted by the Holland States at least as early as 1665, see Chapter 2) is unclear.  Nonetheless, surely the Scots church could not contravene central legislation on recalcitrant Scots sailors.  At any rate, this extra ‘incentive’ was firmly backed by the specific targeting of the English and Scottish quarters in Rotterdam by Dutch naval recruiters.​[652]​  During the early stages of the Second Anglo-Dutch War in the winter of 1664/5, Downing noted that the Dutch were certainly eager to ‘obtain assistance’ from all the English and Scots communities in the Republic.​[653]​

British merchants and communities were long-established in the Netherlands.  At Amsterdam, around 1600, most new foreign citizens were French and German, but English and Scots were also involved.​[654]​  There, the British community throughout our period amounted to about 1000 people.​[655]​  At Rotterdam, mid-seventeenth century, British were the largest group of immigrants – more than Germans or Flemish; over 8% of marriages involved a British partner.  There were even problems finding housing for the numbers of English merchants.  At its peak in the mid-seventeenth century, the British community was 4400 strong, comprising 6.1% of the population.​[656]​  








Many in the British communities in Zeeland were fully integrated into Dutch society.  Peter Morris and Anthony Daly were the educated, Dutch-speaking legal guardians of Elisabeth Blanckert’s two orphaned children.  The children actually lived, though, with Elisabeth Carels, the wife of the veteran seaman Adriaan Adriaansen (Veere) in a house rented from the guardians.  When Adriaanssen deserted from Middelburg in January 1667, owing the guardians 54fl, they were forced to petition the admiralty to obtain his wage arrears for the maintenance of the children.​[662]​  

British churches in Zeeland: ideology & Dutch involvement

What were the attitudes in the churches?  The prominent British exile, spy and Dutch army officer Joseph Bampfield settled in Zeeland after his release from the Tower in 1661 and attended the Middelburg English church, purporting that his exile was due to his religion, until he left for The Hague in spring 1665.​[663]​  According to the Zeeland admiralty Advocate-Fiscal, Daniël Fannius, who had known him during his time in Zeeland, Bampfield was ‘a man of civil conduct and quiet and well-regulated life’.  De Witt employed Bampfield shortly afterwards.​[664]​  Some others of the Zeeland elite probably knew Bampfield through the Middelburg English church (see below).
The British churches do not show monolithic or uniform attitudes.  Some of the British congregations do appear totally committed to the Dutch cause throughout all three of the Anglo-Dutch wars.  The congregation of the English church at Flushing intensively prayed, fasted, sang psalms and celebrated thanksgiving for Dutch victory (usually in company with the Dutch congregations) during the three wars.​[665]​  Admittedly, the Flushing British may have found it politic to support the Dutch for reasons of self-preservation, but is very unlikely that this was the sole motivation for their support.  In total contrast, the administrative record of the Middelburg church barely even mentions the Anglo-Dutch Wars at all.​[666]​  Some of the congregation were deeply involved though.  The Dutch lay elite in Flushing were certainly well disposed towards the local English: when the Flushing burgemeester Gijseling and his mother died in late 1666 (probably of the plague), between them they bequeathed 432fl for the relief of the port’s English poor.​[667]​  Some of the Dutch elite were even members of the English churches (see below).
Religious differences within the British expatriates still need to be explored, particularly given the occasional presence of Anglicans and Royalists.  The Royalist politician Sir George Radcliffe died and was buried at Flushing in 1657, whilst the Anglican clergyman John Featley was living there at least in 1646,​[668]​ probably for longer.  Yet such persons were actually welcomed into one of the British Presbyterian churches: the British admiral Sir William Batten and his wife were admitted as passengers to the Middelburg church in 1650; this is curious given his defection to the Royalist cause in 1648.​[669]​  One of Charles II’s grooms of the bedchamber, Sir Geleijn Quirinsen, who had shielded Charles during his exile, was a member at Middelburg in 1652; he was even allowed to trade between there and England during wartime in 1666.​[670]​
Events in the larger arena sometimes seriously affected relations within the Presbyterian community.  In 1642, following the outbreak of the British civil wars, the States General prohibited the export of war materials to Britain.​[671]​  An example of the differences in attitude within one congregation was a dispute lasting over two years between Thomas Burnet and Steven Foster, two long-standing members of the Middelburg English church.  This resulted from Burnet’s freighting of ammunition for Charles I in 1643.  Ordinarily, this was a strange thing for a Presbyterian to do in any case – but especially as Burnet had been church deacon.  Foster tried to discourage the ship’s master and crew from sailing.  Dockside, he told the master and crew 

‘they should be warie of taking any munition for the king, else the Parliament would have friends at Middelburg to enforme them as well as at Rotterdam’

The threat did not work; the ship sailed and Foster passed on the intelligence to Parliament: the ship was intercepted, searched and seized.  Foster insisted that his warning was ‘no more than his dutie having taken the Covenant of England’.  As far as the church council was concerned, the ammunition was a ‘civil matter’, but they did order Foster to give Burnet attestation to clear the ship – but it was a gesture only: Foster, of course, refused.  The church council could then wash their hands of the matter – they ‘could not constraine’ Foster to produce the document, but Burnet ‘might seek it […] himselfe’.​[672]​
On the more militant side, the Scot David Anderson was ejected from his ministry at Walton-on-Thames, Surrey, but stayed there for some time afterward before moving to Middelburg with his family in 1660.  Whether for religious or personal reasons, or both, Mary Fletcher, a member of Anderson’s congregation at Walton-on-Thames, followed him to Middelburg as his maid.​[673]​  Anderson was already considered dangerous enough to warrant inclusion in Williamson’s ‘Spy Book’.  He was unanimously elected minister of the Middelburg English church in early 1664.  Anderson was very worried by immediate accusations in England of ‘manifesting his disaffection to, and disloyalty against the person and gouvernment of the Kings Majestie of Great Britan’ in his sermons.  The English church council and four Dutch ministers at Flushing testified instead that Anderson had merely led prayers for Charles II’s person, so ‘that he may sway the scepters of his kingdome with justice and equity’.​[674]​  Some subtlety was used, then.  Similarly, after the outbreak of war in 1665, the congregation of the English church at Amsterdam sent a ‘great complainte’ to the burgomasters when a guest preacher included Charles II in his prayers.​[675]​  
Militancy is sometimes obvious.  With the ‘terrible roaring of the canon’ plainly audible at Flushing during the 1666 Four Days’ Fight, the English, Dutch and French congregations prayed together for victory every day, except on the third day, Whitsunday 13 June, when they remained in their own churches.  The outcome was still unknown ashore the morning of the day after the battle, 15 June: everyone crammed into two of the Flushing churches to pray for victory.  Psalm 140 was one of those chosen: 

‘Let burning coals fall upon them: let them be cast into the fire; into deep pits, that they rise not up again’ (Psalm 140:10).​[676]​

This speaks for itself.  The victorious Dutch fleet returned at noon; the Flushing church acts, at least, usually referred to the Dutch fleet as ‘our navy’.  The religious conviction of the British community at Flushing is difficult to quantify, but soldiers may give some indication: perhaps 10% of Thomas Sands’ English company received their ecclesiastical testimonies from the English church to present to the English church at Breda, their new inland station.​[677]​
In a rare example from the Zeeland payrolls at this time of onboard spiritual matters, the Alexander Samuel (Aberdeen) ministered to the religious needs of seamen.  He was aboard the frigate Delft by January 1667 as her ziekentrooster (‘sick visitor’, ‘sick comforter’) – a position allowed on the payroll in the absence of a qualified minister aboard and usually given to a novice.​[678]​  Samuel is also given as a skilled seaman, which may have been his main duty; perhaps he had had religious training before or since becoming a seaman – so was conveniently to hand for ‘extra’ duties – rather than a landlubber novice especially recruited for ziekentrooster (which seems unlikely for a frigate in any case, given the apparent absence of religious positions outside the flagships).  This raises the possibility of a seaman with religious schooling, which must have been Calvinist to be acceptable, and hence religious motivation.
To illustrate the integration of the British, at a higher level, in 1658 the Classis of Walcheren chose the minister of the Flushing English church to sail to the Sound with Johan Evertsen (then Vice-Admiral, Zeelandia, 54).  The normal practice was to choose ministers for the fleet by lot, with the English ministers at Middelburg and Flushing always excused previously – the only reasons being 

‘because our places cannot be supplied constantly in our absence, and also because sometimes […] the English ministers […] have not the readinesse of the Dutch language.’

At that time the minister at Flushing was actually a Dutchman, Arnold van Laren – itself a sure sign of the integration of the English church.  Nonetheless, the Classis excused him at the request of the English church elders, indicating the clout of the English church within the Classis.​[679]​  The tenancy of a Dutch minister at Flushing was not an example of local Dutch control of – or sway over – the English church proceedings or the British community.  When the Middelburg English church also elected a ‘foreigner’ as minister (Petrus Gribius, a German, minister 1642-52), the Zeeland States themselves offered help on procuring ‘more suitable’ candidates, suggesting that the congregation would ‘doe better for their Church in calling a Native Englishman’.​[680]​
Very prominent figures of the Zeeland elite were members of the British churches, becoming elders.  Dutch members also became elders in the Scots church at Rotterdam, which was active in promoting such links with the local authorities and where Houston has pointed out that these Dutch elders were often ‘figureheads’ and often absent from consistory meetings.​[681]​  Absenteeism of Dutch elders also sometimes occurred in Zeeland, but they usually made up for it by doing the weekly rounds visiting the membership with the minister, which must have been time-consuming.  In Zeeland, moreover, some held very high positions indeed, which entirely warranted their absence from consistory meetings.  At Middelburg, the regent Paulus van de Perre (1598-1653), diplomat and burgomaster of Middelburg, joined long before he was in the embassy to the Commonwealth in 1651.​[682]​  At Flushing, the regent Michiel Michielzon, D.D., Pensionary of Flushing, deputy in the Zeeland States and one of the embassy sent to Britain in 1674, was first elected elder of the English church in 1670, having moved from Middelburg.  He continued in the office until 1674.​[683]​  Besides these diplomats, Pieter Boudaen Courten, the leading figure in the Zeeland chambers of both the VOC and WIC, was long a member at Middelburg – as were two of his sons.  Pieter Boudaen Courten the younger (1635-84?) was admitted in 1658;​[684]​ his brother, the minister Johan Boudaen Courten was a member in 1682, and elder in 1683.​[685]​

      
Pieter Boudaen Courten (1594-1668), Salomon Mesdach, 1619 (left); 
Johan Boudaen Courten, Cornelis Janssens van Ceulen II, 1668 (right).​[686]​

The Zeeland admiralty Advocate-Fiscal, Daniël Fannius (1618-81), was a member at Middelburg in the last year of his life.​[687]​  It is curious that, at the end of his life, he chose the English church.  Fannius, a native of Veere, read Scots.​[688]​  Whilst we know that De Ruyter spoke English, Irish Gaelic and French,​[689]​ shore positions, too, in the Dutch host country must have been influenced by trade links and long contact with British migrants.

Sailors in the British Churches

The British church records, at Middelburg and Flushing at least, only rarely give professions of members; it is significant then – even at this micro-degree – that having been virtually devoid of sailors (just three officers and a petty officer) during 1642-52, at Middelburg no less than ten British sailors or their wives appear as members in under two years during the First Anglo-Dutch War.​[690]​  We cannot be certain that they all served in the navy, but the higher frequency at the very least reflects the increased labour demand and maritime activity.  John Wood and Janet Brown contracted at the Rotterdam Scots church just two days before they were married at Middelburg, 17 July 1653, some three weeks before the disastrous defeat at Scheveningen.​[691]​  John Nevin, a member since 1643, died during the war – so he may have been killed in action.  The Middelburg church also gave alms to released British POWs and other needy sailors during the war.​[692]​  As during 1652-4, the four new sailor members during 1658-9 reflect the increase in demand caused by Dutch naval intervention in the Baltic.​[693]​
Other British were in the service of the VOC and WIC and were admitted or readmitted as members at Middelburg on their return from the East or West Indies.  The VOC sailor James Sheila went to the East Indies at least twice, returning (again, twice) in the middle of two Anglo-Dutch Wars – in 1653 and 1667.​[694]​  This makes him remarkable as a survivor, particularly over this length of time.  Many of the rest, though, were probably merchants.​[695]​  Some British were caught up in the great events in the west: John Davidson and his wife returned from Recife when the WIC was driven out of Brazil, 1654.  Thomas Fletcher came back from the West Indies and Elmina, West Africa, in 1655.​[696]​
In 1661, the very long-serving gunner David Thomson (Dysart) was admitted to the English church at Flushing as a good Calvinist.​[697]​  Some professional mariners who were members of the British non-conformist churches in Zeeland may have had religious motivation to fight their own country, given for instance the persecution of Presbyterians in Britain after the Restoration (the Episcopalian settlement in Scotland and the Clarendon Code in England).  In the absence of explicit evidence, we have to be particularly careful in ascribing motivation by dates of appearance.  Thomson’s naval career in Zeeland actually began before 1661 since at least as early as January 1658 (see Chapters 7 and 8).  Overall, though, we have little idea even of the sailors’ level of membership at present; we are a long way away from discerning their attitudes. 

British merchants: trade, the Dutch war effort, and profit

The integration of British emigrants and institutions is also shown by the activities of civilians.  A number closely supported the Zeeland naval effort ashore, clearly uninhibited by any love they may have had for the old country.  Some were prominent members of the British Presbyterian churches in Zeeland, so had – in theory – ideological besides financial motivation for their supply of important ships and weapons.
Personifying the possibilities for the migrants, the third-generation British immigrant Richard Wood (Lillo) made naval captain in Zeeland.  Wood was lieutenant by 1697, commander under Evertsen by 1701, and captain by 1704.  He was killed in action in 1709.​[698]​  He lived at Middelburg, married Joanna de Keyser, widow of Samuel Schorer in 1706.​[699]​  He was killed in action not long afterwards.  Wood’s grandfather, also Richard Wood, was an English factor who settled at Lillo and was exporting tobacco to Antwerp by 1640.​[700]​  The factor’s son, again Richard Wood, was well-connected or well-thought of, as he was permitted to export vital naval materials to Brabant in wartime, 1673, whilst importing 5000 small arms.​[701]​  Where the naval materials went is an interesting question, but the small arms certainly aided the Dutch war effort.
William Parker, Middelburg merchant and gunsmith/small arms dealer, was a second or third generation English immigrant and a leading member of a prominent Middelburg family.  He was a major supplier of small arms to the Zeeland admiralty during the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars: Zeeland superiority in small arms was crucial in at least one important naval action – the taking of the new Bristol-built and manned fourth-rate St Patrick (48 guns, 200 crew, Robert Saunders) by the Zeeland frigates Delft (34, 140 men, Dirk Jobssen Kijella) and Schakerloo (28, 110 men, Willem Heijndrickssen) on 15 February 1667.  St Patrick’s lower tier comprised 20 24-pounders, whilst the Zeelanders’ heaviest guns were only 14 12-pounders and 8 8-pounders respectively.  Notwithstanding this massive advantage in gunpower, St Patrick was closed and boarded.  Despite near-parity in manpower, she was taken after three hours of fierce hand-to-hand fighting.​[702]​  It was then that the Zeelanders’ advantage in small arms told: Samuel Tucker, British merchant at Rotterdam, reported that the feat 

‘occaisoned noe smale rejoyceing […] They saye the Patricks men were good at there great guns, but coming to a close fight for want of good hand armes swords and pistols as the Dutch had (and allways have in there shipps) were much worsted by the Dutch’.​[703]​

At least three British seamen aboard Delft fought hand-to-hand with their own countrymen, including Alexander Samuel (Aberdeen), her ziekentrooster above.​[704]​  In the late 1670s Parker achieved the high position of master attendant at the Middelburg naval base.  Another family member, Isaac Parker, was also involved in small arms in 1667.  The family were still active in trade at least as late as 1690.​[705]​  
Mark Fletcher, Middelburg merchant and ship-owner, was also closely involved with the Dutch war effort; he supplied offensive and support shipping to the Zeelanders and also profited from their taking of British prizes.  Formerly of the English church and merchant at Dordrecht, he moved to Middelburg in 1670, becoming an active member of the English church.  Another family member, George Fletcher, was also involved in the supply of shipping.  The family was still active in 1698.  Mark was church elder by 1698.​[706]​
In 1672, the Zeeland admiralty hired a 100-ton two-gun hoy from him for use as a victualler.​[707]​  Fletcher co-owned the small frigate Sevilla with another British merchant, William Paradine (see below).  They sold her to the admiralty in early 1673 for use as a fireship, though she was not expended in any of that year’s three fleet battles.​[708]​  
Similarly, Fletcher was not impeded by any residual patriotism from purchasing British prize ships up for auction in Zeeland: he bought Richard and John in early 1673, and was allowed to use her to trade out of Ostend, then still neutral, but only provided the crew were neutral subjects.​[709]​  Fletcher should not be singled out for condemnation, as he was not the only British subject benefiting from the prize bonanza – many English ship-owners were then coming into Zeeland from Ostend, specifically to buy prizes, ‘even as there were no war’.​[710]​  There were some problems though: the admiralty seized some of Fletcher’s goods in 1673.​[711]​  Fletcher was one of the major figures ashore in Zeeland privateering during the Nine Years’ War – one of the three ‘greatest dealers in prize ships’.  Fletcher was an attorney acting for English owners, and bought 32 prizes.  He was also one of the major purchasers of wine and brandy prize cargoes.​[712]​  He was involved with the Royal Africa Company in 1697, and with more shipping in 1698.​[713]​
William Paradine, another Middelburg merchant, was closely involved in the supply of heavy weapons and ships – with important contacts at Amsterdam.  In all, he supplied three fireships to the Zeelanders – procuring two fireships at Amsterdam in 1666 (bought from the Levi brothers), and as co-owner with Mark Fletcher of Sevilla above, in 1673.  In 1672, Paradine was involved in the purchase of 147 Swedish iron cannon for the Zeeland admiralty (brought from Mattheus Amya at Amsterdam).​[714]​
In February 1665 – after the Dutch declaration of war (26 January) – Paradine, along with other British merchants at Amsterdam, tried to import English manufactured goods and other products from London in a neutral ship – the Swedish Fortuna of Stockholm – via the neutral port of Ostend.  This was, of course, now illegal: Fortuna was arrested in the Scheldt and the cargo seized.  Part of the lading – lead, sugar and tobacco – was quickly released; the rest followed in June.  Customs had to be paid in both cases, but in the second the merchants had to

‘make a solemn oath that they are in all respects the sole owners and that no subject of the King of England has any part therein, directly or indirectly’.​[715]​

Clearly the Zeeland admiralty either considered Paradine and his associates as Dutch, or conveniently chose to ignore their nationality.  There was, however, a natural limit to the favour in which Paradine was held when it came to the export of vital war materials: in 1673, he was refused permission to export sailcloth to neutral Ostend.​[716]​
Besides wartime trade between Zeeland and England, Paradine was involved with the exchange of POWs.  On occasion the two coincided, when he was allowed to export various building materials to England.  These included deal boards, which, as they were also naval materials, were contraband.  The materials were to help rebuild London after the Fire, then just weeks ago; the Zeelanders – the admiralty council, at least – seem to have believed, quite sincerely, that there was a place for helping their fellow Protestants:

‘we shall not be chary in accommodating the people of England some comfort in their need’.​[717]​

This was not a ‘public relations stunt’ – the admiralty minutes were not public, so there was no need for Jan Steengracht (the Admiralty Secretary) to ‘spin’.  (He was surely not being sarcastic.)  This is strange perhaps, when others saw the Fire as just divine punishment for British excesses at Terschelling during the Vlie raid, but we have already seen the co-religion evident in the Dutch participation in English churches.  Religion sometimes transcended nationality.  On condition for the favour to himself, and backed-up by the good-will gesture, Paradine was to intervene personally (presumably, directly with Charles II) for the release of Dutch prisoners still incarcerated – for whom the Zeelanders had already released their quota of British prisoners, ‘according to the word of his Majesty’.​[718]​  Good works and profit could sit together.
Paradine, born at Bedford, was deacon of the Middelburg English church by 1664, and was later an elder.​[719]​  The family was integrating: his daughter Elizabeth married a Flushing-born mariner;​[720]​ and another William Paradine served as seaman aboard Orange Galleij in 1704;​[721]​ almost certainly a son.  Paradine senior seems to have considered returning to Britain permanently, with his wife and family, in late 1672 – as a pass was issued in Britain for him to do so.  Neither Paradine’s active support of the Dutch navy, nor his Presbyterianism impaired his value to Britain: Charles II actively encouraged immigrants from the United Provinces – including British residents – following the Dutch rampjaar (‘Year of Disaster’) of 1672.  At least eight British Rotterdam merchants were issued protections to return over the winter of 1672/3.​[722]​  Another Zeeland Briton, Jacob Warner, supplied the admiralty with two old cannon in 1672.​[723]​  British civilians were involved in the supply of more everyday fittings: in 1661, a woman living at Middelburg known only as ‘Lucretia of Hull’ supplied cloth and dyes for two admiralty yachts on the inland patrols.​[724]​
	British merchants at Flushing were also involved in the war effort.  John Gill was a merchant and church elder there at least as early as 1645.​[725]​  Gill was yet another supplier of offensive ships: owner of Vrijheid, in 1666 he sold her to the admiralty (for 6530fl) for conversion to fireship.​[726]​  She fought at the Four Days’ Fight (commander Engel Adriaanssen), but was sent back to the Texel on the second day.​[727]​  Gill was heavily involved in the West India and Atlantic trade; in 1666 he gave 4000fl security that two English factors from Madeira, taken prisoner on a prize, would stay in his house and not leave Flushing.​[728]​  Like Paradine, he combined profit through supporting the Dutch war effort with good works.


The Scots at Veere; the Cunningham family & Dutch service

Thomas Cunningham, the Conservator of Scottish Privileges of the Scots Staple at Veere (1644-60), had supplied arms to Scotland as early as 1639.​[729]​  At least three members of the Cunningham family – elite Veere Scots – were involved with the Zeeland admiralty in some way, ranging from administration ashore to active service afloat.  Incredibly, the Dutch-born child of an important Stuart official joined the Dutch fleet in 1664 and fought against Charles II: Adrian Cunningham was the fifth (fourth surviving) son and eighth child of Sir Thomas Cunningham – himself born at Veere in 1604.  Adrian was born in the Lammeken house on the Viskaai at Veere on 20 November 1639, so was 24 when we first see him shipboard.  His two eldest brothers Thomas and Arnold held elite positions.  Thomas was Factor of the Scots Nation at Veere from 1649, which must have given him access to a huge business network.​[730]​  Thomas, as a Dutch resident, naturally reclaimed his goods on a Scots ship taken in January 1665.​[731]​
The family was, however, clearly ‘going native’.  Arnold was a Veere councillor (from 1661), Admiralty Prize Commissioner (Controller) at Veere (1663-81) as well as a leading figure ashore in the Zeeland chamber of the WIC (from 1665).​[732]​  The latter thoroughly Dutch-assimilated positions were dubious at the least in terms of loyalty to Britain, even though they were not fighting posts.  Anna Cunningham, the fifth child and third daughter, born 6 April 1635, rented property to the admiralty in 1666.​[733]​  
The family genealogy in his father’s own hand contains no details on Adrian (or his elder brother Jacob) beyond birth and baptism: Adrian’s seagoing naval career was perhaps a step too far and maybe opposed – or else something too sensitive to be advertised (yet alone recorded): to be known as the father of a traitor would not have enhanced Cunningham’s reputation at the British Court or in Edinburgh.  Certainly, by 1667, Adrian was no longer living at home and was instead in common seamen’s lodgings at Veere run by the slaapvrouw Nelken Poole.​[734]​  The conditions there must have been very tough for an aristocrat.  This suggests that he may have been thrown out by his father, though we cannot be certain: he could have decided to share the men’s quarters out of solidarity and comradeship, having been at sea for two years and badly wounded by that time, though this seems unlikely.
As a third generation immigrant, he was almost certainly fully assimilated – probably considering himself Dutch – though many similar Scots migrants elsewhere have been conclusively shown to simultaneously hold on to their Scots or British identity.​[735]​  Cunningham, however, was clearly uninhibited by any loyalty he might have felt towards Scotland/Britain.  Because of the loss of the payrolls 1649-1664, we do not know if Cunningham served before his service below.  If this was his first time at sea, at 24 he was rather old to start a naval career, so he may have been what in Britain was termed a ‘gentleman volunteer’, or adventurer.
Cunningham first appears in January 1664, petitioning to serve with Adriaan Banckert as an officer cadet.  He got the position but – for some reason unknown – he was to be ‘spared the coldest work aboard’.​[736]​  The appointment suggests some kind of relationship with the commander.  Open Anglo-Dutch hostilities was then not likely, so Cunningham’s service was not motivated by anti-British dissidence.  Similarly, cadets were only on the same pay as prime seamen, so Cunningham’s motivations were certainly not financial – a man of his status and education could have found much better-paid work elsewhere.  In late July some of Banckert’s crew were drafted aboard De Hase.​[737]​  Cunningham may have been one of these, though he may have joined De Hase (then in Schakerloo) earlier.  Cunningham was certainly with De Hase aboard Wapen van Zeeland, based at Veere, by 1 August (see Chapter 7).  De Hase, a native of Veere himself,​[738]​ had almost certainly known Cunningham personally for some time.  Clearly now his new captain’s follower, he moved with De Hase into his new command, Dordrecht (50) – also based at and largely manned from Veere – on 17 April 1665.​[739]​  De Hase took only one or two others with him, leaving his long-serving Scots pilot behind (see Chapter 7).  Cunningham was badly wounded at the battle of Lowestoft in June, receiving gunpowder burns to his head, arms and legs; the whole of his face and hands were severely burnt.  The local surgeons knew exactly who he was.​[740]​  Cunningham must have been badly disfigured, but recovered quickly.  He stayed in his position with De Hase – who moved into Veere in 1666 – until at least June 1667.​[741]​
Another Veere Scot, Alexander Batty, petitioned to serve in summer 1664, starting as an officer cadet with Geleijn Pikke (Dordrecht).  Soon, during the Second Anglo-Dutch War, he became one of the Admiral of Zeeland’s secretaries aboard the flagships Hof van Zeeland and Walcheren.  Batty’s niece was Maria Spang, related to the minister at Veere and Middelburg.​[742]​

Many aspects of emigrant and maritime life mirrored those at home.  In 1643, Martha Burfoot was censured by the English church at Flushing for her adultery with ‘one Cook that is now in the West Indies during her husbands captivity in Argier’ – that is, while he was enslaved at Algiers.​[743]​  Despite the loss of the payrolls 1649-1664, the English churches in Walcheren provide some evidence of British in the Zeeland squadron: for example, John Taylor was admitted at Flushing in 1662, having served in the Zeeland squadron in the Mediterranean.​[744]​  The Middelburg congregation was small.  Sprunger noted they were poor.​[745]​  Despite this, British involvement in the VOC and WIC is also hinted at: in 1645 – in just one month – the Middelburg church received 92fl in legacies from deceased VOC personnel.  The church (and therefore the British poor) also benefited from the interest on loans/investments made by its merchant members with the WIC.​[746]​  Godliness and profit went hand in hand.  The Middelburg church, besides its Bibles, theological and historical works, owned three other books: Mercator’s Atlas in English, Speed’s Chronicle, and – indicative of its financial interests – Historia Naturalis Brasilia.​[747]​  When WIC investment sank to low interest on 200fl, the church fund branched out in banking and property.  The merchant master William Duncan was rumoured to have left 800fl to the poor.​[748]​

Sailors’ Literacy, Marriage and Debt

Literacy is important here because it reflects on a seaman’s ability to understand the implications of disobeying a state recall from foreign service and/or entering the service of the enemy and his capability of making a reasoned choice (if one was open to him).  In England after about 1650, 90% of officers and petty officers could sign their name.​[749]​  This is way ahead of the general population: for the Dutch, in 1630 57% of Amsterdam bridegrooms could sign, rising to 70% by 1680.​[750]​  Evidence on the literacy of British personnel in Zeeland is erratic at present: in the early years of sparse incidence of crew payment, 1642-9, sources for personal payments – petitions and passports – are correspondingly plentiful.  Some specialisations probably required literacy more than others: during the wars of the 1660s and 1670s, it is exceptional that neither of the two navigators aboard Schakerloo could sign their names.​[751]​

Table 3.1  Literacy of British personnel, 1642-1674 





Unfortunately, 1664-7, there is evidence so far for only 49 British individuals.  Only eight of these men either collected their arrears in person or left other proof of their literacy.  The literacy of NCOs was plainly higher: prime examples are Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge’s veteran Scots gunners Alexander Swain and David Thomson.​[752]​  The ‘labour elite’ gunnery specialisation, however, would have made such high literacy much more of a requirement - through the probable use of gunnery handbooks and the necessity of keeping ammunition accounts.  Nonetheless, the high rate (though still from a small sample) during the Third Anglo-Dutch War does suggest that most of the men knew what they were doing – they were not ignorant automatons.









About 24% of all ranks were married.  Whilst information is not quite complete (there is a small ‘unknown’ element), both Figures 3.19 and 3.20 back up current understanding that officers were more likely to be married.  Data for 1672-4 is not yet ready.  The reduction by the 1660s suggests the possibility of a decline in long-term and permanent British migration, but more data is needed.  Also, we cannot tackle the issue of labour market segmentation by these means without data for the other foreigners.

As with those of the payrolls that were issued primarily to dependents or creditors, the person who actually collected the payment – whether the seaman himself or someone else having authorisation – also tells us something of the seaman’s circumstances: if the collector was his wife then we know his marital status, if a relation then he had family.  Both suggest permanent settlement and community support.  If the collector was someone else, then we can be pretty sure that the seaman was dependent on, and effectively under the management of an agent (in our period usually a landlady or slaapvrouw) from whom he received board and lodging when ashore, as well as essentials such as clothes and an equipped sea-chest on credit.​[757]​  Occasionally neither a married seaman nor his wife would collect his wage arrears; in these instances the collectors were mainly landlady creditors.  A couple such cases are discussed in the micro-case studies in Part Two, but it is worth mentioning here that these circumstances suggest recent marriage under heavy debt and raise the issue of being able to afford engagement and marriage in such situations, or the slaapvrouw acting as a wider money-lender.  The British expatriate community in Zeeland was also involved in the management of British seamen.  For instance, the Presbyterian Janet Forbes was the landlady of Alexander Simmer (Aberdeen).​[758]​

Sailors and their families

Long distance voyages give some interesting clues, showing a variety of settlement patterns.  Robert Drake (Topsham) was on the Brazil expedition, 1646-7: a few months after his departure, his wife was about to give birth.  Unhappily, she had no friends and was still having problems with the language – she was ‘very hard-pressed and in the uttermost need’ and ‘she still sounds very foreign and is without acquaintance’.​[759]​  The wife of Thomas Brown (Scarborough) was well-settled: she gave birth to their fourth child a few months after her husband sailed – also for Brazil.​[760]​

The Flushing Briton Domenic Singleton went to the Americas with Crijnssen in 1667 and was left as gunner in the Tobago garrison.  Singleton’s Dutch wife, Claerijen Slabels, petitioned as soon as Crijnssen returned to Europe in September – without her husband – that she desperately needed her husband’s arrears towards her housekeeping.  His four months’ arrears up his transfer ashore – just under 92fl - were paid to her in full.​[761]​  Another Briton with Crijnssen’s squadron was John Williamson (Leith, see Chapter 7).  His illiterate niece May had also migrated to Zeeland, which suggests her mother or father, John’s sibling, was also there.  Both John and May were both married, though we cannot be sure of the nationality of their spouses.  From two individual payments, May received her uncle’s wage arrears before his wife did.​[762]​  This may indicate that John’s marriage took place between the two payments, or there may be some other reason for his niece receiving the first (shortly after his return from sea).

We saw David Drompel senior and junior briefly in Chapter 2; father and son of Leith were merchant seamen, probably Veere-based. The two enlisted separately – senior joined on 12 January 1665 (and took part in the later winter sorties, see Chapter 7); junior enlisted some weeks later on 1 March: perhaps the family at first tried to take the financial strain of the embargo as best they could, father stepping forward first.  The Drompels’ two months’ wage advances were paid to senior’s wife (unnamed), who was definitely the mother of Drompel junior – senior had not remarried.  Junior received his first wages in hand (these were only later paid to his mother) – whilst his father’s first wages went straight to the woman of the family.  Junior was at least in his late teens as he received the prime seaman’s rate – still only 12fl - and was not rated as a ship’s boy.​[763]​  The presence of an entire nuclear family might suggest recent emigration, but two merchant masters who were probably family members were trading in coal, skins and hides from Scotland to Veere in 1635 and 1644: our father and son team may have been more junior crew on these or other merchantmen; or have moved on to greater status at the Veere end of the trade – perhaps as agents.​[764]​  This family involvement in trade is reinforced when a David Rompel (most probably the same man as junior) appears as a merchant skipper in 1675 (see Chapter 8).   In 1665, other changes took place for the Drompel family: Drompel junior afterwards left home and moved into seamen’s lodgings run by Nelken Poole, a Veere slaapvrouw running some of the largest numbers of seamen.​[765]​  





The ‘fuel’ for the navy through embargo, merchant seamen, varied from region to region, as did the trade outlook, specialisation and contacts.  In contrast to the broadly northern and eastern emphasis of both trade and the origins of foreign merchant seamen in the north of the Republic, the situation was very different in the south-west.  Although we cannot yet look at Zeeland merchant ships, we can see foreign merchantmen in Zeeland.  Aside from the years of actual Anglo-Dutch hostilities, far more British merchant ships came into Zeeland than any other group of foreign merchantmen, bringing many more British seamen than any other foreign sailors.  British dominance of this labour supply was especially pronounced and sustained in the long-term either side of the central phase of our period: the Anglo-Dutch Wars.  
The British churches in Zeeland did contain militants, but the churches’ outlook was not uniform; however well-integrated they were, we still have little idea of the convictions of even the few seamen identified as members.  It is clear, albeit from a very small base, that British seamen participated in other subsectors apart from the navy, and that their numbers increased during the First Anglo-Dutch War.
If we cannot see much of the sailors’ attitudes, then British civilians are more obvious.  British merchants were both intimately involved in the Dutch war effort and clearly trusted to be given liberty to trade during wartime in sensitive materials, but there is no clear ideological motivation at work – profit was most important.  
Sailors were literate as an occupation, and would have understood the theoretical risks of disobeying government edicts to return home.  British sailors’ marriage patterns suggest that many were long-term and permanent migrants.  The proportion of these seems to have been decreasing, but the data is still too incomplete to inform us on an accurate trend, or on labour market segmentation. 










As we saw in Chapter 1, the contemporaries Pepys and Marvell put the blame for British personnel’s participation on the Dutch side at the Medway squarely on the failure to pay RN seamen properly.  Where their service has attracted attention in this regard from historians, J. R. Jones stated that Dutch naval wages exceeded northern-European rates, bringing in Scots; English also ‘fought for money’ in the Dutch navy.​[768]​  Certainly, whatever other factors were responsible for British service with the Dutch, any economic differential between the two navies must be taken into consideration, throughout our period.  Appreciable advantages in Dutch service would have provided considerable impetus for transfer – if not the primary pull-factor – especially for the vulnerable lower deck personnel living at subsistence levels.  Economic factors can be discounted only if no differential can be ascertained.  These economic factors consist of both the basic pay rates themselves and the degree to which these wages were actually paid promptly and properly.  At the very least, a detailed study of economic conditions is a base or ‘control’ against which other factors and motivations can be compared and contrasted.
Generally, as is well known, sources for Early Modern wages are scant.  British merchant and naval wages, however, have been well-studied, made easier by fixed naval pay.  The Dutch situation is very different, complicated partly by a more diverse and specialised maritime sector, partly by lack of data – especially on merchant wages – and partly by the decentralised naval structure.  These difficulties are exacerbated by the fluid, market-driven nature of Dutch naval wage rates; here Bruijn’s vision of wartime increases has replaced Boxer’s earlier notion of unchanging rates, 1665-1780.​[769]​
Within the Dutch maritime sector, basic wage levels for the navy and VOC are no more than ‘reasonably well known’.  Sources for the other branches in the maritime sector – the merchant marine and fisheries – are ‘much more difficult to find.’​[770]​  Bruijn’s lead into the Zeeland payrolls yielded insights into crew origins, but little on wages.​[771]​  Yet if Dutch naval wages are fairly well-known, no systematic survey has been made; Bruijn’s brief guide to trends (1990/1998) has long been in need of more detailed exploration.  Present studies have not collated the available Dutch material, lack detail and clarity, and are over-generalised.  Davids, for example, gives peacetime naval rates as the norm, c1650-1700 – albeit reluctantly, as the Dutch were at war for much of this period.​[772]​  De Jonge gave comprehensive wage rates for 1636; these are somewhat underused.​[773]​
If details on Dutch merchant wage levels are scant, then the Dutch naval sources are hitherto almost completely untapped.  Though the unique Zeeland payrolls remain largely unknown – even in the Netherlands, and almost completely unexplored in terms of pay rates, and even given the destruction of the other admiralties’ payrolls for our period – other sources can probably be used.​[774]​  This study details Zeeland admiralty wages through much of the period, demonstrating first that wartime nominal wage differentials between the British and Dutch navies were great enough to have been a great incentive for British personnel to enlist.  This contradicts Boxer’s somewhat blanket assertion that the pay differential between the two navies was ‘not very great’.​[775]​  The main employment choices in Britain – the navy and merchant marine – are closely compared and both found to be suspect options.  Pay elsewhere in other sub-sectors of the two maritime sectors is briefly compared.​[776]​
Both the British and Dutch navies seem to have held the general view that it was not a good idea to pay the men all the wages due to them – even if full payment was financially feasible.  Instead, it was considered that withholding a portion of their wages would prevent desertion: with their pockets full of cash seamen might easily ‘run’ in a search for better-paid employment, having no arrears due to ‘hold’ them.  This was rather academic, as the option was not usually there.  With incidence of payment, again, no systematic study has yet been made, and very little evidence presented – though it is generally accepted that Dutch practise was superior, despite occasional difficulties.​[777]​  Here, a sketch of the British situation (in the absence of an adequate payroll series) is compared with that in Zeeland, including one highly detailed case of one man’s incidence of payment from the Second Anglo-Dutch War.
Nominal wages, though, tell only some of the story.  Historians have often sought to compare sailors with equivalent construction employment ashore: this is fraught with difficulties, as account has to be made of the value of seamen’s free board and lodging at sea.​[778]​  Bruijn stresses that the flow of migrant seamen was dependent on economic conditions as well as labour demand.  Real wages measure the actual  value of the seaman’s wage – his purchasing power – an especially vital measurement in a subsistence occupation.  In view of the lack of rock-solid nominal wage data, so there is no time series available for Dutch naval wages, not much has been said about real naval wages (or indeed those in other maritime sub-sectors).
Heerma van Voss, Van Lottum and Van Bochove contend that, as sailors were non-sedentary migrants, they returned home and spent their money there – and that consequently there is no need to determine real wage differentials.​[779]​  Even if most seamen did return home, many did not do so at all, or quickly: real wages remain, therefore, of the utmost importance to us as a pull-factor when compared with other alternatives for migrants in the international labour market.  Real wages should also be tracked in the short-term, within the career of the individual seaman in order to assess his options.  In construction and those few jobs in other sectors for which wages have been unearthed, real wage analysis is usually in the long- or medium-term, but short-term variations are very apparent.​[780]​  Real wages are examined here in the short-term, along the lines of the episodic division of the personnel data in the thesis.  Although De Vries and Van der Woude argued that there was a large differential in favour of the western Netherlands over England, the CPI used has some flaws; Van Zanden and Allen have refuted the differential, using more modern CPIs.  This study applies Allen’s CPI to a naval wage series.  Although the latter is incomplete, in contrast to the general trends shown by Allen and Van Zanden, there was a real wage differential favouring Dutch service, and it is even more pronounced than that in nominal wages.

Pay and Payment in the British Maritime Sector

British basic naval wage levels are relatively easy to deal with and are best summarised by Rodger.  Basic pay was fixed rigidly by the State and seamen’s wages remained unchanged from the start of 1653 until the great Spithead and Nore fleet mutinies in 1797.  In the quarter century before 1650 a rapid series of increases brought wages up to the level established finally in 1652 (effective 1653).  In 1625 seamen’s pay was raised from 10 shillings per month – where it had languished since at least 1582 – to 14s, and then to 15s in 1626.  In 1643 the Long Parliament increased seamen’s pay to 19s, then, at the end of December 1652, the Dutch practice of grading by skill was adopted, creating the new rank of able seaman: men able to ‘hand, reef and steer’ and ‘fit for helm, lead, top, and yards’ were paid at 24 shillings, whilst ‘ordinary’ seamen’s pay remained at 19s.  Officers’ pay was increased in 1647 and 1653.​[781]​
A weak feature in the study of British naval pay remains the exact position of Scotland and Ireland: poor coverage by Scots historians is surprising.  Grant, referring to a 1690 grant of (theoretical) Scots freedom from impressment, stated that Scots naval seamen were then paid the same as their English counterparts, implying that Scots were paid lower rates pre-1690.​[782]​  This inequality might lead us to attribute – in part at least – the high Scots proportion of the British in Dutch service to dissatisfaction with that unfair treatment.  Such a conclusion would be in error: when Scots were levied in 1664, Charles II guaranteed that they would receive ‘the same pay that we give to our seamen here’.​[783]​  Any inequality prior to this date needs to be established.
English merchant wages had to be in excess of RN rates to attract men.  Monck advocated limiting all other maritime pay to the naval level, but as Capp points out, there would then have been no incentive to serve on merchantmen and this would have paralysed trade through lack of crews.​[784]​  Davis sketched English merchant seamen’s rates; during 1604-c1620 these were 17-18s/month, reaching 19-20s in the 1630s, where they remained until the outbreak of the war in 1652.  This may require some revision, however, as in 1651 the Dutch reported English wages as high as 36-40s, though perhaps this was confined to the West Indies.​[785]​  In 1652 wages rose to 30-38s, fell in the short peace to 23-24s, rising back to 30-38s during the Anglo-Spanish war of 1655-9.​[786]​  Even after the 1652/3 increases in naval wages, these were still ‘well below’ merchant rates.​[787]​  At Plymouth, March 1653, even though Parliament had advanced some of the arrears due to the navy’s seamen

it does not encourage them, as the merchant traders have exceeded their pay by so much that 1,500 men have gone to the Isle of May and Newfoundland, and many more are going.​[788]​

General Deane was warned a few days before that above 2,000 seamen would go and ‘many that are on board your ships will run away to go with those ships.’​[789]​  In 1654, able seamen could earn 40% more in merchantmen than in warships: Captain Giles Shelley complained that even the vital core of his crew – his volunteers – would desert, sacrificing their arrears 

I dare not venture a man ashore, they give such great rates in merchant’s ships, vizt. 40 shillings per mensem and more, insomuch the very volunteers will be enticed away, yea to the losing of five or six months’ pay.​[790]​

The State did not have the financial resources to compete with these kinds of wages, but ‘wisely’ left naval seamen’s pay untouched when soldiers’ pay was reduced in 1655.​[791]​  From 1660-4 English merchant wages fell to around 20s, but from late 1664 to the peace in 1667 reached 35-38s, falling back to an increased peacetime rate of 27-30s until 1671, this largely due to demand for timber to rebuild London.  The Third Anglo-Dutch War boosted wages to 35-40s, which remained high after 1674 at 27-28s during the continued war in Europe, the new war scare of 1677-8 prompting a level of 30s.  From 1679 until 1688 a new peacetime standard emerged of 24-25s; this prevailed during 1697-1702 and in peacetime in the next century until the mid-1730s.  The long period of war in between saw pay hit 45s in 1689, then 50s, then 55s until 1695, when they eased back to 45s.​[792]​  Certain trades, though, were paid per voyage: on the return of the battle fleet home in May 1665,

the Colliers’ great wages having taken many from us since wee came in.  The colliers give £8 and £9 per voyage, which is as much as 7 months pay in the King’s ships and may be performed in a moneth and noe limbes hazarded, the security against being pressed being added what hopes is there our men should stay with us or that others should come to us[?]​[793]​





The impact of the six major wars, 1652-1713, on English merchant wages is striking: very substantial economic benefit for seamen avoiding or deserting British naval service during wartime – such men doubled their wages in the long wars against France.  Wartime was unfortunately for them precisely the time that the greater proportion of British maritime labour was required for the navy: trade was always subject in war to damage through loss of confidence, embargoes and captures; merchant seamen could of course still be pressed and forced to accept poor naval pay.  Foreign seamen in Britain also preferred, naturally, the higher wages in merchantmen.  The Danish Resident Gjöe interviewed Danish-Norwegian seamen already working in Britain before the war in 1672: they preferred to serve on British merchantmen or privateers than on warships, because ‘they have more to gain’.​[798]​  This is borne out by the superior merchant wages, 1667-71, above, though in peacetime naval demand was correspondingly low in any case.
Unfortunately, theoretically higher merchant wages did not necessarily mean that these were seen in full by merchant seamen: Lloyd thought that nominal wages were ‘seldom honoured in full’ when the ship was paid off at the end of a voyage, but Earle notes this only happened ‘often’.​[799]​  Edward Barlow complained bitterly of being cheated of his merchant wages on various pretexts.  On their 1679 return from Barbados, Barlow and the crew of Guannaboe 20 (350 tons), had to compensate the ‘knavish’ master for minor damage to the sugar cargo.​[800]​
In the navy, there is no doubt that the poor incidence of payment was a continual and the primary source of discontent.​[801]​  Conditions were poor well before our period: in Devon, 1618 

seafaring men […] are […] wonderful loath to enter into his Majesty’s service, for that they fear to be long detained in these employments, and doubt they shall be forced willingly to leave the service without their pay at the last, to the loss both of their time and means, whereby those that are married men and have families are brought to great distresses and poverty, the which makes as many as hears of any press either fly the country or to hazard the course of justice.​[802]​

The problem of actually getting the pay went wide and deep into the RN machine, from the men and the officers at sea to those in the dockyards and administration.  The corruption at the top that it helped to cause, or at least encourage, in the reign of James I of Great Britain is well known.​[803]​  Petty pilfering was always a problem, but high-level and large-scale corruption seems to have declined thereafter – despite Pepys’ complaints.​[804]​  The abysmal incidence of payment was due instead to the sheer meteoric growth of the navy, infrastructure and the associated costs: paying the seamen was last on the list of priorities, despite their being recognized as a vital asset.  Wage arrears in the large Ship Money fleets were under control during the 1630s, but the greatly accelerated naval growth and virtually continual war during the Interregnum generated huge manpower levels and an enormous financial problems from the start of the – unprepared-for – First Anglo-Dutch War.​[805]​  
Naturally, arrears worsened.  At Portsmouth in December 1652, Thomas Thorowgood’s crew mutinied over their dissatisfaction with receiving only six months’ arrears out of the total owed them, declaring that they were being cheated by a corrupt establishment.  The men demanded ‘all or none’ of their pay and in the meantime their ship ‘might lie and rot’.​[806]​  At Bristol in 1653, Discovery’s crew, in abject poverty because of their arrears, mutinied.  The mutiny continued even after the arrest of three ringleaders, the drafting of 25 of the more ‘obstinate’ men to Portsmouth and the precedent of the rebellious crew receiving two months’ arrears during the mutiny (on Mayday).​[807]​  Cromwell himself was once in danger of his life from an armed and angry mob of seamen that had marched to London.​[808]​




But even with supposedly thorough financial preparation for war, British naval payment very quickly degenerated: in July 1665 – during the first campaigning season of the Second Anglo-Dutch War

‘a great sum must be ready to pay part of the fleete, and so far we are from it that we have not enough to stop the mouths of poor people and their hands from falling about our eares here almost in the office’​[811]​

By October Pepys noted ‘the horrible crowd and lamentable moan of the poor seamen that lie starving in the streets for lack of money’.​[812]​  Mistakes – deliberate or otherwise – might also be made at payments: at Deal in 1672 some seamen were paid off at the ordinary rate instead of able – ‘which makes the seamen speak desperate words, and swear to strange resolutions, as never to enter the service – to die first.’  Officers were also short-changed at the same pay issue.​[813]​
Intermittent severe crises in pay arrears were bad enough, but a crucial negative factor in British naval payment was its form – during wartime financial crises there was no cash available.  The Royalists at Scilly in 1648 considered an alternative: the men were to be either paid their wages or paid half in wages and half in prize shares.​[814]​  This kind of practice, however, was only possible in privateers: no navy could have been continuously employed in, or financed by guerre de course.  Instead, the use of ‘tickets’ – basically government IOUs – in lieu of cash had become general by the early 1650s.​[815]​  

British financial collapse, 1665-7

We saw in Chapter 1 that the British seamen’s enlistment with the Dutch at the Medway was blamed on the administration’s failure to pay them.  What evidence is there for the effects of financial collapse on the rank and file in Britain?  In part, the Dutch victory can be attributed to poor British morale in the defence ashore: on Monck’s arrival at Chatham, 11/21 June, by which time the Dutch had already taken the outer defences at Sheerness, he could only persuade three out of 1100 dockyard workers to help him organise a belated defence.  Many of the RN seamen present simply deserted their posts at the mere approach of the Dutch.​[816]​  Why, then, would men not fight or help in other ways?  
Usually his only chance of obtaining ready cash, the British naval seaman normally sold his ticket at a heavy discount to petty brokers and crimps who had the time and resources to pursue the money themselves: seamen were seldom able to go themselves up to the Pay Office in London to redeem their tickets in person.  In any case, this involved extra travel expenses and an indeterminate period waiting for their money to be paid.  There was, of course, also no guarantee that any money would even be available.  The discounts entailed great loss to the original ticket-holder: discount levels varied – 15% in 1656, 20-25% in 1666.​[817]​  The buyer determined the discount – on his perception of the likelihood of his own recompense – which was easy enough to gauge by obvious indicators of the state of the government’s finances.
If problems with incidence of naval payment were responsible for pushing British seamen towards Dutch service, then these difficulties did indeed reach their apogee during the latter stages of the Second Anglo-Dutch War.  It has long been recognised that, despite the centrality of trade to the Dutch economy, and the wartime damage to that trade, the more advanced Dutch financial system (better credit and lower interest) enabled a higher naval budget: ‘while the seamen of England loudly complained of want of pay, the Dutch navy was regularly supplied with money’.​[818]​  Ultimately, the Medway disaster itself was caused by the collapse of British government credit and finance: after the strain of two years of war, there simply were not the resources to fit out a battle fleet for the 1667 campaign.  The change in strategy to squadrons of lighter ships, intended for guerre de course and trade protection, may have required less manpower, but this was still heavy and expensive enough; crews which could not be paid.  Naturally it was the lower social strata that got the sharp end of the financial difficulties: the British maritime community bore the brunt; escalating pay arrears and disastrous problems with the tickets led to entrenched destitution.  
Spiralling arrears ran right through the dockyard infrastructure from the top down – from the master shipwrights down to the workers.​[819]​  While the elite designers and craftsmen probably had savings or other assets to save them from starvation or the debtors prison, the lesser artisans and dockyard mateys did not: at Dover, Thomas White’s carpenters were reduced to borrowing money for bread and lived in constant fear of imprisonment for debt.​[820]​  As punishment for refusing to help Monck, in supreme farce an angry Coventry had the Chatham men’s pay stopped.​[821]​  
As for the seamen, by summer 1667 the frigate Harp and the yacht Mary at Dublin were 52 months in arrears, producing such misery that the officers added their own signatures to the crews’ latest petition for pay: 

‘your poor petitioners having sent several petitions to your honours, but receiving no answer, there being above fifty-two months’ pay due to them, and having neither money nor credit, nor wherewith to buy bread for their wives and children, who are now in a starving condition, being forced to lie in the streets by reason their landlords will trust them no longer, and your petitioners going naked for want of clothes, which together are worse ten thousand times than to die by the hands of the enemy, for what can be more grievous than for men to see the starving of their wives and children?’​[822]​

Insubordination, desertion and disorder grew worse from late 1666; early in 1667 RN seamen were already causing disorder ‘from lack of money’, many more ‘hide themselves, and swear they will not go to be killed and have no pay’.​[823]​  In January 1667, Charles II himself intervened to stop seamen rioting for their pay in the Strand.​[824]​  With seamen arrested every day for debt, desperate measures were resorted to – a principal target for disorder was the debtors prison.  Arlington threw able seamen Thomas Garrett and Adam Loe in the Tower for trying to release shipmates from gaol.​[825]​  By the time of the Raid, arrears of 18-24 months were usual.  Even tickets offered at a woeful 60% discount were refused.​[826]​  The crimps had no chance of recouping the money.
The situation was desperation at Hull in late April; Oxford was 22 months in arrears; Pearl and Little Victory mutinied for pay: due two to three years’ pay, the latter’s men refused to weigh anchor.​[827]​  Mutiny and desertion increased; just before the Dutch descent, a large-scale mutiny in the Hope of three or four warships included Happy Return: she was supposed to have carried the Portuguese Ambassador to the ongoing peace negotiations in Holland.​[828]​  Within 10 days, this embarrassment was to be magnified many times over.
If anything, the British financial situation worsened after the Medway Raid.  At Bristol in early July, the timber ships had all stopped for lack of pay and seamen were being thrown into debtors’ prison daily.​[829]​  On 10/20 July, all the men pressed for Hamburg Merchant deserted en masse.​[830]​  In August pay-related strikes caused chaos in the dockyard and aboard the fireships at Harwich. No victuals could be purchased for the warships at Bristol, because, as elsewhere, Charles II could get no credit in the city.​[831]​  Ticket values were said to have utterly collapsed and British deserters and former POWs continued to enlist with the Dutch right up to the Treaty of Breda.  Shortly after the Dutch triumph, the British exile Rotterdam Gazette of 25 July published a vicious report: Royal Navy seamen

‘greatly complayned that in many monthes they had received noe wages, whereby they were soe impoverished, and in want, that they were forced to sell a whole monthes wages for a shilling, that there was allsoe such a great poverty under the seamens wives, and children, that the seamens wives to get bread for them as there children, were nescesytated to prostytute there bodys to whoredom’

The account emphasised that some released English prisoners of war preferred to serve in the Dutch navy than to return home.  If true, RN seamen had been reduced to selling their tickets for just 5% of their value.​[832]​  The Rotterdam Gazette is clearly a biased source servicing an expatriate and exile community, but British seamen were serving abroad, and even made their presence a hard reality for a former member of the government.  Having paid with his career for the lost war, in 1668 the Earl of Clarendon was in France when he was assaulted by armed English sailors and in danger of his life.  The men, now employed in the French artillery, wanted their wage arrears.​[833]​
RN seamen were losing 25-60% of the value of their tickets, possibly at more.  J. D. Davies pointed out that the collapse in payment ‘was said to have created a store of resentment which endured for many years’; payment in tickets, reportedly, ‘so alienated the seamen’ that service with an enemy was preferable.​[834]​  The sharply critical Hollond had advocated paying half the value of the ticket at the time of issue and the other half later.​[835]​  Even this was beyond the administration’s capability.  Fraud – by seamen and pursers – was inevitable, as the tickets themselves were easily forged.​[836]​  
Like so much else in the British naval system, the shortcomings were recognized but suitable or practical alternatives hard to find.  Belatedly, Coventry questioned the paying of the ticket-buyers (i.e. crimps), this took up much of the money belatedly allocated for payment of wages; the seamen themselves went unpaid – producing even more discontent.   He asked ‘whether they should not be paid by the ships’ books’,​[837]​ but nothing was done; the contemporary practice usually suiting the cash-strapped administration.  Coventry wrote again in October 1667 – stating the obvious and with considerable wishful thinking – that paying off the tickets of the men to be demobilized in large numbers properly would help the navy by reducing merchant wages and restore order in the fleet, ‘since the employment would be sought as formerly’.​[838]​  An alternative that should eventually have taken the profiteering ticket-buyers out of the loop failed: at some point Navy Office clerks were permitted to cash the tickets for a percentage as attorneys.   Rampant abuse in the form of exorbitant fees led to the prohibition of this practise by Order in Council in 1707.​[839]​
 	To avoid financial pressure as much as possible as well as easing the manning problem, British crews were frequently ‘turned over’ into other ships instead of being paid off as they should have been at the end of a ship’s commission, adding the insult of a lengthened and indeterminate term of service to the injury of not receiving their pay.  Details of the pay already owed the men were often misplaced as a result of the turnover, adding to their anger.  Originally used only as an administrative and operational expedient, turnovers were officially introduced as an economy measure in the winter of 1691-2.  The seamen’s reaction to this institutionalised cheating of their pay was natural: desertion immediately trebled.​[840]​  Echoing the Medway debacle, British seamen joined the enemy because of poor payment in 1693: Sir Thomas Clarges complained in the Commons 

‘Many of the Seamen take service from the King of France. If some remedy be not taken to provide for and encourage the Seamen, they will desert’.​[841]​

Critically for our study, Barlow was so disgusted with being cheated in English merchant service that he considered the RN the better option for reasons of pay, having very long experience of both services.​[842]​  Both naval and merchant service in Britain can be regarded as employment options with suspect pay and incidence of payment.  The logical outcome is that obvious economic advantages in Dutch service at any particular time would have been eagerly seized upon, unless restrained, during the Anglo-Dutch Wars – like Barlow – by a very keen sense of patriotism.  Barlow never seems to have even considered this option: many other British seamen did.

Dutch Maritime Sector Pay

Dutch world trade supremacy was largely built on low overheads, high productivity, and cheap freight rates, but – surprisingly – it is not explicit that Dutch merchant wages were lower than other nations’ as an integral component of their success.​[843]​  Details on Dutch merchant rates are very sparse in the literature, reflecting the shortage of sources.  Generally speaking, both merchant and naval wages followed the overall trend of ‘substantial increase’ in all Dutch wages between the 1620s and 1650s.​[844]​  (Naval increases are apparent in Figure 4.3 below.)  A knock-on effect of naval pay increases on merchant wages was generally feared – rises would have endangered the low Dutch freight rates, threatening trade supremacy – so naval wages may have been deliberately kept below merchant rates: ‘the State tried at least to influence the mechanisms of the labour market.’​[845]​  The precise nature of any restrictive measures, however, is often unclear from the literature.
Besides financial and commercial motives for restricting naval wages, seamen’s leverage over the authorities through market-driven naval wages provided extra incentive: to many in the elite the pressure exerted by seamen threatened the State and the elite’s vision of the proper order and very structure of society.  Johan de Witt complained in April 1665

one day there must be something determined about keeping wages under an iron law, without that anyone can have some hope of a rise.  Otherwise the seaman is the master and the State at the discretion of the mob.​[846]​

Yet it was not only the seamen’s influence on wages rates that threatened the established order of things: their reaction to wage arrears was viewed similarly.  Failure to pay crews promptly enough was courting mutiny aboard ship or riot ashore.  We saw examples of disorder in Britain above and there were similar instances in the Dutch Republic: the Rotterdam admiralty was occasionally besieged by unpaid crews or their wives.​[847]​  Echoing De Witt, the Zeeland States deputy Michiel Michielzon waxed lyrical on a ‘putrid gang of sailors’ who interrupted a Zeeland States meeting in 1676, demanding their wages with threats of violence: ‘the mob, alas, is gradually becoming more and more the boss’.​[848]​
To return to the pay rates themselves, we shall start by looking at the three largest sub-sectors – merchant, navy and VOC.  Dutch historians have asserted that naval pay always remained lower than merchant wages; this has replaced Boxer’s view that merchant wages were low before 1650, but thereafter there was no differential between the two sub-sectors.​[849]​  Israel gives merchant wages, 1625-50, as 12fl.​[850]​  This, however, differs from Davids’ linkage of maritime pay with other contemporary wage inflation (above), also from Dutch assessments of the merchant wage, and furthermore barely exceeds the Zeeland admiralty rate of 11fl, 1642-9 (see below).  But other admiralties probably paid higher rates at the same time: in 1641 admiral Maarten Tromp (Rotterdam) complained of difficulties in recruiting seamen for less than 14fl; they wanted 17fl.​[851]​  The rate actually reached is unspecified, but seems to have exceeded Israel’s contemporary 12fl merchant rate.  Israel emphasises naval increases in the 1630s; the logical extension is that naval wages were then higher than merchant – the opposite to the Dutch position.  Bruijn gives the naval rate as having reached 11-12fl by around 1650, which is virtually identical to Israel’s merchant figure.​[852]​ 
If the naval rates varied, then merchant rates did too.  Drawing on Van Royen, Davids gives merchant rates of 10-15fl for 1700-10.​[853]​  But most of this period was wartime, when the Zeeland admiralty rate was also 15fl (see below), and Van Royen has given a merchant rate of 16fl in one example.  Bruijn, Lucassen and Boon, however, had already pointed out that merchant rates rose during wartime.  Up to about 1680, Dutch merchant rates were 14-15fl in peacetime, rising to 18-19fl in wartime.  This pattern continued in the eighteenth century.​[854]​  As with the navy, there were regional variations.  Between 1679 and 1705 in West Friesland (i.e., in the North Quarter admiralty’s jurisdiction) from the limited details available, Boon has shown that merchant wages were both somewhat lower than earlier and showed more variation: 12-14fl in peacetime rising to 14-19fl in wartime.​[855]​
For the navy, Bruijn has established that able seamen’s wages also fluctuated between peace and war: as a general trend, having reached 12fl by the 1650s, they stayed there in peacetime but rose to 15fl during ‘most’ of the wars, 1652-1713; wages ‘only’ increased during wartime in this period, reaching this general upper limit.​[856]​  During peacetime, with the consequent fall in labour demand, pay fell back to lower levels: the Zeeland rate had fallen to 12fl after the peace in 1667, through to 1669.​[857]​  The conception of a general 12fl peacetime rate has superseded the earlier (1977) paradigm of long-term stability at 11fl.​[858]​  One inconsistency though is the drop to 11fl in 1670, apparent in Figure 4.3 below; this is not the only instance of this low level (see also below), and is below even the VOC rate.  During the eighteenth century, wages fell to a somewhat lower level, but were more stable – holding at 11-12fl at Amsterdam, but varying 9-12fl in both Zeeland and the North Quarter about 1770.  (Here we see the operation of both grading at the local level and – again – regional variations, explored further below.)  Wages were, however, still increased in wartime, reaching 14fl and 16fl in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War.​[859]​
During our period, however, Bruijn has also shown that wartime naval rates hit 17fl (1673) and even 18fl (1653) due to the dearth of seamen willing to sign on and threats of strikes and riots for higher pay.​[860]​  J. R. Jones maintained, however, that the Amsterdam admiralty ‘exploited the lack of employment to pay even lower rates’ in wartime than in peacetime.  It is difficult to see how he derived this view, especially when he goes on to cite Bruijn on wartime increases.​[861]​  Bruijn states that as a result of De Witt’s opposition to wage increases on principle, before his fall in 1672 there was no repetition of the kind of increases found necessary in 1653 (18fl).​[862]​  Downing, however, passed intelligence on to Arlington and Clarendon following the heavy Dutch defeat at Lowestoft in June 1665:  

‘they write now from Amsterdam that now they offer 30 gilders per month to seamen, and 30 gilders advance: cost what it will, they will have their fleet out’.​[863]​

Downing’s comment sums up the essential fact that the Dutch had massive financial resources and could stretch themselves by adopting short-term incentives.  Israel has already brought this colossal rate to light, contending that the Amsterdam admiralty had to raise wages to this ‘unheard-of level’.​[864]​  Most other historians have not picked this up, though Lucassen states that this level was not reached.​[865]​  Even if this enormous figure is inaccurate or miss-intelligence, 16fl was reached in 1658-9 and 20fl in 1665; 17 and 18fl once again in March 1672 – before De Witt’s fall (see below).  Lucassen has revealed that De Witt’s protest above against the 1665 wage rises originated after wages had risen again from the recently increased rate of 15fl to 18-20fl – without his knowledge.​[866]​  Bruijn did not include these very high levels in his surveys; De Witt, then, did not have as much control of the situation as Bruijn thought.
Whilst study of naval and merchant wages is clearly in need of radical overhaul, WIC and VOC wages present yet more difficulties: like the other sub-sectors, rates were graded on skill and experience, but also on long-service, probably varied across the regional chambers, and in WIC’s case perhaps additionally varied according to geographical location.  Study of WIC pay is hampered particularly by the loss of musters.  The WIC paid 14fl on the Gold Coast in the 1640s.​[867]​  The Zeeland admiralty warships in WIC service off Brazil 1646-8, however, are probably not a guide to local WIC rates, but do show the navy compared poorly with the WIC at that time.​[868]​
Study of VOC wages, though, benefits from both the greater survival of sources, as well as the historical interest generated by its global scale and the sheer manpower consistently involved.  The VOC was (with the navy) the worst-paid option during our period – in any case, during peacetime.  Bruijn and Lucassen’s initial position was that from 1636 the VOC paid 7-11fl, then 9-11fl in the eighteenth century; these ranges appear mainly due to grading according to experience and ability, but also include grades below that of able seaman, which confuses the issue.​[869]​  It has now been established that the general upper limit post-1636 was remarkably stable at 12fl, though some new sources still use a top rate of 11fl, but also that these wages were sometimes raised during wartime – at the end of the late eighteenth century at least, reaching 16fl (the same as the naval rate above).​[870]​  Deconinck, whose period straddles 1636, put the top rate at 10fl.​[871]​
Despite long-term stability, VOC wages need further study: the VOC did not always pay less than the navy after the latter’s rates were increased during wartime.  In early 1665, the VOC (the Amsterdam chamber, at least) actually paid more than the general naval rate – before the latter increased to the same figure – not once but twice in tit-for-tat rises, before in late April 1665 the company outstripped the general naval rate for the remainder of its fleet service, and forced the Amsterdam admiralty to pay even higher.  The VOC was clearly a principal actor in the spiralling contemporary naval wage demands noted by Rowen and sketched further below.  This was also the case during the First Anglo-Dutch War, but this is only hinted at below: study of VOC rates is in need of a revamp – during wartime at least.
Because of the characteristics sketched above, general surveys of Dutch maritime sector wages remain particularly flawed.  From Francke’s data, for example, on the various branches of the maritime sector (‘Range’ in Table 4.1 below), only generalized conclusions are possible.​[872]​










Privateering, and merchant wages were best; the navy next, then the WIC, with the VOC the worst paid.  For the Eighty Years’ War, 1568-1648, Van Vliet broadly confirms this general structure, though omitting the WIC (formed 1621): naval pay lagged some way behind merchantmen and privateers; VOC pay was again worst.​[873]​
The wide ranges in time and rates in Table 4.1, however, cause considerable overlap between the different branches – making accurate comparison impossible.  The simple mean is subject to too much error: it is not clear how the rates evolved, both individually and relatively, over the 60 years covered.  Comparison of the different branches at specific dates remains virtually unstudied.  For instance, Francke points out that the Zeeland chamber of the WIC paid 15-16fl in 1690.​[874]​  The top end then, however, exceeded the contemporary Zeeland admiralty wage of 15fl (see below).  We have already seen that WIC pay exceeded the Zeeland admiralty’s for a time in the 1640s: using much tighter parameters, the navy’s superiority over the WIC in Francke’s data is reversed, turning any interpretation based on Table 4.1 completely on its head.  
We also have to be wary with privateering wages.  These were also subject to state intervention: in early 1665 they were limited to just 12fl – the same as the then usual naval rate – to reduce competition for manpower and aid fleet recruitment.​[875]​  (Subsequently, they surely increased with the naval rate.)  When, additionally, we take into account the limits on operations and recruitment in consideration of naval recruitment we saw briefly in Chapter 2, further study on privateering wages is needed.
Whaling, which is not usually included in comparative studies, probably because of lack of data, paid the highest wages in the maritime sector: up to around 1680 some 17-22fl.  For the late seventeenth century on, Davids gives 18-20fl; but De Jonge gave a rate far exceeding this – 28fl, probably referring to around 1690: wartime.  Not surprisingly, in view of the behaviour of wages in other sub-sectors, and merchant wages rising in wartime close to these whaling levels, whaling wages were sometimes also raised in wartime: in the late eighteenth century, at least, they rose from 19-20fl in peacetime to 24fl and 26fl.​[876]​








To return to the navy, instances in current literature of date-specific Dutch naval able seamen’s rates are summarised in Figure 4.3 above.​[881]​  Bruijn’s general wartime maximum of 15fl is also applied here to all periods during 1652-1713 when major squadrons were fitted out for naval interventions, even if there was no actual combat.​[882]​  Rates from British intelligence accounts are included for comparison.​[883]​  The yawning gaps in data are obvious.  Bruijn’s trend is broadly confirmed for the short transition from war through peace to war once again, 1665-73, but this is hardly conclusive.  The data is completely inadequate for developments before, and especially the many years after this short period.

Dutch naval pay; regional & other variations 

Aside from lack of data, study of Dutch naval wages suffers from additional difficulties.  The decentralized structure of Dutch naval administration sometimes resulted in regional wage variations.  In principle, the States General set wage levels in consultation with the Haagse Besognes – the caucus of all five admiralties at The Hague.  Control varied, though: instructions might comprise comprehensive wages lists, or vaguer directives to pay only ‘moderate wages’.  The provincial States also attempted to set wage levels in consultation with their local admiralties – besides their own delegates’ influence in the States General itself.  In practise, however, the provincial admiralties exercised a certain amount of freedom to react to their local manpower difficulties.  During 1600-1700, Catterall found no Scots naval seamen in Rotterdam earning more than 15fl; this was, however, drawn from a very small sample.​[884]​  We know for certain that this rate was exceeded – at times – both at Rotterdam and elsewhere. 
	The different admiralties might pay their own rates, but this already complicated situation is further confused by the possibility of the same admiralty offering different rates during any one period or within a very short space of time.  The States General occasionally allowed different rates (for men of the same skill) to co-exist as new regulation followed old: sometimes, men already in service were kept on the wages they had enlisted for, whilst freshly-enlisted men were paid a new, higher rate.  This kind of unequal treatment led, naturally, to discontent.  Also, pay was often widely graded according to seamen’s various experience and skills – up to the maximum rate, sometimes stipulated by the States General, sometimes at the discretion of the captain or muster master on an ad hoc basis.
During the First Anglo-Dutch War, especially, the situation is further complicated by the multi-layered nature of Dutch naval effort – not only horizontally (across the different admiralties) but also vertically (within the same admiralty jurisdiction): local ‘Directors’ (i.e. ‘private local navies’) also contributed ships to the battle fleet, as did the regional VOC chambers.  Previously, the Directors had often paid higher wages than the admiralties, and also more promptly.​[885]​  This seems especially the case, 1652-4.  In late summer 1652 Vice-Admiral De With reported that the naval crews’ discontent was due to the Directors paying an 18fl top rate whilst the navy’s was only 11fl; ‘although they both perform the same service, so that it is impossible to pacify these crews any longer’.​[886]​  As with the admiralties, unequal pay rates were also applied to VOC crews on the same ship: a summer 1653 mutiny on the Zeeland Chamber’s Zwarte Bul was due to ‘the inequality of the wages’ caused by the arrival aboard of inexperienced seamen who had been engaged for a very hefty 18fl.​[887]​  This also emphasises that VOC rates were sometimes very high.
The Directors were abolished (1656) and VOC contributions to the fleet phased out (1666), but, as we saw in Chapter 2, a direct levy from merchantmen continued as a recruitment supplement: it is not clear whether these men were always paid the same rate as those enlisting directly.​[888]​  The ‘Fifth man’ was certainly redeemed at 15fl in 1695.​[889]​
Another dimension within any one admiralty jurisdiction was the occasional targeted use of higher wages aboard the flagships – to fill these (usually larger) ships with the best seamen.  In late October 1652, the Zeeland admiralty gave De Ruyter’s crew a rise to 13fl, when their other warships were still on 12fl.​[890]​  This practice was used intermittently thereafter.  Lower rates were sometimes paid for crews on small and inshore craft, and occasionally during the winter season.

Zeeland admiralty basic wage rates, 1642-1663

The Zeeland rates can be reconstructed to a large degree even after the loss of all the payrolls for 1650-1663 and most of the 1652 and 1672 admiralty resolutions.  The payrolls confirm a top rate of 11fl, 1642-9.​[891]​  The resolutions confirm 11fl in 1650.​[892]​  In March 1652 – a few months before the clearly imminent outbreak of the First Dutch War – the States General stipulated a top seamen’s rate of 11fl.​[893]​  This, in fact, was very quickly cancelled.  From the literature, it is not clear how the rate changed as a result, even well after the outbreak of the war: Vice-Admiral De With (Rotterdam) gave a rate of 11fl in August 1652.​[894]​  As late as November 1652 Admiral Maarten Tromp gave the same rate.​[895]​  This matches Boxer’s rates for December 1652.​[896]​  This rate, in fact, was a reduction after previous rises.  The Zeeland sources show that wages rose to 15fl back in March.​[897]​  
Central control proved largely unsuccessful: the States General set out four wage lists in 1652;​[898]​ most were not adhered to.  Local difficulties drove the situation: the North Quarter admiralty could get no men, so independently raised its wages in May.​[899]​  Similarly, Zeeland wages were raised again in June ‘out of necessity’, hitting 17fl for the summer,​[900]​ exceeding the 11fl then paid at Rotterdam.​[901]​  By October the Zeelanders intended to pay off their hired ships and recruit new crews at the ‘old wages’ (11fl).​[902]​  Soon, De With complained that both Amsterdam and the North Quarter’s rates exceeded Rotterdam’s.​[903]​  In the same month the States General tried to reduce pay across the board to 11fl – probably also with a view to reducing operations (and manpower) for the coming winter.  The Zeelanders, however, immediately resolved to pay 12fl instead, marking that most of Dingeman Cats’ crew had earlier deserted at 11fl.​[904]​  Seamen elsewhere refused to enlist for 11fl; within just two weeks the Zeeland rate was raised to 13fl and 14fl.​[905]​  
In April 1653 inequality between different rates on offer simultaneously prompted discussion; Zeeland wages were raised again ‘out of necessity’.​[906]​  In June, Tromp and the senior officers pressed for equality and an increase in wages.​[907]​  The States General increased pay by 1fl, also in June.​[908]​  In the desperate circumstances of summer 1653, the Zeeland admiralty at first authorised rates of 15, 16, and 17fl; 18fl was reached very soon after.​[909]​  Yet after Scheveningen, Zeeland could not man her brand-new large warships – ‘notwithstanding the high wages promised’.  Despite these, other crews were still paid less: such inequality made Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge’s crew – about to put to sea – mutinous.  Johan Evertsen recommended their wages be increased to forestall mass desertion.​[910]​  Soon, the wives of Claas Janssen Zanger’s crew successfully petitioned for their men’s wages to be increased – ‘like on other ships’.​[911]​  Wage inequality was also still widespread at the federal level – the problem was scheduled top priority for the Haagse Besognes of October 1653.​[912]​  
In January 1654, the States General rationalised wages, with the common formula of specified numbers of each warship’s seamen receiving particular rates: 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15fl.​[913]​  With peace imminent (Treaty of Westminster, April, ratified May 1654), these scaled wages were reduced to 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14fl.​[914]​  In July the States General reduced skilled wages to 12fl.​[915]​  




During the renewed war with Portugal the Zeeland rate remained stable at 12fl, but this rose very rapidly indeed during recruitment for the 1659 Baltic intervention; first to 13fl, then 14fl, before hitting 15 and 16fl – all within less than three weeks.​[920]​  It was reduced to 12fl in November 1659.​[921]​  The Zeeland rate fell to 11fl in February 1662.​[922]​  It remained there until late 1664.​[923]​

Zeeland admiralty basic wage rates, 1664-7; other admiralties, 1665

Literature is similarly vague for the Second Anglo-Dutch War.  De Jonge – who had access to the vast material since destroyed – put naval wages at the start of the war still as low as 10 or 11fl, before the increased demands on manpower led to rises of 12, 14 or 15fl for the best and most experienced seamen.​[924]​  He did not specify whether these variations were progressive increases over time or rates from different admiralties – or offered simultaneously in the form of grades.​[925]​  In spring 1665, Rowen states that with recruitment a ‘major problem’, the Holland States backed pay increases for the simple reason that those admiralties that had already resorted to this solution had got more seamen; the Amsterdam admiralty having initially tried to hold to 12fl.​[926]​   (This suggests that the two other Holland admiralties, Rotterdam and the North Quarter, had increased the rate beyond 12fl, which is confirmed below.)  Resulting jealousy between the seamen endangered their ‘merry’ mood during the fleet preparations in 1665; they had signed on at different rates and then threatened to strike for 18, 20, or even 25fl.​[927]​
Despite the difficulties with the sources, examples can be found of comparative intra-Dutch naval wages at specific times, correspondence between the admiralties on the subject, and the direct consequences of poor wages.  The Zeeland flag officers Johan Evertsen (Hof van Zeeland) and Cornelis Evertsen de Oude (Vlissingen) had difficulty in manning their ships at 11fl during the rival fleet preparations of summer 1664, and were delayed from joining the Dutch ‘extraordinary’ fleet at its Goeree rendezvous.  Belatedly arriving about 18 August, Cornelis wrote to his brother – who was still trying to complete his crew at Flushing – that he was the ‘worst-manned’ of any of the 21 ships then at Goeree; the rest each had 200-250 ‘very good’ men.  (Cornelis probably overstated the quality of the others’ men, a ubiquitous complaint of captains.)  All the other warships’ crews were also paid at 11fl – except two Frisian warships paid at 14fl and 15fl, three North Quarter ships paid at 14fl, and the Rotterdam Vice-Admiral Cortenaar’s crew paid at 12fl.​[928]​  (This also shows that Amsterdam was paying 11fl at that time, and must have reached the 12fl level given by Rowen above at some intermediate stage between August 1664 and spring 1665.)  Johan Evertsen, meanwhile, reported that he could get no more men for 11fl; quickly prompting the Zeelanders to write to the other admiralties to enquire as to their wage levels.​[929]​  Rotterdam replied that it had raised its wages to 12fl aboard Cortenaar’s and Obdam’s flagships.​[930]​  Even Obdam, the Commander-in-chief, suffered recruitment problems.  Cortenaar (Klein Hollandia) had sailed for the rendezvous on 29 July, when Obdam (Eendracht) was still 100 men short of his complement.  Obdam did not join before 18 August.​[931]​  
In July 1664 there was trouble in Zeeland when sailors were ‘unwilling’ to serve for 11fl.​[932]​  British personnel joined even for the low wages: it is interesting to note that the first two Zeelanders ready to join the fleet – Adriaan Banckert (Veere) and Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge (Utrecht) – also had high proportions of British in their crews at that time (about 4% on both ships).​[933]​  
After learning of the other admiralties’ rates, the Zeelanders quickly raised theirs to 12fl on 30 August, effective 17 September, but only in the ships in home waters earmarked for the ‘extraordinary’ fleet at Goeree and a separate contingent for a counter-strike at Guinea (i.e. those intended for West Africa before De Ruyter was secretly ordered there from the Mediterranean instead).  Zeeland crews on routine convoy duty, however, were to stay on 11fl.​[934]​  By the time of the Zeeland rise Johan Evertsen had finally joined the fleet, but still 60 men short and now complaining to Obdam of his crew’s poor quality overall.​[935]​  Many experienced seamen in Zeeland must have been avoiding enlistment.  The inequality of wages across the Zeeland warships was removed by December 1664; the admiralty authorised 12fl to two returned convoy escort crews.​[936]​  This was not an isolated case: in the series of Zeeland general pay issues in December 1664/January 1665 all warships were paid 12fl.​[937]​  Zeeland decided to hold to 12fl in early January.​[938]​  
The Rotterdam admiralty informed the States General on the last day of 1664 that her seamen were unwilling to serve for 11fl.  The States General promptly asked Rotterdam and Amsterdam, then the other admiralties, for their opinions on wage rises.​[939]​  Rotterdam maintained that increases would have ‘great and ill consequences’ – necessarily breeding yet more pressure and the promise of wages higher still.  They were, in any case, unnecessary as the embargo would bring in ‘great multitudes’ of men.  Events, as we saw in Chapter 2, were to prove that the embargo alone was not enough..  The States General promptly prohibited wages higher than 11fl.​[940]​  Zeeland replied, reasoning that their increase to 12fl was ‘not to egg [the crews] to wilfulness, or in form of negotiation […] that to wait until we are forced by need to unequal higher wages’, as in the First Anglo-Dutch War, would cause even ‘greater damage to the State’.​[941]​  Besides these prudent considerations, other admiralties had already increased their wages.  Rotterdam’s had reached 16fl by mid-January, which makes their argument against increases look rather strange.​[942]​  The Frisian and North Quarter admiralties, though, took the brunt of the blame.​[943]​  Whilst details are scant, their high rates the previous summer bear this out.
In January the Holland States recommended that all five admiralties increase to 12fl.​[944]​  The States General promptly authorised a general increase to 12fl – simultaneously to the new embargo and related measures issued on the declaration of war.​[945]​  By March 1665 British intelligence thought Rotterdam pay was standardised at 12fl across its ships.​[946]​  In March the Amsterdam admiralty, after some consideration, increased to 12fl, blaming the VOC rate (see below).​[947]​  British intelligence from Rotterdam stated that the abundant labour supply at Amsterdam enabled the admiralty to keep wages down to 12fl.​[948]​  Amsterdam then refused both the Holland States’ recommendation and seamen’s demands, though British intelligence thought that Amsterdam would fall into line if the other admiralties reached consensus.​[949]​    
Another part of the maritime sector, however, closely interacted with naval pay.  By early April 1665, the VOC paid 15fl;​[950]​ it probably reached this figure soon after the Amsterdam admiralty raised pay to equal the 12fl VOC rate in March.  With the fleet still 2000 sailors short, 16fl was being considered, before the States General finally authorised the 15fl rate for skilled seamen across the board, effective 20 April.​[951]​  Initially, the rate was authorised secretly for ‘able and experienced seamen’ only.  The North Quarter admiralty promptly openly proclaimed this as applicable for all seamen – earning themselves a sharp rebuke from the States General, who ordered them to forthwith apply the increase only to skilled men, and also to land any men not satisfied with 15fl – to stop possible further trouble.​[952]​  Johan de Witt himself went 

‘on board many of the ships [at the Texel] to incourage the seamen, having declared to them that from the beginning of May they shall have 15 gilders per month’.​[953]​

The Scots Conservator at Amsterdam thought this would ‘get men [in] aboundance’.​[954]​  But few men enlisted, demanding 18fl instead.  The States General soon freed both the admiralties and the VOC to determine their own wages, but subsequently countermanded this, reinstating the 15fl limit.​[955]​  Nonetheless, wages spiralled at Amsterdam: on the navy’s rise, the VOC promptly increased to 17fl, but ‘severall seamen […] refused it insisting to have still more’.  A few days later, VOC was paying a top rate of 18fl.​[956]​  After another couple of days, the Amsterdam admiralty paid 20fl, almost twice its rate of the previous month.​[957]​
The States General-authorised 15fl level, then, was exceeded in the early months of the war by both the Amsterdam and Rotterdam admiralties.  One problem, noted by Rowen, was the friction caused by men enlisting at different rates.  Such discontent was, of course, quite justified: in view of the experiences of the previous war, it is amazing that disparity in pay for men of equal skill was allowed.  Within one admiralty, it seems very likely that Amsterdam continued her skilled men on the April 15fl rate, whilst only the men recruited subsequently received the higher rates noted above – rather than applying the increases universally, which must have been impossible.  Added to this was the example to other admiralties’ crews 

‘those that were taken on a good while ago since doe begin to grumble that they who have indured the hardship of the winter should have less wages than those that take on now’.

Difficulties were such that even a total change in Dutch practise was temporarily under consideration by a few in Holland: the press.​[958]​  Outside Zeeland, subsequent wage developments in the war are still unclear.  The other two admiralties (the North Quarter and Friesland) may have also exceeded the 15fl level.  It is clear, however, from the Zeeland payrolls that perhaps 90-95% of the seamen were skilled – with only a small proportion of unskilled on lower wages.  When Zeeland wages were increased, everybody on the same grade was raised to the new rate, regardless of when they enlisted.  This must have reduced possible discontent and enhanced cohesion.  Again, the other admiralties’ practises in this respect particularly need to be established.  The 15fl skilled rate was effective in Zeeland from 20 April and stayed there for the rest of the war.​[959]​  The rate fell to 12fl after the peace.​[960]​  The phasing out in 1666 of the VOC fleet contributions probably eased pressure on wages, which seem to have stabilised in the other admiralties: the rate was 15fl at Amsterdam and the North Quarter in 1666.  The same year, when the French were allowed to recruit 400 seamen at Amsterdam, they were no permitted to offer more than 15fl.​[961]​  In 1667, however, De Ruyter himself had to increase by 1fl after difficulties recruiting, probably indicating a widespread 16fl rate.​[962]​

Zeeland admiralty basic wage rates, 1671-1712

Seven weeks before the formal outbreak of the Third Anglo-Dutch War (17/27 March 1672), wages reached 15fl on the Dutch fleet mobilisation.​[963]​  Langley and Taylor sent back intelligence on Dutch wage rates and the levels of British in the Dutch fleet.​[964]​  Very rapid increases seem to have started immediately after Charles’ declaration of war: by 22 March Taylor’s contacts in the Republic reported 17fl.​[965]​  By 4 April an ‘intelligent person’ reported 20, 21, and 22fl.​[966]​  Specific reports of Rotterdam wages gave 18fl aboard De Ruyter’s Zeven Provinciën and 15fl on the other ships.​[967]​  The British Rotterdam merchant Samuel Tucker soon reported a change in the other Rotterdam ships: ‘great wages be given here, as 16 to 18 guilders per month’; the latter may have become general.​[968]​  British merchant seamen arriving at Dover from Amsterdam – where their ships had been seized during the pre-war escalation – reported the enormous figure of 30fl being offered there.​[969]​  In June reports came in of 40s, indicating a rate of 20-22fl.​[970]​  In March 1673 British intelligence claimed that Rotterdam rates again reached 18fl.​[971]​
Actually, Dutch wages had already started to rise in 1671 – well before the war: during the major fleet preparations of that year the Zeeland rate was increased to 13fl.​[972]​  The 15fl rate was paid on the major ships.​[973]​  Manpower shortages prompted special higher rates aboard the Zeeland flagships in 1672 and 1673.  In 1672 the rates of Lieutenant-Admiral Adriaan Banckert’s crew (Walcheren) were raised from 15fl to 17fl.  The crews of Vice-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge (Zierikzee) and Rear-Admiral Jan Matthijssen (Oranje) were raised to 16fl.​[974]​  This pattern was repeated in 1673 (Matthijssen now in Gekroonden Burg).​[975]​  All other major warships (that is, with over a threshold of 50 men in the crew) were paid at 15fl.​[976]​  Wages were reduced in late 1672 on reduced winter mobilisation.​[977]​ This may have been for those vessels below the 50 crew threshold.  Otherwise the rate remained at 15fl until at least 1675.  Although the war with France continued until 1678, the rate was cut right down to 11fl in May 1676; ‘like at Amsterdam’.​[978]​




Zeeland wage summary, 1642-1712





Incidence of payment in the Dutch navy

As mentioned above, Boxer and Bruijn both give Dutch incidence of payment as superior to British, though presenting little evidence.  As for method, Jones points out that Dutch crews ‘were at least paid in cash’, instead of tickets.​[987]​  Van Vliet maintains that all the admiralties ‘had a reputation of being bad employers’ during the Eighty Years’ War, but arrears then seem to have been measured in months.​[988]​  Across the Dutch admiralties, Boxer focused briefly on Rotterdam – a ‘notoriously bad paymaster’ – at least compared to the others.​[989]​  In late 1652, De With complained that Rotterdam seamen were ‘getting no payment as do those of Amsterdam and the North Quarter’.​[990]​  Generally speaking, the situation is said to have reached critical levels during 1652-4 and in the smaller admiralties at the end of our period.  For instance, in 1652 intelligence from Rotterdam reported that the Dutch ‘cannot well get any men aboard their ships, having not the wherewithal to pay them their arrears’,​[991]​ whilst the Zeeland warship Oranjezaal’s crew had to wait over 10 years for their wage arrears from 1709.​[992]​  
Dutch difficulties sometimes caused problems for their British personnel: the Rotterdam Scot Jacob Finney was Vice-Admiral De With’s navigator in 1650 and was still trying to claim his arrears of 283fl (about eight to ten months’ wages) eight years later.​[993]​  British naval commanders even attempted to exploit Dutch problems: at Leghorn in 1652, Henry Appleton, the British commander, was outnumbered two to one by the Dutch Mediterranean squadron.​[994]​  Appleton tried to reduce the odds against him: he knew that 200 English and Scots seamen were aboard the Dutch warships and that the crews were owed fifteen months’ wages.  He asked the administration at home for ready cash to offer these British seamen two or three months’ pay: this would ‘entice’ the majority from Dutch service.​[995]​
From the micro-case studies in Part Two, we can see that, although the frequency of Zeeland warship payrolls was low 1642-9, it was excellent for most of our the rest of our period from 1664.   William Carr, English Resident in the 1670s and 1680s, wrote that ‘great care’ was taken that Dutch seamen were paid ‘punctually’.​[996]​  In the early 1660s the Zeelanders resolved to pay each ship’s company every year.​[997]​  The frequency perhaps fell off again in Anne’s War, with payrolls often issuing only half the money due, the remainder following a year or two later.​[998]​  The payrolls themselves, though, were not the only source of payments.  Seamen’s petitions for arrears, which contributed heavily to overall incidence of payment, were readily paid for most of the period 1642-1700, so that even in the sparse payroll period, 1642-9, crews and dependents were paid much more regularly than the payrolls alone would indicate: about every three or four months, especially for long-serving men, petty officers, or those with families.  Despite the reputation of payment difficulties during the war of 1652-4, for which we not possess the actual Zeeland payrolls themselves, it is very apparent that the crews were paid as a group with equal or perhaps even better frequency as before the war, and, crucially, that seamen’s petitions were paid in wartime with the same regularity as during 1642-9 – despite one order to cease such payments.  Petitions were also regularly paid during 1658-9.​[999]​  




Comparative British and Dutch Basic Naval Wages

At the exchange rate of 11.1fl:£1 sterling, Bruijn’s general base rate of 12fl for able seamen equated to 21.6s: 10% lower than the British rate of 24s effective at the start of 1653 – but the general wartime 15fl peak rate was 12.5% higher.  The previously established wage peaks of 17fl (1673) and 18fl (1653) entailed a massive economic incentive of 27.5% to 35% increases for British seamen transferring to Dutch service.  Just before the British introduced higher wages in 1653, Admiral Blake summed up the pay differential between the two navies: the British

loss of seamen is extraordinary, and unless there be speedy care taken in paying them of their money, and furnishing out new assistance, we shall be but in a sad condition.  For indeed they cry out extremely for money, and refuse to engage again gratis, whereas the enemy give their men their prizes and 40s a month; ours have no allowance of prizes and but 18s a month.  This sticks in their stomachs and quells their valour, which otherwise might prove happily instrumental in the good of this nation.​[1002]​





Figure 4.7 above compares British and Zeeland able seamen’s wages, 1642-1712.​[1004]​  The Zeeland able seaman’s rate was consistently superior to the British from the start of our period until summer 1654 and almost always during wartime thereafter.  The differential opened in 1642 at a huge 32%, but was quickly cut to just 4% until 1652.  It then reached 61% and 30% (1652, 1653 respectively).  Zeeland wages were 20% higher in the Baltic crisis, 12.5% during the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars – and are confirmed at this same level for most of the wartime periods, 1688-1712.
Direct comparison of British and Dutch officers’ and NCOs’ wages is rather more difficult than with the seamen: the British scaled pay according to the size (‘rate’) of ship, whilst the numbers of officers for certain functions differed between the two navies – sometimes complicated further by differences in the grade structure within each function. The Zeelanders, even with their mostly smaller ships, tended to have greater numbers of specialists, especially from 1665.​[1005]​  We should also bear in mind that the two largest British warship rates were relatively few in number, so that these positions were rare.  Captains’ wages cannot be easily compared.​[1006]​  Lieutenants are virtually non-existent in Zeeland payrolls before about 1688.​[1007]​  The Dutch master (schipper) was senior to the navigators (stuurlieden) around 1652, with overall responsibility for navigation, but was actually paid less (24-27fl, as opposed to 30-33fl).  He was also paid less than British masters.  Dutch navigators had the highest basic wages on board in wartime at around 33fl, outstripping even the captain.​[1008]​  These men are usually considered equivalent to British master’s mates, though they were classified as warrant officers (dekofficieren) in the Dutch navy, rather than as petty officers in the British.  Higher social status must have been attractive to British emigrants.








One explanation is that the two navies’ complement allowance and grading system within the gunnery function differed radically from 1665.  The British allowed only one gunner (called the master gunner until 1653) aboard all rates – both fourth- and fifth-rates had one gunner with a mate and a quarter-gunner.  Until 1653, the Zeeland provision of a gunner and mate was fairly similar to British allowance on equivalent fifth-rates; it seems the larger Zeeland ships introduced from 1653 also had the same allowance as the smaller.  From early 1665, however, Zeelanders of 40 guns and up had three gunners, each with a mate.​[1012]​  During the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars, then, Zeeland gunners were more numerous per ship: the number of guns under each gunner’s charge was therefore a third of that in British ships, the responsibility and workload was divided correspondingly.  By 1686, however, the British increased their own allowances, so that the gunner and his mate had four and two quarter-gunners aboard fourth- and fifth-rates respectively.​[1013]​  This narrowed the Zeeland advantage somewhat.  On the other hand, British gunners were warrant officers, whilst Dutch gunners were petty officers.  Transfer into Dutch service, then, meant a drop in status.  If we also take real wages into account, though, Dutch service looks more attractive than here (see below).




Comparing gunners- and boatswains mates, however, gives a very different picture.  Figure 4.11 above shows a massive differential pre-1647, correlating again with what we shall see in Chapter 6.  The Zeeland peacetime rate was low, just outstripping the British sixth-rates, but from the new wartime rate apparent at least by 1688, the peacetime base rate probably also increased later in the period.​[1015]​  After 1647, though, Zeeland gunners mates’ wartime pay was still greater than their colleagues’ wage aboard every British ship, bar the rare positions aboard the scarce first- and second-rates.  Five of the six British gunners mates serving during 1672-4 earned an appreciable 8% more than in Britain, but – as with the gunners, there is also the workload to consider.  After the third gunner and mate were allowed in 1665, Alan Alanson (Bo’ness) was promoted from prime seaman to gunners mate on Zierikzee (60).  He earned only a fraction more than he would have on an equivalent British third-rate, but was responsible for probably only half the number of guns.  The wage differential is even greater when the Zeeland mates are compared to British quarter-gunners (not shown).






Principally because of the lack of nominal data, study of maritime real wages has minimal.  Earle calculated real English merchant wages during peacetime at sparse intervals, 1570-1770, showing that real wages peaked 1667-71, dropping slowly until about 1750, when they fell further.​[1017]​  Otherwise, Van Bochove, Heerma van Voss and Van Lottum argue that migrant sailors 

‘spend only a small part of their money abroad, and instead bring most of it home, and there only the nominal wage […] is relevant’

As Van Lottum also points out, it indeed must have been the case that, having returned to port, ‘in many cases’ migrant sailors left for home as quickly as possible.​[1018]​  My study will show, however, that many seamen settled permanently, or served long-term, often for many years.  Sometimes even those men of whom we only get a short glimpse often had families in Zeeland, so would have spent their money there.  Until the continuous sections of the Zeeland sources are completely worked, men will continue to disappear from our sight, only to reappear sometimes years later in the record – as happens often at the present stage of research.  Even if a man does disappear completely from the record, we cannot be certain that he did go home – he might simply have moved into a different maritime sub-sector within the host country, perhaps a better-paid option, which would be a very natural choice.  Such movement was often possible even in wartime (excepting 1664-7, as we saw in Chapter 2, unless he deserted – in which case he forfeited any arrears still owing anyway).  
Even if a sailor was going home, would he necessarily take his money with him?  Indeed, would he have any money to take home with him?  If he had a family at home, then he had clear motivation to save his money and bring it home.  Otherwise, being by nature a worker who lived from moment to moment, and having a reputation for profligacy, why would he not instead – on returning to his ship’s home port – spend most of what he had on the high life as soon as he could?  Having decided to go home, in normal circumstances he would surely work his passage home from the host in any case.  (In wartime though, options were often more limited, especially for enemy subjects, as we saw in Chapter 2.)  Besides these considerations, the sailor worked in an environment where news and information was a consequence of work and mobility, and so he would have been aware of, have an impression of, or could have informed himself on notable or relevant price movements at home – at least in the case here of Britain and the Dutch Republic, where the distance between home and host was so small and the ports and sea bustling with traffic.  Even during the Anglo-Dutch wars, a British seaman in Zeeland would have been able pick up information about his home from neutral ships’ crews who had been ashore there, though embargoes cut down traffic.  Such awareness would surely inform his choice – other things being equal: why go home if the conditions there would disadvantage him?
Real wages, then, are relevant.  We have already seen the most up-to-date CPIs available, discussed briefly in the Methodology.  There are problems, though.  Can a CPI be designed especially for the sailor?  What consumables should be put in the basket of goods?  Entangled with these questions are additional issues.  Whilst at sea the sailor received his board and lodging for free; Allen’s CPI used here does not include rent,​[1019]​ but the food and drink included in all CPIs are extra weights that distort the picture as long as a sailor is shipboard – at least, for those without dependents.  On the other hand, for sailors with families these items (including rent) would have to be applied throughout the year – no matter whether the sailor was at sea or not.  And how long exactly was the sailor at sea?  So even if a CPI tailored to the sailor can be constructed, one that accurately reflects the different pattern of consumption aboard, in order to be precise as possible this would have to weigh both the time actually spent at sea and the ratio of those with dependents.  More work on these factors needs to be done first.  For the present, I have decided to use a ‘ready-made’ CPI.
Despite the long-term rise they postulated over our period, in the short-term, De Vries and Van der Woude contend that the wars during our period ‘repeatedly interrupted the upward course’ of real wages.​[1020]​  Yet these were precisely the times when naval wages (and, as we have seen, some others in the maritime sector) were increased.  As the transitions between peace and war are central to understanding Dutch naval wages, the newer CPIs in Figure 4.13 below enable us to track the movement of prices over these short-term changes: we can see, therefore, whether wartime price rises were likely to wipe out the pro-Zeeland differential in nominal wages.​[1021]​








The gap was already widening again in 1657 when the Zeeland increases of 1658 then opened up another period lasting until 1662; the differential hit enormous levels during the Baltic crisis – 53% (1658) and 45% (1659).  Real wages were better in Britain for only a brief period, 1662-3, before ten years of Zeeland superiority lasting through the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars, and – in stark contradiction to the nominal wage situation – even during the intervening peace, until 1676.  In real terms the differential reached 17% in 1667, maintained about 10% during the peace, before once more attaining huge levels: 23% (1672), 46% (1673), 34% (1674).  These levels dwarf the 12.5% nominal wartime differential that was fixed 1665-75 and most probably standard until 1713.  The later wars against France were episodes encouraging greater transfer of British seamen across the North Sea than the nominal wartime differential suggests: 1688 saw a 44% differential in real wages, dropping slightly to 36% in 1690.  If the nominal Zeeland wage continued at 15fl during the remainder of William’s War, as is very probable, the real wage would have resulted in a differential that usually exceeded 40% and sometimes 50% (not shown in Figure 4.14 above).  During Anne’s War we do see that the differential hit 43% (1703) and 59% (1708); it never fell below 27% until real wages tumbled (temporarily) after 1708.  Even at the low point in Zeeland (1710), however, sailors were still 12% better off serving in Zeeland warships.  Overall, the nominal differential favouring service in Zeeland is both increased and extended to longer episodes when examined in real terms: of the 36 years where there is continuous nominal data (1642-76), real wages in Zeeland were superior in all but five (1642, 1644-55, 1657-61, 1664-75).  The mean over the years 1642-1712 was 17.4%, based on hard data for over two-thirds of the period; assuming wages continued at 15fl, 1691-7, as is probable, the mean would be 23%, over three-quarters of the period.
We can also further address the issue of the option to return home and whether the migrant sailor might spend his money in the host country or back at home.  Figure 4.15 below shows a scenario where a seaman in Zeeland naval service has managed to save some money in one year; it shows the purchasing power of his wage resulting from his choice of whether to stay in Zeeland or return in that same year.​[1024]​  Here the return is to southern England, but this is where the most employment was, and where most British sailors lived.  This scenario has to assume that the sailor’s arrears were nearly up to date, either by a recent group crew payment and/or a successful individual petition.  Other economic considerations would be his level of debt for goods and services in the host country that could be exchanged for payment of his remaining arrears to a third party creditor.  These are difficult constraints to realise scientifically, but Figures 4.15 and 4.16 (further below) are a useful guide.


In these terms of relative purchasing power, there are some changes for British seamen with ready money from their time in Zeeland warships.  There was clearly an advantage in returning home during the First Anglo-Dutch War, whilst convergence from 1662 to parity in 1665/6 during the Second Anglo-Dutch War meant some freedom of choice in bald economic terms.  These wartime episodes were, however, precisely those times when mobility homeward was most restricted, because – besides embargoes and other legislation – it was movement of an enemy subject to the enemy state.  Otherwise, the seaman is encouraged to stay exactly where he is, with similar appreciable differentials to the direct comparison in Figure 4.14; additionally, here there was pressure to stay for a longer period (1655-62) between the two wars than the simple real wage differential in Figure 4.14 would indicate alone.  




We could apply the same adjustments to NCOs’ wages, but the advantages clear in most of the nominal wage comparisons above are clear enough already; these will be accentuated along the lines of the able seamen in Figure 4.14.  However, it is worth returning briefly to gunners (Figure 4.9 above), as we saw a mix of advantages and disadvantages.  To further clarify the situation with this important function, Figure 4.17 below compares the real wages of Zeeland gunners with those in the most common and similarly-sized major British warships (roughly, about 20-70 guns).​[1026]​   
Aboard the then equivalently-sized ships (fifth-rates), the differential favoured Zeeland by around 50% during the 1640s (peaking at 85% in 1646), the advantage nullified only in 1650, despite the 1647 British NCO increases.  British gunners’ real wages soon heavily outstripped those in Zeeland for a long time; during most of the Second Anglo-Dutch War the British advantage was still about 12% in ships under about 40 guns.  In larger ships, though, the larger Zeeland gunnery complement noted above probably mitigated very strongly against this, with possibly only one-third of the British gunners’ workload.  This advantage of a lower workload continued, but slightly abated after 1686.  


During the Third Anglo-Dutch War, British real wages fell, so that by 1673 Zeeland pay was equal to, or even slightly better than that in British fourth-rates (roughly about 40-56 guns) – so that most gunners in the Zeeland squadron were as well or better paid than those in equivalent British ships.  The large differentials we saw for the seamen during the later French wars are less marked here, but Zeeland gunners’ real wages were now closely associated with that in fourth-rates.  From around 1673, during wartime, the much better nominal British pay in the largest rates (few in number) was compensated for by roughly equal Zeeland real wages for those in the small to medium-large warships – which in their larger numbers offered a much greater number of positions even without considering the workload.  Boatswains’ real wages would have followed these trends very closely.

Other European maritime wages

Knowledge of other European maritime wages is worse than for the Dutch and British.  There are some indications inferred of Dutch wages relative to other European rates: Zeeland warships, wintering in 1664/5 with their convoy at La Rochelle, were easily able to recruit French and Dutch seamen at 12fl.​[1027]​  This rate, then, must have at least compared favourably with wages in the French maritime sector, a major set of employment options then still open to the men.​[1028]​
France and the Southern Netherlands concern us most.  For France, the third in the triad of most important maritime powers, Le Goff has shown that, as elsewhere, merchant pay rose steeply in wartime due to labour demand, 1742-82 – doubling or more.  There is isolated data from after 1713, and Le Goff has also created a wage index showing stability in real terms from 1726, but this too falls outside our period.​[1029]​  Of the other important maritime powers, Saetra points out that Danish-Norwegian naval and merchant pay were normally lower than the rest, the Dutch being the principal comparison.  This situation prevailed until the late 1700s.​[1030]​




Although Bruijn’s general trend in Dutch naval wages is broadly confirmed here, we have seen that Dutch wage increases were not confined strictly to wartime, but were also implemented in periods of increased manpower when large squadrons were fitted out (1671, 1683).  Conversely, some wartime periods showed a reduction to peacetime levels (1676).  More accurate study, therefore, should be possible through the direct correlation of manpower levels – the actual motor of wage rates – against those rates.  This may be an attainable objective for the more important admiralties of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.​[1033]​
Generally, maritime labour was intrinsically mobile over great distances, so that transfer was easier than for any other employment sector.  The seamen at the bottom of the maritime sector were predisposed to seek the best employment because of their precarious subsistence – living from hand to mouth, paid after work that was long and dangerous enough even in peacetime.  The incentive of higher Dutch wages in wartime may have been enough by itself to draw in British personnel, especially during the Anglo-Dutch alliance, but it was an additional, perhaps irresistible, pressure to enlist on British seamen in the wartime Republic, during the Anglo-Dutch Wars – whether there through embargo or as prisoners and destitute.  While some enlisted, others did not: the Dutch offered Drake’s master over £3 per month – from the rate (over 30 or 33fl), probably as a navigator – but he later escaped.​[1034]​  Mobility and willingness to seize opportunities are very evident: some British seamen in the United Provinces signed on with the Dutch at their greatly increased rates; taking the wage advance they quickly deserted and returned home.​[1035]​
From the nominal wage comparisons, for the NCOs the Zeeland wage superiority before the 1647 British increases is marked in nearly all cases: wherever the British equalled or exceeded the Zeeland rates, this was almost always in the very largest British ships – and these would not even have been in commission before 1652, and were thereafter relatively few in number in any case.  These differentials are a probably a principal factor in the large proportion of British NCOs in Zeeland, 1642-9.  The results are mixed after 1647 and the further British increases of 1653, vital experts like navigators retained a large incentive overall (and increased social status); others (gunners and boatswains) compared poorly, though the workload factor resulting from differing complements probably mitigated strongly in their favour.  Though the range of ranks selected here is small, these were the most important.
Skilled seamen, however, had considerable nominal wage differential incentives for Zeeland service in wartime, even following the 1653 British increase, lasting for the rest of the period.  Some lower petty officers, the most important of the mates, shared these differential incentives, though not to such a high degree after 1647 and mostly limited to wartime – only those on the larger British warships earned more, but this was a minority of the total British cases.  It is probable that incentives at the lower ranks put personnel in place as mates; promotion followed naturally.  As with the gunners and boatswains, there were also more positions available – more demand, more opportunities – and probably less workload too.  
Not shown above, the unskilled seamen were also affected: the unskilled Zeeland sailors’ usual wartime rate of 12fl (after 1652, not detailed above) equated to 21.6s: 13.6% more than the British 19s.  Sometimes the Dutch unskilled rate was reported at 14fl (25.2s): exceeding even the British skilled rate.  All seamen – not just the highly skilled – were better off in Zeeland service during wartime.  Additionally, the broad incremented Dutch seamen’s pay scales sometimes used (either stipulated or ad hoc), tailored wages more exactly to merit (experience and skill) than the two grades of able and ordinary in Britain.  Seamen in Dutch service could more fully exploit the value of their own skill.
It has not been possible to cover networks – here the relationships between commanders and their ‘followers’ – which may have affected wages through commanders’ intervention or their ‘political’ connection.  This is not yet apparent for arrears, but there were very rare exceptions to the usual wage rates: the Scots seaman David Charles, already a veteran by 1643, was paid at 16fl when the normal rate for skilled seamen was just 11fl.​[1036]​  The Scot Thomas Qualeth, one of Banckert’s quartermasters, volunteered for Crijnssen’s Surinam expedition in late 1666: he was still paid his quartermaster’s rate of 17fl after he dropped in rank to prime seaman (see Chapter 7).
	These nominal differential incentives, though, were considerably enhanced when real wages are determined.  Zeeland real wages were clearly superior, and for longer periods than the wars alone, extending well into peacetime and – based on the data available – probably for the overwhelming majority of the whole period.  This sets British-Dutch naval wages firmly outside the paradigm of long-term equality in English-Dutch real wages demonstrated by Allen and Van Zanden.  The mean of the real naval wage differential is comparable to those existing in construction between the western Netherlands and the areas providing its principal immigrants.  In wartime it very often exceeded these levels, even those in some of the poorest areas.​[1037]​  Though subject to fluctuation, the real wage differential generated a very strong sustained pull-factor for seamen from all parts of the British Isles.  For the lower ranks, where every extra penny counted, any extra disposable income to hand brought possibilities of improvement: greater prospect of marriage and family, or perhaps of increasing social status; besides through promotion, it was, for instance, possible to purchase citizenship in the United Provinces for as little as 12fl.​[1038]​  
Incidence of payment requires much greater depth of analysis: this is not possible for the British before the 1670s, comprehensive information exists only after about 1690.  Both countries were in great difficulties, 1652-4, stretched by the new intensity of naval warfare.  From the detailed case above, and the payments in Part Two, Zeeland payment was far better during the Second Anglo-Dutch War, particularly in 1667.  It remained satisfactory far beyond – only dropping off in Anne’s War.  Around 1665-7, both the Dutch rate of pay and incidence of payment exceeded the British; better and more certain pay must have been a major contributing factor pulling British emigrants into Dutch service.
In the wider picture, with lower peacetime rates, Dutch peacetime wage expenditure, per man, was less than British in peacetime, but greater in wartime.  Dutch market-driven rates, then, may have had long-term repercussions, and need to be examined as a possible structural factor in the decline of Dutch naval finances, power and the weakening of the smaller admiralties.  This may in turn entail the relative weakness – in the long term – of a decentralised state and naval administration, coupled with low native population, stretched by long-range operations of greater duration in the wars against France, remaining unwilling or unable to embrace full state control of naval wages.  This would be ironic in view of the Dutch triumphs against Britain and the Dutch elite’s fear of the influence of ‘the rabble’.
Having now sketched the primary factors of the seaman’s environment, we turn now to the main results: how many British and other foreign seamen were there?
Having established the background of recruitment systems, trade, and now pay, in Chapter 5 we shall look at the overall figures of the emigrants and other foreigners in Zeeland warships throughout our period, before looking in detail at the crews in Part 2.

Chapter 5.  Overview: 




In Chapters 2-4 we detailed most of the primary variables that impacted on crews and the numbers of foreigners.  Now, having looked at the environmental background, we shall see my results for the British and other foreigners serving in Zeeland warships, starting with a summary of previous Zeeland crew analyses.  Bruijn pioneered this research but only scratched the surface; the gate he opened has not been previously exploited.​[1039]​  Francke made a large sample with other aims (privateering) in mind.  Roos took a much quicker look.​[1040]​  The principal problems arising from these are very sparse chronological coverage and – generally – a low level of sampling.  These drawbacks are sketched below.  This study aims to eradicate these weaknesses.  Another weak feature of previous studies is the unsystematic classification of foreigners.  The latter and the method of foreign classification used here have already been explained.​[1041]​
Then we summarise the overall crew results, the prime focus of this study, charting the levels of foreigners and British through the whole period.  Then we look at the main episodes (1642-9, 1664-7, 1667-9, 1672-4, 1674, 1688-97) one by one, with an analysis of the foreign component, comparing the other main foreign groups.  Some comparisons with other parts of the maritime sector are made within this chronological framework – with the VOC and more specifically with the Zeeland chamber thereof during the 1640s (Deconinck and Ketting, respectively), and from the Amsterdam admiralty during 1673-4.  Then we directly compare the results with some of the factors previously sketched – foreign shipping (Chapter 3) and wages (Chapter 4).




Foreign components in previous Zeeland admiralty studies 





A main source for this, though not specified as such by Van Vliet, is actually a Zeeland admiralty resolution of February 1603, made after complaints over foreign numbers (see below).
De Jonge affirmed a great influx of foreigners after the First Anglo-Dutch War, especially to Amsterdam and after the end of the Northern War in 1660,​[1046]​ but comprehensive Zeeland crew sources are not extant for these years.  Bruijn did not look at the Second Anglo-Dutch War, but his figures indicate that by 1669, foreigners were only half of the 1600 level: 25% of Zeeland crews.​[1047]​  Bruijn did not elucidate this drop, though he emphasised that there were fluctuations over time, depending on market conditions.​[1048]​  The collapse might seem to contradict the influx of foreigners, but 1669 was peacetime – so is not as illuminating as desirable, as discussed earlier​[1049]​ – with much lower demand; additionally, the most intense naval war to date had occurred since.  Nonetheless, there is a 70-year gap between that and the previous samples, during which time enormous changes in manpower and technique had take place.  Also, this sample is even smaller than the earlier, so accuracy could again be a problem.  Roos’ more recent analysis for 1667-70 is actually centred primarily on 1668-70; his sample is marginally larger than Bruijn’s, but still very small.  The disadvantage in small sample sizes is manifest – the foreign contingent in Roos’ results (only 18%) is appreciably different from Bruijn, though the British result is very similar (3%).
No one, again, has looked at Zeeland during the Third Anglo-Dutch War, but as a comparison, Bruijn brought to light the crew of Tromp’s Amsterdam flagship Gouden Leeuw in 1673.  Bruijn calculated that foreigners comprised 26%: exactly the Zeeland 1669 rate.​[1050]​  So, although the comparison is with a different admiralty, was there any fluctuation in the foreign component in the transition from peacetime to wartime?  By 1685-6 Bruijn’s figures indicate an increase to 33% foreigners, though he did not spell this out.​[1051]​  Although set during the longest period of peace in our period, this is still peacetime and so – at these initial stages – is not as useful as the more common periods of war with their much greater labour demand.  Nonetheless, establishing peacetime base-rates is important.
Francke’s 1688-97 data is the only sample hitherto taken over an extensive period – here a very long war in its entirety.​[1052]​  It suggests the foreign component stabilised, continuing level with the previous timeframe (1685-6) at over 32%, despite the transition to war conditions.  This is the second time that this has occurred, on this occasion with direct comparison within the same admiralty.  This seems strange, give the great changes in the labour market.
Although Bruijn’s snapshot at 1694 (37% foreigners) actually has a higher annual sampling intensity (men per year),​[1053]​ Francke’s sample is almost six times as large.  The foreign proportion thereafter increases rapidly, reaching 45% in 1709 and – in a new situation for foreigners – a dominating 59% in a large sample for 1745-6.​[1054]​  By way of comparison outside Zeeland, Bruijn’s Amsterdam admiralty sample in between these two dates (1720-33) fits exactly into the trend, at 50%.​[1055]​
Specifically on the British, to some extent, previous surveys show that they were involved both at an appreciable level almost throughout and generally followed the overall foreign trend – although reacting rather slower to changes.  In 1600 the British proportion was very large in its right: one of every six men.  The fall to 2% in 1669 is very marked but Zeeland levels later recovered and stabilised; at 3-5%.  This would have been informed by a deeper analysis of the Amsterdammer Gouden Leeuw in 1673, a source which Bruijn did not exploit fully.  To an extent the fall to a lower level justified Bruijn’s assertion that the British became scarce or more sporadic later on;​[1056]​ nonetheless, they were always there in proportions large enough to warrant listing.  Davids exaggerated the fall far too much in stating that the British ‘hardly appeared at all […] in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’.​[1057]​  Francke’s work on the Nine Years’ War soon overturned this position, but quietly: for us, Francke’s longer episode of study is clearly more useful in comparison, yielding 6% British.​[1058]​  Francke, however, did not fully recognise the significance, because he kept the Three Kingdoms in separate categories – mentioning only the Scots.  Nonetheless, Francke’s result is double Bruijn’s 1694 figure – the highest British level since 1600 and of independent consequence because of its size – British were the second-largest foreign group; they also comprised almost one-fifth of all foreigners.  Projecting this ratio across the whole Dutch fleet at that time would give us around 1500 British, which notional amount would have been a serious drain on British manpower while it doubled in size, 1689-97.​[1059]​  These notional men by themselves would have provided the whole manpower of a handful of very powerful ships.  Further, this figure suggests that the near-contemporary reports of 2500-3000 we saw in Chapter 1 might not be so ridiculous after all.




Significantly for us, in 1600 at least 14% of Zeeland crews were enemy subjects from the Southern Netherlands, though as Bruijn points out, borders were not yet fixed.​[1061]​  The group remained large until the eighteenth century.  Intrinsic problems with categorisation have already been discussed, but Bruijn’s composite Baltic/Scandinavian group was of large size almost throughout, Germans less so.  Both groups, however, far outstripped all others in the eighteenth century, and must have been at the very least partially responsible for the simultaneous large increase in foreigners overall in Figure 5.1 – though the very large unspecified group here inhibits accurate interpretation.
Figure 5.2 demonstrates just how little we know about crew compositions, especially during the high-water mark of Dutch naval power in the first three-quarters of the seventeenth century.  Bruijn sometimes left appreciable proportions of the men as unspecified foreigners, whilst also detailing only a few groups.  For 1685-6 he listed only Britain and the Southern Netherlands, for 1745-6 Germany, Scandinavia and Britain only, when 23% (1685-6) and 20% (1745-6) were comprised of other, unknown or indeterminate foreigners.​[1062]​  These portions are far too large to leave as unspecified or unresolved and leave an enormous margin of error in analysis; Bruijn’s figures for 1685-6 especially suffer in this regard.  Whilst some groups are clearly much more important than others – especially the growing Scandinavian and German contingents from the late seventeenth century – it would be very useful to have more categories.  The absence of a French category (except in Francke’s analysis) is a particular weakness, as we shall see below.  During our period French nationals belonged to the third in the triad of major naval powers and were allied and then later enemy subjects.  The disadvantages of low sampling, with insufficient rigour on categories are most obvious in the peacetime interlude between the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars: Bruijn and Roos’ samples are similarly sized, on virtually identical periods, but yield very different compositions.  

Foreign and British personnel in Zeeland warships, 1642-1697





As Bruijn’s work suggested, Figure 5.3 confirms that a British component was indeed present throughout our period.  More importantly, Figure 5.3 also shows that the amount of British labour in Dutch service around the height of Dutch naval power was larger than indicated by Bruijn or Francke.  The British element was enormous early on, making up half of the huge foreign contingent.  Following on from Bruijn’s 1600 sample, over 40 years later, although the overall level of foreigners had shrunk by the 1640s, the proportion of British had actually increased, albeit slightly.
The British component was, moreover, largely tied to the general trend in foreigners, though there was a lag in British response during 1674.  Significantly, the fall in the British between the first two episodes correlates virtually exactly with the simultaneous fall in all foreigners.  Was there a causal relationship; could the crash in British numbers have been responsible for the overall drop in foreigners?  The British were also of some significance during the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars (3.5% and 5.3% respectively), as proportional both to all personnel and to other foreigners – even if they had not been enemy subjects – in spite of these years being indeed the lowest rates of British participation.  Also, the British contribution in the years between the two wars was much larger than previously thought: 8.6% compared with 2% (Bruijn) or 3% (Roos) in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 above.




The enormous numbers of foreigners (37%) in the 1640s suggest a slow decline after Bruijn’s much earlier figure of 49% in 1600.  Though the latter was based on a very small sample, it rings very true: just three years later the Zeeland admiralty itself put the figure at more than 50% on some of the warships:

‘there are many Scots, Easterlings [i.e. Germans] and other foreigners serving on the warships, indeed that on some ships the most part are foreigners that are also unskilled, whereby we are apprehensive that some inconveniences may befall.  So it is resolved […] that henceforth in the taking on of new crews, to allow no others than Dutch, so that they [the captains] should not have more foreigners than a fourth part of the men, or less if at all possible’.​[1065]​

Whether this was successfully implemented still needs to be ascertained.  Commander Poortvliet’s published work for 1610-19 and 1630-33 clearly needs to be analysed to inform on the trends before 1642.  Whatever the result may be, during the 1640s the 1603 admiralty quota limiting foreigners to 25% had either been dropped, was ignored – or was simply impossible to implement.  Van Loo has shown that the Anglo-Spanish peace of 1604 pushed many English privateers and associated capital into Zeeland.​[1066]​  Whilst British labour would naturally have been drawn towards the English privateering demand in Zeeland and the booming maritime labour market there, the simultaneous RN (British after 1603) naval demobilisation meant an additional labour surplus whose best prospects were now in Zeeland; it would be strange if expanding Zeeland admiralty demand did not attract some of this influx.  British naval demobilisations after the wars of the 1620s are also likely to have had some effect.  
It is striking that during 1642-9 the British made up half of all foreigners and by themselves 18.6% of the total: almost one of every five men was British – a somewhat higher proportion both overall and relative to other foreigners than in Bruijn’s 1600 figures (16.5%) in Figure 5.1 above.  The reasons for this are not clear.  British commerce had benefitted from neutrality, largely at the expense of the Dutch after the end of the Twelve Years’ Truce in 1621; during the 1640s, the dislocation and impact on trade of the British Civil Wars may have driven much maritime labour out of the British market in search of more security elsewhere.  Perhaps Dutch employment was a way out of the internecine strife and the constant vulnerability of British trade to the British combatants: whilst Dutch ships – even warships – were searched by the British for British personnel (mainly for contraband and French goods), this was not as severe as it would become in the early 1650s.  Those men motivated by Royalist sympathies could find ample employment in privateers.
The nature of service 1642-9, apart from the petty officers and those who made promotion to this position, was largely temporary by transients.  Comprehensive statistical analysis of career patterns will have to wait for the future, but it is already clear that most of the common seamen spent a year, or sometimes for a summer or winter season, in service before being released – those men who served from early in the year were not ‘locked’ into service through the following winter (Chapter 2).  Those released were more often than not replaced immediately – so that the labour supply was plentiful.  The greater part of the crews were freshly recruited each year: this annual rotation is the basic pattern for most of our period – except 1665-7, when the men were held.
The long gap until the next period is frustrating.  Here we particularly lament the absence of comprehensive data, especially for the First Anglo-Dutch War, in the intervening years to 1664.  After 1642-9, there was a drastic fall in the proportion of foreigners (from over 36% to 16%) during the war of 1664-7.  Though measured proportionally rather than absolutely, this drop seems to contradict the increase in foreigners noted by De Jonge in the years before the Second Anglo-Dutch War, and is also perhaps surprising, given the much increased manpower demand enforced by the adoption of modern warship types: we would expect this development to raise demand for foreigners, rather than to ease it.  Was this fall was the result of deliberate policy?  No, there is no evidence that the 1603 or any other quota on foreigners – if extant – was even discussed, yet alone actual enforcement attempted, so the answer must lie elsewhere.   We should view the drop in foreigners instead as an increase in the Dutch component.  Though, as we saw in Chapter 2, foreigners were actively targeted during the war years by means of both embargo (some of the state intervention here was remarkable) and diplomacy, the increased proportion of Dutch personnel was simultaneous with the radical new recruitment measures – these were aimed primarily at Dutch seamen, of which of course there must have been more than foreigners.  The gap in the sources coincides with the rapid evolution of the embargo towards greater intensity, severity and duration.  The increase in Dutch personnel was a direct result of these measures, increasingly effective by early 1665: the general embargo, the threats to those seamen with families, and the compulsory retention for long-term service.  There were simply many more Dutch seamen than foreigners to be corralled into the navy; this remained the same for the rest of the period, despite modifications to the measures. 
	At 3.5% the British proportion relative to other foreigners fell to under one quarter, but this is still substantial.  Data for 1652-4 and after would be particularly useful here to inform a trend.  We have seen that many men answered the recalls; in 1664 the Zeelanders even released a few British who were unwilling to fight against their countrymen (see Chapter 7).  We saw in Chapter 3 that possibly 75% of the men were functionally literate, so that if a cold decision was possible, many may have been properly able to understand the potential consequences of serving with the enemy – national identity, patriotism and ideology aside.
After peace and massive demobilisation in 1667, during 1667-70, there was a slight increase in the foreign component (to 19%), but a very large increase in the British portion – doubling to 8.6%.  At first sight, the figure for all foreigners might not appear too different from Bruijn’s 25% (1669, see Figure 5.1 above), but does signify one foreigner in every five men instead of every four.  My figures here, though, marry with Roos’ (18%).
The peacetime crash in naval demand was coupled with the full opening of the merchant employment option especially favoured by Dutch seamen.  Roos states that the many native Zeelanders in his sample (1667-70) had been on privateers during the war.​[1067]​  This is a stretch without offering more evidence; also, it would be strange that privateer seamen would choose the low-paid peacetime navy instead of moving into merchantmen, where they could stay on equal or even better pay than before (see Chapter 4).  Surely it is more likely that the contraction of naval demand would have led to an exodus of all but the permanent professional hardcore of warrant and petty officers and the long-term ‘followers’ of particular officers, besides short-term transients.  The permanent category is discussed more below.  My figures show that peacetime did open proportionally more jobs for foreigners, though of course their actual numbers, too, crashed in peacetime.  This is just one area where the databasing of all personnel would be particularly valuable for study of careers.  
As far as the British are concerned, the peace took the stain of traitor off of anyone previously restrained by such considerations from taking Dutch service.  This was especially the case for former British POWs.  Nonetheless, many British who served in the war stayed in service after the peace (see below and Chapter 7).  As this is the only proper peacetime period studied here (the Dutch still being at war with the French in 1674), we should note the even larger difference with Bruijn’s other peacetime data for 1685-6, where 33% were foreigners (see Figure 5.1 above). 
	During the war of 1672-4, the foreign component in Figure 5.3 above dropped back slightly (to 17.9%), but these three central episodes were fairly stable around on about the same level as that established back in 1664-7.  Embargo conditions were similar to the previous war, but now the men were no longer compulsorily retained through the winter; wartime service was largely annual again.  This seems to have had no effect on the Dutch/foreign balance, though.
	Though the British component fell back to 5.3%, this is much larger than in the previous war and over one-quarter of all foreigners.  The relative increase over 1664-7 is perhaps related to that in peak labour demand.  By way of comparison, in 1673 Tromp’s Amsterdammer Gouden Leeuw comprised 27% foreigners and 4.2% British (see below).​[1068]​  
During the short episode examined after Britain had been forced out of the war in February 1674, the foreign part increases very substantially – to 27.3%.  Ten months is perhaps too short to examine sustained labour patterns: in future, this episode should be widened in duration to cover the end of the Hollands oorlog in 1678.  As war continued in 1674 (and was about to widen in scope), labour demand was still peaking (in 1674 at least): conditions need further exploration, but we saw in Chapter 2 that Dutch embargoes seem to have been greatly relaxed after 1674; it was probably the same with restrictions on privateering.  It may be that the opening of Dutch seamen’s preferred options, again, resulted in the proportional increase of foreigners.  By way of comparison, in 1674 Tromp’s Amsterdammer Hollandia comprised 35% foreigners and 2.8% British (see below).​[1069]​  The foreign element was increased there too.
When Britain dropped out of the war, the British portion of the crews continued on virtually the same level (moving only from 5.4% to 5.2%).  There was now no brake on the loyal patriot serving, whilst British naval demobilisation released many thousands; these would tend to an increase, whilst Zeeland (wartime) demand remained stable.  This is discussed further below.
Moving much further forward, Bruijn’s result of 33% foreigners for 1685-6, though larger than the figures either side, would dovetail fairly consistently into Figure 5.3 above between 1674 and 1688.  Taking into account the developments during the 1667-70 peacetime episode above, this suggests very strongly that the foreign component always increased during peacetime, even despite the drastically reduced demand and lower wages we noted above – dictated instead by Dutch seamen’s preferences.
During the 1688 expedition and the Nine Years’ War the foreign component virtually levelled out at 28.3%; practically the same as in 1674.  We saw in Chapter 2 that the large-scale embargoes were reintroduced (rather sparsely), but that the quota levy was used more often.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the practical workings of these needs to be examined: principally, in giving up their quotas, did Dutch merchant masters surrender their Dutch and foreign seamen on an equal basis?  Probably not: in small crews, as many merchantmen had, we have already seen that kin and local men were preferred.  The British component increased to 7.2%: the largest in wartime since before the Anglo-Dutch Wars.

Other factors: Wage differentials





There is very close correlation indeed up to 1674, when the relationship diverges; the two trends move in completely opposite directions during William’s War.  As noted, there are some disadvantages with the structure of the analysis later in the period: 1674 stands out because it is just one year, instead of a longer episode encompassing the remainder of the Franco-Dutch War, but the 1674 increase may influenced by British naval demobilisation.  During these two later long wars, annual data on both wages and absolute numbers should be the aim.  In the last episode, more British personnel are certain to be added by further work.  After 1688, we should also remember, the British were at war again, their navy requiring the largest manpower yet – generating enormous labour demand, and after a while, the increased use of force.  Nonetheless, in Figure 5.5 the real wage incentive for British personnel very closely matched the number in service up to 1674: the real wage differential was clearly a primary factor, at least until that date, in determining the involvement of British personnel.




Over the longest possible term here, apart from the total foreign series (which includes the British), other foreigners and the real wage both rose, and show some rough correlation from the Second Anglo-Dutch War on; non-British foreigners, to some degree, reacted too to the varying real naval wage.  Unlike the British, who reacted to the falling differential between the first two episodes in Figure 5.5, the other foreigners did not react to the rising real wage.  Without differential evidence, this movement has to be pinned on the change in recruitment techniques, which is explored more in the next section.  Much more work needs to be done, principally on foreign maritime wages, and most of the abovementioned suggested modifications to the analysis also apply here.  It would be beneficial to make further comparisons of the different groups with the relevant series in the advanced work on real construction wages and welfare rations, but this is beyond the scope here.  Given the British result in Figure 5.5 further above, the individual foreign responses may indeed inform us on maritime wage conditions outside the Dutch-British pairing, but this too is beyond the remit of this study.  These issues should be explored further.

Other factors: Foreign shipping





The crash in foreign shipping in 1664-7 from 1642-8 was in tandem with the new stricter recruitment conditions (aimed primarily at Dutch seamen): these were two factors operating against the (proportional) increase of foreign personnel.
During the 1667-70 interwar episode, foreign shipping continued to fall, but now much more slowly than before.  Simultaneously, though, despite the drop in (one part of ) the foreign labour supply, foreign warship crews rose gently.  This is easy to work around: we have already noted that, during peacetime the preferred employment options of Dutch personnel were opened.  Although naval labour demand contracted heavily, more spaces were opened, proportionally, for foreigners. 
Around 1672 the two strands are once more very closely associated: foreign crews then fell at a similar rate to that continuing in foreign shipping.
	The rapid rise in foreign crews from 1674, synchronous to the continued rate of decline in shipping, might appear difficult to explain, but we noted the relaxation of the embargoes above, freeing up more Dutch labour for merchant and (probably) privateering options and increasing the foreign component by default.
The rapid recovery of foreign shipping by 1688 was accompanied by only a slow growth in foreign crews.  But the Nine Years’ War was the most intense effort yet in terms of duration, yet still occasionally reaching the huge naval manpower levels achieved in the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars (Figure 2.2).  Demand then, was huge, and may have outstripped this means of supply.
If we look purely at the British proportion of the foreign merchantmen and Zeeland warship crews, as in Figure 5.7 below,​[1072]​ then the relationship becomes far more intimate.  British shipping during our period, as we saw in Chapter 3, totally dominated the foreigners trading to Zeeland: comprising 61%, 1642-8, maintained a leading or close-second position for the rest of the period – and only fell from importance during the Anglo-Dutch Wars, when such trade naturally crashed.  The correlation here is startling.  The close relationship of the trends is hardly marred after the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Dutch War in 1674 – when the proportion on the warships levelled out, failing to react to the reestablishment of British trade to peacetime or ‘normal’ levels whilst the other powers fought on.  This, though, is just the widening of the gap that existed in 1667-70.




The Foreign components: Summary, 1642-1697  

Figure 5.8 below summarises all the foreign groups relative to the total crews throughout the whole period.  Consistently, the most important groups are clearly from Britain, the Southern Netherlands, France, Germany, and Denmark-Norway.  The first three – the western group – stands out here: totally dominant before 1650, but always comprising at least half of all foreigners.  Here, then, is a conclusive demonstration of Zeeland’s western outlook.  The east and north grew in importance later, mostly through the increase of men from Denmark-Norway and the addition of new groups: Sweden becomes significant in the 1670s and, after 1688, Holstein.  The other groups – the Iberian powers, Poland-Lithuania and the rest – are negligible.  Not yet included here, the Italian republics, Venice and Genoa, were slowly growing within the ‘all others’ group from the 1670s, and became larger from 1702.  How far this was due to recruitment in Holland is unknown at present.


Overall comparison with the previous Zeeland admiralty studies is somewhat difficult due to the different categorisation used here, and because this study is largely filling the major chronological gaps.  Accepting these obstacles, in our period the German and Scandinavian components were much less important than Bruijn suggested.  If one counts Holstein-Gottorp as ‘Scandinavian’, then our study indicates that the growth of the latter category as mapped by Bruijn in the eighteenth century may have had its genesis around 1674 – accepting the long gap here, 1674-88.

We shall look quickly at each period in turn below.

The end of the Eighty Years’ War, 1642-8; demobilisation to early 1649





Of all foreigners (37%), British domination (18.7%) of the situation is startling, but France (particularly, at 8.1%) and the Southern Netherlands (5.2%) are large groups both relatively to all personnel and to all other foreigners.  Denmark-Norway and Germany are much smaller (2.3% and 1.6% respectively); groups from elsewhere are miniscule.  The foreign composition here is radically different than that in Bruijn’s 1600 sample, where personnel from Scandinavia/Baltic and Germany totalled over 20% (Figure 5.2).
Perhaps most importantly for us, the Southern Netherlands group were, of course, enemy subjects.  This emphatically confirms the involvement of Dunkirkers that has already been identified elsewhere.  Adding in the tiny Spanish and Portuguese figures indicates that 5.5% of the crews were composed of enemy subjects.    When we focus on the British component later – when they, in turn, became enemy subjects – service with the enemy was not unusual.




Deconinck’s analysis rests on categorisation along the sovereignty principal, but with some variation.  It is also over a long timeframe and – due to the surviving sources – overwhelmingly centred on the Amsterdam chamber.  Probably due to the Amsterdam domination of the sample, but also because of the inclusion of soldiers, Germans clearly dominate – by themselves making up a hefty 16% of the total personnel and half of all foreigners; British comprised only 1.7% of the total manpower.  About two-thirds of the sampled personnel were sailors; the ratio in the maritime zones (such as Britain, Flanders) was higher, and that inland lower, so that the British and Danish-Norwegian groups, for example, would be larger if soldiers were excluded.




As discussed before, the different categories hinder comparison, but the large British involvement is clear.  We have already seen in Chapter 3 that the Zeeland chamber composition was radically different to the Amsterdam chamber.  The combination of Scandinavia/Baltic and the German Bight were only marginally the largest group; the British were just behind at 6% and were clearly amongst the major groups – despite the very different categories and the impossibility of isolating most political units.  (At Amsterdam the British only made up 2.1% of the total, whilst the Scandinavia/Baltic/German Bight combination dominated overwhelmingly at 25% of all personnel; two-thirds of all foreigners.)
The total foreign component in Zeeland warship crews, 1642-9 (37%) is very roughly similar to that in the VOC in both Deconinck’s study, 1602-60 (32%), and Ketting’s study of the Zeeland chamber, 1640-9 (30%), and the Amsterdam chamber during the same years (39%).​[1075]​  This opens up to question the divergence of the trends in the admiralty and VOC foreign components.​[1076]​

The Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1664-7 





There are a number of possibilities for the drop in the French, which together with that of the British constituted the overall fall in foreigners.  France, of course, was a combatant and from 1665, labour demand there was very high because of major naval preparations; recruitment measures must then have interrupted, to some extent, the supply of French seamen going abroad.  On the other hand, French trade profited greatly during the war (see below and Chapter 3) and work aboard merchantmen must have been one of the sailors’ preferred options.  At present we do not have wage details for comparison, but merchant wages almost certainly rose during wartime.​[1077]​  Yet these merchantmen were liable to embargo.  Another employment option was privateering: besides their own ventures, which need to be investigated, we saw in Chapter 2 that many French seamen were serving on Zeeland privateers.  The Southern Netherlands maintained its overall proportion, despite losing large swathes of territory in the years after 1648 and the appreciable manpower resources noted above.  
The already small groups from Denmark-Norway and Germany changed little – falling slightly (to 1.6%) and increasing marginally (1.9%) respectively.  Denmark-Norway was also a combatant from early 1666, which may have been a restraint on the numbers due to domestic demand.  Danish naval manpower levels need to be examined (as do privateers).  On the other hand, we have already seen in Chapter 2 that Frederik III granted the Dutch permission to recruit 3000 of his seamen at the end of the same year.  There is no evidence of direct Zeeland involvement in any such action, which – in any case – was much more likely to have been carried out by the northern admiralties.  There is similarly no evidence yet of any Zeeland recruitment in Holland in 1667 – which might have indirectly picked up any Danish subjects recruited in situ by other admiralties.  (Though this was done at other times, as we have seen.)  There was certainly no increase in Danish subjects in Zeeland in 1667.
These results can be compared with Van Vliet’s analysis of De Ruyter’s Amsterdam flagship Spiegel (68) on the Atlantic expedition of 1664-5, summarised in Figure 5.12A below.​[1078]​


Almost half of the crew were foreigners: 45% – over twice the contemporary Zeeland average.  The crew were recruited in peacetime conditions, with no embargo, before the end of April 1664.  Overwhelmingly, these were Danish-Norwegian, who by themselves comprised almost 29%; an enormous group.  The remaining foreigners were mostly two other very large groups: Swedish (7.3%) and Germans (4.6%).  Though the overall foreign proportion and those of the relative groups are different, on the whole the north-eastern focus bears a more resemblance to Van Royen’s merchant crews analysis, 1700-10 (Chapter 3, Figure 3.4), of which Amsterdam and the northern Republic was such a large part, as well as Hart’s analysis of Amsterdam seamen (Figure 3.5).  Some 33% of the warrant and petty officers, though, were foreigners: almost all from the three principal foreign groups.  Besides 16 Scots soldiers (which do not ordinarily concern us), Van Vliet identifies only two British seamen, or 0.9% of the crew – miniscule compared with Zeeland.  Preliminary revision of this source, however, yields more British.​[1079]​ 
	There is only incomplete information on the North Quarter admiralty’s Wapen van Holland (48) from early 1666: foreigners comprised only 6% of the seamen (excluding all higher ranks), but this is a minimum.  The value of the source is compromised, but the foreigners were principally Scandinavians and Holsteiners – some of the very groups we would expect in this region in the light of Hart and Van Royen’s work.​[1080]​ 

Demobilisation and peacetime, September 1667-1670

As already noted, the sample for 1667-70 in Figure 5.13 below is very small.  The data nonetheless suggests that the very large British growth we have seen resulted in a dominance of the foreign groups similar to that before 1650.  It also accounts for the increase in the overall foreign component – despite the simultaneous relatively heavy drop in the Southern Netherlands, which virtually halved here from 5% to 2.7%.  It is not clear how much of this fall was due to the rise in demand concomitant with the increase in Flemish privateering during the short War of Devolution against France, 1667-8.  Of the other principal participants thus far, France and Denmark-Norway remained almost unchanged (3.2% and 1.6%), whilst Germany almost halved to 1%.  The slightly more noticeable smattering of the minor groups is another reason why the sample needs to be enlarged. 




The Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-February 1674

Figure 5.14 below shows developments from early 1672 until the British were knocked out of the war in February 1674.  Despite the fall in the now enemy French personnel (almost halving from 3.2% to 1.6%), the addition of the large British numbers meant that some 7% of Zeeland crews were composed of enemy subjects.  This concentration even outstrips the 5.5% enemy subjects during 1642-8.  We might think that separate nationality and patriotism (in the British case) would prove greater barriers to transfer at this time, rather than that before when a common culture and language were shared (in the Southern Netherlands case).  The British lead is surprising, given the proportions in the war of 1664-7, but the numbers of Southern Netherlanders almost doubled, whilst Germans did double; both recovered their numbers in the previous war.  Danish subjects remained stable (1.7%), but those of a new member amongst the principal actors appear: Sweden (1.4%)








We should be cautious because this is only one ship – and one where the crew composition may have been skewed by the nationality of the flag captain: the Irishman Tobias.  Nonetheless, the sample size is larger than many we saw in Figure 5.1 above.  We saw above that the British component was virtually the same as in Zeeland, but the similarity of the main features ends there: of the other western groups, Southern Netherlanders have collapsed and the French have almost vanished.  The northern and eastern groups – from Germany, Denmark-Norway, Sweden and Holstein – made up two-thirds of all foreigners; radically different from Zeeland and reflecting the much more northern and eastern orientation of Amsterdam.  Even more than De Ruyter’s Spiegel above (Figure 5.12A), the groups resemble (apart from the large British group) Van Royen’s merchant analysis and Hart’s figures for Amsterdam seamen.  (See also Chapter 8.) 


The Hollandse oorlog, March-December 1674





The period needs extending: this would enable study of the situation after the widening of the Franco-Dutch conflict into a more general European war in 1675.  Swedes thereupon became enemy subjects, which if the Swedish and French 1674 levels were sustained, would make about 7% of Zeeland crews enemy subjects in 1675.  Meanwhile, Denmark-Norway, Spain, and German subjects of both the Emperor and Brandenburg all became allied combatants.  The naval labour demand in the north probably had some impact on Zeeland crew compositions; changes here may even inform us of likely changes in the northern admiralties.
The crew of Tromp’s Amsterdammer Hollandia during 1674 is available for comparison in Figure 5.17.​[1085]​  Foreigners comprised 35% of the crew


Again, this is only one ship, but the sample is still relatively large.  Once more, as with the Amsterdammers Spiegel and Gouden Leeuw above (Figures 5.12A and 5.15), the emphasis is to the north and east, but it is very interesting to note that the British group is still appreciable.  (See also Chapter 8.)

The Glorieuse Overtocht and the Nine Years War, 1688-1697





Nonetheless, this does not explain why the Swedish group fell whilst the Danish-Norwegian did not.
With this last episode we directly overlap with Bruijn’s and Francke’s studies.  Firstly, the great changes here in the long interval since 1674 would be generally informed by backtracking.  One comparison is available during the long peacetime period 1679-87.  Preliminary research on the Noorderkwartier admiralty Wapen van Westfriesland, lost with many others in the disastrous storm of 1683, indicates a low incidence of foreigners (only 13.4%), but over half of these came from Denmark-Norway and Germany.​[1086]​  Unfortunately, this more properly belongs in a ‘wartime’ scenario of increased naval manpower – the North Sea/Baltic expedition of 1683 – and is only one ship.  A Zeeland analysis is not yet available for this incident, but should be aimed at.
Although these are from peacetime conditions, interposing Bruijn’s very limited data for 1685-6 might suggest that the Southern Netherlands group at 6% continued at the 1674 level, before dropping after 1688; there is, however, much margin for error.  Francke, on the other hand, gives the Southern Netherlands as the largest foreign group at almost 8%:​[1087]​ radically different to this study.  Francke’s large 1688-97 sample differs radically from Bruijns result’s: particularly, the former’s figures for Germany and Denmark-Norway are much lower than Bruijn’s; they are lowered rather more here.  Preliminary research on a 1695 Rotterdam admiralty comparison indicates 3.6% British, or probably more, but more work is needed.​[1088]​

Foreign personnel & Foreign shipping

Having seen the relation of British shipping trading with Zeeland with the admiralty supply of British labour, we should start here; accepting that a large part of the foreign merchantmen paying the ankeragegelden remain of unknown origin.  Figure 5.19 below compares the two other principal actors: France and the Southern Netherlands. 




The Huguenots were located in the very ports and maritime areas that were linked by trade with Zeeland – i.e. the north and west coasts.  It seems then that the main factor in the French rise was the increasing persecution of the Huguenots after Louis XIV assumed personal rule in 1661, escalating with the violence of the dragonnades policy from 1679, and culminating in the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 1685.  Emigration, however, was only a ‘thin flow’, 1661-81.​[1089]​  One notable migrant in Zeeland in the 1660s was Leonard Allix (Leonart Alicx), an officer cadet from July 1664, and the son of the Calvinist minister of Alençon (Orne, Normandy).​[1090]​  Leonard’s father Pierre (1618-c1664) was minister, 1638-64.  Leonard’s (elder) brother was later one of the highest profile Huguenot refugees of all: Pierre/Peter Allix (1641-1717) minister at the principal Huguenot church at Charenton near Paris, and a prominent theologian favoured by Gilbert Burnet.​[1091]​
After 1685 there are a couple of striking examples of French officers in Zeeland warships.  Samuel Pelevin de Serbier from La Tremblade, an early centre of Calvinism in Charente, rose quickly from lieutenant to captain in Zeeland, probably under the patronage of Vice-admiral Van de Putte.  De Serbier either brought with him or helped to assemble in Zeeland a large group of followers, so that the Vice-admiral’s personal company of 88 men were 35% French, mainly from Charente.  Due to his lieutenant, Van de Putte’s flagships in 1688-91 (when De Serbier got his first command) carried up to 17% French in all – even the big three-decker Zeelandia (see Chapter 9).​[1092]​  At least one of the Dutch flagships landing William at Torbay in 1688 was packed with French, most probably Huguenots.   
The shipping and admiralty crews of the other principal foreign groups are compared in Figure 5.20 below.  There is very little correlation in the trends for Denmark-Norway; they are completely opposite after 1674.  The Swedish trends match apart from a brief divergence around 1674.  The German long-term trends correlate, but move in opposite directions during the peacetime transition, 1667-70.  Germans, then, were perhaps moving into another Dutch subsector, or even in the German merchantmen here.




British personnel, 1642-97: absolute numbers





Firstly, the figures are appreciable.  Whilst the British proportion of fell to 3.5% of total aggregate Zeeland manpower, 1664-7, this is still an appreciable figure: the 121 individuals so far identified were a large enough group – if concentrated – to have completely manned one of the frigates.  Because of the growth in numbers by the Third Anglo-Dutch War in Figure 5.21 above, the British, now 265-strong, would have been enough to provide the whole sailing crew of even one of the big flagships.  In both theoretical cases they could have filled almost every function with skilled men; they would have only lacked a formally commissioned captain to lead them.  
Although the differing length of the various periods distorts perspective by the use of absolutes rather than percentages, the overall numbers of British personnel clearly matches the overall trends in Figure 5.6 above – initial peak followed by crash, then recovery from the 1670s – except that here 1667-70 is a trough rather than a peak, and that also both the rate of increase from 1674 and the late peak during 1688-97 are much higher.  This is simply explained – the 1667-70 crew figures in Figure 5.6 above (8.6%) are a high percentage of a low peacetime manpower level, whilst the medium ratio during 1688-97 (5.2%) is for a much larger wartime labour supply.  Despite the isolated study here, Figure 5.21 replicates the general trend for all foreigners in Figure 5.5 above – but very much exaggerates the ‘shallow bowl’ into a deep trough; this will be amplified even more by further research on the peaks at the start and close of the period.  Viewed against the wider background of Anglo-Dutch relations, the collapse in numbers occurs during the central phase of Anglo-Dutch conflict.  British personnel were more sensitive to this than other foreigners; here is perhaps some empirical evidence of personnel’s response: some general reluctance to serve with the enemy.  We cannot be sure.  On the one hand, if increased wartime manpower demand and more effective recruitment in Britain were responsible for the central drop in Figure 5.21, then the reduction would continue into 1688-97, which it did not.  On the other hand, absolute numbers (as averages) were also used against the real wage differential in Figure 5.5 (see above); we saw the latter was a clear factor, the trends matching very closely up to Westminster 1674.  The lifting of reluctance after then may be reflected in Figure 5.5, but there is also naval demobilisation and falling demand in Britain to consider.  The argument for ‘reluctance’ or ‘patriotism’ is inconclusive.




The two factors of an entry route (shipping) and wage differential incentive were cancelled out simply by low demand.  The next episode, 1672-4, shows a three-fold increase over the previous level, despite the wartime crash in British shipping, but we have already seen the correlation with the enormous growth in the real wage differential.  Post-Westminster the rate increases yet again: doubling.  Here four factors combined: shipping recovered, the wage differential remained very high, whilst Dutch demand (opportunities) remained high and British demand slumped (naval demobilisation).  Another factor in the long-term growth may be the resentment of the seamen at their pay arrears, raised by J. David Davies: the example of 1667 persisting during the war of 1672-4.  The British groups in each episode are examined further below.

Overview of service patterns; linkage 1664-74

Exploring the central phase of the Anglo-Dutch Wars further, we can see some reasons for the increase in the British numbers in the 1670s.    Unfortunately, because of the loss of the sources for such a long period (15 years) before 1664, we cannot definitely fix the proportion of those serving 1664-7 who served beforehand.  At least nine of the men in 1664-7, however, were hardened veterans whose service dated back to before 1649; all but two were warrant or petty officers. This indicates both a high level of professionalism and permanent migration.




Because the overall numbers were roughly equal to those in the previous episode, the one in five veterans that served 1664-7 who re-enlisted again formed one of every five of the men (22%) during 1667-70.  This goes some way to explaining the stability in British numbers and rate over the transition from war to peace in Figures 5.21 and 5.22 above.  This is the professional hardcore, but perhaps most surprising is that, in 1667, three-quarters of these men were seamen, rather than petty officers – who had both more reward and more at stake.  Some of the seamen clearly had prospects and were promoted for the first time in the peace.  Former POWs also enlisted; about one in every eight of those serving 1667-70 had been captured during the war and was still in prison in September 1667.  Two-thirds of the men were new; probably all were part of the glut of labour loosed by British naval demobilisation.
Closing the small gap 1670-1 should be a high priority in the future; this would enable the tracking the men’s service right through to 1672 and determine the proportions of veterans in the British group in 1672.  Nonetheless, despite the gap 1670-1, we still know that at least 17 men who served in 1672 had done so at some point beforehand.  Of these, five – under one-third – were warrant or petty officers. 








From the 1640s until the end of the seventeenth century, the total foreign element of Zeeland admiralty personnel, though variable, was always large: it was enormous in the 1640s – one in every three men.  Whatever the intervening developments, it fell by the mid-1660s to one in five, but increased again in the mid-1670s to one in four.  This confirms Bruijn’s lead on the broader development.  The main reasons for the drop in the foreign proportion during the Second Anglo-Dutch War were firstly, an increase in the native Dutch proportion – itself the result of stringent new recruitment measures – and second, the general decline of foreign shipping.  In the last phase at least, however, the growth in overall admiralty manpower could not have been achieved without foreign labour.
The composition of the foreign element generally reflected the westward-orientation of Zeeland’s commercial linkage: certainly mirroring the makeup of incoming foreign shipping.  Together, Southern Netherlanders, French and British always made up over half of the foreign contingent, and were overwhelmingly the largest in the 1640s.  The northern and eastern groups only grew to any appreciable extent after 1674, but did account for most of the overall foreign growth in the next 25 years or so.  It remains to be seen if the increase in foreigners and the change in the composition was related to recruitment in Holland and/or superfluous quota levies supplied from there.
Rather than the decline proposed by Bruijn and somewhat exaggerated by Davids, the British maintained an appreciable presence throughout our period – even during Anglo-Dutch conflict – as one of the major components; they were even the largest group during the Third Anglo-Dutch War.  They totally dominated during the 1640s, and it was their decline that is most obvious in the fall in the overall foreign proportion by the Second Anglo-Dutch War.  
Changes in the British element more closely resembled variations in their shipping trading in Zeeland than the other foreign groups: commercial linkage was instrumental.  We have not just one, but two factors that were decisive: developments in real wages were also integral to British numbers.  This seems, naturally, to be also the case to some degree for the other groups of foreigners too.  During the Anglo-Dutch Wars, national loyalty, or perhaps fear of punishment if caught, may have been a restraining factor on what was a normal practice – an extra employment option.
Accepting the limitations of some studies on other Dutch sub-sectors, comparison with these shows some very broad similarities.  The total foreign component in the Zeeland admiralty, 1688-97 (29%) roughly matches that in Van Royen’s study of the merchant marine, 1700-1710 (24%).  
The Zeeland admiralty foreign compositions, on the other hand, bear no resemblance to Van Royen’s (northern-orientated) merchant study, where almost three-quarters of the foreigners were Scandinavian and almost all the rest German; the British contribution there was negligible.  More widely for the maritime labour market, these results suggest much greater regional compartmentalisation and variation.







Chapter 6.  The end of the Eighty Years’ War, 




The main focus here is on the Zeeland payroll stream, 1642-9.  In Chapter 5, we saw the very high overall proportion of foreigners (37%) and size of the various groups during this episode.  British personnel alone formed 19% of the total.  Micro-case studies are presented below.  As the Zeeland payroll/petition sources end in 1649, until their renewal in 1664, during the resultant gap we are bereft of definitive crew sources for empirical study of crew compositions.  This is particularly frustrating during the First Anglo-Dutch War, where we have already seen anecdotal evidence of British in Dutch service.  In Chapter 2 we saw Fleming’s estimate of 5-6000 British sailors in Dutch service, the recall of those men – and the anger when British were subsequently found amongst Dutch POWs.  We do have, however, one piece of empirical evidence on foreign crew amongst POWs during the First Anglo-Dutch War, but this is of limited value for our primary purpose – of its very nature, it almost certainly excludes British personnel.  Despite the gap in the Zeeland payroll sources, we can still identify some British and other foreign crew in Zeeland from other sources; this has already been explained in the Methodology.  After dealing with the 1642-9 episode, emphasis is placed on long-serving British veterans from 1642-9 who can be found continuing in service during the First Anglo-Dutch War and the rest of the 1649-64 gap.  This forges a connection with the reopening of the payroll sources in 1664, so there is some continuity with the next episode in Chapter 7.  
Before embarking on the micro case studies, we first focus on a special aspect we have seen briefly in Chapter 2: the British search of and press out of neutral warships.  In Part Two of this thesis, this is particular to the 1642-9 episode, as the British and Dutch were at war in the next two chapters.  The following micro case studies are centred principally around the largest Zeeland warships.  The most senior of the Zeeland flag officers, Vice-Admiral Johan Evertsen is not dealt with here, but the Rear-Admiral, Joost Banckert, is.  The latter’s son, Adriaan Banckert, is in each of the micro-case study chapters.  Later, as admiral, he often had large proportions of British in his crew (see Chapters 7 and 8).

Micro-case studies in Chapter 6​[1093]​
		Base	Guns	Men
Cornelis van Regemorter	Tholen	Flushing	18	65
Adriaan Janssen ‘Gloeijenden Oven’	Zeelandia	Flushing	32	85
Frans Mangelaar	Hollandia	Flushing	36	85
				





Adriaan Banckert	Zierikzee & [?]	Flushing	?	50

The end of the Eighty Years’ War, 1642-8: Operations

The largest long-range Dutch operations in the 1640s do not concern us.  The Dutch ships under Gijsel sent to Portugal’s aid in 1641 were all hired merchantmen; these included Zeelanders led by De Ruyter, but this (including the fleet action at St Vincent, 1641) falls just outside our scope.​[1094]​  Dutch forces also operated in the Baltic, 1644-5.  As her vital interests lay to the West, no Zeeland admiralty warships were in De With’s squadron that cowed Denmark-Norway,​[1095]​ nor (naturally) in the Dutch auxiliary fleet in Swedish service under the Zeelander Maarten Thijssen ‘Ankarhjelm’.  With these limits, the Zeelanders were mostly left with the workaday, but intensive, tasks of blockade and frequent convoy.  Zeeland admiralty strength rapidly increased in the face of the Dunkirkers’ power – from a total of 17 warships in early 1642, to 34 ships of all sizes (over 1800 sailors) in 1644.​[1096]​  
There seems to have been little opportunity for the overworked admiralty ships to cruise, so the guerre de course against Spain devolved upon the burgeoning privateers run by the Directors – the nieuwe kruisers.  Instead, in the Scheldt, Vice-Admiral Johan Evertsen blockaded Antwerp and supported shore operations.  Tromp’s blockade of the Flanders coast was tightened at Dunkirk, providing close cooperation with the French army: this was instrumental in the city’s fall in 1646.​[1097]​  Zeelanders were in the blockading squadron.  Four Zeelanders were on the Dunkirk blockade in October 1643 (Joos Banckert, Swart, Frans Janssen and Ringelszoon).  At least two Zeelanders were in Tromp’s fleet off Dunkirk, 19 April 1646.​[1098]​  


A Dutch seaman (left) watches the Spanish departure from Dunkirk 

With an eye to peace after the fall of Dunkirk in October, the Dutch ended the blockade of Flanders, relieving the stress on resources: as a whole, the navy was largely laid-up.​[1099]​  Nonetheless, the following summer the Zeelanders still maintained at least 1500 men.  Convoy was now by far the principal work; demobilisation did not really gather pace in Zeeland until late 1648, when at least 1000 sailors were still in pay, falling to around 600 the following summer.​[1100]​   The exception to Zeeland’s routine operations was the Brazil expedition of 1646-7 – three Zeeland warships were (nominally) transferred into WIC service.  In the absence of any relevant fleet action, 1646 is emphasised here – for the Brazil expedition and the fall of Dunkirk.

Overview of British personnel, 1642-9

We wonder how many men were either already veterans when the sources open at the start of this episode, and how many continued after they close at the end.  Information is still very incomplete.  With some of the Veere-based ships, however, we do get an opportunity to look at the period before the payroll starts: crewmembers continuing in service (from before the period for which payment was made) were marked as such.  Unfortunately, this information is of limited use – we have no idea how long such veterans served before the opening date of the payroll; it could have been years, or only a matter of months.




In the absence of a fleet action and with no warships lost, battle casualties were few in my sample, though this may be a quirk.  This contrasts sharply with the heavy casualties during 1664-7 (where there were three fleet actions) in Chapter 7.  Ironically, all four men slain here were killed by their own countrymen (see next section below) – and (bizarrely) by neutrals and not by those enemies the Zeelanders encountered – Dunkirkers, Spanish, or Portuguese.  Accidental and natural deaths seem relatively low, at 4%: this is lower than during 1664-7, but higher than in 1672-4.  The desertion rate of 11% was comparable to 1664-7, but higher than in 1672-4 (see Chapters 7 and 8).  The proportion of total casualties here (5%) compares pretty closely – albeit at a different, micro level – with the 3.2% of the British Tiger’s crew in 1706.​[1102]​  Desertion likewise needs wider comparison elsewhere.

British searches of, and pressing out of Zeeland warships

We saw in Chapter 2 that British warships often searched foreign vessels for British personnel.  With the Civil Wars raging in Britain, the precise legal position on the press of seamen from each of the Three Kingdoms needs to be ascertained, but actual practise and that of the searches was a different matter.  The Interregnum regimes eagerly assumed the pretentions of the monarch, and all British were probably subject.​[1103]​  Searches of foreign ships during 1642-1652 had primarily economic aims – merchantmen searched to prevent trade with Royalists – but British seamen were also removed from warships.  Dutch warships had often been instructed not to submit to foreign (i.e. British) searches, but these were still often carried out.  
The two issues were conflated.  On 2 November 1644 the Zeelander Vlissingen (Frans Janssen) engaged two Parliamentary warships for an hour off Dartmouth.  To underline the manpower resources denied Parliament (and Charles I) by the volume of British in Dutch service, four of Vlissingen’s five men killed in the fight were British subjects: a quartermaster and three seamen.​[1104]​  The States General praised Janssen’s conduct and – besides refusing to allow any searches – ordered Dutch warship captains not to surrender any crew, nor let others take them off.  Such belligerence could easily lead to war, so Dutch diplomacy soon leaned back towards ‘passive neutrality’ – the searches of Dutch merchantmen and cargoes continued.  Groenveld, however, does not address the warship aspect.​[1105]​  In this respect matters came to another head in 1646.
In May 1646 the Zeeland warship Arnemuiden (Claas Janssen Zanger), on the routine convoy to London, was stopped at Gravesend by order of Parliament: Francis Royal, an Englishman who had served since December 1644 (over 17 months), was taken out of the ship and pressed.  With startling heavy-handedness, the English authorities demanded that Royal’s wage arrears (six months) be paid there and then, or else they would throw captain Janssen in prison.  The incident might have had major consequences.  Janssen, though, seems to have taken the incident somewhat in his stride: he seems to have informed the admiralty only when requesting reimbursement of the outlay from his own pocket of Royal’s arrears – and the affair only came to light weeks later (in August), when Janssen was ordered to take the next convoy to England.  The Zeeland admiralty, however, immediately complained to the States General and – in strong terms – to Joachimi, the ambassador in London.​[1106]​  The States General thought the matter ‘of great consequence and judgement’ and could find no precedent: Joachimi was instructed to seek redress of the ‘innovation’.​[1107]​  The ambassador did not bring the matter before Parliament – other affairs dominated official diplomatic business.​[1108]​  Instead, Joachimi conferred privately with the Earl of Warwick (de facto chairman of the Admiralty Committee) and the Speaker of the Commons: they replied that

‘Parliament had ordered that all English sailors found on foreign ships would be taken off – men had to serve the state; also, this was no new order, but had been practised similarly for many years – it was rightly feared and would not be revoked’.​[1109]​  

It was a firm rebuff: the Dutch silence is telling – the States General was powerless to take action.  The matter ended there; at least for the time being.  Harassment of Dutch ships had far worse consequences than the loss of a few sailors, it seems, at least in 1646: valuable ships and cargoes.  Hit with a diplomatic brick-wall, there were simply more important matters to attend to: the Duke of Orleans was requesting close Dutch naval support for the French sieges of Mardijk and Dunkirk.​[1110]​  
To avoid future repeats of the Janssen incident on account of English personnel, the Zeeland admiralty ordered their captains to recruit no English whilst the Civil War continued.  English personnel were to be engaged only on flexible terms (which throws light on service terms discussed in Chapter 2) and were to be released ‘when other good and able crew can be obtained’ – which for our purposes is also an indirect admission of the general high quality of such men.  Otherwise, when in England, Zeeland captains were to refuse shore-leave to their English personnel ‘in order to remove and avoid so many possible questions and troubles’.​[1111]​  Although the First Civil War was indeed just coming to an end, did the Zeelanders see the end as inevitable – were they betting on a quick end to the war, with an over-ambitious measure that could be quickly rescinded?  Nonetheless, this kneejerk measure was clearly impossible in view of the enormous proportion of British personnel in Zeeland crews at this time – which we have already seen in Chapter 5, and is detailed below.  There was no hope of implementation: the order could be only a token gesture, doomed to failure – as with the 1603 admiralty quota limiting foreign personnel to 25% of the crews.
Returning to Royal, it is strange that with nine other British crew aboard Arnemuiden (eight English and one Scot), Royal was the only man removed.  How exactly was the search carried out?  Perhaps he was the only one who stood out.  Knowledge of the Dutch language must have helped in other instances involving British crew with British authorities; because Royal had served for so long, he must have had some ability with the language.  The Zeeland resolution on shore leave may be related: perhaps Royal had already been ashore and recognised as an Englishman.  Also, Royal may simply have ‘looked like’ an English sailor: when his landlady outfitted him in Zeeland, along with the three shirts, shoes and breeches, she supplied him with an ‘English cap’.​[1112]​  Or was he a ‘token’ British subject, demanded by authorities seeking to enforce their ‘rights’ and maintain prestige, and surrendered by Janssen with some sort of relief that he had only lost one man?  




Cornelis van Regemorter, Tholen, 1644-7

In 1645 Regemorter’s Tholen was in Tromp’s squadron blockading the Flanders coast and also on convoys.  In early March 1645 Tholen was one of the four Zeeland ships in the Dutch squadron reprimanded for letting three Royalist privateers out of Dunkirk.​[1118]​  Besides the blockade, she brought back the Dutch ambassadors from England in April, and was also on the London convoys.​[1119]​  In 1646 Tholen was again in Tromp’s Flanders squadron, when, with the Amsterdam captain Schaeff, she captured a Dunkirk frigate off the fort of Mardijk on 26 July.  Tholen’s share of the prize money, 1345fl, was some time in coming.​[1120]​  She was again occasionally diverted for short-range convoys to Calais and the Somme, and escorted a convoy of French troops from the Scheldt to Dunkirk at the height of the siege.  After Dunkirk’s fall, after repairs and cleaning, Tholen was on convoys again.  In January 1647, however, she did cruise off the Flanders banks whilst waiting for an east wind suitable to bring out her charges.​[1121]​  
On 10 March 1645, around the time of the Royalist privateers incident at Dunkirk and possibly related, there was a bad accident when at least seven, probably eight men drowned: the schieman’s mate and six seamen, and probably one of the quartermasters as well, were all lost.  Illustrating the almost universal spread of British personnel in Zeeland warships, four of the seamen – half – who drowned were British.  Henry Dark (London), William Richards (Yarmouth) and Robert White (Dundee) had all already served for a year, but Robert Cook (Leith) had only been aboard for six weeks.  Dark’s arrears went to the English church at Flushing for poor relief, which suggests he had neither dependents nor debts.  Whether the bitter winter weather was to blame is unknown, but two British seamen died during winter 1646/7.  David White (of Dundee, probably related to Robert White above), had served for almost three years when he died.​[1122]​








Generally, there was a high turnover of petty officers.  Many foreigners occupied important positions: reflecting the overall foreign composition, they were overwhelmingly British and French, but were joined through the lower boatswains’ grades by two Southern Netherlanders.  As a precursor to the British experience during the Anglo-Dutch Wars, this shows plainly that – besides forming large proportions of a ship’s company – enemy subjects could also enjoy preferment to important positions.  There was a succession of six armourers: all but one were foreigners – the function was totally swamped by foreign personnel – but this was far from the only example of this function being filled by foreigners at this time.  Two were French.  French petty officers might serve for long periods: a master-at-arms served for almost two years.  The French cook’s mate was promoted cook after two years and served through the entire commission of three and a half years.  He was replaced, temporarily, by another Frenchman, promoted and tried out as mate for four months and then demoted back to seaman.  There was also a long stream of carpenters; one German served for six months – but the smaller foreign contingents supplied very few petty officers.  The only Norwegian, a gunner’s mate, served one year before transferring into a Holland warship in 1645. 
Besides the short-serving navigator, British personnel were involved at the core of Tholen’s functions: a schieman’s mate, gunner, and three armourers.  The latter dominated their function over the commission, serving for 6, 13 and 13 months respectively.  The second of these, George Whitemore, had a cultivated signature.​[1125]​    In contrast, the gunner William Williamson (Dysart) was illiterate.  Another in the stream of British gunnery specialists we shall see in this episode and this survey as a whole, he served throughout Tholen’s commission.  Williamson had a wife and children; the family was in some distress in 1646.​[1126]​  Roger Dodd (London) was promoted from seaman to schieman’s mate and served for almost two years until April 1647.  Dodd’s wife was about to give birth again in December 1646; she and her existing children were already sick, whilst her illiterate husband needed a third set of sea-clothes.​[1127]​  James Scotchsome (Aberdeen) cook’s mate, served two and a half years.
Most of the seamen served about one year, but Jacob Mitchell (Aberdeen) served for two.​[1128]​  Some seamen seem unperturbed by lack of promotion and static careers: William Born (Dundee) served the entire three and a half years.​[1129]​
Because almost all individual payments were received by the sailors themselves (rather than creditors or agents), as a whole, Tholen’s British personnel seem to have been equally independent of managers or landladies; the seamen were just as free of debt as the petty officers.  We have already seen some of the petty officers’ financial problems above, but the recurring problem for all ranks was shortage of sea-clothes.​[1130]​  This is perhaps surprising: it may indicate a genuine general problem with vital and expensive outfits, as well as the severity of the weather at this time, but the stress laid may also have been a recognised standard procedure in assuring that petitions were accepted.

Adriaan Janssen ‘Gloeijenden Oven’, Zeelandia, 1644-8 





Generally, the composition of Zeelandia’s foreign personnel in Figure 6.4 was similar to the average levels for the episode.​[1132]​  In the first years, however, the French contingent was huge – over twice as large as average, and surpassing even the British.  During 1644-6, these two groups by themselves comprised over 40% of all personnel.  After late 1646 the British surpassed the others, but the French component was still very large at 13%.  Again, the extremely large size of these groups does not diminish the importance of others, though more modestly sized.  Southern Netherlanders formed almost 7% of the crew, rising to almost one man in ten – very considerable proportions in their own right, but here such personnel were born enemy subjects; taken with Tholen above, the presence of enemy subjects is no longer a surprise and will be confirmed repeatedly below.  Danish subjects increased from an appreciable level of just under 4% to over 5%.  Again, the three main western groups totally overshadowed the Scandinavians and Germans.




British, though, were the greatest influence, to the extent that the British proportion of petty officers actually exceeded their overall level in Zeelandia’s crew throughout her service.  They were spread in significant positions that we shall see repeatedly.  Their swamping of certain functions needs explanation.  Both the two armourers were British: George Lesley (Aberdeen) served well over three years.  Incredibly, all four masters-at-arms were British.  The second, John Cheesbrough (Lincolnshire/Lancaster), served three years.  In early 1648 he was replaced by Peter Kennedy (Dover), who had already served in Zeeland warships for 25 years and was then aged about 74.  This seems far too old for the position of ship’s policeman, but though he soon left Zeelandia, Kennedy went on to serve in the same position during the First Anglo-Dutch War.​[1134]​  British were also in the principal sailing and fighting functions.  Samuel Johnson (Rochester) rose through the lower boatswain’s grades to schieman in only 10 months, serving two years in all.  The seaman Peter Johnson (Sandwich) promoted to schieman’s mate, served one.  Another of the ubiquitous British gunners, Steven Stock (London) served almost four years as gunner’s mate before he was promoted in summer 1648.  Compared to other positions, a British sailmaker was more unusual: Thomas Gouny (Aberdeen) served two and a half years here, having already served aboard Middelburg and Vlissingen from 1642.  When Zeelandia was paid off in late 1648, Gouny reenlisted again aboard Arnemuiden.  Gouny served at least seven years in Zeeland from 1642 until March 1649, on four ships.​[1135]​
As for the seamen, there was a wide variety of service patterns, including instances of long, static service.  Two men served through all of Zeelandia’s nearly five years’ service: John Mackin (Aberdeen) and Henry Kitsman (Yorkshire).  John Simpson (Norfolk) joined later, but was aboard almost four years.  One man took the chance of prize money and adventure: after 14 months aboard, Andrew Denison (Leith) was paid off in May 1646 and promptly enlisted for the Brazil expedition.  He returned, serving another 20 months until 1648 (see below).  The length of employment varied wildly – also amongst the seven British deserters: some ran after a year, forfeiting large sums of money. 
Some of the men’s personal circumstances are visible.  Stock was married with children: his wife was frequently ill (she had at least one long illness), they were often far behind with the rent.​[1136]​  Samuel Johnson was married with three sick children.​[1137]​  If Simpson’s career did not progress, at least his personal circumstances did: at first under extra pressure to pay a poor landlady with a houseful of children, he probably acquired some means, as he was about to get married in 1647.​[1138]​  As with Tholen above, the greatest general need was again sea clothes.​[1139]​ 

Frans Mangelaar, Hollandia, 1642-8 









To illustrate their importance in Zeeland naval manpower at this time, British personnel formed not only one in every four men after early 1645, but also one in every five of the petty officers.  In total, 15 positions were held by British personnel over six years – in many different functions: the more important were a gunner and mate, two quartermasters, two armourers, and two masters-at-arms.  Again, most of these were particular functions that – from what we have already seen – we now almost expect to be occupied by foreigners.  There were also two trumpeters, two steward’s mates, a cook and two cook’s mates.  Having been to Brazil with Middelburg below, the gunner William Wood (St Andrews) reenlisted only a week after his old ship was paid off in early 1648, serving until Hollandia was paid off in October.  He had then served the Zeelanders for four years: we can justifiably speculate whether an experienced man clearly valued for his skills was able to continue in employment during the reduced naval labour market between Westphalia and the escalation in 1652.
British personnel were also advanced from the ranks: the seaman James Davidson (Aberdeen) served for 18 months before his promotion to gunner’s mate, in which position he continued for the next 18 months.  With his promotion, for the last eight months of Hollandia’s service, both the gunnery specialists were Scots – reinforcing the importance of foreigners in this function generally, and further emphasising that of British personnel.  One of the two British armourers, Alexander Samuels (Aberdeen), served for three and a half years, the other for two and a half.  After early 1645 there were two British quartermasters: both were promoted from the lower deck – one via long service as steward’s mate, which seems an unusual step.  Hollandia had just two masters-at-arms throughout her six years’ service: both were British; James Fife (Glasgow) served for four years.  
We also find two long-serving British veterans aboard Hollandia early in their careers.  Another petty officer, William Price (London), cook’s mate, is notable for serving the entire six years here.  He was promoted to cook in 1645, and was married at least as early as 1647.​[1143]​  The seaman Andrew Erasmus (Shetland) was a shipmate for two years after 1646.  Both were together again many years later in 1665, when they were killed fighting against their own country at the battle of Lowestoft (see Chapter 7).​[1144]​  
Careers in Zeeland were not just a matter for petty officers.  Of Hollandia’s British seamen, 13 served for two years or longer.  John Falconer (Alderney), married, served five and a half years aboard Hollandia.  Paid off with the rest her crew, he reenlisted aboard Cornelis Evertsen’s Zeeuwsche Leeuw the same day, serving at least until summer 1649.​[1145]​  Alexander Garret (Shetland) served four and a half years.  Gilbert Thomson (Aberdeen) was married to another Briton, Mary Green.  He served for two and a half years.​[1146]​     The other side of the coin were the ten British deserters.
Within Hollandia’s crew, the British petty officers appear just as likely to be in debt to other parties as the seamen, though both groups seem to have been relatively independent.  One problem for the petty officers was keeping up with rent payments – Samuels was behind with his rent in 1647,​[1147]​ and Davidson’s wife had severe difficulties in September 1648.​[1148]​  As with other crews, shortage of sea-clothes was a recurring problem for the seamen.​[1149]​

Joos Banckert: the Brazil expedition, 1646-7

Banckert’s was the first of three Dutch relief expeditions sent to rescue the desperate situation in Brazil, but is not well known.​[1150]​  At the start of 1646, the Zeeland admiralty decided to lend three of its largest warships to the WIC, these apparently the only naval support.  There was intensive recruitment of soldiers by the WIC in England, but it is unclear whether they also tried to get sailors.​[1151]​  The three Brazil ships are listed as being in Tromp’s fleet off Dunkirk, 19 April 1646.​[1152]​  Including three Zeeland warships (carrying 611 men, most of which were soldiers), the expedition of 20 ships with 2000 men left Zeeland 9 May 1646, arrived at the Cape Verde Islands 3 June, and made landfall at Brazil 30 July.  Banckert took ten ships and at least 250 prisoners.  Having achieved little else, the warships left for home 13 months later on 4 September 1647; Banckert died of fever just a week afterwards.  Middelburg and Vlissingen returned to the Scheldt 5 November.​[1153]​  Roos does not mention the third warship, Veere, on the homeward voyage; she seems to have returned separately and arrived earlier, in October.​[1154]​  




In the first two cases, the various proportions are similar to the episode average, though the British group aboard Middelburg was much larger than normal.  The third ship, Veere, was indeed based at the small Scots staple port – the first such case in this chapter.  The lower total foreign component matches the pattern of reduced overall foreign trade at Veere compared with Flushing.  All in all, foreign labour was a vital part of these three ships throughout their service, and to the Brazil expedition in particular.  This is explored further below.


Rear-Admiral/Commodore Joos Banckert, Middelburg, 1644-8

Middelburg’s crew are in Figure 6.8 above, more detail is in Figure 6.9 below.  Over 1644-8, foreigners comprised over half of Joos Banckert’s crew – 52%.  This would be astounding if we had not seen similar examples in other ships already above.  Overall, the composition of the foreign proportions was close to the episode average – French comprised one in every ten men; Southern Netherlanders ensured one in 20 were enemy subjects.  The British group, however, was even larger than usual: over 28% – one man in every four.  The Danish-Norwegian contingent was slightly larger than average.  In contrast to most other ships whose crews – on average – served for about a year, Middelburg’s crew served for longer – even accounting for the long time away from home.  The rate of desertion was fairly low (9.5%); only slightly higher for foreigners (10%).




It is worth mentioning ‘Bernard of Angola’, who served in Zeeland from at least as early as 1639 until 1650.  He lost his left arm in action serving with Banckert in 1639, but had moved aboard another ship by our period.​[1158]​  His presence reflects the Atlantic element of the Dutch empire at that time. 




With the expedition preparing at the end of April 1646, and manpower at a premium, seven foreign seamen were released from prison for Banckert: an Englishman, four French, a Dane and a German.​[1160]​  The Dane was immediately made the cook.  Steven Bokagier (Le Havre) died in Brazil in April 1647.  The day before he died the clerk prepared his will.  He left his nine and a half month’s wage arrears to a fellow Norman shipmate, another of the seven released prisoners.  
Some British were permanent migrants – married men, often with families.  While the expedition was away, Banckert’s wife Adriaana lent money to some crewmembers’ wives and attested to others’ circumstances.  The wife of Robert Spens (Kirkcaldy, see below), boatswain, was one of the many short of fuel.​[1161]​  William Wood (St Andrews), the gunner, was married to a fellow Scot, Catherine Morton; she was sick.​[1162]​  Alexander Frissel (Inverness) served with Cornelis Evertsen de Oude from January 1644 and joined Middelburg in 1645: his wife and young children were ill and in great distress while he was away.​[1163]​  The most desperate was John Moorfield’s family: the London seaman’s wife had three small children sick and one dead (probably with smallpox).​[1164]​     
A number of British left the ship just before the expedition sailed: both veterans and new men who had enlisted in early 1646.  Where men quickly reenlisted aboard other ships, the prospect of a long voyage and an unhealthy destination must have been the cause for leaving Middelburg: Andrew Gouny (Aberdeen), whose wife may have been considered particularly attractive, had been with Banckert since at least 1644.  He was paid off two weeks before departure and transferred to Hollandia after a week ashore.  If Gouny hoped to avoid disease or death on the Brazil expedition, he was unlucky: he died the following spring, cause unknown.​[1165]​  Three British who enlisted earlier in the year deserted just before the expedition sailed rather than go to Brazil.  We are short of details at present, but one Veere seaman died outbound after nine weeks’ ‘miserable’ sickness.​[1166]​  He was one of nine dead from disease, natural causes or accident, including Banckert himself: a loss-rate of about 9%.  How does this compare with other tropical voyages?  Another permanent British migrant, Thomas Simpson (Burntisland) died in Brazil, 16 April 1647, leaving a widow.​[1167]​  Only one man (the master) was killed in action, whilst there was some dispute involving the (Dutch) master-at-arms: he was murdered in Brazil in June 1647 and, for some reason, not replaced.  One of the British contingent may have been in more exotic service already: a Kinsale man joined the crew at Brazil, but may have come from another ship in the expedition.
Joseph Reket, prominent in the English church, was involved in the management or support of British seamen; amongst many of the passports he bought from British personnel, three were in Banckert’s crew.  It is difficult to disentangle the profit motive from altruism.

We shall take a brief aside to look at Robert Spens.

Robert Spens (Kirkcaldy): I, 1636-54 

The Scot Robert Spens is a remarkable figure.  He is the longest-serving British sailor in Zeeland admiralty pay during our survey: starting in 1636, he served for an incredible 52 years.  By 1672, when Spens was seriously wounded, he had ‘served with courage’ for 36 years and had fought ‘in all the battles’ (see Chapters 7 and 8).​[1168]​  By 1642, Spens was already quartermaster with Joos Banckert, and had been promoted to schieman by the opening of Banckert’s first extant payroll in August 1644; he was soon promoted again, to boatswain, in February 1645.  He served aboard Middelburg until she was paid off in January 1648.​[1169]​  We see him again in 1653, when he was boatswain with Cornelis Evertsen de Oude (Zeeuwsche Leeuw); she blew up at Scheveningen in August.  Spens survived her destruction, but was wounded and taken prisoner.​[1170]​  By that time he had served as boatswain with senior Zeeland officers for almost nine years, and was clearly valued.  Spens was married to Elisabeth Jacobs by the time of his departure for Brazil in 1646.  She was still living in 1673, and already a member of the Dutch church at Flushing when Spens joined in 1672,​[1171]​ while he was convalescing.


Frans Janssen, Vlissingen, 1643-8

Before the Brazil expedition, Janssen was in Tromp’s Flanders squadron on at least two occasions: in October 1643 and when Tromp was summoned to The Hague in December 1645, Janssen was left in command of the 10-strong blockading squadron.​[1172]​  In the last stages of preparations in April 1646, many English soldiers were prisoner aboard Vlissingen: they had been stopped from going to the defence of Dunkirk.  Many subsequently volunteered for the WIC.​[1173]​  None, however, seem to have been able to learn sailors’ skills and to join the ranks of the seamen during the expedition.




We have already seen Vlissingen’s fight with two Parliament ships in November 1644 above.  At that precise moment, 24% of her crew were British.  The British admiralty would never have known that Vlissingen’s dead included four British (Aberdeen, Guernsey, Ayr and Carmarthenshire) – yet alone that 16 others survived.  
As with Middelburg above, some men wanted to avoid a tropical voyage far from home.  But in contrast to Middelburg, where most British stayed and went to Brazil, there was something of an exodus from Vlissingen.  Nine men were paid off in the few months before the expedition sailed.  Some, probably, would have been at the end of their time and due for release anyway, but four reenlisted on other warships more or less immediately.  These men simply did not want to go to Brazil.  Three more British seamen deserted a few weeks before the expedition sailed.  We saw the sailmaker Thomas Gouny (Aberdeen) aboard Zeelandia above.  Having already served two years aboard Vlissingen, Gouny likewise left in early 1646 and reenlisted aboard Zeelandia.  The steward, Steven Perryman (London) also left with the sailmaker.  What is interesting here is that Perryman’s young son William stayed aboard Vlissingen and went to Brazil rather than stay in European waters with his father.  Search for adventure went with his age, of course, but ‘crossing the line’ would have certainly made him a proper seaman.​[1175]​  During the expedition itself, then, the British group fell to 15% – below their episode average, but still an enormous level.  At the opposite end, having served two six-month stints on Arnemuiden – an example where we can be sure of the lengths of fixed-term service – Robert Drake (Topsham) enlisted aboard Vlissingen very soon after the decision was made to send the ship to Brazil.  We saw in Chapter 3 that four months after he sailed, his wife was about to give birth, had no friends and was still having problems with the language.​[1176]​
William Owen (Coventry) was master-at-arms for all five years – another example of British in this position (see veterans section below).  Aside from the almost obligatory master-at-arms, there was a smattering of British petty officers, some of whom we saw leaving for other ships, above.   To summarise, of two steward’s mates, one was promoted to steward.  Of two cook’s mates, one was promoted from seaman.  One British sailmaker was unusual enough, but here there were two, serving consecutively.  British personnel might, again, turn up in exotic places.  Thomas Peters (Leith) died in Brazil in March 1647.  His place was filled by Derek Johnson (Sandwich), who was not previously on either of the other two Zeeland warships in the expedition.  We will probably never know exactly how he came to be in Brazil – there are numerous possibilities.​[1177]​  
The French surgeon again shows how easily this high warrant position was filled by foreigners.  Foreigners again filled particularly important functions: of the other foreign petty officers, a German was gunner.  A Southern Netherlander was promoted from seaman to schieman’s mate, then gunner’s mate and finally to quartermaster.  All three armourers during the episode were foreigners (all French, one promoted from seaman).  Others positions were also occupied by foreigners: one of the stewards was Danish.

Cornelis Ringelszoon, Veere, 1644-8

Ringelzoon’s conduct at sea was called into question in 1642, but the circumstances are unclear.​[1178]​  The first ship in this Chapter based at Veere, the last of the big Brazil expedition ships was often in Tromp’s squadron blockading the Flanders coast, 1643-5.  On 1-2 March 1645 Ringelszoon and Tromp fought and took a Dunkirker; in the process Veere collided with Amelia, taking off the flagship’s bowsprit and beakhead.​[1179]​  Surprisingly, Veere seems to have suffered no casualties.




Conditions at the Scots Staple town were different from Flushing: the foreign contingent was below-average at 23-29%, whilst the non-British foreign groups were small and dwarfed by the British element.  Whilst Scots, of course, were spread elsewhere, as we have seen, of the total of 31 British personnel who served 1644-6, only five were not Scots.  We can also glimpse just before August 1644: when Veere’s new payroll was started; British veterans already formed almost 18% of the crew (not shown in Figure 6.12), about the average in the first couple of years.
George Waterborn (Prestonpans) served the whole three and a half years.  In 1645, back in Scotland, his parents had died: he was paid some arrears for the voyage home.  He was allowed to leave for a foreign country, then, and trusted, moreover, to return.  He had other urgent affairs, unspecified, just before the ship left for Brazil in 1646.​[1180]​  Waterborn was clearly valued as a loyal servant.
As with the other expedition ships, some British left Veere in the months after she was scheduled for Brazil.  The British contingent shrank severely as a result, but were still by far the largest foreign component during the Brazil expedition, comprising 12% of the crew.  Of ten men paid off in early 1646 at least four reenlisted on other ships.  Thomas Jordan (Leith) quartermaster left after 20 months in April 1646; married, he had good reasons not to go to such a far away and unhealthy place.  George Pringel (Leith) sailmaker was the only British petty officer afterwards.  Jordan’s decision was probably pretty wise, as 12 men died on the Brazil expedition, a very high rate compared with the other two ships, but the causes are unknown.   




Other Veere-based ships are also important.  Because the muster master at Veere sometimes used a different notation, marking the veterans from the previous payroll, as with Veere we sometimes get a glance at British personnel’s service before the opening of the extant payrolls.  Aboard Neptunis (Jan Pauwelssen), heavily manned with British, 11 of the 38 British serving in the first couple of years were already veterans before March 1643.  The crew of Neptunis comprised enormous levels of British personnel, 1643-8: 26-35%.  From mid-1645 until the end of 1648, one in every three men was British; most of these – concomitant with the port hosting the Scots Staple – were Scots.​[1181]​  One crewmember was Michael Grit (Shetland), whose career lasted through all three Anglo-Dutch Wars (see Chapter 8).  Similarly, some 30% of the crew of Wapen van Zeeland (Joos Willemssen Block) were British, 1644-6.​[1182]​

Adriaan Banckert, Zierikzee & [?], 1643-9

Details of Banckert’s operations are very sparse at present.  Zierikzee, the smallest ship in this chapter (50 crew), was on the Yarmouth-Hull-Scarborough convoy at the end of 1644, escorting the whale fishery from January to early summer 1645.​[1183]​  The French seaman Jacques Valerie (Caen) ‘deserted to the enemy’ on 18 June 1645, but the circumstances are a mystery.​[1184]​  His motivations are too, but here the issue of enemy   service comes up again – this time a French subject fighting for the Spanish crown.  Sometime afterwards, Banckert seems to have shifted into another, unknown ship.  In 1646 he retook a Royalist prize, a dogger.​[1185]​  In the late summer he was on the London and Calais convoys, then earmarked for Dunkirk-Boulogne-Somme in October.​[1186]​  In early 1649, Banckert was on the London convoy, then on the Waterford route, where we saw the crewmember William Freeman (Yarmouth) above, pressed out of the ship by the British.
Recruitment of POWs is, of course, an issue that concerns us during the Anglo-Dutch Wars.  Here it was attempted as a direct result of Zierikzee’s operations.  Five British seamen from a Royalist privateer out of Ostend were prize crew on the dogger retaken in 1646.  Thrown into the Flushing gaol, they were ordered released in July, provided they paid their prison costs (the usual condition).  This proved impossible; months later, four asked if they could serve with Banckert instead.​[1187]​  The fifth, Alexander Scot, was released on condition that he serve on any admiralty or – illustrating their desperately stretched resources – any WIC ship.​[1188]​  One man at least joined Banckert; it transpired he was actually a Dunkirker.​[1189]​  This man is an excellent example of the seaman’s mobility and priorities – finding work in any circumstances; maintaining a livelihood regardless of the nationality of the employer.
	Banckert’s crew included more foreigners than the episode average: 42%, increasing to a stunning 51% after mid-1645.  Here is yet another ship that simply could not have sailed without foreign labour.  Initially, the crew composition resembled the average levels for the episode, clear in Figure 6.14 below.​[1190]​   From summer 1645, however, the three principal western groups converged – the dominant British group decreased (24% to 20%), but still comprised at least one in every five of the crew over six years.  The two other groups, Southern Netherlanders and French, increased after summer 1645 to very large sections (14% and 12% respectively): approaching one man in eight was an enemy subject.  It was these rises that drove up the overall foreign level to over half the crew.  




Of the warrant officers (not included below), a Southern Netherlander was Banckert’s surgeon for almost six years.  Of the top non-commissioned positions, this was consistently the most accessible to foreigners.  Another Southern Netherlander was inshore pilot for 20 months.  Within the petty officers, the proportion of foreigners kept close pace with the overall level – clear in Figure 6.15 below.  Foreigners yet again occupied critical functions.  The boatswain Maurits Janssen was born at Uddevalla in Bohuslän – part of Norway before 1658.  He served for 15 months.  Another Norwegian was schieman for one year; he was replaced by a Frenchman promoted from the lower deck, who served two years.​[1191]​  A German quartermaster (Goch), likewise promoted from seaman, served for 18 months.  




Looking more closely at the very large British group, they initially formed over one quarter of Banckert’s petty officers, dropping to a still very significant 16%.  They again held important posts, headed by east-coast Englishmen at the heart of the sailing function.  Thomas Richardson (Scarborough) joined as a seaman in November 1644 – before Banckert took the convoy there in December: Richardson joined the ship in Zeeland.  He was promoted through schieman to boatswain within just six months, and paid off after two and a half years.  John Gibbs (Yorkshire) joined as a seaman in January 1643, almost at the very start of Zierikzee’s service, and replaced Richardson as schieman in April 1645; both men were advanced when the ship was with the whalers.  Gibbs served almost three years.  The absence of a British gunner or armourer is almost surprising, but another rank often British-occupied was filled – Derek Blanchard (Wimborne) was master-at-arms for almost five years.  Aboard early, George Thomson (Leith) was promoted from seaman to cook, but deserted three months later in April 1644 – a rare occurrence for a petty officer.  The desertion of a Scot did not stop his replacement by another – his mate Alexander Fredericks (Aberdeen) had also risen from seaman, but only served for a year.  Yet another cook’s mate came later – James Cochrane (Aberdeen). 
We have some idea of the petty officers’ circumstances.  Two here were in debt; there was a 50% chance that they would receive the main group payments, but they always made their wage arrears over to creditors.  Richardson was married.​[1192]​  Blanchard was a widower with small children to support.​[1193]​
As with the other ships we have seen, some seamen seem content to work for years with no promotion: David Johnson (Kirkcaldy) served for over three years, whilst Alexander Smith (Leith) served for four, both until the ship was paid off in January 1649.  Both had family reasons to stay put.  Johnson had a sister in Zeeland.​[1194]​  Smith was married with children.  He also stressed that he was ‘very sober’, so may have been a devout man.​[1195]​  Some that served a year or more were desperately poor: Bennet Culver (Fowey) had ‘spent everything that he has in the world and has nothing to speak of’ – except his wage arrears.​[1196]​  Edward Broom (Dartmouth) was married with children, and was sick, but had no money.​[1197]​  Some were trying to put down roots: Derek Dixon (Cork) had ‘nothing […] but his earned wages’ to offer his bride-to-be.​[1198]​  Robert Corben (Poole) was penniless, but getting married too.​[1199]​  Most of these men were heavily in debt.  The flip-side of the long-serving men were the deserters.  Of the crewmembers before July 1645, 13 deserted – almost half the group.  Of the total of 15 British deserters throughout, four ran during the short time with the whale fishery in the north.  One of these men had served for relatively long – 18 months – forfeiting a large sum.  Most men, however, ran after serving 4-6 months.
As Banckert continued in service after other Zeeland warships were paid-off, men rendered unemployed by demobilisation sought work on his ship.  Some were long-serving professionals and also give us some idea of the time they spent ashore between ships.  Three men had been to Brazil aboard Vlissingen above; after she was paid off in January 1648 they reenlisted with Banckert: Alexander Davidson (Leith) reenlisted after a month ashore.  John Charles (Falmouth, see Chapters 4 and 7) reenlisted with Banckert the very same day he was paid off from Vlissingen.  Robert Drake (Topsham) served aboard Arnemuiden 1644-6; after just one day ashore he reenlisted aboard Vlissingen, then again with Banckert after two weeks ashore.  Drake, promoted to cook’s mate with Banckert (now in Zeelandia) by late 1649, died during the few weeks before mid-January 1651, having served at least seven years.​[1200]​ 

The scale of activity during 1648-1652 is still obscured, with demobilisation thought to have been rapid, but in 1648 eight Zeeland warships at least were to be continued in service as convoy escorts.​[1201]​  Given the number of long-serving men we have already seen, those captains that were continued in employment probably kept a number of their British.  This is confirmed below.  Some, certainly, served through the war.

The First Anglo-Dutch War, 1652-4

As we saw in Chapter 2, some British personnel were also forced to serve: Cornelis Evertsen de Oude kept two POWs (unnamed) aboard for four months over winter 1652/3.​[1202]​

Summary of major naval operations, 1652-3
Dover	19/29 May 1652
Plymouth	16/26 August 1652
Kentish Knock/Hoofden	28 September/8 October 1652
Dungeness/Singels	30 November/10 December 1652
Portland/Driedaagse Zeeslag	18/28 February-20 Feb/2 March 1653
Leghorn/Livorno	4/14 March 1653
The Gabbard/Nieuwpoort	2/12 June 1653
Scheveningen/Ter Heide	31 July/10 August 1653

Contemporary pamphlets claimed that ‘most’ Dutch ships were manned with Flemish, English and Scots.​[1203]​  The foreign scope was quickly extended to ‘English, Flemins, Scots, Walloons, Switzers and Germans’.​[1204]​  This was perhaps exaggerated, but clearly had some foundation: when a Scots merchantman was taken off Fraserburgh in the early stages of the conflict, a servant of the owners went aboard Maarten Tromp’s flagship Brederode and found ‘several’ Scots and English in the crew.​[1205]​  A couple of Portuguese subjects were taken prisoner at the Gabbard.​[1206]​

Zeeland admiralty losses during the First Anglo-Dutch War​[1207]​
		Guns	Date lost	Fate	
					
Jacob Verhelle	Hazewind		30 Jun 1652	Taken	
					
Cornelis Loncke	Faam	30	28 Feb 1653	Burnt	
					
Jan Franssen Waeffel	Roode Hart		14 May 1653	Taken	
					
Abraham Goons	Hammeken fireship		18 May 1653	Sunk	
					
Jan Pauwelssen	Neptunis	28	13 Jun 1653	Taken	
					
C Evertsen de Oude	Zeeuwsche Leeuw	30	10 Aug 1653	Blew up	
Adriaan Bankert	Hollandia	38	10 Aug 1653	Sunk	
Claas Janssen Zanger	Westcappel	26	10 Aug 1653	Sunk	
Andries Fortuijn	Eendracht	24	10 Aug 1653	Burnt	
Adriaan Janssen GO	?				
					




The first loss was Hazewind, taken returning from Brazil.  At Scheveningen, the Zeeland contingent was hammered, losing five of the 11 Dutch ships lost: Hollandia (Adriaan Bankert) and Westcappel (Claas Janssen Zanger) were sunk, Eendracht (Andries Fortuijn) burnt, and Zeeuwsche Leeuw (Cornelis Evertsen de Oude) blew up and sank.  Johan Evertsen’s flagship Vlissingen was disabled.​[1208]​  Dutch losses were estimated at 4,000 men; many were captured or rescued by the British, making 600-700 prisoners.​[1209]​  About 500 men were in the Zeeland ships lost.  Most of the survivors would have been prisoners at Ipswich.​[1210]​  Some British personnel were in these ships.

We sometimes catch a few glimpses indicating the presence of foreign crew in general: though a tiny sample, of Rear-Admiral Florissen’s casualties at Portland, 13% were foreigners.​[1211]​  Despite the loss of the payrolls, though, there is some very limited empirical evidence on Dutch crew compositions.  In Table 6.1 below, of 107 men whose origins are given, all Dutch (mainly naval) sailors prisoner in England, 34 were foreigners (32%); similar to the Zeeland average, 1642-9.  Whilst not too far different in size to the case studies above, this is, however, not a single ship’s company, but a mix of many, from all across the admiralty jurisdictions – it is not, therefore, a coherent sample.  Most of the men were from Amsterdam ships, where there were proportionally more foreigners (41%).​[1212]​




















Commander Poortvliet’s research shows a few British individuals scattered across the record, primarily officers in the Zeeland chamber of the VOC.  During the war these included navigators.​[1214]​  British personnel were not barred from crucial positions, then, even as enemy subjects during the war.  If personnel were willing to serve, their nationality was of little importance here too.
The prime example of the virtual irrelevance of personnel’s nationality during the war, however, is the high rank achieved by Bastiaan Senten, the most notable of British personnel in Dutch service at this time.​[1215]​  Senten, a Scot, commanded Directors’ warships in Zeeland during 1652-3.  At the Dutch victory at Dungeness in 1652, commanding the Flushing Directors’ Haas (30), he took Hercules (36), which had run aground.​[1216]​  Nonetheless, Senten was not an admiralty employee, and as we have seen, foreigners only exceptionally reached commissioned rank.  Our concern remains the mass of NCOs and seamen.

Whilst the comprehensive empirical evidence ends in 1649 (until 1664), as explained in the Methodology, we can still see many British personnel in Zeeland crews from 1649 right through the First Anglo-Dutch War.  Tracking the British known from 1642-9 through the years after 1649, a very heavy British presence was maintained into 1650 – a minimum of 10% aboard four of the largest warships in Table 6.2 below.  

Table 6.2  British personnel aboard four Zeeland warships, 1650​[1217]​
		Men		% British
				






1651 saw a drastic reduction in the issue of arrears to individual crewmembers, probably due to retrenchment, so that there is relatively little evidence available.  Payments of arrears increased during 1652, and even more so during 1653.  Table 6.3 below shows the payment of arrears to British veterans from the 1642-9 cohort in the years until 1654.

Table 6.3  British veterans from 1642-9 aboard Zeeland warships, 1650-4​[1218]​








Accepting the flawed and limited nature of these sources for our purposes, by 1653 almost 60% of the 1642-9 cohort who can be found in 1650 were still in service – even after the outbreak of war with the countries of their birth, and after the passage of three years.  In future, this rate of retention needs to be empirically compared with other instances.  We cannot yet disentangle natural wastage due to age, dispersal into other maritime subsectors, or reluctance to fight their own country.  Nonetheless, retention was similar that during 1642-9, so that the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War clearly made very little impression on the British veterans – perhaps some had reservations about fighting their countrymen, but – for most – their careers took precedence over any national loyalties, their loyalties probably lay now more with their long-time commanders, shipmates and employers in Zeeland – besides their families.  During the First Anglo-Dutch War most Zeeland warships had at least some British in their crews; aboard Middelburg (Claas Janssen Zanger) in winter 1652/3, for instance, two of the three quartermasters were British (Booth and Badman, both below)
The other foreign personnel that appear in the Zeeland admiralty resolutions belong to the familiar groups.  Cornelis Loncke’s clerk, Jacob Hazard – himself probably descended from French or British stock – was replaced by a Southern Netherlander in late 1652.​[1219]​  Amongst the seamen, another Southern Netherlander, in De Ruyter’s crew, was wounded in 1653.​[1220]​  More spectacularly, a German escaped with his life when Faam (Cornelis Loncke) blew up at Portland in early 1653; wounded in three separate places, he was rescued and then kept prisoner for 10 weeks in England.​[1221]​  A Norwegian transferred from the fireship Oostend (Jan Dieme) aboard Dordrecht (Pieter Gorcum) before the Gabbard in June 1653.  Having moved from that highly dangerous work, during the battle he suffered a fractured skull from falling wreckage when the maintop was shot away.​[1222]​  Other foreigners served in the Mediterranean: another Norwegian was one of 16 men badly burnt in a large peacetime ammunition accident aboard Wapen van Zeeland (J. W. Block) in 1651 (see also below).​[1223]​  Further research in the rekeningen will illuminate more foreign personnel.

British casualties in Zeeland, 1652-4

Some notable British personnel were killed or wounded fighting on the Dutch side during the First Anglo-Dutch War.  Two Britons died during the First Anglo-Dutch War, though we have no idea of the circumstances – whether they were killed in action or died from other causes.  Other British personnel were wounded, or served on warships that were lost, so they were probably killed or captured. 
Ralph Booth (Newcastle) served in Zeeland warships for at least 12 years as a petty officer.  He was already armourer with Abraham Crijnssen in 1642; by March 1645 he was quartermaster with Jacob Verhelle (Hazewind), where he served until 1649.​[1224]​  Booth then served briefly with Vice-Admiral Johan Evertsen (Oranjeboom), before joining Claas Janssen Zanger (Middelburg), 1650-54.  Booth was dead by late April 1654.​[1225]​  After war broke out in 1652, Booth held on to his important position as head of one of the three watches aboard one of the principal warships, despite his being an enemy subject.  Like the example above of the Spanish quartermaster on Veere during the 1640s, his nationality was irrelevant.  Married, by the outbreak of the war in 1652, he was already a veteran of at least 10 years service and was probably very well assimilated.
Peter Baxter (Kinghorn) served at least six years.  He joined the Veere-based Wapen van Zeeland (Joos Willemssen Block) in December 1646.​[1226]​  Baxter continued in the same ship after 1649.  Serving in the Mediterranean, he was dead by early February 1653, so did not fight in the battle of Leghorn.​[1227]​
James Miller (Kirkcaldy) joined the Veere-based Neptunis (Jan Pauwelssen) in 1645, serving through to the end of 1648.  He was married in 1646.​[1228]​  The ship continued in service after the demobilisation, and when we get the next glimpse of her crew in 1652, Miller had been promoted to boatswain’s mate; he continued in this rank during the war – like other British petty officers, his status as an enemy did not interfere with his career.  Combat against his own country, though, did.  He was wounded in the left arm – it seems fairly lightly as the compensation was low – at Portland in early 1653.  Neptunis (now commanded by Adriaan Janssen Gloeijenden Oven) was captured at the Gabbard in June 1653; Miller’s fortunes were mixed: he avoided capture somehow, but received another wound – a pistol shot through the elbow.  Now unable to flex his arm, and stressing the expense of maintaining his family in his petition, Miller was transferred to Frans Mangelaar’s crew (Wapen van Keulen) and the admiralty fixed his wages at the high seaman’s rate of 14fl.  Having served at least eight years, his subsequent fate is unknown.​[1229]​
The seaman Thomas Cook (Leith) served with Jan Christofelssen Duijm (Salamander) at Portland, where Duijm towed De Ruyter’s flagship Witte Lam.  One of Salamander’s cannon burst, smashing Cook’s left leg above the knee.  Recovering and seemingly undeterred, he wanted to stay in service.​[1230]​  Cook’s shipmate, another Scot, Thomas Thomson, was also very badly wounded – also in the left leg.  Before Portland, Duijm was in a small Zeeland squadron escorting homebound West India merchantmen: Thomson, at least, had enlisted at St Christophers.​[1231]​  What was he doing there?  There were always men needed on the warships, whilst the better-paid jobs on the merchantmen were probably already full.  For most men there are a variety of possible motivations above the overriding need for work.  In this case, Dutch control of the distant seas probably put extra pressure on British personnel in these areas to enlist.  Perhaps Thomson wanted any passage back to Europe.  

British petty officers and wartime promotions in Zeeland, 1652-4

As Miller’s example above shows, British personnel held onto positions as, and were even promoted to petty officers during the war.  Those holding their rank included Erasmus Badman (Bantry), who served with Frans Janssen (Vlissingen) 1643-8.  He was married with children by the time he went to Brazil in 1646 and was promoted to steward’s mate in 1645.  When paid off in early January 1648 he spent three weeks ashore before joining Claas Janssen Zanger (Arnemuiden); he was promoted to quartermaster in summer 1648.​[1232]​  Badman stayed with Janssen after his move into Middelburg (April 1649), serving through the war.  By 1658 Badman had been downgraded to seaman with Jan Banckert (Tholen), having served for at least 15 years.​[1233]​   
Another British petty officer, Richard Harbert (Plymouth) served at least 13 years; he served with Jacob Verhelle (Hazewind) as sailmaker from at least as early as 1645 until 1649.​[1234]​  Harbert transferred to Cornelis Loncke (Dolfijn yacht), heavily manned for another Brazil relief expedition during 1650-2.  Returning from Brazil in June 1652, after the outbreak of war, Dolfijn eluded capture.  Harbert survived the expedition: he had joined Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge (Vlissingen) by 1653.  Pensioned in spring 1658, Harbert came back into service the following year, but was pensioned again by 1664.  He lived on, seeing Dutch victory in the Second Anglo-Dutch War, until at least the end of 1673.​[1235]​ 
We can even see promotions of enemy personnel.  William Tait (Dundee) served aboard the Veere-based Amsterdam (Adriaan Nicolaas Kemp) from spring 1647 until late 1649.​[1236]​  After the post-Münster demobilisation, Amsterdam continued in service until at least 1653; Tait served through this time – promoted to gunner’s mate by late 1652, after the outbreak of war.  The promotion could, though, have taken place any time from mid-1651 until that time, so was not necessarily a wartime promotion of an explicitly enemy subject.  Nonetheless, even if just pre-war, his promotion took place during a  time of increasing Anglo-Dutch tension.​[1237]​
The situation with Robert Kyle (Fairlight, Sussex) is more explicit.  Kyle served for at least 15 years, from as early as 1644; he was one of those who left Joos Banckert’s Middelburg in spring 1646 (before the Brazil expedition departed) and reenlisted elsewhere, with Adriaan Swart (Middelburg [II]).  Kyle, however, was paid off with the rest of Swart’s crew later in 1646.​[1238]​  By 1650 Kyle was with Adriaan Banckert (Zeelandia), promoted to boatswain’s mate; his career was already on an upward trajectory when war intervened.  Kyle served through the First Anglo-Dutch War with Banckert (in Westcappel and Hollandia), promoted again to schieman by summer 1653 – there was no hesitation in preferring an enemy subject over native Dutch even during wartime.  Banckert was flag captain under Johan Evertsen in Hollandia from Dungeness in late 1652 until after the Gabbard in June 1653.  Aboard the Zeeland flagship, then, the man in charge of the sails and rigging of first the mizzen mast and then – after his promotion – the foremast during four of the fleet actions was actually an enemy subject.  Hollandia was sunk at Scheveningen; Kyle survived and must have been taken prisoner with the other survivors.  Kyle’s service was long enough for us to see his career decline, probably due to advancing age: by 1659 he had been downgraded to seaman, now with Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge.​[1239]​ 

British veterans, 1642-64: 
Summer; Kennedy; Lee; Owen; De Clerk; Dougal

Using veterans, we can throw a rope-bridge over the gap between the comprehensive career evidence in the 1640s and its renewal after 1664.  Some British veterans from the 1640s (and before) served during the First Anglo-Dutch War, and in some cases even through the Second and Third.  We have already seen Robert Spens above.
We have minimal evidence on one veteran.  Gabriel Summer (Dundee) was cook’s mate aboard Zeeridder – first in 1645 and again in June 1653.​[1240]​  Maintaining the same rank, it is likely that he was in Zeeland service during the intervening eight years.
We saw the aged master-at-arms Peter Kennedy (Dover) briefly above, aboard Zeelandia in 1648.  Kennedy served with Jacob Verhelle (Hazewind) in 1650.​[1241]​  By the aftermath of the last fleet action at Scheveningen in summer 1653, he had served the Zeelanders, including Johan Evertsen, for no less than 30 years.  Now aged 79, aboard Claas Janssen Zanger (Westcappel), he was now too old to continue and wished to retire to the Flushing hospital.  Vice-Admiral Evertsen, the senior captains Verhelle and Janssen, and Commissioner De Moor all attested to his service: he was pensioned for life.​[1242]​
One of the many foreign surgeons we saw in the 1640s, Robert Lee (London) served for an immense time – some 40 years from the early 1620s.  Lee first appears aboard Westcappel (Gillis Janssen) 1642-8.​[1243]​  Lee stayed in employment during the demobilisation, aboard Wapen van Zeeland (Joos Willemssen Block) in 1649-51, latterly in the Mediterranean.  He continued with the same commander and ship through the First Anglo-Dutch War, continuing in the Mediterranean, fighting at Leghorn/Livorno in 1653.​[1244]​  Even in peacetime, though, life shipboard was dangerous: in 1651 Lee was very busy in the aftermath of a large ammunition accident, treating 16 men badly burnt by powder – 14 so severely that they had to be replaced, though it is unclear if they died.​[1245]​  After Leghorn, Lee also tended to five English POWs sent aboard by Rear-Admiral van Galen.  It is very doubtful that Lee was chosen for this just because he was a native English-speaker – wounded POWs were probably scattered throughout the Dutch squadron for treatment.​[1246]​  After the war, Lee served with Geleijn Pikke (Wapen van Zeeland) in 1658-9, back in the Mediterranean, and earned prize money from the Portuguese St Sebastiaen, taken off the Portuguese coast.  Lee was paid off some time in the early 1660s.  He then joined Goes (Adriaan Banckert) and finally Schakerloo, back in the Mediterranean in 1663.  Lee died sometime before July 1664.​[1247]​  
Another of the ubiquitous British (and other foreign) masters-at-arms, William Owen (Coventry) served in Zeeland for at least 25 years.  First appearing in 1642 with Frans Janssen aboard Vlissingen, after five years and a voyage to Brazil, Owen had joined Cornelis Evertsen de Oude (Zeeuwsche Leeuw) by March 1649.​[1248]​  Owen remained with Evertsen, serving right through the First Anglo-Dutch War.​[1249]​  He was with Evertsen (now in the new Vlissingen) in 1658-9, probably remaining there continuously until 1664, and served with Evertsen on the flagships after his promotion to Lieutenant-Admiral, then Banckert after the former’s death in 1666.​[1250]​  Owen was another literate and assimilated man.  Owen survived many battles during his long career, only to accidentally drown on 16 March 1667 – a reminder of the seaman’s dangerous and uncertain life.​[1251]​
The Flushing resident Peter de Clerk (Sandwich) served 1642-9, first with Adrian Swart (Middelburg) and from late 1646 with Claas Janssen Zanger (Arnemuiden).​[1252]​  He was maimed serving with the same captain (now in Middelburg) during the First Anglo-Dutch War.​[1253]​  In contrast to Lee’s long career all spent as an officer, most of De Clerk’s minimum 19-year career was spent as a seaman.  By 1646 he had been promoted to trumpeter but quickly demoted again; he was certainly illiterate in 1645-7, which probably held him back to an extent.  By 1658, though, he had made petty officer once more – promoted to master-at-arms with Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge – yet another example of this rank occupied by a Briton.​[1254]​  Finally, he was pensioned in 1661 and lived to see the Second Anglo-Dutch War, dying in early 1666.  During 1652-4 it had not mattered that he was born an enemy subject, nor did the era of hostility between the maritime powers stop him being looked after in the Flushing gasthuis in retirement.​[1255]​
In contrast, the life and career of Andrew Dougal (Wemys), who we saw as a POW in Chapter 2, ended in violence (see Chapter 7).  Dougal first appears aboard Zeeridder (Gillis Janssen), in late 1652.​[1256]​  Dougal lost his left arm in action in 1652.  Months later, having recovered, incredibly, he asked to continue in service – despite the offer of 200fl compensation for the mutilation; about 17 months’ peacetime wages.  Despite the loss of his arm, his petition was allowed.​[1257]​  Here is a man who surely had very strong motivation to continue in Dutch service, but this does not necessarily mean he was a dissident: it was natural for him to want to continue in his usual work, his opportunities ashore were now limited, and he had proved his loyalty to his present employers with his blood.  Still with Janssen, Dougal was paid off on demobilisation in late 1654, but petitioned against the loss of his job, stressing the loss of his arm in battle.  He was reinstated, aboard Zeelandia (Jan Vijnckaert).​[1258]​  
Dougal reappears in late 1659 as a navigator with Geleijn Pikke, part of the Dutch fleet in the Baltic, 1659-60.​[1259]​  Dougal must have developed navigational expertise or aptitude – all the more interesting in the aftermath of a severe injury that would have made it difficult to handle navigators’ equipment: why else would he have been promoted?  Of course there was a desire to reward a loyal servant, but such a high-status and well-paid position could not have been a deliberate over-promotion or a mere sinecure, because such places were in short supply.  By June 1660, after one of Adriaan de Hase’s navigators died, Dougal was transferred in his place.  In January 1663 he was almost paid off when De Hase moved into the small Blauwen Visser (10) with a reduced complement of only 20 men.  Dougal’s successful petition against the loss of his job stressed his long service and, once more, the loss of his arm in battle.​[1260]​  All Dougal’s three petitions here give his service as ‘against the English’.  As a Scot, this might raise the exciting prospect of ideological motivation, but, as we saw, Dutch usage of ‘English’ was applied far too generally in normal circumstances to be certain.




In the 1640s, the enormous British contribution to Zeeland admiralty manpower was spread wide across the warships.  They were not there just to make up the numbers; many British personnel accessed petty officer rank and enjoyed long careers, some in central ship-board functions for which we might think that Dutch personnel would be preferred.  Other foreigners did well too, it was just that there were so many British they were universal.  We saw that trade generated a flow of personnel, primarily British, but why were there so many foreign petty officers?  Overall, foreigners had only a slightly less chance of preferment and promotion than Dutch personnel.  Why where there so many British and foreign in crucial functions – especially gunners, but also boatswains – and armourers.  Technical?  Why so many masters-at-arms?    









Here we will concentrate on the crews of Zeeland naval elite – the flag officers and the prominent Banckert and Evertsen officer dynasties: the crews of Adriaan and Jan Banckert, and Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge are covered in detail.  The crews of admirals Johan Evertsen and Cornelis Evertsen de Oude – as well as Jan Matthijssen – are also touched upon; this means that all the Zeeland flag officers, 1664-7, are covered in this chapter in some way.  For a non-European perspective on Dutch service entry, Abraham Crijnssen’s Atlantic expedition to Surinam and Virginia is also covered; British subjects were present from the start (some were recruited especially for the operation) and also joined in the Americas.





Adriaan de Hase/B Tuinman	Wapen van Zeeland	Veere	44	123
J & Cornelis Evertsen de Oude	Hof van Zeeland	Flushing	58	191-227




Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge	Utrecht	Flushing	50	140-169
Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge	Zierikzee	Flushing	60	171-192
				




Escalation of the Second Anglo-Dutch War; Background

The direct causes of the war were Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry in West Africa and the associated snowballing of strike and counter-strike.​[1265]​  News reached Europe in May 1664 of Sir Robert Holmes’ capture of the Dutch forts and factories on the West African coast; naval preparations quickly followed on both sides of the North Sea.  On 20 May the States General instructed the Zeeland Admiralty to fit out her five most heavily armed ships.​[1266]​  By the following month the Zeelanders had a large squadron fitting out.  On 9 June Charles II recalled and banned British mariners from serving abroad.  Those who disobeyed were to suffer ‘the utmost severities of Law.’​[1267]​  Military escalation gathered apace in August 1664 when the States General secretly ordered De Ruyter to recapture the West African losses, which he achieved – and more – in the autumn, before crossing to Barbados.  Also on the other side of the Atlantic, Colonel Nicholls took New Amsterdam in 1664, renamed New York.
We saw the sequence of the British and Dutch embargoes in Chapter 2:​[1268]​ the British were first to lay a general trade embargo, in the autumn of 1664 – drastically curtailing employment prospects in Britain.  For foreign-serving British seamen, this must have been a major consideration their decisions on whether to return to Britain: why go home if there was very little work apart from the navy?  For those in the Republic, passage home was clearly still available at this early stage for those British seamen willing to take it and obey their sovereign’s recall.  There was a brief window in December, but the embargo was reinstated early in 1665.  On the other side of the North Sea, Downing was misled when he reported the Dutch were partially demobilised for the winter.​[1269]​  Far from it – preparations continued apace.  The Dutch had already decided to retain all their crews through the winter of 1664/5 and introduced another innovation – their own general embargo; Downing overconfidently thought that ‘most British ships escaped from Dutch ports before the embargo was imposed’​[1270]​  Retention was an extremely unpopular measure with the seamen and their families (see below).  Despite the order, we also saw in Chapter 2 that British personnel could still be released.  Desertion was not the only way out.​[1271]​  
The embargo deepened would be effective early in 1665, forcing more and more unemployed merchant crews to enlist as time wore on.  If, by late 1664, full scale war was inevitable in any case, Sir Thomas Allin lit the final spark on 19 December when he attacked the Dutch Smyrna convoy homebound from the Mediterranean off Cadiz – though with little success.  The Dutch had already ordered the preparation of 72 warships above the usual provision of peacetime convoy escorts.​[1272]​  That December the Zeeland warships anchored in the usual winter anchorage of the Vlack, south west of Walcheren.  They were fully manned.​[1273]​  The Zeeland States were pressing for the issue of privateering commissions by December, with the local privateer captains threatening to put to sea with or without commissions.  Some had ships of over 30 guns.​[1274]​  Ships of this size required appreciable manpower: privateers were soon required to supply the admiralties with one man for every man they recruited (see Chapter 2).  Privateering commissions, a sure sign of the coming onslaught, were issued first by the British; the Dutch delayed – for fear of international opinion but also of losing men needed for the navy – until their formal declaration of war on 24 January 1665.​[1275]​  During the winter, the Zeeland Vice-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen de Oude commanded 18 warships cruising or lying in the Wielings at the mouth of the Scheldt.​[1276]​  It is unclear what Evertsen himself achieved: it was Adriaan Banckert, the Rear-Admiral, who led a number of winter sorties from this position (see below).


Summary of major naval operations, 1665-7

British personnel were killed in Zeeland service in all three fleet actions, and also taken prisoner at the Lowestoft and St James Day defeats.  The Zeelanders suffered heavy losses at Lowestoft: Wapen van Zeeland was of nine Dutch ships taken, Zwanenburg one of eight burnt.  Cornelis Evertsen de Oude (Vlissingen) had 100 dead and wounded.​[1277]​  Zeeland lost over 700 men killed and taken prisoner – a heavy drain on the manpower resources of a small province.​[1278]​  At least three Zeeland ships were heavily damaged in the battle and needed major repairs – Johan Evertsen’s flagship Hof van Zeeland, his son Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge’s Utrecht, and Delft.​[1279]​  Losses were not so heavy at the Four Days’ Fight victory, but Hof van Zeeland was burnt and all hands lost.  Tholen was captured at the St James Day Fight.

Battle of Lowestoft	3/13-4/14 June 1665	
Bergen	2/12 August 1665	VOC only
Four Days’ FightVierdaagse zeeslag	1/11-4/14 June 1666	
St James Day Fight Tweedaagse zeeslag	25-26 Jul/4-5 Aug 1666 	
‘Holmes’ Bonfire’, the Vlie	8/18 August 1666	Minor Dutch forces only
Crijnssen’s Expedition: Surinam & Virginia	20/30 Dec 1666-Sep 1667	Zeeland forces only
Medway Raid Tocht naar Chatham	10/20-14/24 Jun 1667	Zeelanders not present
Harwich Raid	2/12 Jul 1667	

Though overshadowed by the simultaneous large-scale Medway Raid, Crijnssen’s Virginia Raid was a costly ‘double whammy’ for Charles II.  Like at our starting point of the Medway, British personnel took part on the Dutch side.  But, unlike the Medway, where we have no details on rank and file, here we can actually see each of Crijnssen’s British men reaping appreciable benefits from the destruction inflicted on their own country.  Also like the Medway, a Briton played a crucial individual role on the Dutch side – but at Virginia this man was undoubtedly the key to Dutch success.  

Overview of British personnel, 1664-7





Perhaps most striking is the large proportion (13%) of British personnel who died as a direct result of ‘enemy action’ – killed in battle (by far the largest sub-group), died of wounds they received in battle, or died through wounds or disease after being captured (‘enemy neglect’).  This seems a very high figure compared with casualty rates elsewhere.  Including deaths from natural causes, disease and accident, 20% – one in five – lost their lives.  Those who were POWs and not heard of again are likely to have died in British custody through neglect: total casualties, then, would have approached one out of every four – a devastating proportion.  At the other end of the scale, there was a small group (3%) of ‘unwilling’ who were released in December 1664-January 1665, though this group would be larger when viewed as a proportion of the British personnel in service at that particular time.  The 14% overall desertion rate is a slight increase on, but comparable to that during 1642-9.  This needs to be properly compared with the rate for Dutch and other foreign personnel, but is unlikely to be different.  As discussed briefly in Chapter 2, those who deserted in the immediate aftermath of the declarations of war cannot have ideological motives for their desertion positively pinned on them – desertion for service on privateers is also likely at that time.  The sizeable (37%) group whose fates still remain unknown were, for the most part, probably merely paid off on demobilisation – as would be normal.  This group also contains, for convenience here, just three individuals who were paid off during the war, but for unknown reasons.  Lack of adequate skills is a possibility, but they could also fall into the ‘unwilling’ category.

Perhaps the most important men for us here are the one in five of the total (27 men) who reenlisted for service at the end of the war, now in a vastly shrunk naval labour market.​[1281]​  It is perhaps surprising that such a relatively large proportion reenlisted when – once in – service had been for the most part permanent and compulsory for the past three years (see Chapter2).

The Battle of Lowestoft, 1665; Bastiaan Senten; 
Cornelis Cuijper, Zwanenburg, 1664-5

The Scots-born Zeeland captain Bastiaan Senten had excelled during his service during the First Anglo-Dutch War (see Chapter 6).  Commanding the large Indiaman Oranje (75, VOC, Zeeland Chamber) at Lowestoft, he heroically supported the isolated Dutch commander-in-chief Obdam (Eendracht) by closing the Earl of Sandwich and attempting to board.  Against a local British superiority, Oranje was heavily battered – ‘abundance of her men killed and the ship scarce able to swim yielded’.  The survivors were taken off and she was burnt and sunk shortly after Eendracht blew up.  Senten died shortly afterwards; James, Duke of York remarking on his bravery.​[1282]​  The Dutch fleet then fled in disorder.  In his eagerness to engage, Jacob de Reus, commanding another large Indiaman, Marseveen (78), collided with Ter Goes (34) and the Zeeland warship Zwanenburg (30).  The three ships were hopelessly fouled and could not work free of each other.​[1283]​


The battle of Lowestoft.​[1284]​

The incident can be confusing, as on two separate occasions in the battle three or more Dutch ships collided, fouled and were burnt together.  Sandwich recounted that about 6pm

‘keeping their luff more than the rest to engage my ship and hinder our chase, I bore up unto him [De Reus] and after some dispute made him bear round and so shear aboard his two consorts, and being fast together and well paid they struck their colours unto me.’ 

Sandwich then continued on the chase and left them to be taken by following ships, but the fireship Dolphin (William Gregory) burnt all three surrendered vessels before the survivors were taken out: of about 800 men 

‘they were all destroyed but 100 saved in a boat and some few taken up out of the water.  This cruel act was much detested by us as not beseeming Christians’.​[1285]​  

Sandwich could not have witnessed the destruction at first hand.  A Dutch galliot picked up around 13 survivors from the three ships after they had been in the water for four hours – at least three of these were interviewed at the Texel two days later by the Fleet Deputies from the States General.  They confirmed that the three ships were ‘so entangled together that they could not be separated’, but maintained that Marseveen had then fought alone against 23 or 24 ships – probably engaged by each as they passed in the chase of the retreating Dutch main body – and that ‘she was so battered that she was ready to sinke’ when eventually fired.​[1286]​  The difference in the accounts raises questions on others’ conduct besides Gregory’s – if the Dutch had already struck.  At any rate, the wreckage of all three ships eventually blew up about 1am on 14 June: Downing, in his house at The Hague, reported that the explosion ‘shooke the whole house, and the very beds as if it had bin a great earthquake’.​[1287]​  
Foreigners made up 19-23% of Zwanenburg’s crew, rather more than average for this episode.  Figure 7.2 below shows the major foreign groups.​[1288]​  Unusually, the French contingent was the largest – some three times larger than average; British followed, at almost twice their normal level – as were the Germans.  The Southern Netherlands group, on the other hand, was much smaller than average at this time.  
Are these quirks explainable?  Just days before the opening of the payroll in September 1664, Cuijper (then in Westcappel) had returned from escorting the inbound VOC retourschepen, and his crew had simply been transferred to Zwanenburg – the latest most of the men enlisted was in May, therefore, when Cuijper had increased his complement.​[1289]​  The crew composition was therefore already different from the 1664-7 average when Zwanenburg was commissioned for the Malaga convoy run in September 1664.  She helped to bring home the Dutch Smyrna fleet and was in the December fight with Allin off Cadiz.​[1290]​


Homebound in early 1665, Zwanenburg and Prins te Paard (Adriaan Thijssen), another Zeelander, put in at La Rochelle to pick up the French trade – here they were ordered to increase their complements, but French already comprised 9% of the crew.  Zwanenburg took on one-third more crew; many were Dutch seamen signing on for passage home.  Despite this, the addition of a few French and Germans kept the foreign components fairly stable into May.  Yet, in February, the French element was even greater than the 9% shown in Figure 7.2: four more French seamen joined at La Rochelle but deserted before the convoy sailed for the Texel.​[1291]​




Six of Zwanenburg’s crew were British (mainly Scots) – all killed at Lowestoft.  All but one must have been present when Cuijper transferred from Westcappel to Zwanenburg in September 1664 – the steward and two seamen (John and James Park, both Dysart), the cook Andrew Erasmus (Shetland) and William Price (London), his mate.  Three were veterans: Price and Erasmus had at least 23 and 19 years of Zeeland naval experience respectively (see Chapter 6).​[1292]​  Both were married, with wives in Zeeland.  The third old hand, John Park, had already served with Cuijper (then in Dordrecht) in 1659.​[1293]​  The other two had probably enlisted in normal, peacetime conditions more recently.  At the June 1664 recall of British mariners, all five men, then, were already in service – all ignored the recall.  Within six months, these five men twice fought against their own country – at Cadiz and then at Lowestoft.  Apparently, they did not ask to be released – this was an option we saw in Chapter 2, in Figure 7.1 above and is detailed below – nor did they desert after the Cadiz battle – or the declaration of war.  Fighting against their own country was just a normal part of their job, if their employer happened to be at war with Britain.  This was even more so the case with the two oldest veterans: they almost certainly fought against the Commonwealth during the First Anglo-Dutch War.
At Lowestoft, the sixth Briton, Alexander Williamson (Orkney), was particularly unfortunate: he had joined Zwanenburg on 10 June – just three days before her destruction.​[1294]​  We might think that he was transferred aboard from another Dutch ship, but given the timing and his pay record, it is certain that he was a crewmember on the British Hamburg convoy (crammed with naval stores) that the Dutch fleet gobbled up off Dogger Bank shortly before the battle.  Downing reported that the Dutch took out the 160 crew of the escort Good Hope (hired merchantman, 34, Anthony Archer) and ‘dispersed them two into a ship so that they will make them fight for them’.​[1295]​  Their forced service is confirmed by a British informer in Holland.​[1296]​  Williamson, however, was willing – he was paid an advance of two months’ wages in hand on the day he joined Zwanenburg: this would not happen for a seaman transferred from another ship, whilst POWs were sometimes encouraged to enlist by offers of wage advances or cash bounties.​[1297]​
Thomas Webster was also captured aboard Good Hope: he and four other shipmates were put aboard the Rotterdam admiralty’s Prins Maurits (50).  Webster claimed to Downing that at Lowestoft the five men refused to fight – and that, in punishment, they were chained to the ensign staff for four hours.  It was then shot away; the men – incredibly, uninjured – were only unchained after Prins Maurits was fired.​[1298]​  This is a very lurid story: Webster may have exaggerated his ordeal to impress Downing – to secure financial support for his passage home.  On the whole though, few POWs seem to have enlisted – at least actually during the war itself.  After the peace was a different matter.






Jan Banckert was busy on routine convoy duty during 1664 – in Vissers Herder, before transferring his crew into the Flushing-based Delft in late June.  Still in Vissers Herder, recently returned from Lisbon, Banckert went twice to London, taking the next convoy (May) and transporting Ambassador Van Gogh from Scheveningen, arriving 20 June.​[1300]​  Banckert and De Hase (Wapen van Zeeland) cruised in the Channel later in 1664 and put in at Le Havre.​[1301]​  In early 1665 Delft took part in successive Zeeland sorties to the English east coast.​[1302]​  She was heavily damaged at Lowestoft: Banckert died later of his wounds, and at least five crew were killed outright and 16 wounded.​[1303]​  In August, now under Jan Matthijssen (Johan Evertsen’s old flag captain), Delft took an English ketch, but the prize money was not paid until six years later.​[1304]​  In 1666, Delft’s crew transferred to Vlissingen, forming the core of her complement.








As with some other ships here, most of the crew were already in service when the pay sources open, so we do not know exactly when they enlisted.  Two such British were petty officers early on, but took very different paths: the veteran James Kiddie (Kirkcaldy), who had served with Banckert (then in the old Tholen) as a seamen and been quickly promoted in 1658-9, was boatswain’s mate aboard Delft in May 1664.  He was paid off, however, only a few weeks later on 7 June.​[1308]​  He was not answering Charles II’s recall of mariners: Kiddie left three days before the recall was issued – and the ship may even have been at London (see above) when he was released, after at least six years’ service.  Initially, James Morgan (Stafford) was cook.  Morgan’s skills as a seaman were evidently more valued than his cooking: he transferred aboard the frigate Zeelandia (Jan P. Tant) as a prime seaman on 24 December 1664, before moving again with her new commander Sijmon Block into the former flagship Hof van Zeeland on 3 August 1665.  He was killed when she was burnt in 1666 (see below).​[1309]​  Other British served short-term early on: Ewart Johnson (Leith) was aboard in December 1664, but otherwise remains a mystery.​[1310]​
Other British crew served for longer.  These men were varied in their attitudes and experiences – both loyal, committed followers of particular officers as well as men who eventually deserted.  Peter Lenny (Canterbury) joined 10 November 1664, but he may have been already settled in Zeeland and in service elsewhere.​[1311]​  Otherwise, with war coming, work clearly took priority over going home to serve his king.  He was sick for almost a month in autumn 1665, during which time he was examined every day.​[1312]​  Even though he was an enemy subject, he was still well-looked after: enemy nationality made no difference to the medical treatment given to personnel.  We shall see this again.  Even though Lenny was married, he deserted sometime in late 1665 – and may have run from hospital.  William Thompson (Kirkcaldy) joined on 6 April 1665.   His enlistment at this time suggests it was due to the stringent embargo.  He also deserted in late 1665 – even though he was still owed just over two months’ wages – 30fl.  We cannot be certain, but the embargo was now off: better-paid work was now available for those willing to risk punishment for deserting.  It is even possible that he tried to go home.
In contrast, the seaman John Hay (Perth) seems to have been a personal follower of Jan Matthijssen.  Hay moved into Delft with Matthijssen when the latter took over the ship on 25 July 1665.  In 1666, when, Matthijssen took Delft’s crew into Vlissingen, Hay was promoted to officer cadet.​[1313]​  Despite their enemy status, other British personnel were on upward career trajectories at this time ​– but this is a notable leap for any foreigner.  His future progress, however, is unknown – he may have been killed in summer 1666.
The Irishman Thomas Hurd (Wexford) joined sometime after 17 July 1665.  As he was already married, and his wife was in Zeeland, he was probably already resident and had been working somewhere in the Zeeland maritime sector.  He also received special attention in payment that suggests that he was known and valued.​[1314]​  Hurd served the rest of the war with Matthijssen and was wounded twice in the right leg at the St James Day Fight.  He quickly recovered and rose from common seaman to serve as boatswain’s mate throughout the 1667 campaign.​[1315]​  In 1671, now schieman, Hurd was the only British crewmember from Delft who was still in service to receive his prize share from 1665.​[1316]​  His career was looking up.  We shall meet him again, during the Third Anglo-Dutch War, rising rapidly through the ranks (see Chapter 8).  

Wapen van Zeeland, Adriaan de Hase & Bastiaan Tuinman

De Hase transferred his crew from Schakerloo into Wapen van Zeeland (44), based at Veere, 1 August 1664.​[1317]​  Extra crew were drafted in from Veere (Adriaan Banckert).​[1318]​  Wapen van Zeeland was taken over by Bastiaan Tuinman in April 1665; she was captured in the retreat on the second day of Lowestoft, 14 June 1665.​[1319]​  The hand-to-hand fighting must have been particularly savage – or the ship battered mercilessly before boarding: perhaps only 39 of almost 180 men in her crew were taken alive.​[1320]​








Wapen van Zeeland was unusual in having a cluster of four foreigners amongst the warrant officers.  The French officer cadet Leonard Alix was the son of the Huguenot minister of Alençon in Orne (see Chapter 5).​[1322]​  Flight from religious persecution was more than ample motivation for migrating to Zeeland, but Calvinist motivation to fight an Anglican British regime is a stretch.  The other three officers were British.  The one-armed veteran of the First Anglo-Dutch War, Andrew Dougal (Wemys, see Chapters 2 and 6) was one of two navigators, and the gentleman surgeon Patrick Greeff/Grieve was almost certainly a Veere Scot of some standing.  We saw the Veere Scot Adrian Cunningham, officer cadet, son of the Scots Conservator, in Chapter 3.  They were joined by the seamen David Reed (Wemys) and Andrew Skeen (Shetland).  
The opening of the pay sources after the wholesale transfer to a new ship again means that most of the crew were already in service.​[1323]​  All the British were already serving, 1 August 1664.​[1324]​  Dougal, who was De Hase’s navigator in the early 1660s, was probably already with the same captain aboard Schakerloo before the transfer.  Cunningham possibly likewise, or drafted from Adriaan Banckert’s Veere: he was already Banckert’s cadet in January 1664 (see Chapter 3).  Reed and Skeen could have come into Wapen van Zeeland from either of these two ships.  Dougal and Cunningham, then, were professionals of some status long before the worsening of Anglo-Dutch relations by August 1664.  Reed may have enlisted not too long before then, but Skeen was already settled in the Veere community (see below).  Andrew Thomson (Anstruther) joined in September 1664.​[1325]​  Cunningham followed De Hase into Dordrecht.​[1326]​   
Reed perhaps had ideological reasons to fight the Stuart regime: he was eager enough to go ‘to sea in thee Staits servis against thee Englishes’.  This is inconclusive: does the specific use of ‘English’ really mean that much in the circumstances?  On the one hand, although in everyday Dutch usage, ‘English’ was generally applied instead of ‘British’, here a Scot (Reed) was closeted with a Veere Scot, his notary; in a Scots meeting, perhaps we should pay more attention to the language used – especially as Reed was more cultivated than most seamen, judging by his signature.​[1327]​  On the other hand, Reed seems to have forgotten that his king, Charles II, was the son of a born-Scot and King of Great Britain – not of England only – and that, in battle, he would also face Scots personnel aboard RN warships.​[1328]​  If ‘nation’ was not so important, perhaps he identified ‘English’ with Anglican suppression of Presbyterianism, but we need more evidence to be certain.
At any rate, with battle imminent, Reed was careful – in case of his absence or death – to authorise his Veere Scots landlady ‘Jannet Broun or her husband Peter Wilson’ to take what rent he owed and send the rest of his wages home to his mother in Scotland.  Reed was still connected with home, then, but had access to the Veere community: Alexander Christie, Skeen’s brother-in-law, drew up Reed’s power of attorney and witnessed it.  In petitioning for Reed’s arrears after Lowestoft, Wilson stressed that the money would give Reed ‘some comfort in such grievous and severe imprisonment’.​[1329]​  Reed’s subsequent fate is unknown.  Skeen, though, escaped and returned to Zeeland: he lived to fight another day – in the war of 1672-4.​[1330]​  Andrew Thomson was captured too.  Some 18 months later he was still languishing

‘kept in a filthy stink and pestilential imprisonment where most must endure sickness, hunger and thirst, treated not as Christians but as Turks’.​[1331]​

His fate, too, is unknown.  The surgeon Patrick Grieve was also captured.  Having survived the battle, he died in prison in England some time before 31 October 1665; his wife later compensated for his lost surgeon’s chest and medicines.​[1332]​  The fate of Grieve, who was effectively left to rot in prison, is in sharp contrast to that of the navigator Andrew Dougal, who seems to have been quickly exchanged.

We have now seen three of the smaller ships, but what about the largest?

The Lieutenant-Admirals: the flagships Hof van Zeeland & Walcheren, 1664-7









Most of the British had joined in September 1664.​[1334]​  In contrast to most of the men in this episode, half of the British aboard the flagship did not want to fight against their own country.  With war approaching in December, the Zeeland admiralty, after speaking with the flag captain Matthijssen, promptly authorised the release – despite the order to hold everyone in service – of at least five, possibly as many as nine ‘English’ seamen from service: they were ‘unwilling to remain in Dutch service, with war imminent, and have to fight against their own nation’.​[1335]​  One was Thomas Richards (London), who Matthijssen attested, was ‘shy’.​[1336]​  These men had ignored Charles II’s recall in June 1664; it was the obvious escalation towards war that made them decide to leave.  On top of these men, another Briton was released from service just two days after the formal Dutch declaration of war in January: yet another British gunnery specialist, John Jacobs ‘English’, gunner’s mate, had become ‘very shy’.​[1337]​  
If British personnel in other Zeeland warships were this vociferous in their reluctance, it is not recorded.  Perhaps the fact that they were on the flagship (where the crew was already discontent) lent more urgency to the issue, but their release does show that it was possible to get out of Dutch service with official sanction.  What happened to the men afterwards is unclear – at this stage it was extremely difficult to leave Zeeland – we have already seen (above and Chapter 2) that all outbound trade was shut down, so passage on expensive packet-boats was the only way home.
Other seamen in the flagship’s crew left any decision until later and deserted very soon after the formal Dutch declaration of war, 24 January 1665: the Bo’ness seamen Alexander Moody and Alexander Williamson, with Andrew Misseth (Orkney), risked serious punishment if caught.  Their decision to desert may have been motivated by the lure of prize money – privateering had just been permitted and was the only local alternative employment – but national loyalty, or at least fear of punishment if captured in Dutch service, are also very strong possibilities.  We just cannot be sure.​[1338]​  Whilst these three appear to have made rational choices, Nathaniel Jarrist (Sandwich) deserted for some reason on 27 December, when he could have left legally, with his comrades about the same time – without the risk of serious punishment if caught.​[1339]​  Those British released and deserted left behind at least five other British who fought at Lowestoft in June.

The career of the seaman Richard Kemp (London), one of Johan Evertsen’s personal followers, benefitted directly from the heavy damage suffered at Lowestoft: having performed extraordinary service as carpenter in the battle, he was immediately rewarded with promotion to carpenter’s mate – another Briton promoted during the war, despite being an enemy subject.  Kemp was arrested in January 1667 and interrogated three times before the Admiralty Council; he was tried 27 April aboard Walcheren.  The charge and verdict, however, are a mystery.​[1340]​  Recently, a couple of deserters had been executed aboard the flagship as examples to the squadron, but Kemp seems to have served until October 1667.

The Four Day’s Fight, June 1666

The Zeelanders played a full part in the battle: Lieutenant-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen de Oude was killed aboard Walcheren; his former flagship Hof van Zeeland was burnt and destroyed by incendiary shells.​[1341]​


Pieter Cornelisz van Soest, The Four Days’ Fight, detail.​[1342]​

About 190 men, including at least four British, were lost with Sijmon Block’s Hof van Zeeland.​[1343]​  Three had joined in early 1665, then under pressure of the embargo: the seamen Alexander Simmer (Aberdeen) and Gilbert Clifton (Orkney).  We have already seen British petty officers, but the migrant Matthew Stuart, born at Calais, was quickly promoted to gunner.  Jacob Morgan had joined from Delft (see above). 






Adriaan Banckert commanded the Veere-based Veere, Zeeridder (temporarily), and Tholen, 1664-6; he was in all three fleet actions.  The transfers between these ships are described below.  Banckert rose to the top Zeeland flag rank very rapidly, taking over the flagship Walcheren in August 1666.​[1345]​   Banckert’s crews during the 1640s contained very large British elements (see Chapter 6); we do not know if this made any impression on him.




British and Southern Netherlanders were by far the largest foreign groups; all the other principal groups were well below their average levels.  The British, always above their average level for the episode, were in parity with the Southern Netherlanders (themselves below average) before outstripping the latter in early 1665.  In the domination of British and Southern Netherlanders, the crew composition shares features with Wapen van Zeeland, also Veere-based.




British seamen enlisted quickly in the early summer of 1664: the Scots John Johnson, Andrew Smith (Dundee), John Day (Aberdeen), John Rams (Aberdeen) Thomas Qualeth (Leith), and the Veere Scot John Anderson.​[1348]​  All but one of these men served at least until summer 1666.  War was clearly brewing in the second half of 1664; like most of the British personnel elsewhere, the other five men do not seem to have been at all concerned about the prospect of fighting against their king and country: they could have asked for release from service – we have seen that British personnel were released even after the admiralties enforced long-term service in late 1664.  One of their shipmates, though, was released.  John Day enlisted 15 June 1664, at the very earliest stages of Veere’s preparations, one of only a handful of officers and men already aboard at that time.  Day ‘asked for his passport’ – i.e., for release – and was discharged 6 October (before the crews were locked in service).​[1349]​  Perhaps Day wanted to avoid the coming conflict, but we cannot be sure: there was other work still available.
Worsening Anglo-Dutch relations were clearly not a deterrent to the Britons’ service, but this was also the case with the men on the flagship who proved unwilling when it came to the crunch.  The precise thinking of Banckert’s men remains unclear: trade was still moving when they enlisted, but perhaps it was not easy to get work on merchantmen – the VOC ships had just returned, so maybe there was a temporary glut of labour.  Perhaps they were former VOC men – naval wages were better.  The need for work was most important – abundantly clear when David Costen (Dartmouth) enlisted in late December: the embargo on, the navy was the only option for a foreigner.

Winter sorties, Zeeridder & Veere, January-February 1665

Mirroring the ever-greater extension of naval operations into the dangerous winter months as our period wore on – though with smaller and handier warships – Banckert commanded a small squadron of four ships in early 1665, his flag in the frigate Zeeridder (36).​[1350]​  Downing thought he had gotten wind of Banckert’s intentions, as the latter ‘confessed to severall’ that his aim was to catch a small RN detachment known to be off the English north coast.​[1351]​  The operation instead achieved some success against English merchant shipping.  Banckert sailed at the beginning of January 1665 and had returned to Dutch waters by the 10th.  This, Banckert’s first winter sortie, was made at the same time as a small homebound VOC squadron returned northabout Scotland; the latter suffered heavily from cold and storms.​[1352]​  Banckert’s crews certainly did not suffer as badly as the Indiamen; being in the lower latitudes and away from the North Atlantic; they had also just been paid, especially so they could buy extra clothes for the cruise – another sign of good employment conditions in Zeeland.​[1353]​  On 5 January Banckert’s squadron caught eight English merchantmen against the shore near Flamborough Head, taking five.  The Zeelanders were then themselves hotly pursued by eight or nine large British warships.  Escaping homeward, they lost one of the prizes on the Schouwen banks.​[1354]​  The others arrived at Flushing on 10 and 12 January.​[1355]​  Downing confirmed the return of Banckert’s ships – each with a small prize laden with ‘coales and salt and such like grosse ware for London’.  Other Zeeland warships may have brought in ‘two or three’ English and Scots merchant prizes before Banckert’s return.​[1356]​
Banckert moved back into the larger Veere and his small squadron sortied from the Wielings again on or before 20 January, again thought to be attempting to intercept detached RN warships.​[1357]​  The Dutch were confident that the Banckert would ‘do some notable exploit’; he quickly returned, but only after searching neutral shipping in the Downs – ‘one cannot admire his boldness enough’.​[1358]​  He sortied yet again on 5 February in much greater strength; with 12 or 13 warships.  Otherwise, the British were kept in the dark by increased Dutch security through the issue of secret orders until Banckert was ‘very ill treated’ by a storm north of Dogger Bank on the 9th; one ship was dismasted and ordered home under tow, arriving 12 February.  Most of the rest of the squadron returned around 17-20 February.​[1359]​


Veere, Willem van de Velde the elder

The six British seamen were all with Banckert during the three short cruises.  Figure 7.10 above shows that the crew composition was virtually unchanged from the first period of service aboard Veere (up to December 1664).  The prizes were sold quickly, but the first instalment of the prize money was not paid until over a year later, in April 1666.  The seamen got just over 3fl each – a welcome benefit, but hardly spectacular.  In contrast, Banckert’s share was almost 40fl; the Lieutenant-Admiral’s 105fl.​[1360]​

Lowestoft & transfer into Tholen, 1665; Four Days’ Fight, 1666

The prisoners were kept for exchange, but the pool of available British personnel was expanding under the increasingly effective embargo.  By March 1665, four more Scots had enlisted: in Figure 7.10 the British were now the largest foreign group in the crew by some distance.  David Drompel senior and junior (both Leith), father and son, were joined by Anthony Anderson (Leith) and William George (Musselburgh).  The Drompels were probably established merchant sailors (see Chapter 3).
Three of Veere’s crew were killed outright on the first day of the battle of Lowestoft.  Nine were wounded.​[1361]​  Anthony Anderson’s leg was ‘shot to pieces’ – or in the more accurate testimony of Kakelaer, the State surgeon at Veere, Anderson suffered ‘a severe compound fracture’.  Kakelaer brought Anderson away from the Texel with many other wounded on 20 June.  Back at Veere he was treated by two more local experts – examined 68 times over 80 days by Dr Abraham de Koninck and also treated by the surgeon Johan van Gelcken.  As a crippled seaman, Anderson received 172fl for his injury – over 14 months’ peacetime wages – a few months later on 14 October.  By that time his treatment had finished and he was well enough to collect the payment himself.  His petition had doubly spelt out his origin, so that there could have been no doubt that he was an enemy subject: Anderson was ‘from Leith in Scotland’.  As we have seen with the crippled pensioners in Chapter 3, the fact that Anderson was a foreigner – yet alone an enemy – made no difference whatsoever to either the medical care lavished on him, or to his chances of receiving the proper compensation for his crippling wound.​[1362]​  He was treated normally, just like any other naval seaman.
Banckert was at sea again 10 days after Lowestoft: he sailed from the Texel on 23 June with a large squadron of 17 smaller warships (from various admiralties), excluding light craft, but accomplished little.​[1363]​  The Scot William George was discharged on Banckert’s return to the Texel, 6 July 1665.  George was somewhat less-skilled than an able seaman – perhaps the reason for his release, but the circumstances are a mystery.​[1364]​  
The British group was replenished soon after.  We saw the seaman George Morris (Leith) in Chapter 4.  Morris came aboard Veere on 10 August in a group of 23 seamen with Crijnssen (as flag captain) from the three-masted yacht Prins te Paard.  Morris had originally enlisted abroad – he joined Prins te Paard (under the then commander Adriaan Thijssen) at La Rochelle, 22 January 1665, where the ship had just arrived.​[1365]​  What Morris was doing at La Rochelle is unknown – he may have been on one of the many Dutch merchantmen being convoyed home, but Dutch naval wages were lower than in trade.  Perhaps he was in France for other reasons.  Even before joining Banckert, Morris had already had one of the most exciting times in his short career, getting a taste of no less than four prizes.​[1366]​  This was only the start of an intense career.
In winter 1665/6 Banckert moved his flag into the brand-new Tholen (60).  Veere’s crew were simply transferred – it was not voluntary:  the men were – as we saw in Chapter 2 – to all intents locked in service.  The British group was not only the largest foreign element in the crew – they were starting to get promotion and ranking positions.  When one of the three quartermasters died at the end of November 1665, Thomas Qualeth was promoted in his place.​[1367]​  Being an enemy subject was no barrier to promotion.  From 1 March 1666 the status and reputation of the British crew must have been enhanced by the addition of an experienced British warrant officer – the one-armed Scots navigator Andrew Dougal,​[1368]​ formerly Wapen van Zeeland’s navigator, captured at Lowestoft.  The embargo was back on, which probably accounted for the enlistment of Oliver Reed (Orkney) in early 1666.  By May 1666 the British group was pushing 6% of Tholen’s crew.  In the thick of the fighting at the Four Days’ Fight in June 1666 (see image above), there were 23 wounded, including both Qualeth and Johnson, though neither’s wound seems serious and they were in action again within a few weeks.​[1369]​  Desertion in Banckert’s crew during 1664-6 was negligible, which suggests his ships were ‘happy’ ones.

The loss of Tholen at the St James Day Fight, 4-5 August 1666

Banckert’s crew came through the various fortunes of defeat at Lowestoft and victory at the Four Days’ Fight relatively lightly.  That luck ended abruptly and disastrously at the St James Day Fight in August 1666.  Johan Evertsen commanded the Dutch van squadron; composed of the Zeeland and Friesland ships.​[1370]​  After a couple of hours’ heavy gunnery exchange with the White squadron under Sir Thomas Allin in the British van, Evertsen lost a leg early in the afternoon of the first day – the flagship Walcheren then collided with and ran afoul of five other ships.  Thereupon the Dutch van was quickly put to flight, with Sir Thomas Allin at the head of the British pursuit into the night.  Evertsen died early the following morning.  Banckert’s Tholen was very severely damaged during the first day and shipping water.​[1371]​  


De Tweedaagse Zeeslag (P. J. Schotel, 1808-1865)​[1372]​

The slowest of the new Zeeland capital ships in any case,​[1373]​ she fell astern of the retreating Dutch during the night, and was certain to share the fate of Sneek (66, Friesland Admiralty) – which Allin had just taken and burnt.  Tholen had 296 men aboard (123 were soldiers and marines).​[1374]​  Amid what must have been desperate scenes, Banckert and 78 crew escaped in the ship’s boats; getting away with little time to spare as Allin came up.  The rest of Tholen’s crew were left behind.​[1375]​
At present, we can only imagine the situation in those last minutes, but there seems to have been some unpleasant scenes aboard after Banckert made his decision to leave.  One of the two quartermasters left behind and made prisoner claimed to his British captors very soon afterwards that he had struck Banckert on the shoulder with a hand spike as the Vice-Admiral went over the side into the boats – ‘upbraiding [Banckert] for leaving of them at such a time’ – the blow propelling Banckert either into a boat lying alongside or straight into the water.​[1376]​  Whatever the truth of the claim, Banckert’s 78 escapees included his son and a number of the officers.  Amongst the lucky ones were the master, surgeon, the schieman, two boatswain’s mates, two gunner’s mates, armourer, one of the quartermasters, and the carpenter and his mate.  The steward’s mate, cook’s mate, and cooper were also spared death or imprisonment.
Banckert succeeded in shifting his flag to his old ship Veere (Adriaan de Hase) whilst Allin caught and boarded the unfortunate Tholen.  50 of her crew were killed ‘outright’ and 50 wounded before she struck and was taken.​[1377]​  Dougal, the one-armed veteran navigator, the Englishman Costen and the Scots Reed and Drompel senior were all killed.  Rams was thought to have been killed also, though he and Drompel junior were taken prisoner.​[1378]​  Allin did not have enough men to spare anyone for prize crews; he was forced to burn his prizes – being ‘still on the chase and should have unmanned our owne ships to carry them in’.​[1379]​  The surviving members of Tholen’s crew were taken off; the prisoners were found to be ‘as stout, sturdy and able as if they had been culled’; they were also absolutely terrified that they would be butchered on landing in England.​[1380]​  At about midnight Tholen was burnt; she blew up and was ‘sent to the bottom’.​[1381]​
Despite the heavy casualties amongst the British group, the long-serving hardcore was not annihilated with the rest.  The lone quartermaster to escape was in fact Thomas Qualeth.  Smith, John Johnson and Morris were with him; Morris was hit in the backside.​[1382]​  There was clearly confused fighting in the dark: 18 British prisoners (possibly boat crews) were taken and put aboard Veere.​[1383]​  
In Figure 7.10 above (August 1666) these five Scots formed an even greater proportion of Banckert’s remaining men than they had previously.  How chaotic were the scenes aboard Tholen in the last minutes as Allin came up?  How were the lucky ones chosen for escape in the boat parties?  Why were the Scots included?  We might easily imagine the extra bitterness and anger of the quartermaster who lashed out at Banckert when a Scot of the same rank was given a chance of escape and he was not.  Did Banckert consider the Scots’ possible fate as traitors to their sovereign if they were captured – and include them out of pity?  That might be unlikely, as he must have been aware that Dougal had been previously captured and later exchanged; Banckert himself, however, had been taken prisoner at Scheveningen/Ter Heide in 1653 and may have known more.  Did he think the Scots indispensable, perhaps as favourite boatmen or bodyguards – or amongst the most disciplined or enthusiastic of his warriors?  If the latter, the Scots may have been ideologically-motivated, but we have no proof.  Was there any choice at all – was their inclusion just sheer blind luck?
Despite Clifford’s report of Banckert’s escape, miss-intelligence from captured Dutch fishermen caused Rupert and the Duke of Albemarle to request the Duke of York to have the prisoners from Tholen ‘searched diligently’ in case the British had already unwittingly captured Banckert and the admiral was still amongst the prisoners in disguise.​[1384]​  The search seems to have failed to uncover the British prisoners (see Chapter 2).  According to a British informant at Middelburg writing a day earlier, Banckert and the remnant of his crew were still aboard Veere five days after the battle on 9 August: having been 

‘him selfe saived and severall of his men [, they were] now aboard of Captain De Hase wher the Admirals Flage of Sealandt is sett up.’​[1385]​  

The 46 of Tholen’s crew aboard Veere remained with her until 21 August, when Banckert moved his flag into Walcheren.  He simply ‘inherited’ the Lieutenant-Admiral’s crew along with the flagship.  Tholen’s survivors were given the choice of serving on any Veere-based warship;​[1386]​ only four of the survivors served with Banckert again for any length of time – the others scattered, to serve throughout the Zeeland squadron.
All 78 escapees from Tholen were mustered at Veere on 24 August; their arrears were paid up to 30 May 1666.​[1387]​  Arrangements were made for those few who were so badly wounded that they were unable to attend.  George Morris’ wound in the backside went septic within three days, so that he suffered ‘a great mortification of the bottom’.  Dr De Koninck examined him 60 times at Veere from 17 August 1666.​[1388]​  Morris’ strong bond with his admiral is emphasised in the wake of his escape: he was still recovering from the wound that October.  Petitioning for the remaining two months’ of his arrears (up to the loss of Tholen), Morris stressed that he needed the payment so that he could get back to sea with Banckert.  He was paid in full.​[1389]​  In contrast, the wives of the British dead may have lost more than their men: their husbands’ wage arrears were wiped out by debt – the slaapvrouw Nelken Poole collected the arrears of Costen, Reed, Rams and David Drompel senior – instead of their widows – and may have pocketed the lot.​[1390]​  There was a happy ending for one, though – John Rams had not been killed – the report had been false; he returned from prison after the war.

The remnants of Banckert’s crew after August 1666

As for the British in Banckert’s old crew, John Johnson stayed aboard Veere – where there were also British personnel.  He served into the peace, at least until 23 October 1667.​[1391]​  
Andrew Smith stayed aboard Walcheren until October 1666, but is then a mystery until joining Prins te Paard after her return to Europe, 13 September 1667 – he did not go on the expedition.  Smith was a victim of peace: naval labour demand had crashed; what ships remained in service had their complements reduced.  Smith was paid off that December.​[1392]​
Morris served in home waters aboard Goes and then Dordrecht until September 1667, adding two more prizes to the four he had already helped to take.  His was one of the most lucrative careers of any Briton in Zeeland warships.  Morris moved back into his first ship Prins te Paard on 4 October, and was still in Zeeland service, now settled and married, well after the peace in 1669.​[1393]​  
Qualeth remained aboard the flagship as quartermaster for a few weeks until 15 October 1666.  The following day he transferred aboard Zeeridder (De Mauregnault) for winter service,​[1394]​  then assigned to Crijnssen’s expedition.  Qualeth is very unusual indeed: he was not rated as quartermaster during his service on Zeeridder before or during the expedition, but continued to draw the quartermaster’s rate of 17fl.​[1395]​  No other seaman was paid more than 15fl, the highest seamen’s rate paid by the Zeeland admiralty during the war.  We can only conclude that Banckert especially valued Qualeth’s skills and loyalty – and specially recommended him to De Mauregnault.  Returning to Europe, the British took Zeeridder, 3 September 1667, but this was the end of the war and the prisoners were quickly released: Qualeth joined Prins te Paard, 22 September.​[1396]​  On 7 February 1668 Qualeth received his 72fl prize money from Crijnssen’s expedition:​[1397]​ about five months’ wages for a quartermaster in peacetime, a considerable amount with which he could have set himself up.  He was a professional though, serving into 1669.​[1398]​

Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge, Utrecht & Zierikzee, 1664-7


Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge.​[1399]​

Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge, in Flushing-based ships, fought at all three fleet actions 1665-6.  First in Utrecht, 36 were wounded at Lowestoft.  In the partially-rebuilt Zierikzee by 1666, he was heavily engaged again at the Four Days’ Fight, with 28 wounded; 14 were wounded at the St James Day Fight.​[1400]​  Evertsen, with Isaac Sweers, took and burnt Charles Merchant (54, 220 men), off Boulogne, 11 September 1666.​[1401]​




Two non-European sailors were aboard: a Bengalese and the black sailor Adriaan Christiaanssen.​[1403]​  If the overall level of foreigners was not spectacular, Figure 7.13 below shows that foreigners serving with Evertsen were actually much more likely than Dutch personnel to get promoted or find ranking position.  Not for the first time, foreigners dominated the crucial functions of sailing and gunnery – the boatswain’s grades, whilst all three gunners were foreigners.  The boatswain’s mate and the second of two armourers were Norwegian; the third gunner, master-at-arms, and (less dramatically) the cook’s mate were Southern Netherlanders.  What drove the proportion of foreign petty officers up, though, was a hardcore of British professionals. 








Because most already held high ranks in 1664, the men had probably already served at least some time to get to those positions.  This was indeed the case: the hardcore were already veteran members of Evertsen’s pre-war crew in Delft, in continuous service in the Channel, Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1659-1664, and were firmly Evertsen’s ‘followers’.​[1406]​  Charles, Swain, the two Thomsons, and Alanson all came aboard the same day as Evertsen, 19 July 1664.​[1407]​  We know for certain that all, apart from Alanson, had served with Evertsen from at least as early as 1658, when they held the same ranks, except David Thomson, who was then gunners mate.​[1408]​  The four senior men, then, had already served for at least six years.  Two though, were veterans of the First Anglo-Dutch War: Swain had served since at least summer 1653 – as seaman with Adriaan Banckert (Hollandia) and was almost certainly taken prisoner when she was sunk at Scheveningen.​[1409]​  Peter Thomson had served as early as 1650.​[1410]​
 
Their long careers emphasise their permanent settlement, but three of the men were also married, with wives in Zeeland: Swain and Peter Thomson were certainly married by October 1665.​[1411]​  Charles, married with a child by June 1665, had settled in Zeeland ‘many years’ before: he had certainly already served with Evertsen for a long time, possibly since 1651-2.​[1412]​  The veterans did not come through the war unscathed: Charles was killed outright (doodgeschoten) at Lowestoft.  The 36 wounded including Peter Thomson – wounded in the chest and leg.​[1413]​  He was, however, soon back aboard.  At St James Day the gunners lost a good deal of their own specialist equipment ​[1414]​  Swain and the two Thomsons served with Evertsen throughout the war.  The gunner’s mate Alanson was eventually transferred to Gillis Gheleijn’s ship (unknown) in January 1667.​[1415]​  Another Briton, Samuel Clinton, was junior surgeon/surgeon for six months in 1666, released in December.​[1416]​  He is otherwise a mystery.
The rest of the British group were a varied bunch.  Like Alanson, John Williamson (Dysart) was probably another veteran: he was already in service before Evertsen and the British NCOs arrived in mid-July 1664.  Dutch restrictions on trade were responsible for the new enlisters in winter 1664/5, producing one very unusual case.  John Kelly, a Kirkcaldy merchant master, enlisted for some time as a mere common seaman in 1664 while his cargo was seized as contraband naval supplies.​[1417]​  The Irishman Thomas Magnus (Waterford) joined 17 February 1665, probably constrained by the embargo.  He deserted soon after Lowestoft, on 11 July.  More British crew joined in early 1667, all fresh men: John Higgins (London), Thomas Christopher (Bermudas), Alexander Glynn (Linlithgow) and John Ward (Leith).​[1418]​  These extra men made the British the joint largest foreign group in the crew, when they were enemy subjects.  Where did these men come from?  There was no general trade embargo – only the whale fishery was completely stopped – but in Chapter 2 we saw the 1667 ‘fourth man’ levy from trade.  They may have been POWs who had been persuaded to serve, but do not yet appear in the Zeeland lists.  Alternatively they were some of the large numbers of RN deserters that Pepys noted ‘running over to the Dutch’ in 1667 (see Chapter 1).  
After the Medway raid, Evertsen cruised in the southern North Sea and Channel.​[1419]​  After the peace he again commanded Delft: the seaman John Charles (Newcastle) served from December 1667 until the following August.  This man is not to be confused with the Falmouth navigator of the same name, though like him, the Newcastle man had been settled in Zeeland for some time and had family there.​[1420]​  Where Charles had been during the war, though, is unknown.  

Abraham Crijnssen: the Surinam Expedition, 1666-7







Pieter de Mauregnault/Rochus Bastaert	Zeeridder 	Frigate	112	34
Sijmon Loncke	Westcappel 	Frigate	69	24
Salomon le Sage	Prins te Paard	Three-masted yacht	48	16
Abraham Trouwers/Jan Adriaanssen	Aardenburg	Flyboat (hired); victualler	17	12
Rochus Bastaert/Frans Rooijs	Westersouburg 	Advice yacht/hooker	14	6
Hayman Adriaensen(Claas Reijnierssen)	[Tijdverdrijf?]	Snow (lost in Biscay)	?	?
				
Reinforcements sent January 1667:





Crijnssen went first to West Africa, taking two prizes and touching at Cayenne,​[1424]​ before arriving at Paramaribo, Surinam, 26 February 1667.  The Zeelanders anchored a league below Fort Willoughby, taking another prize the following day.  The colonial forces quickly surrendered (6 March).  By the articles of surrender signed aboard Zeelandia on 16 March, no oath of loyalty was required from the English population – whose property rights were confirmed – but they were 

‘to be faithful to the States of Zealand […] and in case the King of England shall attack it, to keep quiet and give no assistance, but to fight against all other enemies.’  

Nonetheless, after the surrender of 6 March, ‘some of the English enlisted with [the Dutch] and promised to show them every corner of the country’.​[1425]​  As well as joining the Dutch occupying forces, some probably joined Crijnssen’s squadron.​[1426]​




British personnel, including – again – some petty officers, dominated the foreign contingent and were in the expedition before it left Europe – especially aboard Crijnssen’s flagship Zeelandia.  The Flushing Briton Henry Graham (see Delft above) volunteered, transferring from Vlissingen.​[1428]​  On 12 November 1666, eight of Charles II’s American subjects (all born in New England) enlisted – a strange coincidence, if the expedition was still secret.  At least six were Amerindians, who may have wanted just to go home.  The two other New Englanders were probably white: they were not listed as Amerindians or black.  All eight were all prime seamen; previously, they may have been POWs from America merchantmen (many prizes were taken by Zeeland privateers), or even already in Dutch service with the WIC.  Their fates were miserable, though.  Six of the New Englanders died – five in March 1667, soon after arrival at Surinam (which suggests the Amerindians were more susceptible to tropical disease) the other in April.  Only one may have returned to Zeeland.​[1429]​  The multi-racial character of the crew was expanded on arrival at Surinam: one of at least six black personnel serving with the expedition enlisted there: Anthony ‘the black’ survived to receive his prize money in Zeeland.​[1430]​
After the surrender of Surinam, the flyboat Aardenburg was sent home full of sugar; Westcappel was left off the Surinam River to wait for English slavers: she took York with 270 slaves and 1000lbs of ivory, before arriving home in October 1667.  A primary aspect of this study is that finding work was the foremost factor in foreign seamen’s service – brought to an extreme level by the example of the British in Dutch service during the Anglo-Dutch Wars.  The capture of York opens another, much more shocking, perspective: five black personnel (three prime seamen and two boys) were in Westcappel’s crew when she took the slaver.  We have no idea what they thought about the situation.  Nonetheless, all five returned to Europe; four asked to be released from service in October 1667 – before the payment of the prize money.  They promptly sold their passports and must have quickly found other work, as their captain (Loncke) received their prize money.​[1431]​
There were also British crew already aboard before Westcappel left Zeeland – the veteran Robert Spens (Kirkcaldy) was gunner’s mate.​[1432]​  This was at least the second time he had been to South America, having been to Brazil 21 years earlier.  Spens, previously boatswain, had changed specialism – which the adaptable old hand was do again in the future (see Chapters 6 and 8).  Spens asked for release a few weeks after returning from his adventure, 13 October, but – true to his professionalism – was probably back at sea in December, when his wife (doubtlessly well-pleased) picked up his 68fl prize money.  The seaman Robert Monk (London) was also already in the crew in late 1666, later spending 17 days on the prize.  In contrast to Spens, Monk stayed with Westcappel well after her return to Zeeland, until 3 December.  That was long enough for him: he asked for release and was discharged.  By any standards Monk had had a very successful voyage, but even the prize money did not go far.  He probably had accumulated debts by this time, perhaps during the voyage or living the high life ashore, as he sold his passport and made over his prize money – 57fl, almost five months’ wages – to his attorney, Westcappel’s clerk.​[1433]​

Meanwhile, on 27 March Crijnssen rendezvoused off Paramaribo with the reinforcements from Zeeland; he sent Keuvelaar’s Vissers Herder to Berbice.​[1434]​  John Williamson (Leith) was her gunner.​[1435]​  Having served on the Zeeland flagships from early 1665 (see above), Williamson volunteered for the expedition.  Vissers Herder rejoining the squadron off Berbice, 20 April; Crijnssen left for Tobago, finding it deserted, 26 April.  Another Flushing Briton, Domenic Singleton, was gunner aboard Zeelandia.  He was transferred ashore at Tobago as gunner in the new garrison on 30 April.​[1436]​  Singleton later returned to Zeeland and was promoted to warrant officer – junior navigator (derde waak) – in the Third Anglo-Dutch War (see Chapter 8).  
Crijnssen left Tobago on 4 May; British were amongst the numbers of foreigners that joined during the course of the expedition – at Surinam and Martinique (8 May), but principally at Guadeloupe (16 May) and St Kitts.  The Zeelanders joined with French forces at Martinique but the combined squadron was defeated (20 May) by Berry’s heavily-armed British squadron off Nevis.​[1437]​  Despite the presence of the British squadron, at St Kitts, Charles Carty (Ireland) and the Englishman Thomas Holland enlisted on Vissers Herder.​[1438]​  Why did they do so?  Whatever their motivation, their decision paid off – the Zeelanders arrived at the Chesapeake in June, earning them both prize money.
 
Conventionally, the success was achieved by deception and surprise: Crijnssen was guided up the James ‘by one of his hostage vessels’ taken off the Chesapeake.  The Zeeland squadron flew British colours, whilst the crew not only called out the soundings in English but also hailed the British ships in the same language.  These factors enabled the Zeelanders to get to close range and achieve total surprise.​[1439]​  The British we have already seen would have added authenticity to the deception – even if other crew participated – but one was key to the operation.  Enter the English navigator Josiah Wilkinson.  Wilkinson had earlier joined the flagship Zeelandia from Aardenburg.​[1440]​  The Zeelanders had no or minimal local knowledge – it was Wilkinson who took them up the James, where they otherwise would have achieved little.  Even with the glory heaped on Crijnssen after returning, the commander wanted to reward Wilkinson quickly.  Crijnssen personally petitioned the Zeeland admiralty on his behalf:  Wilkinson, his ‘English navigator’, he emphasised 

‘has done very great services for the squadron, and brought the same into the river [James] where the prizes were taken, without which service it would have been very difficult to achieve any exploit’  

Wilkinson was to be awarded an additional 200 rixdalers (480fl) directly from the proceeds of the prizes.​[1441]​  That was well over a year’s wages for a navigator – and on top of his regular share of 126fl prize money he would receive in December 1667.​[1442]​  He was not rich, but 600fl (£54) could have ‘set him up’.




















In this chapter we mostly look at three years’ of wartime, 1672-4.  The micro-case studies include all three flag officers and Evertsen the Youngest’s Atlantic expedition. The ships are mostly capital ships: six – two of which were based at Veere.  There were often great differences between these warships’ crews, but also similarities.
In contrast to the previous war, where crews were retained during winter, we saw in Chapter 2 that short-term service was continued into wartime from 1672 and men were released at the end of the campaigning season.  As a result, the composition of the crews 1672-4 largely changed annually as more men left after a campaign than reenlisted, so that there was a high rate of crew turnover (i.e. replacement, rather than the British term meaning use of drafts).​[1447]​
As in Chapter 7, British personnel served aboard Zeeland warships right through the thick of Anglo-Dutch conflict.  We are still hindered by the lack of other sources from determining men’s previous employment, precise enlistment circumstances and motivation, but, nonetheless, we can track a large number of British personnel: they served for a variety of terms – sometimes just a few days, sometimes for years.
Initial study of POWs points directly to French prisoners volunteering.​[1448]​  This part of the research is only at early stages for this episode, so study of the recruitment of British POWs has not been possible.  We will see foreigners’ career prospects for promotion, and two examples of long-serving British professionals.

Zeeland operations, manpower shortages & labour demand

After a pre-emptive strike on the homebound Smyrna convoy, Charles II declared war on the Dutch Republic 17/27 March, Louis XIV on 27 March/6 April, quickly followed by Cologne and Münster.  The war subsequently expanded: Brandenburg and the Emperor came in on the Dutch side in 1672 followed by Spain in 1673.  A separate Anglo-Dutch peace was made at Westminster in February 1674, leaving the French alone before Sweden joined them in 1675.  Ultimately, Britain was forced out of the war by the Anglo-French failure in four attempts to achieve a victory over the Dutch battle fleet, combined with the economic damage caused by Dutch privateering, and domestic political opposition to the war.  We are mainly concerned with the Third Anglo-Dutch War proper, but the 1674 campaign will also come into the micro-case studies.​[1449]​  The Zeelanders took part in every major operation, 1672-4.

Summary of major naval operations, 1672-4
Smyrna convoy	13/23 March 1672	
Battle of Solebay	28 May/7 June 1672	
Atlantic (Surinam, Caribbean, North America) 	December 1672-4	Zeeland & Amsterdam admiralties only
First Battle of Schooneveld(Schooneveld I)	28 May/7 June 1673	
Second Battle of Schooneveld(Schooneveld II)	4/14 June 1673	
Battle of the Texel/Kijkduin	11/21 August 1673	
		
Biscay (Belle Isle & Noirmoutiers)	June-July 1674	
Martinique	July 1674	

In the action that opened the war, the Smyrna convoy fight, the Zeelander De Hase was commodore of the five-warship escort; three were Zeelanders.​[1450]​
With the rival fleets approaching readiness and the Dutch looking to concentrate their scattered contingents, De Ruyter left the Texel on 29 April, but was not joined by Banckert with six ships until 2/12 May – if they had concentrated earlier the Dutch fleet could have engaged the British before they left the Nore and before the French joined.​[1451]​  A potentially war-winning opportunity was therefore lost, but the Zeeland squadron’s delay was not caused by manning problems: the Zeeland States had ordered Banckert not to move unless he knew De Ruyter was actually at sea.  Despite the setback, on 14/24 May four Zeelanders were in Van Ghent’s strong detached squadron including 15 major warships that chased Coleman’s small British squadron of six up the Thames estuary.  They got as far up as Sheerness before calling off the chase; Evertsen in the van.​[1452]​
In early 1672 the British received reports that Dutch capital ships were short of men because the seamen thought that in battle the British concentrated fire on the large ships – these were the ‘hottest’.​[1453]​  Whatever the truth of that, manpower shortages are evidence of the crucial need for foreign labour; shortages in Zeeland did actually reduce the number of operational warships – rather more serious effects than Bruijn maintained.  Those ships with the most incomplete crews were stripped or further reduced to make up the crews of those less short of men.  Foreigners, naturally, are also found in these drafts.
In contrast to the previous war, Zeeland manpower was a severe problem right from the start: before Solebay, Banckert’s flagship Walcheren had to be made up from the two-decker Domburg and the frigate Vissers Herder; similarly Rear-Admiral Matthijssen’s Oranje from Vissers Herder and another frigate, Schakerloo.​[1454]​  A number of important capital ships could not be manned sufficiently and were unavailable for Solebay: Gekroonde Burg (60), Domburg (60) and Dordrecht (50) were all missing.​[1455]​ 
In 1673 another three Zeeland capital ships were not operational for any of the three great fleet actions because of manpower shortages – including two of the Zeelanders’ principal warships: Oranje (70), Gekroonde Burg (60), as well as Middelburg (50).  A fourth, Dordrecht (50), missed the two battles at Schooneveld in June but fought at the Texel in August.  In 1673 Banckert’s Walcheren is said to have been completed by stripping three frigates.​[1456]​  This does not seem to be the case.  A number of men were certainly taken from his son’s frigate Delft and other ships were indeed stripped, but they were two-deckers and their men were widely-spread.  Rear-Admiral Matthijssen’s big new two-decker Gekroonde Burg was stripped as early as late March – indicating the seriousness of the situation.  Those men transferred aboard Walcheren included the Englishman Peter Francis.​[1457]​  Some of the Rear-Admiral’s men were drafted to the Vice-Admiral, Evertsen (made up to strength by additional drafts from Utrecht and Vlissingen), others to the frigate Goes.​[1458]​  On the very day of Schooneveld I, the two-decker Middelburg’s crew – included her Scots quartermaster, John Campbell – was divided amongst unspecified warships.​[1459]​  Van Cruyningen’s new two-decker Oranje was likewise split – two separate drafts to Goes: the first including one of her carpenters, the Scot George Dawson; the second included four Scots and a few other foreigners.  Other crew went to the old two-deckers Veere and Dordrecht.  The covering payroll is exceptional – in referring in any way whatsoever to the number of ‘foreigners’ (vremdelijngen) – not once but twice (heading and summary).  The mention is bizarre: foreign crew do not seem to have been even commented on for many years.  The total concentration of foreigners aboard Oranje is unknown, but that of enemy British subjects was indeed very heavy and these were clearly the dominant group in spring 1673 (see Veere section below).​[1460]​  However, as very high levels were also reached the previous year without such consequence, this is unlikely to be the reason for the decision to split Oranje’s crew – probably, she was simply too far below her complement compared with other ships, but we can wonder why these were not drafted in.​[1461]​ 
Besides the failure to utilise vital warship assets, the manning situation in summer 1673 was so desperate that a small number of seamen were paid enormous wages ‘for one voyage only’ (meaning one month) – at 30fl: twice the normal wartime rate.​[1462]​

Overview of British personnel, 1672-4

As at the outbreak of the previous war, British intelligence recognised their seamen’s peacetime Dutch service: shortly after the Smyrna convoy action, it was noted the Dutch ‘have many [English] in their service, so that a great number were in this Straits fleet’.​[1463]​  This referred to the Dutch merchantmen, but there were certainly British personnel aboard all three Zeeland escorts – which were manned many months before the outbreak of war.  We saw in Chapters 5 and 7 that a number of British continued to enter and to serve well after the peace into 1669, and that an absolute minimum of 19 veterans from peacetime 1667-70 served in 1672: there was at least some continuity of service during the transition from peace to war in 1672.  Some of these veterans are discussed below, though it is not clear if every one served all through peacetime.  Many more entering during the increased demand in 1671 have not been classed as veterans here.  Some veterans disappear completely in the interim: Van Cruyningen captured John Melvin aboard Hamilton’s Scots privateer in April 1667, but we lose track of him until he appears in the Dutch captain’s crew in early April 1672.​[1464]​
The fates of 266 British personnel serving during the Third Anglo-Dutch War are shown in Figure 8.1 below.​[1465]​  Some 192 men served in the short time thereafter until the end of 1674.  Whilst some of the 1672 men had already served in Zeeland warships, most were probably entirely new recruits.  Relatively few men were already on the retainer loopgeld in early 1672: most men probably came in afterwards via the embargo and seizures of British shipping, but the loopgeld figure does not put the issue beyond doubt – old hands could have tried to ‘stick it out’ rather than enlist early.​[1466]​  


Reflecting the reduced Zeeland warship losses compared with 1664-7 – only one major Zeeland warship was captured, none were sunk, 1672-4 – casualties were far fewer (3%): accidental and natural deaths exceeding battle casualties.   Deserters were also much reduced (4%).  This may be a result of re-introduced short-term service and the possibility of release, but further investigation and comparison with other personnel are clearly needed – especially while so many remain ‘unknown’.  The 24% who stayed in service post-Westminster are also a minimum: we also saw in Chapter 5 that one-third of those that did so were warrant- or petty officers.
As usual, very few warrant officers were foreigners of any kind, but the British were prominent at this small scale: during 1672-4 at least seven were warrant officers, including four navigators and two masters.  Two veterans were born into the British community in Flushing: in 1673 Domenic Singleton, (Surinam expedition, see Chapter 7), was promoted to derde waak (junior navigator) aboard Domburg, then to navigator by the end of the campaign.​[1467]​  Another, the master Henry Graham, is mentioned below.  The majority of this group, however, were British-born; one was even second captain aboard Gekroonde Burg for the post-Westminster 1674 campaign: Thomas Trantel (Yarmouth).  John Johnson (Glasgow) was Dordrecht’s navigator the same year.​[1468]​
Continuing the existing trend, of at least 19 British petty officers, nine – over half – were gunnery specialists.  The rest were a mix of boatswains, quartermasters, carpenters, cooks and stewards.  Petty officers were only 7% of the British group, but this means little without comparison with others.
Payments to individual crewmembers from early 1672 to January 1675 reveal 143 British personnel, in a total of 153 cases involving such men.​[1469]​  As a career, the sailor’s level of debt and dependence (on creditors) was such that, of these payments, the individual British crewmembers themselves actually received their arrears in person in only 23 cases (15%).  Other persons positively identified as family members received the payments only in another 13 cases (9%).  Taken together, then, only one-quarter of payments directly reached the seamen or their families.  Leading members of the English churches were involved in another 11 cases (7%).  Otherwise landladies and agents dominated the receiving group: the two most prominent Dutch landladies handled 35 of the cases (23%).  The wife of one Scots sailor handled at least five, possibly 14 men’s payments, including those of her husband and her dead brother, killed at Solebay.  Altogether, women handled 100 of the 153 cases (65%), but out of these women only 11 were family members; professional women dominated the management of seamen.  
The high level of seamen’s debt and dependence also impacts on our understanding of literacy from this source.  Of the few women family members above, though of course a very small sample, only two could sign their names (18%).  In all, only 24 British crewmembers received either for themselves or for their sons, leaving evidence of their literacy: 15 could sign their names (63%).  This high literacy increases when the officers are taken as a group.  Five of the six warrant- and petty officers could sign (83%).  Once again, at the least we can say that the men understood the implications of serving with the ‘enemy’.  These figures are rendered imprecise by the tiny sample, but closely match Earle’s for English merchant sailors – two-thirds literacy for the seamen and 90% for warrant- and petty officers.  The British in Zeeland are also fairly similar to Van Royen’s figures for Dutch merchant sailors at this time: 53% literacy in seamen, but diverge from the officers (62%).​[1470]​

Before following the micro-case studies, it is worth looking quickly at some scattered British personnel.  A few men served on fireships at the battle of Solebay: immensely dangerous work – but for much higher pay whilst the highly volatile combustibles were aboard.  The high pay was an obvious incentive for the destitute and most desperate.  We know almost nothing of George Thomson (Weymouth), aboard Haas.​[1471]​  Most of these men, however, were permanent migrants and/or veterans – those with family included Joseph Betsem (London),​[1472]​ whilst John Johnson (Glasgow), was cook aboard St Catherine.​[1473]​  Veterans aboard fireships included John MacNeil (Greenock, originally recruited as a POW in the previous war),​[1474]​ whilst David Drompel was Eenhoorn’s boatswain (see Chapter 7).​[1475]​  Such long-serving men were definitely also permanent migrants, and should have been less vulnerable to extreme hardship than transient workers; perhaps they were down on their luck, or daredevils. 

Veere-based warships: Rear-Admiral Jan Matthijssen & 
Adriaan van Cruyningen, 1672-4

Within a few days of open war, Scots seamen were entering in large numbers on the large warships based at Veere: the Rear-Admiral, Matthijssen in Oranje (70), and Veere (50), commanded by Adriaan van Cruyningen.  By July 1672, British (Scots) comprised a massive 13% of the 203 men aboard Oranje,​[1476]​ and 9% of Veere’s 140 men (see below).  These figures are very high indeed – for any foreign group, yet alone enemy subjects – one in every eight men aboard Oranje.  Unfortunately, no comparison with other foreign groups is possible at present: the muster master at Veere, Commissioner Pieter Boreel, left a very messy series of payrolls that – in the vast majority of cases – do not record the seamen’s origins (which was technically illegal).  These origins can only be reconstructed by cross-referencing with the individual seamen’s passports and petitions; which I have done only for some of the British so far.  There seems no doubt that, at these levels, British seamen formed the largest foreign groups on these two warships, but we saw in Chapter 2 that Matthijssen was recruiting in the Southern Netherlands, which bore results for Evertsen below, so this is plainly a foreign group to target in the future.  
The Scots joined Oranje quickly during the escalation, through the early stages of the embargo and Charles II’s declaration of war; by far the most had joined by the time the French declared war in early April.  Matthijssen’s master was the educated veteran Flushing Briton Henry Graham (see Chapter 7), who assisted with recruitment for the advice yacht Sint Joris in May.​[1477]​  George Dawson (Kirkcaldy) was carpenter’s mate (see below).   Before Solebay, Oranje added a Scots carpenter (Robert Drayby, and his son) drafted in from the frigate Vissers Herder.​[1478]​  At least one of the British was killed at the battle.  With widespread illness in the Dutch fleet in late summer 1672, Oranje then seems to have been one of the ships worst-hit.  After the fleet’s return from the Ems in August, at least 40 men were landed sick, including 12 Scots, one of whom died.  Soon, of Matthijssen’s 24 seamen being treated at the Veere hospital, 13 were Scots.  They must have been very sick: our 13 Scots dominated the 15 men who had to be seen by a second Veere physician.  Oranje then seems to have been taken out of fleet service earlier than the rest of the squadron; a 65-strong shore party under Graham was sent across the Scheldt to Aardenburg in States Flanders.  French forces attacking the vital fort having been defeated and driven off in June, Oranje’s shore party, including five Scots, removed a number of weapons and ammunition to the arsenal at Middelburg.​[1479]​  
At the end of the 1672 campaign season, how many of these men subsequently volunteered for winter or further service?  We would expect a professional warrant officer like the master, Graham, especially as he was also established in the community, to continue in service.  One of the two petty officers, George Dawson (Kirkcaldy), is a good example of continuous professional service, albeit short-term and soon curtailed.  Carpenter’s mate on Oranje in 1672, he was sick as early as 28 June, and one of the 40 we saw landed above.  He was paid off in October, but reenlisted for winter 1672/3 aboard the snow Bruijnvis, returned to Oranje (now commanded by Van Cruyningen, see below) and was then transferred aboard Goes on 8 June 1673, the day after Schooneveld I.  Dawson died 30 August, nine days after the battle at the Texel, but in unspecified circumstances.​[1480]​  Of the 21 seamen surviving at the end of the 1672 season (recovered from the long Scots sick-list), nine reenlisted (43%) either that winter or the following spring, mainly serving in Veere-based ships.  Over winter 1672/3, most of these Scots from Oranje scattered amongst the lighter craft; the frigate Goes and the snows Bruijnvis and Zeehond.  Three of Oranje’s men went on the Atlantic expedition: all served until at least 1674 (see below).  Matthijssen died in 1673.
In Table 8.1 below, Van Cruyningen’s very large British crew is similar to Matthijssen’s, but most joined somewhat later: apart from one man from the previous winter, and another who joined the very day (13/23 March) the battered Smyrna convoy returned, the majority of the British joined Veere in early April 1672; around the time the French declared war.  The veteran Michael de Griet (Shetland, see Chapter 6) was pensioned as a maimed man only a few months before – at the end of the 1671 season.  He received a pension instalment in January 1672, but reenlisted in February.​[1481]​  Why?  We will probably never know – this was before the Smyrna convoy action, but war was clearly coming – ideology or adventure may have been factors, but his pension of 6fl compared poorly with 15fl wages.  After Solebay, three more British were transferred in from Delft (see below): Veere’s crew was then almost 9% British: one in every eleven men was an enemy subject.  Of the 12 British aboard in summer 1672, 11 were released at the end of the campaign: a few were commended for conducting themselves ‘fit and properly without ever using any impudence’.​[1482]​  Another Scot, Alexander de Lap (see below) joined Veere in the late summer.  Of these men, De Lap, the veteran De Griet and two others reenlisted for winter 1672/3 – aboard Goes.​[1483]​  This was a retention rate of 31%; rather less than in Matthijssen’s crew.  Together with Scots from Oranje, Goes’ crew was around 4% British.  She seems to have been in Van Nes’ failed expedition to Scotland and Brest in late 1672.​[1484]​  In the worst part of the winter, when even the frigates had to be laid up, De Griet moved with others into the snow Tonijn (9% British, 45 crew).   If the Shetlander’s motive in coming back from retirement was money, he was rewarded with prize money – though an 8fl share was hardly the jackpot, and paid over 18 months later.​[1485]​

Table 8.1.  Van Cruyningen: musters & drafts to other ships, 1672-4​[1486]​
		Men	British	% British	other foreigners
Veere	4 Jul 1672	140	12	8.6	Not available
Veere to Goes	17 Nov 1672	30	2	6.7	Not available
Veere to Goes	24 Dec 1672	33	2	6.1	Not available
Oranje	6 Apr 1673	80	11	13.8	Not available
Oranje	12 May 1673	73	4	5.5	(3) = 4.1%
Oranje	13 May 1673	123	12	9.8	Not available
Oranje to Goes	25 Sep 1673	44	5	11.4	Not available
Oranje	15 May 1674	166	16	9.6	(6) = 3.6%
Oranje	10 Oct 1674	176	16	9.1	(23) = 13.1%

Despite the release of so many British in late 1672, in early 1673 British formed a particularly heavy proportion aboard Oranje – hitting 14% before dropping to 10% as the crew increased in size; still a very high proportion for enemy subjects.  Only four of the 11 British in spring 1673 had served in 1672; most were the remnants of Matthijssen’s crew, though a fifth was a veteran from peacetime.  The others – over 50% of the contingent – were fresh recruits, though we do not know where they worked previously.  Van Cruyningen retained only one of his men from 1672, even though four had reenlisted that autumn: there was some disruption caused by short-term service.  
At the end of 1673 reenlistment fell to 18%, so that the enormous level of British (now neutral subjects) aboard Oranje in 1674 (over 9%), were mostly fresh recruits.   As proportions of a relatively full crew (over 100 men) rather than drafts, the British level was remarkably stable over the three years, despite the change in Anglo-Dutch relations in 1674.  Compared with the other ships below, the Scots presence at Veere consistently translated into large numbers on the warships – well above the average levels we saw in Chapter 5 (5.3%, 1672-February 1674, and 5.2%, March-December 1674).

Lieutenant-Admiral Adriaan Banckert, Walcheren, 1672-4

Walcheren fought at all four fleet actions 1672-3, then in Biscay in 1674.  There were radical annual changes in the composition of Banckert’s crew, clear in Figure 8.2 below.​[1487]​  These were mainly due to the release of crews at the end of each campaigning season and the recruitment of fresh men in the spring, though the changing of flag captains and incoming drafts from other warships also contributed.  Away from Boreel’s rushed record-keeping at Veere, we get a better overview on all foreigners.  The proportion of foreigners fell from 19% to 14% by May 1672, before going above the average (18%, see Chapter 5) to 24% in 1673, stabilising at 23% in 1674 – not far below the post-Westminster average (27%).  The special high wages (17fl, see Chapter 4) available aboard the flagship did not make getting men easy during 1672 or the following year.
Generally speaking, within the low levels of foreigners in 1672, the largest group within the year as a whole – very unusually – was German.  A large influx of Southern Netherlanders formed the leading group of the increased foreign crew the following year; reaching almost one in every ten men.  The German portion led again in 1674, by some way at over 7% of the total crew.  Though the British were below their average rates during 1672 and 1674 (5.3% and 5.2%, respectively), they were an appreciable component throughout the episode.  On the whole they formed the second largest group 1672-3; they even formed the largest group late in the 1673 season at almost 8%, before falling to third place in 1674.  Together with the French, the level of enemy subjects aboard the Zeeland flagship is remarkable: one of every nine men by the close of the season in 1673.  The French level may have been larger than shown in Figure 8.2: just before Schooneveld I, Banckert specifically asked for French POWs to be recruited according to their ‘free will’.​[1488]​






Looking closely at the British group, all were released at the end of 1672 – even the only British petty officer, a cook.  One, however, reenlisted when the 1673 campaign began but did not return to Walcheren.  This illustrates the difficulty of tracing the men’s careers during periods when short-service was allowed: Thomas Holycross (Guernsey) was released in October 1672 and reenlisted aboard Middelburg in early April 1673.  He was transferred to Domburg in May, where he remained for the three summer battles.  Holycross’ activities over winter 1672/3 remain a mystery: he must have been Zeeland-based in the meantime, so that privateering and merchant employment are the obvious options.  The 1672 British were all in the flag captain’s crew, rather than part of the 50-strong formal company of followers allowed the lieutenant-admiral above his flag captain’s crew.​[1489]​  That changed in 1673 with the addition to the company of two British seamen and a master; the abovementioned Flushing Briton Henry Graham, formally with the rear-admiral.​[1490]​  The Scots gunner John Williamson, veteran of the last war and Crijssen’s expedition, joined the ordinary crew with another 16 British.  Most of these were fresh recruits, their entry route unknown.  Once again, all (bar Graham) were either paid off, or asked to be released at the end of the 1673 season.  
After the Treaty of Westminster, in 1674 Banckert’s admiral’s company included yet another Scots gunnery specialist, the gunner’s mate Alexander de Lap, abovementioned, who had served as a seaman aboard Veere-based ships since at least as early as summer 1672.  De Lap transferred after service on a snow during winter 1673/4 and then a second stint aboard the frigate Goes; both with Banckert’s former flag captain, Hollare.  With the others we have seen, this yet again suggests some kind of awareness of, and preferment for British gunners.  The fresh recruits in 1674 included the seaman Lancelot Whitson/Wilson (London); he joined in April and was badly wounded by nerve damage in his hand (punctuere nervorum) – either during the assault at Belle Isle or at Noirmoutier during the Biscay operation.  He recovered after six weeks’ treatment.​[1491]​ 

Vice-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge, Zierikzee, 1672-4

Zierikzee fought in all four fleet actions, and was in De Ruyter’s 1674 Martinique expedition.  Like Banckert above, the foreign element in Evertsen’s crew was subject to great change, clear in Figure 8.4 below.​[1492]​  Foreigners comprised almost 36% of Zierikzee’s crew during 1672 – twice the average level in Zeeland at that time.  They made up only 15-17% the following year – the opposite to the development aboard Walcheren above.  Foreigners increased to 26-27% in 1674, almost exactly the average level, post-Westminster.








In 1672 Evertsen had a few foreign veterans from the previous war with him; mainly, these men were now petty officers and included his old Scots gunners Swain and Thomson (see Chapter 7).  Another Scot, gunner’s mate Alexander Kirkwood (Peterhead) joined, so that, as during 1664-7, half of Evertsen’s gunnery specialists were Scots.  Scots made up most of the British contingent, including six men from Kirkcaldy, three of which were almost certainly members of the same family.  Swain and Kirkwood, at least, were with Evertsen at a very early stage in 1672.​[1493]​
The composition changed radically in 1673.  All the British from 1672 disappeared, though Swain and Thomson reappear in 1674.  Neither has yet been found on other warships, so it is not certain where they went after late 1672; service on privateers is a strong possibility.  Swain returned to his old position with Evertsen in May 1674 after 18 months’ away.  Thomson dropped to quartermaster aboard Zwanenburg (returned from America) soon after.  Kirkwood was paid off with the two gunners at the end of the season in 1672 and seems to have also been a permanent migrant as he was also married.​[1494]​  Of the seamen, John Bateman (Londonderry) died in October 1672.​[1495]​  None of the other British ‘took his opportunity’ (gelegentheit) to remain in service; all were released.​[1496]​  The six Kirkcaldy men all sold or surrendered their passports to Thomas Tullock, deacon of the English Church at Flushing and an occasional manager/helper of seamen.​[1497]​  The seamen who served in 1673 were all fresh recruits, bar Walter Magepijn (see below).  These recruits show extremes in careers: one was promoted cook, whilst two deserted early (April) despite the higher wages of 16fl given aboard the Vice-admiral.​[1498]​
In 1674, some 15% of the British group had served on other ships the previous year: one from Walcheren even deserted.  Most, once again, were fresh recruits.

Simon Loncke: Delft & Utrecht, 1672-4

Loncke took over the frigate Delft after she returned from the Smyrna Convoy action in March 1672; he inherited Le Sagie’s crew – which was probably recruited during peacetime in late 1671, or earlier that year.  At the end of the 1672 campaigning season a new crew of reenlisted men was assembled for winter service, lasting until late December.  Loncke then took command of the two-decker Utrecht (50) for 1673-4, though she did not fight at the Schooneveld battles, the crew being drafted into other ships until just before the Texel engagement.  She was part of the 1674 Biscay operation.   




In Figure 8.6 above,​[1499]​ the changing composition from 1672 to 1673 has to be largely discounted because Loncke changed from Delft into Utrecht, a larger ship, but the change 1673-4 again shows the predominantly annual turnover of men.  In early 1672 the British were the largest foreign group in Delft’s original peacetime crew at 5%; only the Southern Netherlanders and French approached this level; of the three groups, only the Southern Netherlanders had not fallen heavily by the late autumn.  The composition of foreigners in the new crew in December 1672 is similar to previously, but this is coincidental: nearly all the men had served earlier aboard other ships or were entirely new.  British comprised 7% of these volunteers; appreciably higher than their average rate during the war (5.3%).  In 1673, Utrecht’s composition was very unusual: just before the summer battles, Germans led by some way at almost 7% – much higher than their average rate – whilst the French and Swedish groups were also larger than average.  Most of the Germans had been recruited early in the year,​[1500]​ and reached a massive 8% by the autumn; even more than aboard the flagship that year.  By that time an influx of Southern Netherlanders, British and Norwegians helped to push the overall foreign level up to over one in every three men; the first reaching 6% – all were above average.  The British increased from virtually nothing to 5%.  With the British and French together, over 6% of the crew were then enemy subjects: not far off the 8% aboard Walcheren above.  During 1674, apart from the French, the major foreign groups in Utrecht’s crew were – unusually – equally balanced.




Of the British group, five – one the steward’s mate, William Rowen (Ayr) – were aboard in April 1672; all probably served during 1671.  The seaman John Webb (London) came through the Smyrna Convoy action unscathed, but received a very bad [rampaart] splinter wound in the right leg at Solebay in June: a bad break with extensive contusions that put him ashore for six weeks’ treatment, and then convalescence 20 July-28 September.  Crippled, he had to walk with a stick thereafter, receiving 50fl compensation.​[1501]​  Despite the injury, he stayed in service.  Presumably, he was given new duties (perhaps a sort of waister); it seems unlikely that he would still be able to go aloft.  We should beware of ascribing any kind of ‘ideological commitment’ to Webb because of his determination to continue in service: it is more likely that he wanted to stay in service because he lacked the skills – or perhaps now even the basic physical ability – to perform any other job.  There is also the skill of the medical personnel to consider in promoting recovery, but also the example of the Swede Jan Pietersen below (Evertsen de Jongste) who continued as a leading seaman after bad injury.  Webb, like others, was dependent on the slaapvrouw Matie Mels, who picked up his compensation.  The 50fl may not necessarily have gone into Mels’ pocket to cover debt, but it is likely.  Webb was released in October 1672, but reenlisted and served aboard Delft and other ships until at least late 1674, rejoining Loncke aboard Utrecht in May 1674.​[1502]​  Rowen, the steward’s mate, was married and therefore almost certainly a permanent migrant.  He was sick 14 August-30 September.​[1503]​
Three of these five British transferred out of Delft into Veere (Van Cruyningen) at sea a few weeks after Solebay, where they would have joined many Scots (see above).  The three were all released in October.​[1504]​  We do not yet know the scale or circumstance of the transfer, but the British were clearly not split up to avoid potential trouble as enemy subjects.  Did Van Cruyningen (who seems to have had a liking for Scots, at any rate) ask for the transfer?  
In 1673, now aboard Utrecht, Loncke briefly had an Irish navigator, James Maynard, though the day after Schooneveld I he was transferred to Delft (see below).  Most of the British influx – all new men – arrived after the two battles at Schooneveld.  Three men took the miniscule recruitment bounty but never reported for duty.  James Robertson (Greenock) was wounded at the Texel.​[1505]​  We do not know exactly how these men came to be in Zeeland in the midst of the 1673 campaign.  They were perhaps released POWs: of the French POWs released from prison in September, five served aboard.​[1506]​  The British, however, could have originated from elsewhere. 
In 1674 the British component, below the post-Westminster average (5.2%), fell slightly by proportion (in a now more heavily manned ship with a lower crew turnover) compared with 1673, but was still large (10 men).  We saw John Webb, now a veteran, back aboard above, but these men were mostly fresh recruits.  Some of the earliest Scots entrants in spring 1673 were under the management of Janet Forbes, the Flushing Presbyterian (see Chapters 3 and 7).  Another had assigned power-of-attorney to a fellow-Scot, a veteran gunner on a snow in 1672.​[1507]​

Adriaan Banckert de Jonge, Delft, 1673-4

Banckert’s son got his first command, the snow Bruijnvis, in winter 1672/3, then took over the frigate Delft for 1673-4.  There were more foreigners than average aboard Delft in both 1673-4: around one in every four men in 1673, when she fought in all three fleet actions.  This rose to one man in every three the following year, when she was part of the Martinique expedition.








Despite the low numbers of British in 1673, one of Charles II’s subjects was responsible for a core function aboard Delft.  It is worth stepping aside for a moment to look at him, a permanent migrant.

Thomas Hurd (Wexford), 1669-1674

The Irishman Hurd, boatswain’s mate in the previous war, is a noteworthy case, as he served through peacetime and was promoted schieman (second boatswain) under De Hase aboard Delft, and then Vlissingen in the Mediterranean.  Already married by 1665, Janneken Smits, his wife, received at least one payment while he was away in 1671/2.​[1509]​   He was in the Smyrna Convoy fight, staying in his position under the new commander, Le Sagie.​[1510]​  Sick at some time that year – but not badly enough to warrant attention from shore-based medical personnel – he was promoted to boatswain in April 1672.  By the end of that year’s campaign he was praised for 

‘his very proper conduct in the face of the enemy and elsewhere wherever need may have required’.

He was released from Vlissingen in early November, but – just six days later – reenlisted for the winter with Loncke aboard Delft; initially having to take demotion back to schieman.  The frigate was only taken out of service on 12 December.​[1511]​  Promoted back to boatswain, he joined Banckert aboard the snow Bruijnvis at least as early as 15 January 1673, until 19 March.​[1512]​  The following day Banckert took command of Delft, with Hurd as boatswain, where he served through the 1673 campaign until 25 September.​[1513]​  He then may have had a month ashore, before reenlisting (27 October) for winter 1673/4 aboard Matthijs Laureijnssen’s snow, probably Zwaluw, where he served until 24 February 1674.​[1514]​  Hurd took a radical change in rank during this time – as steward: it is not clear why – either there were not enough positions available in the much-reduced size of the Zeeland winter squadron – even for veteran professionals – (likely), or this was a deliberate choice.  
In 1674, after less than a week ashore, Hurd went back aboard Vlissingen (Carel van de Putte) as boatswain on 1 March, going to Martinique and serving until 27 September.  On the death of the master in the West Indies, Hurd broke into the ranks of the warrant officers on 25 July, when he was promoted to second master.​[1515]​  His career had taken him from common seaman to warrant officer in under eight years.  This is a case against which other foreigners as well as Dutch seamen should be measured in future; Hurd’s case is remarkable because his advance in rank and social position was swift during a time when he was an enemy subject for most of his service.  Returning to Europe, Hurd had a week ashore before he was demoted to boatswain aboard the same ship during late 1674.  This seems merely the result of more restricted opportunities in a drastically reduced complement: there was simply no ‘second master’ position available.​[1516]​  

Returning to Delft in 1673, large sections of the crew were moved back and forth, and new drafts brought in as the Zeelanders struggled to man their ships.  A large section was moved into the flagship, Walcheren, before the summer battles.  This draft included John Webb, wounded previously, who fought aboard Walcheren in both Schooneveld battles.  Delft seems only to have been fully manned at the very last moment by a 34-man draft from Utrecht on 7 June: the very day of Schooneveld I.​[1517]​  As with Utrecht and especially Vlissingen, the admiralty resorted to desperate measures to get Delft to sea at this late hour: five experienced seamen were recruited for 30fl – an unbelievable amount, twice the normal wartime rate – ‘for one voyage’ – actually meaning one month at this rate, with all other time paid at the usual skilled rate of 15fl.  Of these five men, four were foreigners – a Norwegian, a Southern Netherlander and two British: William Johnson (Bo’ness) and Robert Fleming (Greenwich), who joined on the day of the battle and the day after, respectively.  Both were paid off in the autumn.​[1518]​  We do not know where these men came from – there were reasons for them to be in Flushing in June 1673 other than being enticed with money out of prison.  We do know, however, that – as we have already seen with Walcheren above – eight French POWs were taken out of gaol the day after Schooneveld I and served for the rest of the campaign.  They worked for only 10fl.​[1519]​  
The draft from Utrecht included two navigators, one of these warrant officers was the Irishman James Maynard.  Just before Schooneveld II, Delft’s two original navigators were transferred aboard De Ruyter and Evertsen respectively, so that Maynard was one of only two senior navigators left aboard.​[1520]​  As with the other men in this position, we can be particularly curious whether he was recruited for specific local knowledge and how long he had been in Zeeland; this after all was a time when poor British knowledge of the Schooneveld put the Allies at a disadvantage in the two engagements.​[1521]​  Maynard fought aboard Delft during all three summer battles, even though most of the Utrecht draft returned to their ship before the last, the Texel.  Most of Delft’s men on Walcheren also returned at this time, so that John Webb (see above) rejoined Delft for the Texel.

Jacob Colom, the Flanders coast (1668), detail.  Schooneveld marked at centre.​[1522]​

Maynard, the only foreign warrant officer aboard Delft 1673-4, was a permanent migrant and temporarily in debt to a widow.​[1523]​  In 1674 he was virtually the only foreigner from the previous year who stayed in service, in a completely new crew.  The nature of Zeeland naval service, yet again, was primarily annual.  The huge number of fresh foreigners – one third of the crew – and the 14% Southern Netherlanders, were again reflected in the composition of petty officers, though not as exceptionally closely as in 1673: over 20% were foreigners.  The veteran Majorcan cook rejoined the ship from Banckert’s father, the Lieutenant-Admiral, but over half the foreign petty officers were Southern Netherlanders: the carpenter and his mate, whilst two countrymen were promoted – the schieman’s mate, through boatswain’s mate to schieman; the cooper from the lower deck.


Jacob Colom, the Wielings (1668), detail.  Schooneveld (unmarked) at centre.​[1524]​

The British component was very representative at over 5% of the crew.  One Scot deserted before leaving Europe, but Steven Perreman, probably a second-generation British migrant (see Chapter 6), was lost overboard with a shipmate in the West Indies in June.

Cornelis Evertsen de Jongste, Utrecht & Zwanenburg, 1671-4; 
The Zeeland Atlantic expedition, 1672-4





Foreigners comprised 18% of Utrecht’s crew serving in peacetime over the four months October 1671-January 1672.  Together with the 19% aboard Vlissingen over the 12 months February 1671-January 1672, this gives us a good idea of the level of foreigners during the increased naval activity in the year before the Third Anglo-Dutch War. Though these are only two ships and more work needs to be done, with the evidence we saw in Chapter 5 these crews do suggest that the overall level of foreigners in Zeeland was relatively stable all the way from 1664 to 1674.  In Figure 8.10 above, aboard Utrecht pre-war, Southern Netherlanders, French and Danish-Norwegians each comprised about 3% of the crew, Swedes 2%, whilst the British were the largest group at almost 5%.​[1530]​  There was, however, a very different mix aboard Vlissingen at this time.
After the return to Zeeland in March 1672, the overall level of foreigners – now aboard Zwanenburg – increased (21%); above average.  Also, unusually, despite this only one was a petty officer, and the balance between the groups remained stable; the British increase (to 6%) was the only appreciable change.
At the end of the 1672 season and reenlistment for winter service, foreigners increased slightly again, to 22%.  The contingents from France and Denmark-Norway especially shrank – most were probably released, but the Norwegian Bartel Theunissen (Trondheim) deserted beforehand.​[1531]​  Some foreigners were maimed or injured during the campaign.  After his toes were smashed by a shot at Solebay, the Southern Netherlander Cornelis Toomken (Bruges) had to lose part of his left foot.  He was the only of Evertsen’s foreigners seriously wounded in the battle, though the single Holsteiner aboard, Dirck Janssen, took a bad contusion in the left shoulder.​[1532]​  Apart from these men, the cause of those foreign groups’ decline seems to be the choice not to reenlist at the end of the season.  More desertion is possible, but we can rule out sickness or injury: the missing men do not appear in the medical records.
In October the British increased to almost 9%; an enormous level, but the Swedish group trebled in size to an exceptionally large 6%.  An unusual example is the seaman Jan Petersen (Kalmar).  On 12 April 1672 (before the move into Zwanenburg), whilst Utrecht was under repair at Flushing, the Swede was working aloft and fell from the mainmast; breaking his right femur very badly near the hip, with extensive contusions.  After four months’ treatment and convalescence 21 August-28 October, Petersen recovered from his wounds, receiving 50fl compensation.  Despite much pain and the restricted use of one (now shortened) leg, he asked to stay in service.​[1533]​  Afterwards, he actually rose in (informal) rank, moving up into the group of leading seaman at the head of their section of the payroll; clearly he was one of the best seamen aboard.
The British personnel who had joined in peacetime had varied careers.  Alexander Crung (Peterhead) was promoted to gunner’s mate.​[1534]​  We shall see the veteran Spens below, but Alexander Scrimger (King’s Lynn) was lightly wounded at the Smyrna convoy action; in the finger.​[1535]​  He was sick later, and ashore 19 August-13 September.  Scrimger, Crung and John Jewel (Dysart) all served until released in October 1672; Scrimger reenlisted, joining Evertsen’s uncle, the Vice-admiral.​[1536]​  Of the five Britons from peacetime, only Jacob Pates (Dysart) went on the Atlantic mission, his service ended December 1673; the circumstances unclear.​[1537]​  Another only served during the main 1672 campaign.  The almost entirely fresh composition of the group makes the British increase in October more remarkable still.  The Scots gunner’s mate was even replaced by an Englishman: William Hamer (Dover) – yet another British gunnery specialist.​[1538]​  Despite the high overall level of foreigners, only two were petty officers: Hamer and one of the carpenter’s mates, a Southern Netherlander.  This was to remain the case throughout the duration of the expedition.  
Evertsen reached the Canaries in January 1673, the Cape Verde Islands in February, Surinam in March, leaving in May.  Passing Barbados at the end of the month, he then met Jacob Binckes’ Amsterdam squadron at Martinique.  The Dutch arrived at the Chesapeake in July, and New York in August.  Evertsen left at the end of September, reaching the Azores in November and Cadiz in December 1673.  

The long voyage provided ample opportunity for foreigners to enlist during 1673 (see below), but by December 1673, the overall level of foreigners had fallen slightly to 21% (still above average), but Zwanenburg’s crew composition in Figure 8.10 above remained relatively stable, despite the loss of many men to crew prizes taken in the intervening 14 months.​[1539]​  The British party had decreased somewhat, but still formed over 7% of the crew; the Swedish proportion had increased to just under that, though their actual numbers remained unchanged.  Three of the British personnel who reenlisted in late 1672 are missing by December 1673, but what exactly happened to them remains a mystery; they could have been prize-crew, otherwise transferred, but also have ended up anywhere Evertsen touched.​[1540]​
Evertsen was still at Cadiz at the next payment, sometime in April 1674.  The overall foreign component fell slightly again to 20%; there were now three large foreign groups in the crew; Southern Netherlanders had increased (4%), approaching the British and Swedish components – which had both fallen somewhat (over 6% and 5% respectively), but these were still exceptional proportions.  The overall crew composition was otherwise largely unchanged.  Another three British had disappeared but one new man joined, whilst two Swedes had gone; again, they remain a mystery at present.​[1541]​




Figure 8.11 above summarises the foreign petty officers during 1672 and the Atlantic voyage: after corresponding closely with the overall level in 1672, petty officers fell to half those levels, 1673-4; prospects for foreigners were somewhat lower on this long-distance voyage than in any of the four other examples above.  This could, however, be coincidence.
Evertsen’s squadron is shown below.  The hooker Eendracht returned to Zeeland in October 1673.  Two ships were left behind on Evertsen’s departure from New York, 27 September 1673: Surinam and the snow Zeehond; they did not return until December 1674.  Of the remaining three, Schakerloo was taken in February 1674 in a duel with Tiger at Cadiz.  Zwanenburg returned to Zeeland in July 1674 with the ketch Sint Joris.​[1543]​

Cornelis Evertsen de Jongste’s Zeeland squadron, 1672-4​[1544]​
		guns	Men	
				
Cornelis Evertsen de Jongste	Zwanenburg	44	135	ex-St Patrick
Passchier de Witte	Schakerloo	28	94	frigate/pinnace
Evert Evertsen Franszoon	Surinam	25	81	victualler; ex-Richard and Francis merchantman
Daniel Thijssen	Zeehond		40	Snow





British personnel were closely involved with the outcome of events at Virginia.  We have already seen that the Dutch sometimes used British navigators.  Dutch charts of the area were not good, compared with the local ‘state of the art’ (see below).  Navigation was a problem very soon after the Dutch arrival in the Chesapeake: Binckes’ Noord-Holland (44), amongst others, ran aground and could only be refloated ‘with great difficulty’ four days later – but only after taking out her armament.  The British warships and merchantmen ran; 20 of the latter fled further up the James river: the Dutch decided to send Schakerloo, the snow Zeehond (and Boes from Binckes’ Amsterdam squadron) after them.    
Echoing Crijnssen’s use of Wilkinson in the same area in 1667, on 24 July Evertsen recruited two British POWs as pilots for the operation.  Otherwise, there seems to have been a number of British deserters who joined the Dutch squadron in the Chesapeake: Evertsen received intelligence from apprentices who came aboard (24 July), having fled the heavy press ashore for the British warships and merchantmen (now unloaded and taking on cannon), as well as a number of deserters and turncoats (25 July).


Augustine Herman, Virginia and Maryland, 1670 [1673].​[1545]​

On 27 July, Evertsen summoned his two British pilots for their advice on navigating the Elizabeth (after the two warships), Nansemond and York rivers to come at the British.  The pilots said they were not experienced with such large ships in the Elizabeth, and that if any ship ran aground there was great danger of losing it.  The Nansemond was narrow, and at only 13 feet deep in parts – was too shallow for the largest Dutch ships in any case.  One British deserter, coming aboard Zwanenburg that same night, revealed that the British had prepared solid boom defences and underwater obstacles, and that the largest merchantmen – in the York river – were to be unloaded and readied for action.  It was these reports that prompted the Dutch decision the following day to end the operation and make do with the prizes they had already taken.​[1546]​  De Jonge’s assertion that the Dutch lack of knowledge of the waters stopped the pursuit of the British ships is therefore not the whole story.​[1547]​  The inexperience of the renegade British pilots in one crucial task was also a principal factor.  Defensive measures taken since the Dutch arrival, and a possible counter-attack were also responsible; again, this intelligence supplied by British personnel.  Unfortunately, if the two British pilots were recruited formally and paid, they are not yet identifiable in any of the relevant Zeeland payrolls.






Pieter Goos (1668, detail, left) & Hendrick Doncker (1660, detail, right).​[1549]​

Figure 8.12 below shows the foreigners in the Zeeland squadron as a whole (excluding Eendracht).  As the largest ship, Zwanenburg’s crew – and the heavy British component thereof – dominates the squadron’s manpower, but there were also foreigners aboard the other warships.​[1550]​
The frigate Schakerloo was based at Zierikzee; the composition of her crew during the main 1672 campaign reflected the much more restricted foreign influence in the mainly fishing port, with normally only two frigates based there: only 5% of her crew were foreigners.  That changed when she was preparing for the winter; during the expedition over 11% were foreigners; most of these were British.    




Other foreign crew joined during the voyage: a Swede joined the outbound ship at the Canaries (4 February 1673), but deserted on the return leg at the Azores.  Another Swede joined in the Chesapeake and completed the homeward voyage.  He was probably amongst the POWs on the British merchantmen taken in the first few days after the Dutch arrival, rather from the solitary Swedish merchantman found soon after.​[1551]​  
Of the British in Schakerloo’s crew, John MacDull (Aberdeen) joined the Zierikzee-based frigate Vissers Herder at least as early as January 1672 – peacetime – and reenlisted in November.​[1552]​  Another two joined whilst the Dutch squadron was in the Chesapeake: just days after Evertsen’s arrival, an Irishman enlisted (25 July), followed by a Bristolian (2 August): the day all the POWs were landed on the squadron’s departure for New York.  The Irishman died of natural causes two days out from New York, 29 September.  This man does not seem to have been one of the two abovementioned POWs used as pilots in the Chesapeake.  The Bristolian deserted in thick weather at the Azores, 15 November.  A native of New York joined on the squadron’s arrival there (8 August); he was unskilled and completed the voyage back to Zeeland.  Another was transferred aboard from the ketch Sint Joris at the Azores (12 November).  A Virginia-born seaman joined during the stay at Cadiz in April 1674 for the last leg of the voyage.​[1553]​
During the stay at Cadiz on the homebound leg, 12/22 February 1674, while Evertsen was on the careen, De Witte was challenged by Thomas Harman in the much heavier Tiger (44).  Evertsen is said to have himself estimated Tiger’s complement at 160 men.  He then sent enough of his men aboard Schakerloo to make up her crew to 170, and instructed De Witte to engage.  The following day it transpired that Tiger’s crew was actually 315; already heavily outgunning the Zeelander, it is not surprising that she took Schakerloo, whose casualties were reported as very severe – ranging from 50 dead and 70 wounded to more than 100 dead.​[1554]​  


Daniel Schellinks, ‘HMS Tiger Taking the Schakerloo in the Harbour of Cadiz, 23 February 1674’, 1675.​[1555]​

The origin of the Tiger estimate is unclear, though: Evertsen himself wrote in Zwanenburg’s log that ‘although they had professed that they had no more than 160 men aboard, the English afterwards declared they had over 300 men’.​[1556]​  British accounts turned the Dutch disadvantage in men on its head, reporting Evertsen as making Schakerloo’s crew up to 270 men and Tiger with only around 180, so that a shameful boast arose:

‘No Seamen nor Souldiers with us compare, 
Although they have odds yet to fight them we dare’​[1557]​

The lie persisted until fairly recently,​[1558]​ though Clowes went a long way to redressing the case, whilst still maintaining parity in manpower.​[1559]​  The main point for us is that the payrolls indicate that Schakerloo’s complement of sailors was very thin at the time of the battle: only 104 sailors – with no new men drafted in since those from Sint Joris at the Azores.  The extras drafted in on 22 February seem, therefore, to have been soldiers and marines.​[1560]​  Six of Schakerloo’s men who fought Tiger were British subjects.  The fighting was indeed very fierce: 34 sailors – one third of the crew – were killed or died of their wounds shortly afterwards.
The prisoners were quickly released after the timely arrival of Binckes in strength; they seem to have been transferred to the remaining two Zeelanders.  Of the British, Jacob Bodie (Dundee) was killed in the action with Tiger.  He was unusual as a permanent migrant at Zierikzee: his father collected his arrears.  The Scot John Housen deserted and ‘went over to the enemy’; joining the British the day after the battle.​[1561]​  He did so, somehow, with a shipmate but – as we saw in Chapter 2 – this risked death or imprisonment at home.  Perhaps he thought there was a low risk of this.  In deserting, he forfeited almost 16 months’ wages – over 208fl.  If he was desperate to leave the Dutch we wonder whether why he did not take some other employment option at Cadiz, if such was then available.  Perhaps Housen simply wanted to ‘go home’.  The survivors suffered the disaster of losing their sea-chests and clothes; they later received token compensation of one ducaton (3fl), when replacement of their lost kit must have cost many times that – reckoned as taking a year to replace.​[1562]​

The victualler Surinam is interesting for a couple of reasons.  Firstly, during the 1672 campaign one in three of her 36 personnel were foreigners, though only two were petty officers.  Her master was Henry Graham, later with Rear-Admiral Matthijssen (see above).  Three seamen were British – at least two of whom were released at the end of the campaign.​[1563]​  Second, the larger crew (80 men) recruited for the Atlantic expedition was 22% foreign, mainly Southern Netherlanders (over 8%), and included a number of veteran foreign petty officers and crew who had served in the previous war: the steward’s mate, cook and mate, the armourer and master-at-arms had all been with Vice-Admiral Evertsen until the partial demobilisation in autumn 1672 (see above).  All reenlisted to serve on his nephew’s expedition; hinting at some loyalty to the Evertsen ‘dynasty’, though was also the lure of prize money and ‘adventure’.  Four of the five foreign petty officers were Southern Netherlanders; the armourer French.  
On the expedition’s departure 6% of the crew were British: most of their fates cannot yet be traced, though two do not seem to have served beforehand.  We do not even know the real surname of the seaman Walter Magepijn (Leith).  His last name means ‘stomach ache’ – apparently a nickname derived from an in-joke with his shipmates; perhaps something like the modern tag ‘sick-note’.​[1564]​  Outbound, Evertsen took two prizes off Finisterre.  Magepijn was transferred aboard one as part of the prize crew; both were driven into La Corunna by bad weather.  He had returned from Spain on a privateer by mid-April 1673, then joined Vice-Admiral Evertsen for the 1673 campaign.​[1565]​  Surinam was left at New York; Thomas Friend (London) was paid off in October 1673, just two weeks after Evertsen’s departure and may have stayed in the New World.​[1566]​

The actual complement of the Veere-based snow Zeehond (35 men) was 50% larger than previously given.​[1567]​  Only two foreigners were aboard at the start of winter service in late 1672; both were Scots who had served on Rear-Admiral Matthijssen’s Oranje from spring 1672.  Daniel Curtis was one of the many sick, but survived and volunteered for Zeehond in October.  Curtis was promoted to steward at New York in September 1673 and stayed with Zeehond (and Surinam) in America when Evertsen and the rest returned to Europe – so did not return till the end of 1674.  Last known, he was paid off in mid-winter 1674, after at least two and a half years’ service.​[1568]​  John Spar would have gone on the expedition, but was left ashore sick.​[1569]​
At the Virgin Islands in June 1673, Evertsen ordered Thijssen to recruit ten more seamen; virtually all were foreign.  Homebound, nine were subsequently transferred aboard Schakerloo at the Azores, but their fates are almost all unknown.  At least three of these were British and three Norwegian.  The tenth man, probably British, was one of 19 men drowned on the four prizes that dragged their anchors and were ‘smashed into a thousand pieces’ at Fayal (11 November); the rest were probably killed in the action with Tiger.​[1570]​ 
Before we leave the Atlantic expedition, the Flushing Briton Henry Graham appears once again: after serving as master with Matthijssen and Banckert, in early 1674 – as master of an escort with a convoy from Ostend – he was sent out to Cadiz with orders for Evertsen.​[1571]​ 

Robert Spens (Kirkcaldy): II, 1670-87

Our longest serving veteran Robert Spens was largely on the opposite career gradient to Thomas Hurd above.  After Crinssen’s Surinam expedition (see Chapter 7), Spens reappears with other personnel joining Evertsen’s Zeelandia at Lisbon in late 1670; he was quickly, but only temporarily, promoted to navigator.  He had reached the rank of warrant officer, apparently for the first time after almost 30 years of service as a petty officer, but was subsequently demoted to seaman.  At the very youngest, he was now probably in his mid-forties and was getting too old for ranking positions, such as boatswain, that required a younger man’s fitness, strength and agility.  In Utrecht for the Smyrna convoy action, Spens, already wounded almost 20 years before at Scheveningen in 1653, now had his left hand and part of the arm shot off.  Since he was a boy, Spens had served the Zeeland admiralty at sea continuously for 36 years and had

‘served in all the battles during the past 30 years, without exception, and conducted himself therein with all courage’.​[1572]​

Landed three days after the action on 26 March, he was treated at Flushing by the principal State medical personnel for 11 weeks, so missed Solebay.  He ‘fully recovered’.​[1573]​  Spens was still registered as wounded, 8 June-31 August, but rejoined Evertsen aboard Zwanenburg.​[1574]​  He did not, however, go with Evertsen to America: on 12 October he moved into the Lieutenant-Admiral’s barge Oranjeboom, patrolling in the Scheldt off Lillo, for a year until at least 30 September 1673, though he was sick 4 September-6 October.​[1575]​  We then lose track of him until 1678 when he reappears aboard Oranjeboom back in his old rank of boatswain, which he held until at least 1682; he had turned his career around.  This is surely a sign of patronage at the highest level – the Lieutenant-Admiral was often aboard the barge in the years of peace – and his continuing value despite advancing age and mutilation, though the river patrol would of course been less arduous than service at sea.  After another gap, he reappears aboard Oranjeboom again in 1686, finally as navigator in 1687.​[1576]​  Seventeen years after his first stint in the position, he had made warrant officer again.  Spens was demoted to seaman once more in 1688.  His last service seems to have been in May 1688; as a maimed seaman, he was life-pensioned by 1689:​[1577]​ a full 47 years after we first saw him, and at least 52 years’ service since 1636 – a lifetime in Zeeland service.

Amsterdam admiralty comparison: 
Tromp & Tobiaszoon, Gouden Leeuw, 1673; Hollandia, 1674

There is limited scope for comparison with the evidence from Amsterdam.  For Tromp’s flagships Gouden Leeuw and Hollandia, we have already seen the more northern- and eastern-orientated foreign groups in Chapter 5.  Aboard Gouden Leeuw, of the commissioned and warrant officers, apart from the Irish flag-captain Tobias and one of the surgeons (from New York, and therefore qualifying as British at this time in our survey), there were no other foreigners of this status.  Of the petty officers, almost 43% were foreigners – much higher than the overall level for the crew (25%) – and also much higher than any level for petty officers in Zeeland during this episode.  Some 11% of Tobias’ petty officers were Danish subjects, and 15% were British – the largest group in this rank.  As mentioned in Chapter 5, this is just one case specifically from the Third Anglo-Dutch War, and the British flag captain probably exerted some influence on preferment.  Some of these British petty officers were in unexceptional functions (cook and mate, drummer), but the sailmaker, one of the two carpenters, and both of the two armourers were in more central maintenance functions for sailing and fighting, whilst one of the vital quartermasters was also British.  The critical frontline sailing and fighting functions were dominated by foreigners.  Of the eight gunnery specialists (four gunners and their mates) only two gunners were Dutch, whilst no less than five of the total were Danish-Norwegian.  The sailing function was entirely foreign: the boatswain and mate, too, were Danish-Norwegian, whilst the schieman and mate were the only two French subjects aboard – also enemy subjects.​[1578]​
This situation was replicated aboard Hollandia in 1674, of the eight gunnery specialists, only one was Dutch – the other three gunners were Irish, Swedish and Norwegian.  All their mates were foreigners.  Similarly, only one of the four boatswains grades was Dutch (the schieman); the boatswain was Norwegian, the two mates Swedish.  Foreigners were found throughout the petty officers.​[1579]​
Though only two cases, this domination of a critical function by foreigners in two Amsterdam flagships mirrors the foreign (British) domination of the same function aboard Vice-Admiral Evertsen in Zeeland during the previous war.  Together with the continual incidence of British gunners in Zeeland throughout our whole period, this does suggest that interest in foreign gunnery specialists was not confined to Zeeland.






In the wider view, short-term wartime service and the option for release (in contrast to 1664-7) caused disruption to the integrity and continuity of ships’ companies (and obvious difficulties for the researcher): those men who did reenlist usually moved to a different (smaller) ship for the winter; there was also a knock-on effect when the next campaign season started in the spring – the men might move on again.  In Zeeland, the manning difficulties exacerbated disruption through drafts.  On the other hand, the greater freedom for the seamen seems to have reduced desertion, but this needs to be ascertained across all the crews.
Foreign labour was even more important than even the high crew levels we have seen indicate alone – the failure to man many warships is clear proof of this.  On individual warships, overall proportions of foreigners sometimes varied wildly from year to year, or sometimes on even shorter terms.  The different component foreign groups also fluctuated annually, sometimes extremely, and sometimes also in the short term.  Occasionally, groups such as Germans and Swedes, who were not in the principal groups we saw in Chapter 5, challenged or even outstripped the usual leading groups.  In the British case, the Scots connection with Veere again yielded very high levels on Veere-based warships.  More work needs to be done on the deliberate – especially in situ – recruitment of foreigners: where we have evidence both of a drive in the Southern Netherlands and full crew data, we have seen that this bore direct results (Vice-Admiral Evertsen).  Further investigation of POWs is also needed; initial study suggests that very few British POWs volunteered during the war.  French were specifically sought-after (at least temporarily), but attitudes to British POWs should be established: any apparent preference for French would suggest a possible religious dimension (perhaps common Protestantism/Calvinism), perhaps along the lines of British efforts with POWs after 1688.
Taking the case studies together, and comparing the proportion of foreigners in the total crews and foreign petty officers, foreigners were probably slightly less favoured in employment as, or promotion to petty officers – but not by much.  How the British fared compared with other foreign groups in this regard remains to be established – some certainly were promoted during the war.  
As in 1665-7, appreciable numbers of British personnel served in sections of the Republic’s naval forces during full-blown Anglo-Dutch conflict.  Whilst we do not know how most of these men were employed previously, in Zeeland a small professional British hardcore of officers and seamen clearly already existed: though we do not yet know its exact size in 1672, it had grown in size by 1674 with the continued labour demand of the war effort: 32% of those serving after the Treaty of Westminster in 1674 were veterans of the previous year(s).   Thorough investigation of the Zeeland crews especially during the semi-war-footing of 1671 would throw more light on this hardcore, establishing linkage with the previous episode.  Most of the British warrant- and petty officers during the war were married, or had some family in Zeeland – and, at least to some degree, were therefore settled migrants, reinforcing professionalism.  A few men were released at the end of the season to reappear the next year or even the year after.  Such men probably went into trade or privateering in the interim.






Chapter 9  Conclusion

In Chapter 1 (Introduction) the instance of the Dutch naval raid up the Medway was introduced as an important historical event where British personnel fought on the Dutch side – with ‘the enemy’.  A handful of prominent British individuals played leading roles as officers – most had ideological reasons to do so – but many seamen seem also to have fought in Dutch naval service against their own country.  The failure of the British to pay their sailors was seen by contemporaries (albeit biased commentators to various degrees), as the cause of the seamen’s defection to the enemy.  I initially suspected ideology also played a role for the seamen too, but explained the difficulties of establishing evidence of sailors beliefs and some pitfalls when trying to extract a narrative from the available sources.  
The background and some of the most relevant historiography include migration studies; wider Dutch demographic and economic trends (including labour market segmentation and wages) are also reflected within the main relevance of this thesis: international maritime labour with the Dutch Republic as its focus.  Maritime historiography and other studies have long shown that foreign service was commonplace, but British service on the Dutch side during the Anglo-Dutch Wars is the acid test of internationalisation, the most extreme example – service with the enemy.  Nonetheless, though it is well known that Dutch ships had many foreigners aboard, Scandinavians and Germans are very much thought to be the most prominent groups.  Whilst the contemporary market for soldiers was larger and more prominent, and whilst Jeremy Black and Jan Glete have related the two and drawn parallels – in recruitment, for example​[1581]​ – distinctions were made here at the outset to separate sailors from mercenaries: they were not the same.
As much of the thesis is concerned with the state’s role, categorisation of the various groups of foreigners here rests on de jure sovereignty and the tracking of territorial changes.

British personnel in the Zeeland admiralty; the Dutch navy

To go right back to our starting point, to the Medway Raid and other contemporary reports of British seamen in Dutch naval service and estimates of their numbers, we have seen that there were indeed some numbers of British seamen serving in the Zeeland admiralty, one of the five regional Dutch admiralties – even fighting against their own country during the Anglo-Dutch Wars.  Their numbers were sometimes large: many hundreds served in Zeeland in the 1640s and after 1688.  Even during the Anglo-Dutch Wars, though, a Zeeland warship could have been completely filled, in theory – if they could have gathered all together – purely with British personnel.  Such numbers were a drain on British resources at important times – most obviously when those resources were in ‘enemy hands’ during the Anglo-Dutch Wars, but also during the 1640s and particularly during the French wars – every extra warship ready earlier resulted in greater overall fleet readiness (and hence the possibility of strategic initiative), as well as enhanced protection of one’s own trade (more convoy escorts) and threat to that of the enemy (more cruisers and therefore capability to wage guerre de course).    
As was implicitly suggested by J. R. Bruijn’s earlier work, British personnel were indeed present in Zeeland admiralty crews throughout all the wars in the period of study here: during the neutral phase in Anglo-Dutch relations before 1652, through conflict to 1674 and the Anglo-Dutch alliance against France from 1688.  British personnel were also present in peacetime – during 1667-70, at least – and on the evidence from these episodes are certain to be found during the other peacetime episodes throughout our period.  Table 9.1 below shows the British proportion of Zeeland naval personnel during each of the episodes considered.​[1582]​  

















How many British seamen were there in the whole Dutch navy though, and were the contemporary estimates at all realistic?  We can extrapolate the figures for British in Zeeland warships: Table 9.2 below projects (very roughly) the thesis Zeeland results across the Dutch fleet.​[1584]​

Table 9.2  Projections & contemporary reports











Where the projections can be paired with fleet estimates, the latter are inflated by two and a half to four times.  This, though, is ultimately of little value.  Firstly, the contemporary estimates should be seen as merely indicators; they are impressions only.  Second, projections are subject to far too much error in this case: they should also be seen as impressions at this stage.  Can Zeeland be taken as an accurate measure for the other four admiralties?  Ketting’s work on the VOC already indicates that regional recruitment varied too much – in the proportion of all foreigners as well as the composition of nationalities and the ratio of the different groups – to warrant this approach.  This is at least the case for the 1630s and 1640s.​[1585]​  Ketting clearly demonstrated the variation between Amsterdam and Zeeland, but perhaps did not stress it adequately enough.  With the much greater survival of VOC sources, it will be possible to determine the extent of this regional compartmentalisation.  Van Royen’s work on the merchant subsector proved that there were substantial variations in the native/foreign proportion between Amsterdam and other areas in the north of the Republic – but though noting the different trade specialisations in the regions that were almost completely absent in his sample (South Holland and Zeeland), he did not emphasise sufficiently the probable regional variations in crew composition that might result.​[1586]​  The regional variation revealed by these two scholars is reinforced by comparative evidence (though limited) from the Amsterdam admiralty – from the work of Van Vliet, Bruijn, and original material from this thesis.  (We shall return to this theme.)

Chapter 2, to assess first how the British might enter Dutch service, examined more closely the structure and workings of the maritime environment, principally regarding the Dutch navy in wartime (and during escalation into war).  The starting point was to explore differences between the British and Dutch recruitment systems that may have pushed British into Dutch service: possibly ideological ‘resentment’ at the British press and attraction to a Dutch system characterised as ‘free’; also British entering through a putative voluntary Dutch system had freedom of choice to enter enemy service – again a measure of possible ideological motivation.  
Though some maritime historians (Bruijn, Davids, Glete) have sometimes hinted at doubts as to whether the Dutch system of naval recruitment by trade embargo was truly or completely free, others (Jan Lucassen, Van Royen) have maintained its voluntary characteristics; none, however, have fully examined it.​[1587]​  The only explicit association with force was a passing mention by De Jonge some 150 years ago that no one has since run with.​[1588]​  This thesis disproves the predominant view of Dutch naval recruitment as fundamentally or basically ‘free’: Dutch embargoes on maritime trade were very severe, curtailing almost all seafaring jobs (except the VOC) for some months, sometimes very long periods.  Their varying duration on the other subsectors was described: the most impact was on the merchant and whaling subsectors, with the greatest manpower yield coming from Dutch merchant shipping, though foreign shipping trading to Dutch ports was usually subject also, causing diplomatic difficulties.  The embargo measures were, effectively, indirect force – seamen had either to join the navy or remain unemployed and risk poverty and starvation.​[1589]​  Recruitment was probably only truly free in peacetime.  The quota levy was an alternative to the embargo sometimes used, raised as a varying proportion of merchant crews, in return for non-imposition or release from the embargo.  This was indirect conscription, but this has not been hitherto recognised as such, and this system too had not been fully explored before.
Sometimes the importance of Dutch embargo measures are entirely missed by historians, so that temporary reductions in shipping and employment has been attributed to enemy privateering (Gijs Rommelse, on the Baltic trades and revenue from the convoy duties in 1665),​[1590]​ or warfare in the general sense and the Dutch navy’s failure to control the sea (Christiaan van Bochove and Jan Luiten van Zanden, on the fisheries during the Second Anglo-Dutch War).​[1591]​  Certainly, trade and shipping cannot be examined in wartime without taking the embargo into account; furthermore, systematic examination of the embargo legislation may even yield more knowledge of trade.
The British recruitment system was also shown to have used embargoes regularly and that this method had support at the highest levels.  Again, maritime historians have either skirted over the topic or very much played down the role of the British use of this method (Bernard Capp, J. David Davies, Peter Earle).  None have explored it in depth; Nicholas Rodger briefly suggests they were sometimes integral and hints at wide use, but most emphasis in British naval historiography has been to uncover the integral role of volunteers in partnership with the use of force.​[1592]​  Only Sir George Clark emphasised the major role of embargoes in the British system, as well as their use by both the Dutch and British; this, however, was some 50 years ago and mentioned only very briefly.​[1593]​  Fundamentally, there was no great divide in the recruitment systems; the major aspect of the state stopping the bulk of trade in order to man the navy was shared – supplemented in Britain by overt force (the press) and in the Dutch Republic by the incentive of wage increases.  
Other facets of the maritime environment in themselves demonstrate the internationalisation of maritime labour.  The British stopped and searched foreign ships (even foreign warships) for British personnel, though this has not achieved much prominence in the literature since Thomas Fulton looked at maritime sovereignty almost 100 years ago – and was then only tackled it briefly.​[1594]​  The practice has been overshadowed by other aspects of British searches which had more impact on international diplomacy due to sheer economic value – the search for banned foreign cargoes aboard Dutch ships – for instance, as Simon Groenveld has shown in the 1640s and early 1650s.​[1595]​  Though the evidence available was limited, it may be that Dutch warship captains viewed the British interference with some resignation, but this needs to be established.
Embargoes, quota levies and searches were not the end of the state’s reach into the maritime world.  The naval powers issued recalls of their sailors serving abroad – the Dutch and British (at least) did so regularly in wartime: this in itself is again clear evidence of the internationalisation of maritime labour, and of the state’s awareness that a considerable volume of its subject seamen were serving abroad.  This regular legislation, however, has attracted very little attention: recently, Johan Francke mentions it briefly in one Dutch case; John Ehrman rightly pointed out that it did not prevent or halt internationalisation, but this again was some 50 years ago and was only touched upon cursorily.​[1596]​  This thesis has shown that sailors both obeyed and disobeyed these measures, which has wider implications than naval recruitment – labour relations for example – as well as mapping out sailors’ mobility during wartime.
Unpleasant aspects of compulsion specified for non-compliance accompanied the Dutch embargo and recall legislation: these were aimed at seamen’s families – forfeiture of property and refusal of poor relief.  These have wider implications for the nature of Dutch government and society.  In contrast, though, to the death penalty always stipulated for non-compliance with the recalls, investigation of the British personnel in this thesis who were captured in enemy service shows that none were executed.  We only know for certain, however, of only one who was actually discovered, which seems to have been a difficult task in any case, when seamen had international experience, probably had some knowledge of other languages, and who would probably be shielded by their shipmates.  Seamen were a finite resource; execution of miscreants or ‘traitors’ was far from the certainty David Ogg thought it to be.​[1597]​  On the other hand, despite the draconian Dutch measures above against families of seamen, leniency shown by Dutch authorities to men found in foreign vessels would suggest more pragmatic attitudes sometimes prevailed (though examples men found in enemy ships are lacking in my period).
The abovementioned aspects of the state’s interference for the sake of manning its navy have attracted little attention from political and diplomatic historians; Rommelse omits the Dutch embargo and the role of recalls in negotiations with the northern maritime powers, when these added another layer to the tangle of diplomacy before and in the early stages of the Second Anglo-Dutch War.​[1598]​  Aspects of recruitment by embargo and a more active and aware state with regard to maritime labour raises the whole area of policy- and decision-making in both countries, as well as the political balance between government and the merchant interest – especially in the Dutch Republic where the trade interests were so close to government, and in Britain where Charles II also subordinated trade to the interests of the navy.  In the Dutch case application and evasion of the measures also reflects on the admiralties’ independence and on provincial interest.  Were the new stricter and more extensive Dutch embargo measures in 1653 due to De Witt’s elevation to Raadspensionaris and his influence – or a wider consensus, or was it just coincidence?  Substantial cross-fertilisation and convergence in recruitment techniques took place even before William III’s rule from 1688, raising another aspect of the Anglo-Dutch relationship and bringing a most important area into the extensive nebula of British ‘conscious imitation of the Dutch’.​[1599]​  We have even seen awareness of international labour colour naval operations and perhaps even greater strategic concerns: perhaps the Commonwealth’s tough attitude in negotiations in 1652 was indeed influenced by over-confidence of a new regime in calling back its seamen.  Similarly, the Zeeland States’ pressure for the issue of privateering commissions sought to harness wartime in-migration before it simply bled away to the enemy (so they claimed) – against the background of manoeuvring a declaration of war in addition to international and allied opinion.  Labour considerations affected higher diplomacy and politics, as well as relations between allies.
Generally, given this reassessment, more emphasis needs to be placed on naval recruitment in the development and effectiveness of navies, as well as the state and trade more widely.

Having just shown that trade was overwhelmingly the source of Dutch wartime naval manpower, Chapter 3 showed that the one comprehensive survey of Dutch merchant crews – Van Royen’s – was inapplicable to the Zeeland case.  This is because conditions varied so much regionally, as Van Royen himself has already shown within his northern merchant reconstruction; he also quietly pointed out that the situation in South Holland and Zeeland was different.  With its northern focus, Van Royen’s analysis agreed very broadly with Simon Hart’s study of Amsterdam seamen, but Herman Ketting’s crew analyses of the VOC showed clear distinctions between the Amsterdam and Zeeland chambers – both in the native/foreign ratio and the various foreign nationalities present.  The Amsterdam chamber’s foreigners were drawn from the north and east, like Van Royen and Hart’s material, but the foreign groups in the Zeeland chamber were radically different, with less Scandinavian involvement, and much less from the German Bight and Denmark.  Foreigners were drawn much more from the west and south: British seamen were very prominent, Flemish too, though Ketting’s method of categorisation did not express this westward outlook very clearly.  As with Van Royen, Ketting did not emphasise this strongly: these regional variations in crews derive directly from a Dutch region’s own trade specialisations and the mix of foreign shipping coming in to trade with the region’s ports.  Both contributed to the nationalities of foreign seamen present – whether transients or long-term migrants; the greater presence of British migrants (not just seamen) in South Holland and Zeeland also having been noted in Chapter 1.  The end result is a compartmentalisation of the Dutch regions manifesting in different foreign groups and/or different proportions of these in the crews of Dutch ships.  Through the embargo these regional differences would be reflected in basic distinctions in the five admiralties’ crew compositions.
With no breakdown of Zeeland’s European trade to hand (though empirical work on convoy destinations is possible, as Arjan Otte has shown,​[1600]​ and should be aimed at in the future as a rough indicator), the nationality of foreign shipping coming into Zeeland ports was used instead – as a direct source of naval manpower (as foreign shipping was also embargoed), a general measure of foreign seamen in peacetime and immediately pre-war, and also as a proxy for Zeeland merchant ships.  This hard data series, the ankeragegelden, showed that Britain, the Southern Netherlands and France dominated inbound foreign shipping, reflecting a fairly large part of what we know about Zeeland’s own European merchant shipping – orientation towards the west – though Iberia and the Mediterranean were hardly featured. 
Trade also pointed towards the British emigrant communities largely built around it; here, British expatriate merchants’ participation in the Dutch war effort is an example at the elite level of what the sailors are doing.  Dutch religious toleration also fostered the growth of the British communities: the theme of ideology was returned to, through the British non-conformist churches in Zeeland, as a factor in British transfer.  Sailors in church congregations proved useful for general linkage (given the lacuna in the payroll sources), but the evidence is still far too thin to warrant ideological motivation as a factor.  This, of course, needs further investigation.

Chapter 4 compared wage levels and incidence of payment in the Dutch and British navies (also looking more briefly at other subsectors), to determine whether any differences created incentives for transfer or migration of British personnel.  Chapter 4 showed that Dutch naval wages varied in a number of ways, but also regionally across the five different admiralties; it produced – for the first time – a fairly complete wage series for a Dutch admiralty (or in fact for any Dutch maritime subsector).  This Zeeland admiralty series confirmed the general pattern of market-driven wartime naval wage rises established in brief terms (but with no systematic evidence presented) most recently by Bruijn (and earlier with Jan Lucassen).  This, however, was with the proviso that it was a general but not a hard-and-fast rule: wages did not always rise in wartime, and might even rise in peacetime too.  Labour demand was the actual motor of wage changes, so that manpower also increased during episodes that did not involve warfare – such as naval exercises and other naval preparations made, for instance, for power-projection.  Similarly, manpower demand sometimes fell during wartime so that the wage was reduced.  Bruijn, Lucassen, and more recently Piet Boon have shown that merchant wages also rose in wartime.  Despite Bruijn’s overview of naval variation, this had insufficiently penetrated the historiography, so that general wage summaries both maritime (Davids, Francke) and wider economic investigations using naval wages (Van Zanden) have failed to take into account wartime rises at all, or have not stressed their operation enough.​[1601]​
Chapter 4 compared the nominal wage rates and showed that Dutch naval seamen’s pay always exceeded British wages during wartime, sometimes very substantially indeed – where any comparison had been made before, Charles Boxer’s very dated view of a low differential was disproved.  The differential was clearly an incentive for British to enter Dutch naval service.  The rates of most Dutch ranks increased in wartime; some petty and warrant officers’ pay also outstripped the British, others did not.
The benefits of Dutch service for British personnel were greatly enhanced when real wages were examined, using Robert C. Allen’s CPI: the differential favouring Zeeland service increased in size but also extended to cover much of the peacetime years.  The thesis examined real wages in the short-term; most historians (Allen, Van Zanden, De Vries and Van der Woude, Van Lottum, Van Bochove) have examined real wages in the long- or medium-term.​[1602]​  Here we see them operating in the career of an individual and in the perspective of the temporary migrant on an annual basis, or in that of a long-term labour migrant who might be weighing up his choices.  The often very appreciable naval real wage differential here in favour of Dutch service shows that the longer term trends identified by the abovementioned scholars need more detailed scrutiny and must be qualified when applied to the labour market in the short-term.  Chapter 4 also argued that real maritime wages are relevant to migrant sailors (even transients), in opposition to the view of Lex Heerma van Voss, Van Bochove and Van Lottum,​[1603]​ because even transients staying in the host only briefly would probably spend their wages there – at least, after the usual fashion of sailors, who were not known for their thrift.  Comparison of living standards would also inform migrants’ choices on their movements. 
The large real naval wage differential also exposed flaws in Van Lottum’s view of English-Dutch real wage parity (using non-maritime data) and English-Dutch nominal merchant wage parity, in relation to his comprehensive argument for England’s general isolation from the Dutch migration field.  For seamen, the first of these was not the case: real naval wages favoured the Dutch.  In the second, Van Lottum (also with Heerma van Voss and Van Bochove) did not build in either British or Dutch wartime merchant rises in the nominal rates, nor as abovementioned, convert these to real wages.​[1604]​  The British Zeeland admiralty personnel that are the focus of this thesis clearly show that British sailors were not excluded from the Dutch migration field, though they are perhaps exceptional in this respect, because of the special characteristics in Dutch naval wages.  (Most British sailors lived in southern England – principally in and around London, where the most work was – though they might have been born elsewhere.)  It may be that the situation with British seamen in the Zeeland admiralty was accompanied by a similar movement of sailors into merchant shipping; here we must bear in mind Van Royen’s study, but also take into account probable compartmentalisation in the south and west.  




With incidence of payment, Chapter 4 showed that Dutch practice was superior to British, through a comprehensive reconstruction (for Zeeland) of an individual sailor’s pay and arrears; this confirms Bruijn’s position, though no survey had been hitherto presented.  The view of Dutch incidence of payment does, however, vary widely in the literature.​[1606]​

British and other foreigners in the Zeeland admiralty

Chapter 5 presented the crew analyses and related these to the ‘control’ data of merchant shipping and the real naval wage differential, which both correlated very closely indeed.  For the British, these were the two crucial factors in determining their levels in Zeeland employment, which have already been summarised above.  These levels contrast with the current view.  First, the reduction in British apparent in Bruijn’s Zeeland research was exaggerated too much by Davids.​[1607]​  Second, Jan Lucassen states the ‘exceptionally weak representation of British sailors on Dutch ships in comparison to Scandinavians, Germans and [sometimes Southern Netherlanders]’.​[1608]​  This is indeed very much the case in Hart’s study of Amsterdam sailors and Van Royen’s merchant analysis, but Bruijn’s work on two of the admiralties do not justify the same conclusion over the whole of the period he studied: most dramatically in 1600, 14.5% of Zeeland naval personnel were from England and Scotland, whilst 8.5% were from Germany and 8% from Scandinavia and the Baltic.​[1609]​  




The western group always comprised at least half of all the foreigners, though the eastern group grew after 1672.  Many of the latter may, in any case, have been recruited in Holland, which adds another dimension (see Chapter 2).  As for recruitment inland, there is only a handful of inland Germans in the last episode, but this may be the genesis in Zeeland of the trend noted in the VOC and, in the eighteenth century, in the navy.  This structure is completely different from the compositions of Hart and Van Royen’s analyses, and is also different from Bruijn’s study of Zeeland in the mid-eighteenth century.  It does show broad similarities with Ketting’s study of the Zeeland VOC.  During our period, the Dutch maritime labour market was compartmentalised – at least in Zeeland for the admiralty and VOC, and due to regional trade specialisation, reciprocal foreign trade contacts and the coastal trade.  This compartmentalisation probably also distinguished South Holland broadly from the northern and eastern Republic too, though this needs to be established, as does its extent by province and subsector (merchant, VOC, WIC).  The main Zeeland recruitment zone covered the coasts of the North Sea to the west, the Channel and the French Biscay coast.
The Zeeland admiralty results are comparable to Degryse and Jan Parmentier’s very high levels of foreigners – particularly of English, Irish, French and Dutch – on Ostend East Indiamen, and the low incidence of Germans and Scandinavians.​[1611]​  This is again a completely different composition to Amsterdam and the north, indicating one again a more western emphasis. 
Rotterdam’s growth as a port and trade orientation towards Britain, France and the west was perhaps also reflected in the crews aboard the Rotterdam admiralty’s warships, but we are hindered by the sources.  It is worth noting, though, that Catterall’s work implies that British – or at least Scots – were heavily involved: besides a number of examples of common seamen, Vice-Admiral Kortenaar (respected then and today as one of the most able of Dutch senior officers) had a Scots navigator during the 1650s, as did the unpopular Vice-Admiral De With.​[1612]​  If two of the Rotterdam flagships had Scots in senior positions, then we can justifiably suspect more numerous British personnel lower down.  Preliminary work on the few payroll sources so far identified suggests appreciable British and other foreign involvement, but more work is necessary.

Foreigners in the Dutch maritime sector





Whilst we have seen that Zeeland cannot be taken as representative of all the admiralties (if indeed, any can), Van Lottum’s far-reaching analysis of foreigners in all the subsectors postulates that in the navy, foreigners declined from 50% in 1600 (after Bruijn) to just under 40% by 1635, continued at this level until around 1694, before increasing steadily until the late 1700s.  This agrees with the Zeeland data up to 1649, but diverges radically for the next 50 years.  This emphasises the need to complete the investigation for 1675-87 and after 1697.  Honing the analysis of both the Zeeland admiralty and the VOC to annual absolutes would also enhance our picture.

British and foreign ranks and careers in Zeeland

We have seen British in high ranks and important positions – on four occasions even as commissioned naval officers: at Amsterdam the Irish captain Tobias, though he was only example apparent so far actually during the Anglo-Dutch Wars.  The other three were in Zeeland: the ‘second captain’ Thomas Trantel (Yarmouth), post-Westminster, 1674; the Briton Ephraim Turner, commanding Zeist in the Nine Years’ War (also a former VOC captain); and the third-generation English immigrant Richard Wood, 1697-1709.  All these men require further research.​[1615]​  We have also seen French (usually Huguenot or suspected as such) and Southern Netherland commissioned officers, but should not be surprised that though the Dutch had a few foreign commanders, this was unusual.  There was perhaps simply too much native Dutch expertise available at this level, in the Zeeland case the two large officer dynasties are prominent, but it seems that virtually every son of a commissioned officer was schooled from the lower deck up with a view to a command in the future.  The officer corps, though, was not our focus.
Bruijn did not examine warrant officers. There were a number of British in these important positions, including three navigators during the Anglo-Dutch Wars: the long-serving Dougal and Charles (at least 13 and seven years, respectively), and the Irishman Maynard.  Other foreigners were also found in these ranks, but relatively rarely for all nationalities.  The odd Southern Netherlander, French, Norwegian or German master or navigator was also unusual, but they prove that it was possible.  The one exception was the position of surgeon, which was very accessible to foreigners; here French and Germans were the most common.  This, again, still needs to be explained.  
Bruijn has already challenged De Jonge’s much earlier position that foreigners could not access petty officer rank.  Van Royen, however, showed that foreigners found it extremely difficult to get to petty officer rank in the merchant subsector.  The evidence for the navy in this thesis is overwhelming: throughout the period foreigners were routinely promoted to petty officer rank – or preferred for these positions – just about as easily as native Dutch personnel.  The numbers of British petty officers indicate that British personnel were just as likely as any other foreigners to be preferred for ‘labour elite’ skilled positions; even enemy nationals were not excluded from responsibility in an admiralty that was clearly a meritocracy (certainly to petty officer rank, though it was much harder to reach warrant status).  The demand for manpower, skills and experience transcended nationality and even official status as enemies.  Perhaps there was more pressure in Zeeland because the province was shorter of men from trade and native population than the three Holland admiralties, but the Amsterdam admiralty comparisons, too, show that foreigners accessed petty officer rank easily.
Of some of the most notable men, the boatswain Robert Spens served 52 years.  The gunners David Thomson and Alexander Swain served for a minimum of 43 and 36 years respectively.​[1616]​  The emphasis on British gunners remains to be adequately explained.  This may be a coincidence, or perhaps British knowledge and/or techniques were particularly valued in this area.  Pepys thought that English gunners were widely acknowledged for their skill;​[1617]​ but this omits the Scots we have seen, and perhaps smacks of mere national pride.  It does not explain, additionally, the apparent profusion of (different) foreign gunners at Amsterdam.





Bruijn maintains that reduced operations in the eighteenth century ‘prevented the natural growth of loyalty to captain or ship’ – in contrast to the British navy where Rodger has already conclusively demonstrated the mutual bonds of loyalty between commander and crew.​[1618]​  These bonds were sufficient to prevent captains from advancing their careers by taking better or larger commands – simply in order to keep their men.​[1619]​  Capp and Davies have also shown this during the Interregnum and after the Restoration.​[1620]​  Later, in 1693, Scots volunteers turned over into Norfolk petitioned their admirals in disgust at being torn from their former commander.​[1621]​  For the seventeenth century Dutch navy, Bruijn was unsure: when recruiting, each commander began afresh and after 1652 ‘crews […] largely had no bond with the navy, although the frequency of naval campaigns would suggest otherwise’.​[1622]​  The last point is the crucial one for our period: many career men managed to stay in employment after peacetime demobilisation, when naval labour demand crashed to levels of a few thousands – just enough to run the convoys: in Zeeland say about 600 men.
The long naval careers of so many British (and other foreigners) with particular officers (or returning to those officers) points to men’s loyalty to their loved and respected commander; others seem to have ‘floated’ from ship to ship without forming attachments other than to the admiralty – or perhaps this was rather to a set of captains.  The great difference in our study here is that some followers were foreign immigrants and – for no less than three episodes during the whole period – enemy subjects.  From the many examples we have seen of long-service, some numbers of men plainly preferred the Dutch navy, staying for years on end both in war or peacetime.  Some seem to have made every effort to stay in, yet were demobilised in peacetime.  Whilst this thesis has focused on the British, it has been very clear in the course of the research (a couple of examples have been given earlier) that other foreigners also served for long periods.  This was also the case for some Dutch personnel: even without promotion.  For the British in the mid-eighteenth century, Nicholas Rodger has pointed out that seamen moved easily between the navy and merchant shipping:

‘there was no identifiable class of man-of-warsmen, there were simply seamen working at the moment for one particular employer’.​[1623]​

Nonetheless, in Zeeland there were a core of men who eschewed better-paid work in other subsectors, and who were career employees in the naval subsector serving through peacetime with labour demand much reduced.  Whether something else – in addition to the preference for employment aboard warships – marks out the British and other personnel in Zeeland or distinguishes them from other seamen remains to be established.  We can say that there was a group of professional men wedded to the admiralty, the veterans did form a core of ‘man-of-wars men’.
On top of these British veterans were more men who spent anything from six months to a couple of years in employment that was low-paid – in relation to other Dutch options, but for most of the time was a well-paid for British personnel.  Rodger has pointed out that work was not as hard on warships (tons per man productivity); whilst peacetime complements were lower than wartime, this seems to be the Dutch case too.  Also, for the British, Zeeland was in very close proximity to home, with established trade and coastal links – service terms were usually short and flexible (sometimes in wartime too).  Almost all the voyages were short – barring the very few famous Atlantic expeditions, the western Mediterranean convoy was the longest, those down the Channel and to Biscay much shorter.  These were attractive options for British personnel in peacetime, which sometimes persisted when wartime was of low intensity.  Added to these men of course, were those forced in during wartime.




Segmentation in the Dutch labour market applied to the maritime sector as an internal segment and external segment, where most naval personnel other than the higher ranks  are classified in the latter – composed of casual and migrant labour.​[1624]​  This thesis suggests some adjustment is worth considering.  Because of regular work with one employer, long-serving admiralty men from the lower ranks – sailors (serving long without promotion or veterans demoted because of age) and petty officers – can be moved to firmly within the internal segment; these include British and other foreigners who would otherwise belong in the external segment.  Some of both labour migrants and permanent migrants can move to within the internal segment.






Some tasks were beyond the scope of this study; some require investigation of their own on the same scale; some, already mentioned above, are still in progress.  There was no space, as mentioned, for closer analysis of the Nine Years War.  Some aspects need entirely new research (such as the large portion of foreign shipping that remains unattributed in Chapter 3).  
The most important benefit would be to address the remaining gaps in the wage data and crew analysis for where the sources are extant, and to process the data by annual absolutes.  Labour demand – manning levels – needs to be established annually also, which – if extended to the navy as a whole – would also contribute to the wider knowledge of the maritime sector being established by Van Lottum and Jan Lucassen.  The future points to refinement of the draft database attached here and research in Commander Poortvliet’s database, so that the career structure of other foreigners (and Dutch) can be compared more closely.  We cannot yet comment on age except in the tiniest minority of cases, compared with the emphasis placed by Rodger and Bruijn on youth,​[1627]​ though these are probably exceptional.  Rodger notes a few exceptions in the British navy.​[1628]​  Further research targeted at migrants’ home ports may reveal much more.  Combined with further work in the Zeeland population and church sources, this will illuminate the sailors in wider migration aspects.  For instance, it is difficult to say how far the British personnel as a whole can be regarded as a community.  Their very work, however, would have bonded them to each other and to their shipmates, as is clearly the case with some and their commanders.
With trade, the instances of convoys in the admiralty resolutions should established as a measure of trade, and the Zeeuwse Tol is sure to bring greater knowledge and perspective.  New sources and perspectives may even shed light on entry and departure routes – where the men were working before and after serving in the admiralty.




Van Royen very accurately pointed out that sailors and life at sea was a ‘dimly lit category of history’ because of the lack of sources.​[1629]​  The Zeeland crew sources can open up many avenues.  In terms of migration alone, here are series of data for a number of states and nationalities for comparison.  In the wider view, here is a major cross-over, a crucial connection between, on the one hand, maritime and naval history including its labour aspects – and on the other national and international histories.
British personnel were both a symptom and cause of the interdependence of Zeeland and Britain.  Seamen’s work made them intrinsically mobile: interaction was an everyday occurrence in a sphere of common maritime culture and exchange   At the root, the British rank and file’s presence was an inevitable consequence of the very structure and workings of the maritime/naval environment: seamen were drawn near through the framework of trade, then by state action via seizure and pervasive embargoes and sometimes draconian regulations.  Yet men rendered unemployed took different paths: many enlisted, many tried to return home.  How much real ‘choice’ there was in wartime is open to question; of those who ran for Britain some must have been driven by some sort of patriotism, others by fear of punishment or plain homesickness; all were subject to the ‘chance’ of finding help.  Others were stopped from returning – or had no intention whatsoever of doing so.








This is a list of the crews of particular ships that are most easily to be found; some are separate short pieces, others can be found together, in quite large pieces.  The crews are listed below as arranged in the boxes; they not in date order.  This is not a comprehensive list of all sources used: almost all partial and mixed extraordinary payments are not included.  Payments to individuals (petitions & passports) are not included.  Items in bold were fully sampled and are in the spreadsheets.

6784
Payroll of Hollandia (Frans Mangelaar), 15 July 1645

6785
Payroll of Zierikzee (Adriaan Banckert), 15 December 1645

6786
Payroll of Vlissingen (Frans Janssen), 11 February 1646
Payroll of Neptunis (Jan Pauwelssen), [3?] October 1645
Payroll of Goes (Cornelis Mangelaar), 9 November 1645
Payroll of Westcappel (Gillis Janssen), 4 November 1645

6795
Payroll of Arnemuiden (Claas Janssen), 1 June 1646

6796
Payroll of Middelburg [Ster?] (Adriaan Swart), 30 October 1646
Payroll of Amsterdam/Mereminne (A N Kempe), 17 July 1646
Payroll of Zeeridder (Bastiaan Thijssen & C Gerrits van Zanen), 11 Oct 1646

6803 
Payroll of Zeelandia (Adriaan Janssen ‘Gloeijenden Oven’), 12 April 1647
Payroll of Joos Banckert’s crew [Middelburg], 21 January 1648 

6804 
Payroll of Tholen (Cornelis van Regermorter), 29 November 1647

6805
Payroll of Wapen van Zeeland (Joos Willemssen Block), 26 April 1647
Payroll of Veere, (Cornelis Ringelszoon) [1 August 1644-30 April 1646]
Payroll of Veere, (Cornelis Ringelszoon), 22 October 1647 	
Payroll of Veere, (Cornelis Ringelszoon), 6 January 1648

6806




Payroll of Zeelandia (Adriaan Janssen ‘Gloeijenden Oven’), 6 October 1648

6814
Payroll of Hollandia (Frans Mangelaar), 14 October 1648

6816
Payroll of Neptunis (Jan Pauwelssen), 1 December 1648
Payroll of Westcappel (Gillis Janssen), 26 October 1648
Payroll of Zeeridder (C Gerrits van Zanen), 13 October 1648

6823
Payroll of Amsterdam (A N Kempe), 17 September/7 October 1649
Payroll of Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Zierikzee & ?], 24 July 1649
Payroll of Arnemuiden (Claas Janssen), 24 September 1649

6984
Payroll of Vlissingen (Cornelis Evertsen de Oude/Simon Block), 29 Dec 1665
Payroll of Zeelandia [Hof van Zeeland] (C Evertsen [de Oude]), 16 Oct 1665
Payroll of Utrecht (Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge), 16 October 1665
Payroll of Vlissingen (Simon Block), [16 October 1665]
Payroll of Westcappel (Dirrick Jobsen Kijella), 28 December 1665
Payroll of Delft (Jan Matthijssen/Jan Banckert), [16 October 1665]
Payroll of Zeelandia (Jan P Tant), [16 October 1665]
Payroll of Zouteland (Claas Reinierssen), [16 October 1665]
Payroll of Vlissingen (Cornelis Evertsen [de Oude]), 17 July 1665
Payroll of Delft (Jan Matthijssen/Jan Banckert), 15 October 1665
Payroll of Delft (Marinis Loncke), 17 July 1665
Payroll of Zwanenburg (Cornelis Cuijper), 1 July 1665
Payroll of Zeelandia [Hof van Zeeland] (Johan Evertsen), 17 July 1665
Payroll of Hof van Zeeland (Johan Evertsen), 5 January 1666
Payroll of Simon Block’s crew [Zeelandia], 17 July 1665 
Payroll of Zeelandia (Simon Block/Jan P Tant), 7 December 1665
Payroll of Westcappel (Marinis Loncke), 17 July 1665
Payroll of Middelburg (Jacob Pens), 22 July 1665

6985
Payroll of Wapen van Zeeland (Adriaan de Hase), 3 April 1665
Payroll of Zeeridder (Bastiaan Tuinman), 3 March 1665
Payroll of Dordrecht (Adriaan de Hase), 20 April 1665
Payroll of Wapen van Zeeland (Bastiaan Tuinman), 20 April 1665
Payroll of Dordrecht (Geleijn Pikke), 27 January 1665
Payroll of Dordrecht (Geleijn Pikke), 20 September 1664
Payroll of Veere (Adriaan Banckert), 20 April 1665
Payroll of Veere (Adriaan Banckert), 23 December 1664
Payroll of Zouteland (Claas Reinierssen), 17 July 1665

6986
Payroll of Utrecht (Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge), 17 July 1665

6994
Payroll of Utrecht (Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge), 15 January 1666
Payroll of Utrecht (Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge), 20 April 1665
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge’s crew [Utrecht], 31 December 1664
Payroll of Vlissingen (Cornelis Evertsen [de Oude]), 20 April 1665
Payroll of Vlissingen (Cornelis Evertsen [de Oude]), [?] December 1664

6995
Payroll of Zeelandia [Hof van Zeeland] (Johan Evertsen), [after 20] Dec 1664
Payroll of Zeelandia [Hof van Zeeland] (Johan Evertsen), 20 April 1665
Payment of maandgeld, Zwanenburg (Cornelis Cuijper), 23 May 1665
Payroll of Zwanenburg (Cornelis Cuijper), 24 May 1665
Payroll of Jan Banckert’s crew [Delft], [26?] December 1664
Payroll of Jan Banckert’s crew [Delft], 20 April 1665

6996
Payroll of Middelburg (Jacob Pens), 27 January 1666
Payroll of Hof van Zeeland (Simon Block), 6 August 1666
Payroll of Zeelandia (Simon Block), 20 April 1665
Payroll of Simon Block’s crew [Zeelandia], [?] December 1664 

6997
Payroll of Abraham Crijnssen’s crew [Zeelandia], 16 March 1666

6998
Payroll of LA [Cornelis] Evertsen [de Oude]’s crew [Walcheren], [1] Jun 1666 [I]
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]’s crew [Zierikzee], [1] June 1666 [I]
Payroll of Jan Matthijssen’s crew [Vlissingen], [1] June 1666
Payroll of Utrecht (Jan P Tant), 1 June 1666 [I]
Payroll of Dirrick Jobssen Kijella’s crew [Delft], [1] June 1666 [I]
Payroll of Abraham Crijnssen’s crew [Zeelandia], [1] June 1666
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste]’s crew [?], [?] June 1666
Payroll of Hof van Zeeland (Cornelis Evertsen [de Oude]), 18 August 1666
Payroll of Zierikzee/Utrecht (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]), 17 August 1666
Payroll of Delft (Jan Matthijssen), 18 August 1666
Payroll of Utrecht (Jan P Tant), from Zeelandia, 17 August 1666
Payroll of Middelburg (Jacob Pens), 18 August 1666
Payroll of Zeelandia (Abraham Crijnssen), 17 August 1666
Payroll of Zouteland (Claas Reinierssen), [August 1666]
Payroll of LA Cornelis Evertsen’s crew [Walcheren], 1 June 1666 [II]
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]’s crew [Zierikzee], 1 June 1666 [II]
Payroll of Jan P Tant’s crew [Utrecht], 1 June 1666 [II]
Payroll of Dirrick Jobssen Kijella’s crew [Delft], 1 June 1666 [II]
Payroll of Hof van Zeeland (Cornelis Evertsen [de Oude]), [April 1666]
Payroll of Zierikzee (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]), 13 April 1666
Payroll of Zeelandia (Jan P Tant), [April 1666]
Payroll of Dirrick Jobssen Kijella’s crew [Westcappel], [April 1666]




Prize money distribution for Zeeridder (Adriaan Banckert), 16 April 1666
Payroll of Tholen (Adriaan Banckert), 24 August 1666
Payroll of Tholen (Adriaan Banckert), 16 April 1666
Payroll of Veere (Adriaan Banckert), 29 January 1666
Payroll of Veere (Adriaan Banckert), 16 October 1665
Payroll of Veere (Adriaan Banckert), 22 July 1665
Payroll of Veere (Adriaan Banckert), 3 July 1665

6999.1
Payroll of Veere (Adriaan de Hase), 16 April 1666
Payroll of Dordrecht (Adriaan de Hase), 17 October 1665
Payroll of Dordrecht (Adriaan de Hase), 18 July 1665
Payroll of Dordrecht (Adriaan de Hase), 18 January 1666

6999.2
Payroll of Prins te Paard (Willem Marinissen), [May 1665]
Prize money distribution for A van Cruyningen’s crew [Dordrecht], 18 May 1666
Payroll of Goes (Adriaan van Cruyningen), 16 December 1665
Prize money distribution for Prins te Paard (Abraham Crijnssen), 30 April 1666
Prize money distribution for Prins te Paard (Claas Pietersz), 30 April 1666
Prize money distribution for Prins te Paard (Adriaan Thijssen), 17 Nov 1666

6999.3
Payment of new seamen, Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Tholen], [spring 1666]
Payment of new seamen, Adriaan de Hase’s crew [Veere], [spring 1666]
Payment of maandgeld, Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Tholen], 27 May 1666
Payment of maandgeld, Adriaan van Cruyningen’s crew [Dordrecht], 27 May 1666
Payment of maandgeld, Willem Heijdrickssen’s crew [Prins te Paard], 27 May 1666
Payment of new seamen, Zeeridder (Willem Marinissen), 13 March 1666
Payroll of Jan Crijnssen’s crew [Schakerloo], 7 May 1666
Payroll of Prins te Paard (Willem Heijndrickssen), 18 August 1666
Payroll of Prins te Paard (Abraham Crijnssen/Jacques Wolferssen), 27 May 1666
Payroll of Prins te Paard (Abraham Crijnssen), 24 December 1665

7004
Prize money distribution for Delft (Dirrick Jobssen Kijella), 1 April 1667

7006
Prize money distribution for Schakerloo (Willem Heijndrickssen), 20 May 1667

7013
Payroll of Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Walcheren], 8 November 1667
Payroll of Zierikzee (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]), 4 November 1667
Payroll of Delft (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]), 21 Nov 1667/14 Jan 1668
Payroll of Jan Matthijssen’s crew [Vlissingen?], 10 January 1668

7014
Payroll of Prins te Paard (Dirrick Jobssen Kijella), 27 November 1668

7015
Payroll of Vissers Herder (Jan P Tant), [?] February 1668

7016
Payment of ducatons to Adriaan de Hase’s crew [?], 7 December 1668
Payroll of Zeeuws Post, [26 November 1667]

7018
Payroll of Goes (Adriaan de Hase), [12 November 1667]

7019
Payroll of Schakerloo (Willem Heijndrickssen), 24 May 1668
Prize money distribution to Zeeridder etc, 7 February 1668 [I]
Prize money distribution to Zeeridder etc, 7 February 1668 [II]
Payroll of Dordrecht (Adriaan van Cruyningen), 28 May 1668

7023
Payroll of Dirrick Jobssen Kijella’s crew [?], 23 May 1669
Payroll of Adriaan de Hase’s crew [?], 31 January 1670
Payroll of Vissers Herder (Jan P Tant), extraordinary men, [Nov 1668-Mar 1669]
Payroll of Vissers Herder (Jan P Tant), [Jan-Aug 1669]
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]’s crew [?], extraordinary men, [Jan-Oct 1669]

7033
Payroll of Middelburg (Willem Heijndrickssen), 11 September 1670
Prize money distribution to Prins te Paard (Salomon le Sage), 30 October 1669
Prize money distribution to Zeeridder (Rochus Bastaert), 26 October 1669
Payroll of Schakerloo (Adriaan van Cruyningen), [May 1669-Apr 1670]
Prize money distribution to Goes [Dordrecht] (A van Cruyningen), [?] Sep 1669
Prize money distribution to Abraham Crijnssen’s crew [Zeelandia], 23 Dec 1667
Prize money distribution to B Keuvelaar’s crew [Vissers Herder], 23 Dec 1667
Prize money distribution to Simon Loncke’s crew [Westcappel], 23 Dec 1667
Prize money distribution to Frans Rooijs’ crew [Westersouburg], 23 Dec 1667
Prize money distribution for Aardenburg (Jan Adriaanssen), 23 Dec 1667

7043
Payroll of Adriaan de Hase’s crew [?], [11 January 1762]
Payroll of Delft (Adriaan de Hase), 27 May 1671
Payroll of Zeelandia (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]), 20 February 1671
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]’s crew [?], [Oct 1669-Feb 1671]
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]’s crew [?], 19 October 1671

7044
Payroll of Goede Hoop (Salomon le Sage), [5 May 1671]
Payroll of Schakerloo (Adriaan van Cruyningen), 30 October 1671 
Payment of loopgeld, Simon Loncke’s crew, [21 March 1672]
Payment of loopgeld, Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]’s crew [Utrecht], [21 March 1672]
Payment of loopgeld, Salomon le Sage’s crew, [21 March 1672]
Payment of loopgeld, Middelburg (Willem Heijndrickssen), [21 March 1672]
Prize money distribution to Jan Matthijssen’s crew [Delft], 25 May 1671
7052
Payroll of Utrecht (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste]), 7 May 1672
Payroll of Vlissingen (Adriaan de Hase), 7 May 1672
Payment of premiums to Surinam expedition ships, all 13 September 1669:
Payment of premiums, Abraham Crijnssen’s crew [Zeelandia]
Payment of premiums, B Keuvelaar’s crew [Vissers Herder]
Payment of premiums, Simon Loncke’s crew [Westcappel]
Payment of premiums, Frans Rooijs’ crew [Westersouburg]
Payment of premiums, Aardenburg (Jan Andriessen)

7173
Payroll of Cortienne (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste]), 24 April 1688
Payroll of Cortienne (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste]), 2 October 1688
Payroll of Carel van de Putte’s company, [September 1688]
Payroll of Gekroonde Burg, 24 September 1688
Payroll of Zeelandia, 5 October 1688
Payroll of Gekroonde Burg/Oranje, 25 September 1688

7183
Payroll of Zeist, 10 March 1690
Payroll of Zeist, 12 July 1689
Payroll of Zierikzee, 16 June 1689
Payroll of Gekroonde Burg (Carel van de Putte), [?] June 1689

7184
Payroll of Zierikzee, 1 December 1688
Payroll of Veere, 1 December 1688
Payroll of Zomer, [24 April 1690] I
Payroll of Zomer, 2 August 1689
Payroll of Zomer, [24 April 1690] II
Payroll of Veere, [5 April 1689]
Payroll of Gekroonde Burg (Carel van de Putte), 18 March 1689
Payroll of Walcheren, 2 June 1689

7194
Payroll of Veere (Cornelis Mosselman), [10 September 1690]

7403  
Payroll of Orange Galleij, 23 May 1710
Payroll of Orange Galleij, 9 April 1710
Prize money distribution, Blikkenburg, [?] 1708
Prize money distribution, Zierikzee, [1703] 10 November 1705
Payroll of Orange Galleij, [1706-1707], 22 December 1711
Prize money distribution, Veere [1708], 22 November 1709
Prize money distribution, Veere, [1705], [?] 1710
Payroll of Vlissingen, [1705-1706], 27 June 1710
Payroll of Nassau, 13 January 1711




Payroll of G. Maximilian van den Berge’s crew [?], [1709-1711], 30 April 1711
Payroll of Orange Galleij, [23 May 1711]
Payroll of Orange Galleij, 3 July 1711

7423  
Payroll of Nassau, 14 June 1712
Payroll of Veere, 6 January 1713
Payroll of Orange Galleij, 28 May/13 June 1712
Payroll of Orange Galleij, 27 May 1712
Payroll of Cortgeen, 15 November 1712

7432
Payroll of Nassau, [?] 1713

8315
Payroll of Goes (Carel van de Putte), 16 November 1672
Payment of mondkost, Jan Matthijssen’s crew [Oranje], 18 November 1672
Payroll of Daniel Thijssen’s crew [Zeehond], 15 November 1672
Payroll of Adriaan van Cruyningen’s men [Veere] drafted to Goes, 24 Dec 1672
Payroll of Bruinvis (Anthonij Janssen), 17 November 1672
Payroll of Jan Matthijssen’s crew [Oranje], 4 July 1672
Payroll of Adriaan van Cruyningen’s crew [Veere], 4 July 1672
Payroll of Carel van de Putte’s crew [Goes], 4 July 1672
Payroll of Daniel Thijssen’s crew [Zeehond], [4 July 1672]

8316
Payroll of Walcheren (Adriaan Banckert), 21 October 1672
Payroll of Delft (Simon Loncke), 20 December 1672
Payroll of Simon Loncke’s crew [Delft], [28 November 1672]
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste’s] crew [Zwanenburg], 26 October 1672
Payroll of Evert Evertsen Franszoon’s crew [Surinam], 26 October 1672
Payroll of Cornelis Eeuwoutssen’s crew [Sint Joris], 26 October 1672
Payroll of Eenhoorn (Peter Block), 2 August 1672
Payroll of Goes (Carel van de Putte) [partial], 31 December 1672 
Payroll of Goes, transfer from Veere (Adriaan van Cruyningen), [23 Dec 1672] 

8317
Payroll of Schakerloo (Paschier de Witte), [31 December 1672]
Payroll of Schakerloo (Paschier de Witte), 21-22 February 1673
Payroll of Vissers Herder (Barent Maartenssen), 23 May 1673
Payroll of Pelikaan (Thonis Janssen), 23 May 1673
Payroll of Haas (Jan van Eede) [1672], 23 May 1673
Payroll of Vissers Herder (Barent Maartenssen), 21-22 February 1673
Payroll [unknown fireship] (Pieter Hermanssen), 24 May 1672
General payment of ducatons, all 23 May 1672:
Payment of ducatons, Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Walcheren]
Payment of ducatons, Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]’s crew [Zierikzee]
Payment of ducatons, Willem Heijndrickssen’s crew [Middelburg]
Payment of ducatons, Marinis [Simon] Loncke’s crew [Delft]
Payment of ducatons, Domburg (Dirrick Jobssen Kijella)
Payment of ducatons, Cornelis Hollare’s crew [Bruinvis]
Payment of ducatons, Carel de Ridder’s crew [Zwaluw]
Payment of ducatons, Andries den Boer’s crew [unknown snow]
Payment of ducatons, [unknown fireship] (Antheunis Janssen)
Payment of ducatons, [unknown fireship] (Maarten Andriessen)
Payment of ducatons, Sint Jan (Benjamin Stevenssen)
Payment of ducatons, [unknown fireship] (Pieter Hermanssen)
Payment of ducatons, Haas (Jan van Neer?)
Payment of ducatons, Sint Catherina (Adriaan Janssen)
Payment of ducatons, Sint Joris (T Jacobssen Freuijt)
Payment of ducatons, Succes (Cornelis Janssen)
Payment of ducatons, Eenhoorn (Pieter Block)
Payment of ducatons, Surinam (Evert Evertsen [Franszoon])
Payment of ducatons, Salomon le Sage’s crew [Vlissingen]
Payment of ducatons, Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste]’s crew [Zwanenburg]
Payroll [unknown fireship] (Antheunis Janssen), 28 April 1672
Payroll of Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Walcheren], 22 April 1672
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]’s crew [Zierikzee], 22 April 1672
Payroll of Willem Heijndrickssen’s crew [Middelburg], 23 April 1672
Payroll of Simon Loncke’s crew [Delft], 23 April 1672
Payroll [unknown fireship] (Antheunis Janssen), [7 June 1672]
Payroll of Salomon le Sage’s crew [Vlissingen], [7 June 1672]
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste]’s crew [Zwanenburg], 3 May 1672
Payroll of Evert Evertsen [Franszoon]’s crew [Surinam], [7 June 1672]
Payroll of Andries den Boer’s crew [unknown snow], 15 May 1672
Payroll [unknown fireship] (Pieter Hermanssen), 11 May 1672
Payroll of Sint Joris (T Jacobssen Freuijt), 16 May 1672
Payroll of Sint Catherina (Adriaan Janssen), 13 May 1672
Payroll of Eenhoorn (Pieter Block), 17 May 1672
Payment of ducatons, Abraham Buscop’s crew [Domburg], 12 June 1672
Payroll of Domburg (Dirrick Jobssen Kijella), [7 May 1672]
Payment of maandgeld, C Evertsen de Jongste’s crew [Zwanenburg], July 1672

8318
Payment of mondkost, Oranje (Adriaan van Cruyningen), [13 March 1673] 
Payment of mondkost, Veere (Dirrick Jobssen Kijella), [13 March 1673]
Payment of ducatons, Oranje (Adriaan van Cruyningen), [20 May 1673]
Payment of ducatons, Veere (Dirrick Jobssen Kijella), [20 May 1673]
Payment of ducatons, Roskam (Heijman Adriaensen), [20 May 1673]
Extraordinary, Evert Evertsen [Franszoon]’s crew [Surinam], [15 July 1673]
Payment of loopgeld, Carel van de Putte’s crew [Domburg], [27 March 1673]
Payment of mondkost, C Evertsen [de Jonge]’s crew [Zierikzee], [27 March 1673]
Payment of mondkost, Jan Matthijssen’s crew [Gekroonde Burg], [27 Mar 1673]
Payment of loopgeld, Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Walcheren], [27 March 1673]
Payment of mondkost, Pieter de Moor’s crew [Tonijn], [27 March 1673]
Payment of mondkost, Salomon le Sage’s crew [Vlissingen], [27 March 1673]
Payroll of Walcheren (Adriaan Banckert), [4 June 1673]
Payroll of Zierikzee (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]), [1 June 1673]
Payroll of Domburg (Carel van de Putte), [29 May 1673]
Payroll of Delft (Adriaan Banckert de Jonge), [27 May 1673]
Payroll of Middelburg (Adriaan Coenraet), [27 May 1673]
Payroll of Vlissingen (Salomon le Sage), [28 May 1673]
Payroll of Utrecht (Simon Loncke), [3 June 1673]
Payroll of Gekroonde Burg (Jan Matthijssen), [17 June 1673]
Payroll of Zwaluw (Matthijs Laureijnssen), [12 April 1672]
Payroll of Pieter de Moor’s crew [Tonijn], [12 April 1672]
Extraordinary, Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste]’s crew [Zwanenburg], [8 April 1673]
Payroll of Bruinvis (Adriaan Banckert de Jonge), 28 March 1673
Payroll of Tonijn (Dirrick Jobssen Kijella), [15 February 1673]
Payroll of Bruinvis (Adriaan Banckert de Jonge), [15 February 1673]

8319
Payroll of Gekroonde Burg (Jan Matthijssen), 25 July 1673
Payroll of Middelburg (Adriaan Coenraet), 25 July 1673
Payroll of Dordrecht (Willem Heijndrickssen), 15 December 1673
Payroll of Daniel Thijssen’s crew [Zeehond], [24?] January 1674
Payroll of Haeyman Adriaanssen’s crew [?], [24 January 1674]
Payroll of Goes transferred from Oranje, 9 December 1673
Payroll of Veere (Dirrick Jobssen Kijella), 22 November 1673
Payroll of Dordrecht (Willem Heijndrickssen), 12 July 1673
Payroll of Goes transferred from Oranje, [28 October 1673]
Payroll of Dirrick Jobssen Kijella’s crew [Veere], 26 July 1673
Payroll of Daniel Thijssen’s crew [Zeehond], [9 September 1673]
Payroll of Roskam (Haeyman Adriaanssen), 26 May 1673
Payroll of Oranje (Adriaan van Cruyningen), 12 May 1673
Payroll of Veere (Dirrick Jobssen Kijella), 12 May 1673

8319.1
Payroll of Walcheren (Adriaan Banckert), [30 September 1673]
Payroll of Zierikzee (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]), [30 September 1673]
Payroll of Domburg (Carel van de Putte), 12 August 1673
Payroll of Pieter de Moor’s crew [Tonijn snow?], 29 September 1673
Payroll of Zwaluw (Matthijs Laureijnssen), 28 September 1673
Payroll of Matthijssen’s crew [Gekroonde Burg] transfer to [Zierikzee], 12 Oct 1673
Payroll of Loncke’s crew [Utrecht] transfer to [Zierikzee], 12 October 1673
Payroll of Le Sage’s crew [Vlissingen] transfer to [Zierikzee], 12 October 1673
Payroll of Coenraet’s crew [Middelburg] transfer to [Domburg], 21 October 1673
Payroll of Delft (Adriaan Banckert de Jonge), 7 October 1673
Payroll of Utrecht (Simon Loncke), 18 October 1673
Payroll of Tholen (?), [23 September 1673]
Payroll of Walcheren (Adriaan Banckert), 27 October 1673
Payroll of Zierikzee (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]), 7 November 1673
Payroll of Matthijs Laureijnssen’s crew [Zwaluw], [27 November 1673]
Payroll of Domburg (Carel van de Putte), 27 October 1673
Payroll of Vlissingen (Salomon le Sage), 12 December 1673
Payroll of Orangeboom, binnenschip, 21 February 1674
Payroll of Zwanenburg (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste]), 22 December 1673
Payroll of Evert Evertsen [Franszoon]’s crew [Surinam], [22 December 1673]
Payroll of Sint Joris (Cornelis Eeuwoutssen), 22 December 1673
Payroll [unknown drimmelaar] (G J Schuytte), 2 February 1674
Payroll of Matthijs Laureijnssen’s crew [Zwaluw snow?], 28 March 1674
Payroll of Pieter de Moor’s crew [Tonijn snow?], 28 March 1674
Payroll of Roskam (Haeyman Adriaanssen), [18 March 1674]
Payroll of Zeehond (Daniel Thijssen), 28 July 1674
Payroll of Schakerloo (Paschier de Witte), [3 July 1674] 

8319.9
Prize money distribution to Tonijn (Dirrick Jobssen Kijella), 21 November 1674

8362
Payroll of Abraham Basselaar’s crew [unknown snow], [28 April 1674]
Payroll of Matthijs Laureijnssen’s crew [Zwaluw snow?], [28 April 1674]
Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste]’s crew [Zwanenburg], [19] April 1674
Payroll of Evert Evertsen Franszoon’s crew [Surinam], [19] April 1674
Payroll of Sint Joris (Cornelis Eeuwoutssen), 19 April 1674
Payment of schellings, all [2 June 1674]
Payment of schellings, Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Walcheren]
Payment of schellings, Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]’s crew [Zierikzee]
Payment of schellings, Simon Loncke’s crew [Utrecht]
Payment of schellings, Carel van de Putte’s crew [Vlissingen]
Payment of schellings, Adriaan Coenraet’s crew [Middelburg]
Payment of schellings, Adriaan Banckert de Jonge’s crew [Delft]
Payroll of Zierikzee (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]), 7 May 1674
Payroll of Simon Loncke’s crew [Utrecht], [May 1674]
Payroll of Carel van de Putte’s crew [Vlissingen], [May 1674]
Payroll of Adriaan Coenraet’s crew [Middelburg], 9 May 1674
Payroll of Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Walcheren], 22 May 1674
Payroll of Adriaan Banckert de Jonge’s crew [Delft], 22 May 1674
Payroll of T Jacobssen Freuijt’s crew [Zwanenburg?], [8 June 1674]
Payroll of Zomer (Joos Willemssen), [9 July 1674] 
Payroll of Jacob Vogel’s crew [Hoop], 21 July 1674
Payroll of Oranje (Adriaaan van Cruyningen), 15 May 1674
Payroll of Goes (Cornelis Hollare), 15 May 1674
Payroll of Dordrecht (Willem Heijndrickssen), 15 May 1674
Payroll of Roskam (Haeman de Waet), 14 June 1674
Payment of schellings, Gekroonde Burg (Pieter Keuvel), [15 September 1674]
Payroll of Gekroonde Burg (Pieter Keuvel), 4 September 1674
Payroll of Daniel Pieterssen’s crew [?], 17 September 1674
Payroll of Hoop (Jacob Vogel), 19 September 1674
Payroll of Abraham Basselaar’s crew [unknown snow], 12 October 1674
Payroll of Zierikzee (Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge]), 19 October 1674
Payroll of Utrecht (Simon Loncke), 30 October 1674
Payroll of Vlissingen (Carel van de Putte), 16 October 1674
Payroll of Vlissingen (Carel van de Putte), 17 November 1674

8363
Payroll of Tholen (Simon Loncke), 16 November 1674
Payroll of Walcheren (Adriaan Banckert), 22 October 1674
Payroll of Dordrecht (Willem Heijndrickssen), 27 October 1674
Payroll of Goes (Cornelis Hollare), 3 November 1674
Payroll of Delft (Adriaan Banckert de Jonge), 11 Decmber 1674
Payroll of Middelburg (Adriaan Coenraet), [10 October 1674]
Payroll of Oranje (Adriaaan van Cruyningen), [10 October 1674]
Payroll of Zeehond (Cornelis Eeuwoutssen), 23 December 1674
Payroll of Gekroonde Burg (Cornelis Evertsen de Jongste), 9 August 1674

8364
Payment of compensation, Schakerloo, 19 November 1674
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^426	  PRO, SP 84/175, f. 94.  Downing to Arlington, 18/28 April 1665; ibid, ff. 97, 97r.  Downing to Arlington, 26 April/5 May 1665.
^427	  PRO, SP 84/175, f. 77r.  De Bacquoy [De Ruyven] to [Arlington], 11 April 1665.  (L’Âmiraute d’Amsterdam ont ecrit à leurs Hautes Puissants que la foule des matelots […] cessoit entierement’.)
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^446	  One British pamphlet of 1728 erroneously maintained that the Dutch had only laid two embargoes since 1672.  See Sailors Advocate, 22.
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^464	  NA, AA 2484.  RAvZ, 23 March 1665 (on States General, extract resolution & missive, 16 March 1665); Bruijn, ‘Dutch Privateering’, Neerlandica, 87; Bruijn, ‘Dutch Privateering’, Course et Piraterie, 405, both citing NA, AA 2486.  RAvZ, 14 September 1665.
^465	  NA, AA 2491.  RAvZ, 6 June 1667; ibid, 20 June 1667.
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^468	  NA, AA 2498. RAvZ, 27 March 1673 (on States General extract resolution & missive, both 22 March 1673, taken on petition of owners of 11 frigates and two snows).
^469	  Bruijn, ‘Dutch Privateering’, Neerlandica, 87; Bruijn, ‘Dutch Privateering’, Course et Piraterie, 405.  It is similar with Lunsford, again relying entirely on Bruijn.  See Lunsford, Piracy and Privateering, 23-24.
^470	  PRO, SP 84/175, f. 1.  Downing to Bennet, 2/12 March 1665; ibid, f. 12.  Downing to Bennet, 7/17 March 1665; ibid, f. 156.  Amsterdam admiralty to States General, 2/12 March 1665 [English translation in Downing’s hand].  The Amsterdam captains were Van der Hulst; Gillis Thijssen van Campen; Jan van Campen; Pieter Salomons; Nicolaas Marrevelt; Isbrant de Vries; Adriaan van Reede.
^471	  April 1665, CSPV 1664-1665, 103.
^472	  NA, AA 2484.  RAvZ, 14 March 1665 (on Jan Banckert and the privateer Jan Diemissen); ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Delft, 15 October 1665.  
^473	  ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Hof van Zeeland, 5 January 1666.  Though we cannot be certain beyond any doubt that these British seamen were loyal subjects who, after the recent declaration of war, refused to fight their own country and ran home – this seems much more likely than them choosing to desert to serve on a Zeeland privateer for money.  The latter option risked, in theory, punishment by death from both sides – whether captured by the British, or discovered by the Dutch.
^474	  NA, AA 2484.  RAvZ, 17 January 1665 (on States General, missive & extract resolution, both 13 January 1665).  (‘groote menichte op hope van emploij van buiten incomende gelijck men alreede begonnen gewaer te werden sullende bij langer uitstel vant’ verleenen der […] commissien niet alleen geen volck van andere quartieren sijn te verwachten, maer oock dat veel schipsvolck ledig aen de wal sal moeten blijven, buijten emploij’.)
^475	  Francke, Utiliteyt, 96.  This figure, however, is based on a very small sample (169 men), because of the lack of sources.
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^1139	  ZA, Rek. C 6784.  Wijllem Mongomerij [Ayr], petition, 7 June 1645; ibid.  Jan Mackij [Aberdeen], petition, 7 June 1645; ibid.  Janne Kesbo [Lancaster/Lincolnshire], petition,  11 October 1645; ibid.  Andries Denijs (Leith), petition, 11 October 1645; ibid.  Heijndrick Kitsman (Yorkshire), petition, 5 February 1646; ibid, 6804.  Robbert Adams (Kilmarnock), petition, 9 September 1647; ibid.  Johannis Keesbroeck (Lancaster[/Lincolnshire]), petition, 23 September 1647; ibid.  Thomas Willemss (Cornwall), petition, 30 September 1647; ibid.  Jan Mackin (Aberdeen), petition, 4 December 1647; ibid.  Johannis Keesbreet (Lancaster[/Lincolnshire]), petition, 1 February 1648.
^1140	  NA, AAAa 41.  RAvZ, Index, ‘Convoy te doen […]’, 16 December 1644; ibid, 2466.  RAvZ, 21 & 30 April 1646, [8?] July 1646, 12 September 1646.
^1141	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 6784.  Payroll of Hollandia, 15 July 1645; ibid, 6814.  Payroll of Hollandia, 14 October 1648.
^1142	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 6784.  Payroll of Hollandia, 15 July 1645; ibid, 6814.  Payroll of Hollandia, 14 October 1648.
^1143	  ZA, Rek. C 6784.  Wilm Prys (London), petition, 7 August 1645; ibid, 6804.  Wilm Prijs (London), petition, 24 June 1647.
^1144	  ZA, Rek. C 6804.  Andryes Rasmus (Shetland), petition, 12 June 1647.
^1145	  ZA, Rek. C 6784.  Jan Fackenaer (Alderney), petition, 11 October 1645; ibid, 6822.  Jan Fackenaer (Alderney), petition, 14 July 1649.
^1146	  ZA, Rek. C 6814.  Gilbert Tommasse (Aberdeen), petition, 16 September 1648.
^1147	  ZA, Rek. C 6804.  Alecsander Samuelse (Aberdeen), petition, 6 March 1647; ibid.  Alecsander Samuelse (Aberdeen), petition, 19 October 1647.
^1148	  ZA, Rek. C 6804.  Jacop Davijetsen (Aberdeen), petition, 17 April 1647; ibid.  Jacop Davidtse (Aberdeen), petition, 12 October 1647; ibid, 6814.  Jacop Davidtse (Aberdeen), petition, 19 September 1648.  (‘alles nu comt in te geliggen’.)
^1149	  ZA, Rek. C 6784.  Sander Gerritse (Shetland), petition, 15 November 1645; ibid, 6804.  Sander Gerritse (Shetland), petition, 6 March 1647; ibid.  Andryes Gouny (Aberdeen), petition, 13 March 1647; ibid.  Pyeter Boy (Jersey), petition, 13 March 1647; ibid.  Dirck Wael (Milton), petition, 27 March 1647; ibid.  Andryes Rasmus (Shetland), petition, 12 June 1647; ibid.  Jan Robbertse (Plymouth), petition, 17 July 1647; ibid.  Jan Robberse (Plymouth), petition, 13 January 1648; ibid.  Andrijes Rasmus (Shetland), petition, 20 January 1648.
^1150	  The Zeelanders were to send one warship and a yacht in 1649; one warship and a frigate in 1653.  See NA, AAAa 41.  RAvZ, Index, ‘Brazyl 6 schepen & 6 jagts […] te zenden’, 28 October 1649; ibid.  ‘Brazyl 6 schepen en 2 fregatten […] te zenden’, 17 February 1653.
^1151	  ZA, SvZ 2117.2, ff. 67, 175, 292.  Joachimi to States General, 15 May 1646, 15 June 1646, 13 July 1646; NA, AAAa 41.  RAvZ, Index, ‘Brazyl 3 schepen van oorloge derwaerts te zenden’, 10 January 1646.  
^1152	  http://anglo-dutch-wars.blogspot.com/2005/11/tromps-fleet-off-dunkirk-on-19-april.html. (citing M. G. de Boer, Tromp en de Duinkerkers (1949)).
^1153	  Roos, Zeeuwen en de Westindische Compagnie, 57-63; G. J. A. Raven, ‘De Banckerts’, Marineblad, 92 (1982), 521.  Raven gave the size of the expedition as much higher – at 52 ships.
^1154	  NA, AA 2466.  RAvZ, 23 October 1647.
^1155	  There may have been two ships named Middelburg at this time.  The other was Adriaan Swart’s ship, but her right name may have been Ster.  Commander Poortvliet does not give a name for Banckert’s ship, though Roos does.  See Roos, Zeeuwen en de Westindische Compagnie, 59-60, 62.  Also, Banckert’s payroll does actually name the ship, but not at the top and tail (as was usual): her name only appears because her clerk, Guilliaem de Backer, prepared two wills for crewmembers, noted as marginalia.  The first, for no. 35 Steven Bokagier (Le Havre), was dated 16 April 1647; note states that De Backer is clerk ‘of the ship Middelburg’.  The second, for no. 79 Francke Phillips (St Thomas), who died 4 January 1647, was dated 31 December 1646; note states that this was done ‘in the ship Middelburg, lying off Recife’.  See ZA, Rek. C 6803.  Payroll of Joos Banckert’s crew [Middelburg], 21 January 1648.
^1156	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 6803.  Payroll of Joos Banckert’s crew [Middelburg], 21 January 1648; ibid, 6805.  Payroll of Veere, 22 October 1647; ibid, 6806.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 23 January 1648.  Because of the long period covered by the sources for two of the three ships, a tight time-frame is only possible for Veere at present.  Detailed analysis of Middelburg and Vlissingen is, of course, possible in the future.
^1157	  Source: ZA, Rek. C 6803.  Payroll of Joos Banckert’s crew [Middelburg], 21 January 1648.
^1158	  NA, AA 2468.  RAvZ, 15 October 1650.  The action was presumably the Battle of the Downs. 
^1159	  ZA, Rek. C 6790, ff. 164, 165v, 166v, 167v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1646 (7 March 1646, 18 April 1646, 29 September 1646, 27 October 1646).
^1160	  NA, AA 2466.  RAvZ, 30 April 1646.  Two Germans (Lübeck and Hamburg) are given here, but the Lübecker is given as Danish (Glückstad) in the payroll.
^1161	  ZA, Rek. C 6803.  Roobaert Spens [Kirkcaldy], petition, 26 August 1647.
^1162	  ZA, Rek. C 6803.  Willem Woet [St Andrews], petition by wife [unnamed], 1 July 1647; ibid.  Willem Woudt [St Andrews], petition by wife Catelijne Morten, 7 October 1647.
^1163	  ZA, Rek. C 6784.  Sandert Frissil (Inverness), petition, 20 March 1645; ibid, 6803.  Sandert Frissel (Inverness), petition by wife [unnamed], 29 May 1647.
^1164	  ZA, Rek. C 6803.  Roobaert Spens [Kirkcaldy], petition, 26 August 1647; ibid.  Joon Morfiel [London], petition, 9 September 1647.
^1165	  ZA, Rek. C 6804.  Andryes Gouny (Aberdeen), petition, 13 March 1647; ibid, 6814.  Payroll of Hollandia, 13/14 October 1648.  (‘Marij Gounij de moij’.)
^1166	  Roos, Zeeuwen en de Westindische Compagnie, 59.
^1167	  It is unclear if this was due to some action or illness?  The Frenchman Bokagier above died the following day.
^1168	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.7.  Robert Spens [Kirkcaldy], petition for compensation, 4 July 1672
^1169	  ZA, Rek. C 6750, f. 173.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1642 (28 June 1642); ibid, 6790, ff. 165v, 167v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1646 (18 April 1646, 27 October 1646); ibid, 6803.  Roobaert Spens [Kirkcaldy], petition, 26 August 1647; ibid.  Payroll of Joos Banckert’s crew [Middelburg], 21 January 1648.
^1170	  ZA, Rek. C 6860, ff. 217, 222v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (25 June 1653, 3 November 1653); ibid, 6870, ff. 506-507.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1654 (medical expenses, 29 April 1654)
^1171	  ZA, Rek. C 6803.  Roobaert Spens [Kirkcaldy], petition, 26 August 1647; Nederduits Hervormde Gemeente Vlissingen, Ondertrouw Register, 1599-1810, Mannen, 4213.  Jacobs could sign her initials, though hesitantly.
^1172	  http://17th-centurynavwargaming.blogspot.com/2005_12_01_archive.html.
^1173	  NA, AA 2466.  RAvZ, 21 April 1646.  An English ketch full of English soldiers en route to Dunkirk had been driven into Walcheren by bad weather.  The ketch and her captain were released.
^1174	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 6786.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 11 February 1646; ibid, 6806.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 23 January 1648.
^1175	  William Perryman, like his father, had served aboard Vlissingen since February 1643.  He was probably in his mid- to late teens, as he was promoted from ship’s boy in autumn 1644.
^1176	  ZA, Rek. C 6796.  Robbert Draek [Topsham], wife’s petition, 26 September 1646.
^1177	  For instance, as a sailor in one of the other expedition ships – or a WIC ship, or privateer.  He could have come from another state’s ship, or been in Portuguese service and swapped sides.  Previously, Johnson may even have been a soldier in Brazil already, or taken there with the expedition.
^1178	  NA, AAAa 41.  RAvZ, Index, ‘Capiteijn Ringers excessen in zee begaen hebbende, begeeren haer Hogen Mogens informatien’, 28 July 1642.
^1179	  http://anglo-dutch-wars.blogspot.com/archives/2005_12_01_anglo-dutch-wars_archive.html.  The prize was ex-Kasteel van Medemblik (27, 105 men).
^1180	  ZA, Rek. C 6785.  Joris Watterborn (Prestonpans), petition, 24 April 1645; ibid, 6796.  Joris Watterborren (Prestonpans), petition, 2 May 1646.
^1181	  ZA, Rek. C 6786.  Payroll of Neptunis, [3?] October 1645; ibid, 6816.  Payroll of Neptunis, 1 December 1648
^1182	  ZA, Rek. C 6805.  Payroll of Wapen van Zeeland, 26 April 1647.
^1183	  NA, AA 2465.  RAvZ, 19 December 1644, 21 January 1645.
^1184	  (‘verlopen aen den vyandt’.)
^1185	  NA, AA 2466.  RAvZ, 9 & 30 July 1646.
^1186	  NA, AA 2466.  RAvZ, 29 August 1646, 6 September 1646, 27 October 1646.
^1187	  NA, AA 2466.  RAvZ, 9 July 1646 (the men are named here and given as ‘English’); ibid.  RAvZ, 24 September 1646 (on their petition).  
^1188	  NA, AA 2466.  RAvZ, 26 September 1646 (on Scot’s petition).  It is unknown where Scot went.  The Royalist captain was given variously as Catrick, Cockevil and Cattreel.
^1189	  Pieter Goddyn (Dunkirk) served right through to the pay-off in 1649.  The other three men seem to have disappeared.
^1190	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 6785.  Payroll of Zierikzee, 15 December 1645; ibid, 6823.  Payroll of Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Zierikzee/?], 24 July 1649.
^1191	  At 50 men, the crew was too small for the hoogbootsman and schieman to have mates.
^1192	  ZA, Rek. C 6785.  Thomas Ritserssen (Scarborough), petition, 7 June 1645; ibid, 6795.  Thomas Ritsers [Scarborough], petition, 4 April 1646; ibid.  Thomas Ridchardson [Scarborough], petition, 13 October 1646; ibid, 6804.  Toomaes Ressert [Scarborough], petition, 6 April 1647.
^1193	  ZA, Rek. C 6795.  Dirrick Blanckert (Wimborne), petition, 4 April 1646; ibid.  Dirrick Blanckert [Wimborne], petition, 21 November 1646.
^1194	  ZA, Rek. C 6795.  Davit Janssen (Kirkcaldy), petition, 24 September 1646.
^1195	  ZA, Rek. C 6795.  Sander Smidt [Leith], petition, 4 April 1646; ibid, 6804.  Sander Smidt (Leith), petition, 31 July 1647.  (‘seer sober in de abijten’.)
^1196	  ZA, Rek. C 6804.  Binnet Colve (Fowey), petition, 27 January 1648.  (‘alles verteert heeft dat hij in de warelt heeft en niet en heeft om aen te spreken’.)
^1197	  ZA, Rek. C 6804.  Eduwaert Brom (Dartmouth), petition, 19 August 1647.
^1198	  ZA, Rek. C 6804.  Dirck Dirckssen (Cork), petition, 31 July 1647.  (‘hij niet en heeft om aen te spreken als sijne verdiende gagie’.)
^1199	  ZA, Rek. C 6804.  Robbert Cerbij (Poole), petition, 24 July 1647.
^1200	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 214v, 216v, 218v, 221, 224, 226v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (1 November 1649, 29 January 1650, 25 April 1650, 23 July 1650, 14 November 1650, 11 January 1651).
^1201	  http://anglo-dutch-wars.blogspot.com/2007/10/eight-zeeland-convoyers-funded-in-1648.html.  This list is dated 28 November 1652.  Some of the ships and captains in a previously posted list do not marry with the situation that we have seen above, 1648-9.  See http://17th-centurynavwargaming.blogspot.com/2006_06_01_archive.html
^1202	  NA, AA 2471.  RAvZ, 26 April 1653 (on petition of Cornelis Evertsen de Oude).
^1203	  The Dutch Intelligencer, 8-15 September 1652 (London, 1652), Thomason/104:E.675[6], 13.
^1204	  The Dutch Intelligencer, 22-29 September 1652 (London, 1652), Thomason/104:E.675[24], 28.
^1205	  ‘A letter from Leith’, 31 July/10 August 1652, First Dutch War, I, 400.
^1206	  Council of State proceedings, 21 July 1653, CSPD 1653-1654, 1-63 [http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=53492].
^1207	  Excludes fireships expended.  See ZA, Rek. C 6850, 6860, 6870.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1652-4, passim; NA, AA  2471-2473.  RAvZ, 1652-4, passim.  See also http://anglodutchwarsblog.com/Articles/Documents/DutchLossesInFirstAngloDu.html.
^1208	  The fifth Zeeland ship lost was not an admiralty warship, but the Middelburg Directors’ Bonaventura, captured and burnt.  See http://17th-centurynavwargaming.blogspot.com/2005_11_01_archive.html; http://anglodutchwarsblog.com/Articles/Documents/DutchLossesInFirstAngloDu.html, citing Elias, Schetsen, V.
^1209	  Sacheverell to Navy Commissioners, 2 August 1653, CSPD 1653-1654, 64-121 [http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=53493]; The British at first claimed 1,000 prisoners.  See A true relation of the last great fight at sea, July 29 and 31 between the English and the Dutch, as it was presented to the Councill of State in two letters sent them from General Monck (London, 1653), 6; Boxer, Anglo-Dutch Wars, 15.
^1210	  Beverningk & Van de Perre to Zeeland States, 19/29 August 1653, Thurloe, State Papers, I, 429.
^1211	  Extracts from Monnikendam’s journal, 24 February-10 March 1653, First Dutch War, IV, 186.  4 of 31 total (10 killed and 21 wounded), excluding soldiers.  The foreigners were two French, a Swede, and a German.
^1212	  90 naval (45 admiralty, 45 directory), 1 privateer, and 16 merchant sailors.  Fishermen and soldiers are not included here.  See ZA, SvZ 3101.1.  [?] to States General, 2/12 September 1653.
^1213	  ‘All others’ here are those not in the 10 main foreign groups used throughout the thesis – following the standard scheme in Chapter 1 – rather than everyone who was not in the four main groups in this particular chart.
^1214	  Poortvliet, Ontvanger generaal te water database:  Willem Oyer/Eyer (Morton) senior navigator, Hof van Zeeland, 31 January 1652, outbound for Batavia; Mathijs Deuge (Wexford), surgeon’s mate, yacht Zierikzee, 3 April 1653, outbound for Batavia; Jan Willemse (Ayr), junior navigator, Zwarte Bul, 30 March 1654; Jannes Regemorte (Yarmouth), 2de assistent, Zwarte Bul, 30 March 1654.
^1215	  Also spelt Sentsen, Centsen, Centen, Sempson, Semptsem, and Comtsen.  Details are lacking on Senten, but De Jonge confirms his Scots birth.  See De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, II, 21; Frank Fox, A Distant Storm: the Four Days Battle of 1666.  See also http://kentishknock.com/officers1.htm; http://anglo-dutch-wars.blogspot.com/2004/02/bastiaen-centen.html; http://anglo-dutch-wars.blogspot.com/2006/09/17-ships-that-sailed-to-zeeland-after.html.
^1216	  NA, AA 2471.  RAvZ, 21 December 1652; Johan Evertsen’s Journal, 1/11 December 1652, First Dutch War, III, 231; De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, I, 440; http://anglo-dutch-wars.blogspot.com/2006/05/nine-zeeland-directors-ships.html.
^1217	  Source: ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 169-228.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50.  Banckert’s crew includes 15 ‘extraordinary’ men above the normal complement of 50.
^1218	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 6830, 6840, 6850, 6860, 6870, passim.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-54.  This is a rough guide only.  First, the British personnel from 1642-9 so far identified so far do not comprise all those who served during that time: as detailed in the Methodology, the sample was only around half of the total manpower.  The 1642-9 cohort here, then, is only a part of an unknown total.  Only those receiving individual payments are listed; such payments were not applied to all ships’ companies in any case, and were sometimes restricted to only a few men in each crew – especially on the light craft.  Besides this, short-serving personnel tended to be missed out in any case, which would exclude many men of the type we have seen in the 1642-9 section above.  New personnel are only those for whom origins are given in these sources or elsewhere; as detailed in the Methodology, origins are very rarely given in the rekeningen, so such men are extremely difficult to identify.
^1219	  NA, AA 2471.  RAvZ, 16 December 1652 (Jan de Plecker of Thielt); ibid, 2472.  RAvZ, 29 September 1653.
^1220	  NA, AA 2472.  RAvZ, 20 October 1653 (on Diego Leijne of Dunkirk).  At that time he was still de jure a Spanish subject rather than French.
^1221	  NA, AA 2472.  RAvZ, 26 May 1653 (on petition of Jan Janssen of Sachsenburg).
^1222	  NA, AA 2472.  RAvZ, 19 July 1653 (on petition of Daniel Pietersen of Stavanger).  For the name of the fireship, see ibid, 2471.  RAvZ, 7 April 1653 (on movement of captains).
^1223	  NA, AA 2472.  RAvZ, 14 February 1654 (Fredrik Janssen of Norway).
^1224	  ZA, Rek. C 6750, f. 175.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1642 (21 May 1642); ibid, 6784.  Raef Boets [Newcastle], petition, 18 November 1645; ibid, 6790, f. 169.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1646 (21 February 1646); ibid, 6803.  Raef Boets (Newcastle), petition, 8 June 1647; ibid.  Raef Boets [Newcastle], petition, 2 December 1647; ibid, 6820, ff. 138v, 144v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649 (11 April 1649, 25 August 1649); ibid, 6822.  Raeff Boets (Newcastle), petition, 11 April 1649; ibid, 6823.  Raef Boets [Newcastle], petition, 25 August 1649.
^1225	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 167v, 185v, 188v, 211v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (13 December 1649, 23 February 1650, 2 July 1650, 21 December 1650); ibid, 6840, f. 147v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1651 (27 March 1651); ibid, 6850, f. 193.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1652 (23 December 1652); ibid, 6860, f. 225v, 227, 230v, 233v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (22 March 1653, 9 April 1653, 12 July 1653, 13 October 1653); ZA, Rek. C 6870, ff. 229v, 231, 232v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1654 (25 April 1654, 20 July 1654, 18 January 1655).
^1226	  ZA, Rek. C 6805.  Payroll of Wapen van Zeeland, 26 April 1647; ibid.  Pieter Backxter [Kinghorn], petition, 2 September 1647; ibid, 6820, ff. 157, 158v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649 (19 April 1649, 28 June 1649); ibid, 6823.  Pieter Backxter [Kinghorn], petition, 19 April 1649; ibid.  Pieter Backxter [Kinghorn], petition, 28 June 1649.
^1227	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 237, 239v, 241v, 243, 244.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (29 January 1650, 30 April 1650, 23 July 1650, 21 November 1650, 28 January 1651); ibid, 6840, f. 161.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1651 (9 August 1651); ibid, 6850, f. 211v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1652 (8 February 1653).
^1228	  ZA, Rek. C 6786.  Payroll of Neptunis, [3?] October 1645; ibid, 6790, f. 244.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1646 (31 March 1646); ibid, 6796.  Jems Muller (Kirkcaldy), petition, 31 March 1646; ibid, 6816.  Payroll of Neptunis, 1 December 1648.
^1229	  ZA, Rek. C 6850, f. 242.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1652 (19 October 1652); ibid, 6860, ff. 296, 301v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (24 March 1653, 29 September 1653); ibid, ff. 491, 495.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (medical expenses, 9 April 1653, 17 May 1653); NA, AA 2472.  RAvZ, 30 August 1653 (on petition of Jacob Muller).
^1230	  ZA, Rek. C 6860, f. 497v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (medical expenses, 9 June 1653); NA, AA 2471.  RAvZ, 21 April 1653 (on petition of Tomas Cock of Leith); ibid, 2472.  RAvZ, 26 May 1653 (on petition of Tomas Cocq of Leith); ibid, 9 June 1653.  For Duijm, see http://anglo-dutch-wars.blogspot.com/archives/2006_04_01_anglo-dutch-wars_archive.html; http://17th-centurynavwargaming.blogspot.com/2007/12/three-days-battle.html.  See also Poortvliet, Ontvanger generaal te water database: Tomas Cok, seaman.
^1231	  ZA, Rek. C 6860, f. 492.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (medical expenses, 19 April 1653); NA, AA 2471.  RAvZ, 19 April 1653 (on petition of Tomas Tomassen, Scotsman).  For the Zeeland squadron (also Claas Janssen Gaeuw, Joannes Michielszoon, Frans Mangelaar), in January 1653, see ibid.  RAvZ, 26 March 1653, 24 April 1653; http://anglo-dutch-wars.blogspot.com/2006_02_01_anglo-dutch-wars_archive.html.
^1232	  ZA, Rek. C 6786.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 2 February 1646; ibid, 6806.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 23 January 1648; ibid.  Erasmus Badman [Bantry], wife Geertje Jacobs’ petition, 2 September 1647; ibid, 6820, 148v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649 (24 April 1649); ibid, 6823.  Erasmuijs Badman (Bantry), petition, 24 April 1649; ibid.  Payroll of Claas Janssen Zanger’s crew [Arnemuiden], 24 September 1649.
^1233	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 200v, 202v, 206v, 210v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (1 December 1649, 16 March 1650, 11 July 1650, 3 December 1650); ibid, 6850, f. 193v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1652 (13 January 1653); ibid, 6860, ff. 228v, 226, 235.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (22 March 1653, 7 June 1653, 31 December 1653); ibid, 6870, f. 228v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1654 (28 March 1654); ibid, 6910, ff. 291v, 296, 303v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (7 January 1658, 23 March 1658, 7 October 1658).
^1234	  ZA, Rek. C 6803.  Ritsaert Herpers [Plymouth], petition, 30 March 1647; ibid.  Ritsaert Herpers [Plymouth], petition, 12 July 1647; ibid.  Ritsaert Herpers [Plymouth], petition, 11 November 1647; ibid, 6820, f. 140v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649 (17 April 1649); ibid, 6822.  Ritsaert Herpers [Plymouth], petition, 17 April 1649.
^1235	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 330v, 333v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (2 July 1650, 29 October 1650); ibid, 6840, ff. 242, 245, 246v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1651 (1 April 1651, 19 June 1651, 11 September 1651); ibid, 6860, f. 339v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (9 July 1653); ibid, 6910, f. 148v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (30 March 1658); ibid, 6920, ff. 137-137v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (24 April 1659); ibid, 6982.  Richard Harbert [Plymouth], pension instalments, 31 March 1665, 30 June 1665, 30 September 1665, 31 December 1665; ibid, 6992.  Richard Harbert [Plymouth], pension instalments, 31 March 1666, 30 June 1666; 30 September 1666; 31 December 1666; ibid, 7002.  Richard Harbert [Plymouth], pension instalments, 31 March 1667, 30 June 1667, 30 September 1667; ibid, 8313.  Richard Harbert [Plymouth], pension instalments, 31 March 1672, 30 June 1672, 30 September 1672; 31 December 1672; 30 March 1673, 30 June 1673; 30 September 1673; 31 December 1673.
^1236	  ZA, Rek. C 6806.  Willem Teijt (Dundee), petition, 5 February 1648; ibid, 6816.  Willem Teijt (Dundee), petition, 14 December 1648; ibid, 6820, ff. 165v, 166v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649 (19 April 1649, 9 June 1649); ibid, 6823.  Willem Teijt (Dundee), petition, 19 April 1649; ibid.  Willem Teijt (Dundee), petition, 9 June 1649; ibid.  Payroll of Amsterdam, 17 September/7 October 1649.
^1237	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 253, 256.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (8 December 1649, 13 April 1650); ibid, 6850, f. 207.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1652 (16 November 1652); ibid, 6860, 257v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (26 March 1653).
^1238	  ZA, Rek. C 6796.  Payroll of Middelburg [II, Adriaan Swart], 30 October 1646; ibid, 6803. Payroll of Joos Banckert’s crew [Middelburg], 21 January 1648.
^1239	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 222v, 225.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (7 September 1650, 26 November 1650); ibid, 6840, f. 149v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1651 (13 March 1651); ibid, 6850, f. 197.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1652 (23 December 1652); ibid, 6860, ff. 242, 245v, 247v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (10 May 1653, 25 August 1653, 13 October 1653); ibid, 6870, f. 238.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1654 (14 September 1654); ibid, 6920, ff. 249, 253.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (16 June 1659, 18 August 1659).  Johan Evertsen had moved his flag into the brand-new Vlissingen by Scheveningen.
^1240	  ZA, Rek. C 6796.  Payroll of Zeeridder, 11 October 1646;  Poortvliet, Ontvanger generaal te water database: Gabriel Sommer (Dundee).
^1241	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 188, 193v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (7 February 1650, 6 July 1650).
^1242	  NA, AA 2472.  RAvZ, 30 August 1653 (on petition of Peter Kinneleij of Dover).
^1243	  ZA, Rek. C 6750, f. 215v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1642.ZA, Rek. C 6786.  Payroll of Westcappel, 4 November 1645; ibid, 6816.  Payroll of Westcappel, 26 October 1648; ibid, 6823.  Robbert Lij (London), petition, 30 June 1649.  For Block’s ship, 1652-4, see http://17th-centurynavwargaming.blogspot.com/2005_06_01_archive.html.
^1244	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 236v, 239, 241, 244.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (8 November 1649, 6 April 1650, 11 July 1650, 28 January 1651); ibid, 6840, f. 161.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1651 (2 & 18 October 1651); ibid, 6850, ff. 208-208v, 211.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1652 (2 September 1652, 23 November 1652); ibid, 6860, ff. 264, 267.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (28 April 1653, 9 February 1654).
^1245	  ZA, Rek. C 6840, ff. 159v-160.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1651; ibid, f. 207v.  (Medical expenses, 25 October 1651).
^1246	  ZA, Rek. C 6870, f. 508.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1654 (medical expenses, 29 April 1654); NA, AA 2473.  RAvZ, 29 April 1654 (on petition of Robbert Lije/Lhie).  Lee also tended to three of Cornelis Tromp’s crew.  See ZA, Rek. C 6870, f. 511.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1654 (medical expenses, 18 July 1654).
^1247	  ZA, Rek. C 6910, ff. 343v, 348v, 355.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (19 May 1658, 12 August 1658, 23 November 1658); ibid, 6920, f. 333.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (9 April 1659); NA, AA 2482.  RAvZ, 10 January 1663; ibid, 7 March 1663; ibid, 2483.  RAvZ, 2 July 1664 (on petition of Lee’s widow).
^1248	  ZA, Rek. C 6750, ff. 222, 223v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1642 (23 April 1642, 15 November 1642); ; ibid, 6786.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 11 February 1646; ibid, 6806.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 23 January 1648; ibid, 6822.  Willem Houdens (Coventry), petition, 15 March 1649; ibid.  Willem Houdens (Coventry), petition, 30 June 1649.
^1249	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 170, 174v, 178, 180, 182v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (6 October 1649, 6 April 1650, 11 July 1650, 8 October 1650, 11 January 1651); ibid, 6850, f. 190.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1652 (7 December 1652); ibid, 6850, ff. 211, 215v, 221.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (17 February 1653, 10 May 1653, 20 September 1653).
^1250	  ZA, Rek. C 6910, ff. 210v, 218v, 225v, 233.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658; ibid, 6920, ff. 189, 191.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (29 March 1659, 30 April 1659).
^1251	  ibid, 7003.  Willem Houdens (Daventry [Coventry]), heir’s petition, enclosing captain’s certificate, 15 June 1667.  Owen managed a reasonably cultured signature in Dutch form in 1649.  He was married by 1646, but widowed by 1667: there is no mention of a widow after his drowning.  Owen’s arrears went to his heir (erfgenaeme), Dirck Bernaerd.  Bernaerd was the Provost of Flushing and appears many times as collector for British seamen.  He may have been involved with the English church.
^1252	  ZA, Rek. C 6750, ff. 226v, 228v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1642 (19 April 1642, 27 December 1642); ibid, 6786.  Pieter de Clerck [Sandwich], petition, 14 August 1645; ibid, 6790, f. 256v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1646 (23 July 1646); ibid, 6796.  Payroll of Middelburg, 30 October 1646; ibid.  Pieter de Clerck [Sandwich], petition, 23 July 1646; ibid, 6804.  Pijeter de Cleerck [Sandwich], petition, 30 July 1647; ibid.  Pieter de Clerck [Sandwich], petition, 16 December 1647; ibid, 6823.  Payroll of Arnemuiden, 24 September 1649.  De Clerk appears not to have married.  His slaapvrouw in 1647 was a widow with 4 children.
^1253	  ZA, Rek. C 6830, ff. 201, 203v, 205v, 209v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (15 January 1650, 13 April 1650, 4 July 1650, 8 October 1650); ibid, 6860, ff. 223v, 230, 230v, 234v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (10 March 1653, 5 July 1653, 23 August 1653, 24 December 1653); ibid, 6870, ff. 228v, 230.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1654 (28 March 1654, 23 May 1654).NA, AA 2473.  RAvZ, 5 December 1654.
^1254	  ZA, Rek. C 6910, ff. 276, 278, 283, 284v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (10 April 1658, 6 May 1658, 3 August 1658, 7 September 1658); ibid, 6920, ff. 238v, 246, 247, 252, 254v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (4 January 1659, 3 May 1659, 17 May 1659, 4 August 1659, 1 September 1659); NA, AA 2479.  RAvZ, 22 May 1660.
^1255	  NA, AA 2480.  RAvZ, 22 July 1661; ibid, 2481.  RAvZ, 5 July 1662; ZA, Rek. C 6982.  Pieter de Clerk (Sandwich), pension instalments, 1 April 1665, 2 July 1665, 30 September 1665; ibid.  Pieter de Clerk (Sandwich), death certificate (12 January 1666), 19 January 1666.
^1256	  ZA, Rek. C 6850, f. 246.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1652 (6 November 1652).
^1257	  ZA, Rek. C 6860, f. 499-499v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (medical expenses, 28 June 1653); NA, AA 2472.  RAvZ, 25 June 1653 (on petition of Andries Dougel [Wemys]).  Dougal was wounded ‘in the fight off Dover’ (‘int slaen […] ontrent Douvres’), but neither Gillis Janssen nor Zeeridder were in the opening engagement of the war at Dover of May 1652.  Kentish Knock, in autumn 1652, may have been meant instead.  In January 1653, Dougal was paid maintenance whilst under treatment for his wound.  See NA, AA 2471.  RAvZ, 13 January 1653 (on petition of Andries Doegt).
^1258	  NA, AA 2473.  RAvZ, 3 October 1654 (on petition of Andries Donckel).  For Jan Vijnckaert’s ship (Zeelandia) see ibid, 24 August 1654 (ships to stay in service).  
^1259	  ZA, Rek. C 6920, ff. 488v, 492v, 498.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (4 October 1659, 6 December 1659, 9 February 1660).
^1260	  NA, AA 2479.  RAvZ, 23 June 1660; ibid, 2482.  RAvZ, 24 January 1663 (ships to stay in service); ibid.  RAvZ, 29 January 1663 (on Dougal’s petition); ibid, 41.  RAvZ, Index, ‘Andries Dougel gecontinueerd als stierman op Capitein De Hase’, 29 January 1663.
^1261	  Connor Wallis (Norwich) master, flyboat Harp, 31 May 1658 outbound for Batavia; Malcolm Robertson (Dundee), senior surgeon aboard the same; George Smith (London) surgeon’s mate, Wapen van Zeeland, 1662.  See Poortvliet, Ontvanger-generaal te water database.
^1262	  ZA, Rek. C 6920, ff. 290, 477v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (23 April 1659, 4 February 1660).
^1263	  NA, AA 2481.  RAvZ, 23 [?] May 1662 (on Cornelis Evertsen de Oude, 2 letters, 27 May 1662).  Evertsen took on William Robertson (Anstruther) and three more seamen on 27 May, when Vlissingen was off Cadiz. 
^1264	  Manpower excludes soldiers and marines.
^1265	  For an account of the road to war, particularly diplomatic, economic and political aspects, see especially Rommelse, Second Anglo-Dutch War, 93-121.
^1266	  NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 11 June 1664 (on States General instructions, 20 May 1664); Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 229.  The five were Hof van Zeeland (58), Vlissingen (46), and Utrecht (50) at Flushing, and Veere (46) and Dordrecht (46) at Veere.
^1267	  ‘A Proclamation for Recalling and Prohibiting Sea-men from the Services of Forreign Princes and States’, [30 May 1664].  See also discussion of State recalls of foreign-serving seamen in Chapter 2.
^1268	  Rommelse omits the embargoes altogether as part of the escalation process itself, as well as their effect on wartime trade.  He does mention them briefly when touching on Dutch naval recruitment.  See Rommelse, Second Anglo-Dutch War, especially 116, 128.
^1269	  PRO, SP 84/173, f. 45.  Downing to Bennet, 25 November/5 December 1664 [PRO Catalogue abstract].
^1270	  PRO, SP 84/173, f. 51.  Downing to Bennet, 29 November/9 December 1664 [PRO Catalogue abstract].  British intelligence also misjudged the character of the embargo.  See PRO, SP 84/173, f. 73.  De Bacquoy to Bennet, 6 December 1664 [PRO Catalogue abstract].  See also Chapter 2.
^1271	  The Zeeland payrolls show that some men were paid off during winter 1664/5, but these were few.
^1272	  De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, I, 612.
^1273	  Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 226, citing GAV, OSA, 5610, 29 December 1664.
^1274	  PRO, SP 84/173, f. 65.  Downing to Bennet, 2/12 December 1664 [PRO Catalogue abstract]; ibid, f. 85.  Downing to Bennet, 3/13 December 1664 [PRO Catalogue abstract].
^1275	  Rommelse, Second Anglo-Dutch War, 114.  James, Duke of York, Lord High Admiral was authorised to issue privateering commissions against the Dutch as early as 30 November/10 December 1664, and again on 28 January/7 February 1665.  See CSPD 1664-1665, 95, 182.  Formal Instructions for privateers against the Dutch were issued on 23 December 1664/2 January 1665.  See J. W. Damer Powell, Bristol Privateers and Ships of War (Bristol, 1930).
^1276	  Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 226, citing De Jonge, Johan en Cornelis Evertsen, 210.  The States General, however, had ordered Evertsen’s squadron to be 26-strong.  See De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, I, 612.
^1277	  NA, AA 2485.  RAvZ, 27 June 1665 (on in-letter from Cornelis Evertsen de Oude).
^1278	  Including the Zeeland VOC crew in Oranje.
^1279	  Confusion is possible over Dutch warships bearing the same or similar names: three ships bearing the name Utrecht fought at Lowestoft; Delft (32) and Ter Goes (48) were taken or sunk.  The latter two ships belonged respectively to the Rotterdam and Amsterdam admiralties and were not the Zeeland ships of the same or similar names.
^1280	  Source: Little, British personnel database.
^1281	  This group includes include two men who may not have reenlisted until the outbreak of the next war in 1672.
^1282	  Sandwich Journal, 226.  Apparently, the Dutch could never accept that the flagship was destroyed other than by an Englishman getting aboard and firing the magazine.  Spectacular stories of this kind were common – as either heroic sacrifice or dastardly sabotage, depending on the instigator – but this needs further investigation.  This one may be down to national pride, but if true, does the Dutch position refer to an English crewmember – which would have implications for Dutch attitudes to British crew – or a boarder?  See Fox, Distant Storm; Rommelse, Second Anglo-Dutch War, 131.
^1283	  De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, II, 21; Sandwich Journal, 228.  Johan Evertsen recognised Zwanenburg and Marseveen, though Admiral Cornelis Tromp mistook Zwanenburg for an Amsterdam frigate.  See PRO, SP 84/176, f. 133r.  Cornelis Tromp to [Fleet Deputies/States General] 4/14 June 1665 [English translation in Downing’s hand]; ibid, f. 135r.  Johan Evertsen to [Fleet Deputies/States General], 4/14 June 1665.
^1284	   This contemporary print compresses the events, showing the incident involving Zwanenburg – the labels are illegible in the image here, but she is given as in the centre group – probably the right-hand, i.e. the smallest, ship.  Obdam’s Eendracht is exploding on the far right, Bastiaan Senten’s Oranje is sinking in the left foreground.  Image: http://www.vocshipwrecks.nl/home_voyages/oranje.html; http://members.home.nl/tettero/ZuidHolland/Wassenaer.htm [unknown artist].
^1285	  Sandwich Journal, 228.  Gregory disappeared after the battle, thereby escaping court martial.  See http://anglo-dutch-wars.blogspot.com/archives/2004_12_01_anglo-dutch-wars_archive.html.
^1286	  PRO, SP 84/176, f. 136.  Witsen, Van Vrybergen & Schrieck [Fleet Deputies] to States General, 5/15 June 1665 [English translation in Downing’s hand].  The men were Dirck Davidts, quartermaster of Marseveen, Hendrick Janssen, carpenter’s mate of Ter Goes, and Leendert/Leunis Janssen, one of Zwanenburg’s seamen.
^1287	  PRO, SP 84/176, ff. 54, 55.  Downing to Arlington, 6/16 June 1665.
^1288	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Zwanenburg, 1 July 1665; ibid, 6995.  Payment of maandgeld, Zwanenburg, 24 May 1665.
^1289	  NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 28 May 1664 (Cuijper ordered to increase complement); ibid.  RAvZ, 11 June 1664; ibid.  RAvZ, 30 August 1664 (on transfer); ibid.  RAvZ, 8 September 1664 (order to pay crews of Cuijper and Thijssen).  The latter payment (not extant) must have taken place on 10 September 1664, as the period covered by the extant source opens on the following day.
^1290	  Life of Tromp, 258; PRO, SP 84/176, f. 55.  Downing to Arlington, 6/16 June 1665.
^1291	  NA, AA 2484.  RAvZ, 5, 10, 30 January 1665.  The Zeeland warships arrived with the convoy at the Texel by 17 April, and returned to Flushing by 20 May.  See PRO, SP 84/175, f. 72r.  Downing to Arlington, 7/17 April 1665; ZA, Rek. C 6998.  Johannes Radeus, Admiralty Usher, accounts, May 1665.
^1292	  Andrew Erasmus (Shetland) was in the crew of Jacob Verhelle (Hazewind) 1649-51; by 1654 he was serving with Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge; during 1658-9 with Claas Janssen Zanger/Cornelis Cuijper (Dordrecht).  See ZA, Rek. C 6820, f. 144v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649 (25 August 1649); ibid, 6823.  Anderies Jerasmussen [Shetland], petition, 25 August 1649; ibid, 6830, ff. 186, 189, 192, 196, 199.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1649-50 (15 December 1649, 28 February 1650, 8 June 1650, 19 September 1650, 8 January 1651); ibid, 6860, f. 342.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (7 January 1654); ; ibid, 6910, f. 246.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (20 November 1658); ibid, 6920, ff. 204v, 206.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (25 January 1659, 26 April 1659).  William Price (London) served with Frans Mangelaar (Zeelandia & Middelburg), 1658-9.  See ZA, Rek. C 6910, ff. 252, 261, 262v, 267v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (16 January 1658, 7 August 1658, 16 September 1658, 11 November 1658); ibid, 6920, ff. 224v, 227, 231v, 235.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (10 March 1659, 2 April 1659, 7 June 1659, 24 September 1659).
^1293	  ZA, Rek. C 6920, ff. 211v, 215.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (29 September 1659, 1 December 1659).
^1294	  ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Zwanenburg, 1 July 1665.
^1295	  PRO, SP 84/176, f. 49.  Downing to Arlington 2/12 June 1665; Sandwich Journal, l, 177.  The Zeelanders were prominent in the action and took a group of 30 men from the convoy and escort; these prisoners were to be used specifically as bargaining chips against future POW exchanges: ‘om tegens andere verwisselt te werden’.  See NA, AA 2485.  RAvZ, 9 June 1665 (on Johan Evertsen, 4 June 1665).  These 30 were in addition to those dispersed amongst the Zeeland warships.  Also, Good Hope’s complement is given as 160 in this source – which was based on Johan Evertsen’s letter of 30 May – as opposed to the 130 given in Sandwich’s April list of the British fleet.  The Zeeland captain Willem Marinissen, en route from Zeeridder to take command of Prins te Paard, was captured by a British ketch at about the same time; he was to be exchanged for Captain Archer.  See NA, AA 2485.  RAvZ, 10 June 1665.
^1296	  Thomas Corney to Thomas Kempe, 9/19 June 1665, enclosed in Sir William Davidson to Arlington, 15/25 June 1665, CSPD 1664-1665, 427.
^1297	  Men transferred from one ship to another would have been paid at the last general payment of their old ship, and would have to wait for the next payment on their new ship, some months later.  Arrears from their previous ship were either be made up in the next payment or, if overlooked, would have to be petitioned for.
^1298	  PRO, SP 84/176, f. 79.  Downing to Arlington 23 June/3 July 1665.  Prins Maurits was in the second group of Dutch ships that collided, fouled, and were burnt together.  Webster’s account to Downing is perhaps just too sensational: escaping the blazing ship, Webster claimed to have been in the water for eight hours clinging to a mast with four Dutch seamen, until rescued by the Dutch.  He later deserted; managing to escape he reached The Hague, where Downing gave him a pass for England.  His subsequent fate is unknown.  See also ibid, f. 87v.  Downing to Arlington, 30 June/10 July 1665.
^1299	  Jan Banckert (? - 1665), was the son of Admiral Joos Banckert and younger brother of Adriaan Banckert.  Following usual practice, his son Joos Banckert de Jonge and nephew Joos Banckert de Oude served as seamen.  For the Banckert dynasty see De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, I, 456.  Joos Banckert de Oude was the son of Captain Joos Banckert, killed in action in 1653.  The latter was the middle brother between Adriaan and Jan, and so not to be confused with their father, Rear-Admiral Joos Banckert, who, as we saw in Chapter 6, died in 1647.
^1300	  Though Delft’s main summary payroll opens in 1 May 1664, Banckert and his crew were, in fact, still in Vissers Herder at this time, before the late June transfer to Delft.  Banckert’s crew were paid in October 1664 (payroll not extant); this must have covered the period up to the end of April 1664.  See NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 8 May 1664 (on London convoy); ibid.  RAvZ, 12 June 1664 (on transport of Van Gogh); ibid.  RAvZ, 14 June 1664 (on transfer) ; ibid.  RAvZ, 25 June 1664 (on in-letter from Van Gogh, 22 June); ibid.  RAvZ, 27 October 1664; ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Delft, 15 October 1665.
^1301	  ZA, Rek. C 6989.1.  Jan Banckert & Adriaan de Hase, extraordinaries, enclosing account for an inshore pilot for Le Havre, 15 April 1665.
^1302	  See section on Adriaan Banckert below.
^1303	  ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Delft, 15 October 1665; ibid, 6988.  Pieter Busack [Lübeck], Delft’s surgeon, list of wounded, 10 August 1665; ibid, 6999.7.  Jacob Pilsius, State surgeon at Flushing, accounts (June 1665), 1 March 1666; PRO, SP84/176, f. 139.  B. de Hubert to States General, 16 June 1665 [English translation in Downing’s hand].
^1304	  ZA, Rek. C 7044.  Prize money distribution for Jan Matthijssen’s crew [Delft], 25 May 1671.
^1305	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 6995, Payroll of Jan Banckert’s crew [Delft], [26] December 1664; ibid.  Payroll of Delft, 20 April 1665; ibid, 6984 Payroll of Delft, 17 July 1665; ibid.  Payroll of Delft, 28 December 1665; ibid, 6998 Payroll of Delft, 18 August 1666.
^1306	  The desertion rate was fairly heavy – of the 185 crew recorded during May 1664-September 1665, 23 deserted – or 12.4%.  See ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Delft, 15 October 1665.  Delft may have been an unhappy ship, and she had three commanders within a few weeks in summer 1665: after Jan Banckert’s death, Marinnis Loncke took over, but died soon after.  Jan Matthijssen, the future Rear-Admiral, replaced him on 25 July 1665.
^1307	  Hendrickssen was married to Janneken Cornelis.  See ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Delft, 28 December 1665.  Unfortunately, we can only guess at his wife’s nationality or race.  Hendrickssen was sick, 26 September-11 October 1665; he rejoined Matthijssen as master-at-arms, but died at sea on 19 February 1666.  See ZA, Rek. C 6995.  Pauwels Heyndricks neger [no origin], passport & widow’s petition, 6 March/5 April 1666; ibid, 6999.7.  Dr Pieter van de Putte, Flushing physician, accounts (July-December 1665), 6 March 1666.
^1308	  ZA, Rek. C 6910, ff. 291v, 293, 297v, 304v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (5 January 1658, 4 February 1658, 1 May 1658, 16 November 1658); ibid, 6920, ff. 262, 266, 270v, 276, 279v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (1 January 1659, 5 March 1659, 5 May 1659, 9 August 1659, 29 September 1659).  Kiddie was promoted schieman’s mate by May 1658, schieman by May 1659, and moved to boatswain/mate (unclear) by August.  Kiddie is not in Figures 7.4 and 7.5.  He sold his passport to his crewmate Abraham Jasperssen (Flushing), to whom his arrears were paid.  
^1309	  Morgan is not listed in Delft’s main payroll, though he was married to Grietie Laurens by the end of 1665.  For the other ships, see ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Zeelandia, 17 July 1665; ibid.  Payroll of Zeelandia, 7 December 1665; ibid.   Payroll of Zeelandia, 28 December 1665; ibid, 6998.  Payroll of Hof van Zeeland, 6 August 1666.  Confusion is possible between the frigate Zeelandia, the flagship Hof van Zeeland, and Wapen van Zeeland – the name Zeelandia was applied to all three at various times.
^1310	  ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Delft, [26] December 1664.  Johnson is not listed in Delft’s main payroll.
^1311	  He was married, perhaps already when he enlisted, but at least by October 1665.
^1312	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.7.  Jasper van den Bussche, State apothecary at Flushing, accounts (1 October-31 December 1665), 16 August 1666; ibid.  Dr Pieter van de Putte, Flushing physician, accounts (July-December 1665), 6 March 1666.
^1313	  ZA, Rek. C 6995.  Joannis Haeij (Perth), petition & passport, 29 April 1666.
^1314	  ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Delft, 15 October 1665.  On enlisting, he was paid a month’s wages by special order, which went straight to his wife, Janneken Smidts.  Hurd was also paid two months’ maandgeld in late August, the only member of Matthijssen’s crew paid at that time.  See ibid, 6985.  Payment of various extraordinaries, 26 August 1665.
^1315	  ZA, Rek. C 7009.  Jacob Pilsius, State surgeon at Flushing, accounts (1666), 25 April 1667; ibid, 7013.  Thomas Hoor (Wexford), petition, 11 February 1668.
^1316	  ZA, Rek. C 7044.  Prize money distribution for Jan Matthijssen’s crew [Delft], 25 May 1671.  This was only 20fl, but well over one month’s peacetime wage.
^1317	  NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 16 July 1664 (previous transfer into Schakerloo); ibid.  RAvZ, 26 July 1664 (on transfer).  The new ship is given in the latter as Zeelandia, but Wapen van Zeeland is meant.
^1318	  NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 23 July 1664.  Some of Banckert’s men were also drafted aboard Pikke’s Dordrecht. 
^1319	  It is worth noting that Tuinman had had his ship captured in the first battle of the First Anglo-Dutch War, which dubious honour he had the misfortune to repeat in the Second.
^1320	  BL, Add MS 22920, f. 136.  ‘A list of the Dutch Ships, and the number of Prisoners in each ship set on shore at Southwould the 11th and 12th dayes of June 1665, all which were taken by his Royall Highnes in the late Engagement’.  The loss of life here (proportional to complement) is in marked contrast to some of the VOC ships that were taken.  Their crews were accused of cowardice.
^1321	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 6985.  Payroll of Wapen van Zeeland, 3 April 1665; ibid.  Payroll of Wapen van Zeeland, 20 April 1665
^1322	  NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 3 June 1664; ibid.  30 July 1664.
^1323	  The transfer appears neat, giving us an uncomplicated look back, with no overlap of arrears from previous ships: we can be certain that the extra men, at least, were paid around the time they were drafted in.  See NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 21 July 1664.
^1324	  ZA, Rek. C 6985.  Adriaen Cynnegem [Veere], petition, 3 August 1665; ibid.  David Rid [Wemys], petition, 21 October 1665; ibid.  Andries Skeyn [Shetland], petition, 28 October 1665; ibid.  Andries Dougelt/Dougel (Wemys), petition, 21 November 1665; 
^1325	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.2.  Andries Thomassen (Anstruther), petition, 9 January 1666.
^1326	  ZA, Rek. C 6985.  Payroll of Dordrecht, 20 April 1665; ibid.  Payroll of Wapen van Zeeland, 20 April 1665.
^1327	  ZA, Rek. C 6985.  David Rid [Wemys], Peter Wilson’s petition as attorney, 21 October 1665, enclosing Reed’s power of attorney to Broun and Wilson, 22 April 1665.
^1328	  Little, ‘Scottish Service’, 335-351.
^1329	  ZA, Rek. C 6985.  David Rid [Wemys], Peter Wilson’s petition as attorney, 21 October 1665, enclosing Reed’s power of attorney to Broun and Wilson, 22 April 1665.  (‘eenigh soulaes in soodanigh bedroufden en sware gevanckenisse’.)  Reed’s landlords Broun and Wilson received his 5½ months’ arrears here, but it is not known if they actually sent any aid to Reed in prison.
^1330	  ZA, Rek. C 6985.  Andries Skeyn [Shetland], petition, 16 October 1665.  Skeen’s sister, Margaret Christie, collected his arrears.
^1331	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.2.  Andries Thomassen (Anstruther), petition, 9 January 1666.  (‘gestelt in vuyle stijnck ende in pestiale gevanckenisse alwaer der veelen van de zelve door ziekten honger ende dorst commen te stievelen.  In getracteert niet als Christenen maer als Turcks’.)  As he was still in prison, Thomson’s friends or agents must have organised the petition as proxies or attorneys, but this is not clear in the paperwork.
^1332	  ZA, Rek. C 6989.1.  Zeeland Admiralty, Extract Resolution & petition of Grieve’s widow (Maeyken Jans Snoecke), 31 October 1665.  The value was reckoned at 100fl.
^1333	  Williamson later went to the Americas with Crijnssen.  See below.
^1334	  20 men were drafted in from De Hase’s Veere-based crew in August 1664, but none of the flagship’s British joined at that time.  See NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 9 August 1664.
^1335	  NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 18 December 1664.  (‘onwillig en niet genegen sijn, om in ‘s Lants dienst langer te blijven, mits apparente oorlog tegens haer eijgen natie souden moeten vechten’.)  Only two of these men can be identified in the December 1664 payroll and are therefore the only men in the group of released who are included in Figure 7.8   Allowing for a possible extra seven omitted men, the British proportion of Evertsen’s crew may have been as high as 8.9% in December.  See ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Hof van Zeeland, 5 January 1666; ZA, Rek.C 6995.  Payroll of Zeelandia [Hof van Zeeland], [after 20] December 1664.
^1336	  ZA, Rek. C 6995.  Thomas Ritcherts (Londen), petition & passport, 29 December 1664/14 March 1665.  (‘hem verlegen vint’.)
^1337	  ZA, Rek. C 6995.  Jan Jacobssen Engels, petition & passport, 26 January 1665/7 February 1665.  (‘hem seer verlegen vint’.)  Both Richards and Jacobs sold their passports to the flagship’s clerk.
^1338	  This modifies my interpretation in Little, ‘British personnel’, 45; Little, ‘Comparative Survey of Scottish Service’, 367.
^1339	  ZA, Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Hof van Zeeland, 5 January 1666.  
^1340	  ZA, Rek. C 7008.  Ulrich Claessen, Provost of Flushing, accounts ([23, 24 & 29] January 1667), 5 February 1667; idem, ([21] March 1667) [Kemp named], 7 April 1667; idem, ([25 & 27] April 1667), 2 May 1667; idem, ([2] May 1667), 6 June 1667.  The flagship suffered 15 dead and 20 wounded at Lowestoft.  See ZA, Rek. C 6999.7.  Jacob Pilsius, State surgeon at Flushing, accounts (June 1665), 1 March 1666; De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, II, 30, citing J. Boreel [Middelburg burgemeester and Zeeland Admiralty Commissioner] to Van Kinschot, 20 June 1665.
^1341	  As was the 48-gun Amsterdammer Duivenvoord.  See Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 225.  The official Dutch account of the battle blamed the two losses on burning wads – either from their own guns or from other Dutch ships – being blown back aboard by the wind.  See De Witt et al, A Relation of the Passages in the Battel at Sea, betwixt the Fleet of England, & of the United Provinces, collected according to the charge & order of the Lords States General (24 June 1666), 5.
^1342	  Adriaan Banckert (Tholen, centre) and Cornelis Evertsen de Oude (Walcheren, left).  Image: NMM [http://www.nmm.ac.uk/mag/pages/mnuExplore/ViewLargeImage.cfm?ID=BHC0285].
^1343	  The crew of Hof van Zeeland had been transferred from Vlissingen (formerly Cornelis Evertsen de Oude) in 1665.  Vlissingen was in service from April 1664.  See ZA, Rek. C 6996.  Payroll of Hof van Zeeland, 6 August 1666.  ibid, 6984.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 17 July 1665; ibid.  Payroll of Vlissingen, September 1665; ibid.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 29 December 1665.
^1344	  Adriaan Banckert (1620-1684) was the most prominent member of the large Banckert family at Flushing (11 members were mariners, seven of which were naval captains).  Banckert seems to have been largely ignored by Dutch historians.  No full biography exists, short pieces only.  See, for example, Raven, ‘De Banckerts’, Marineblad, 518-526.
^1345	  Banckert was promoted Rear-Admiral in December 1664, then Vice-Admiral in June 1666 (after the death of Cornelis Evertsen de Oude in the Four Days’ Fight), and reached Lieutenant-Admiral in August 1666 (after the death of Johan Evertsen in the St James Day Fight).  Banckert’s son, Adriaan Banckert de Jonge, served with his father as a seaman throughout.
^1346	  NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 11 June 1664. 
^1347	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 6985.  Payroll of Veere, 23 December 1664; ibid.  Payroll of Veere, 20 April 1665; ibid, 6999.  Payroll of Veere, 22 July 1665; ibid.  Payroll of Veere, 16 October 1665; ibid.  Payroll of Tholen, 21 January 1666; ibid.  Payroll of Veere, 29 January 1666; ibid.  Prize money distribution for Zeeridder, 16 April 1666; ibid.  Payroll of Tholen, 24 August 1666; ibid, 6999.3.  Payment of maandgeld to Adriaan Banckert’s crew [Tholen], 27 May 1666.
^1348	  ZA, Rek. C 6985.  Payroll of Veere, 23 December 1664.  
^1349	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.  Payroll of Veere, 29 January 1666; ibid.  Jan Daij (Aberdeen), petition (J. van Lure) & passport, 6 October 1664/11 October 1666.  (‘sijn passport vercregen’.)  Day was not paid off: he had to sell his passport.
^1350	  The other ships in the squadron were Zeelandia (34, Sijmon Block), Delft (34, Jan Banckert) and [Westcappel] ([Sijmon] Loncke).  See NA, AA 2484.  RAvZ, 12 January 1665; ZA, Rek. C 6988.  Jan Jasperzsen van den Berge, State coachman, accounts (October 1664-April 1665), 10 January 1665. 
^1351	  PRO, SP 84/174, f. 2.  Downing to Bennet, 3/13 January 1665. [PRO, SP 84/175, f. 2r.  Downing to Bennet, 2/12 March 1665?]
^1352	  The two VOC ships that made it home had lost one third of their crews on the voyage and had about 80 sick; many had lost fingers and toes from frostbite.  It is not surprising that winter service was unpopular: two Friesland warships appointed to the main Dutch winter squadron under Cornelis Eversten de Oude in the Wielings mutinied at the prospect of winter service.  See PRO, SP 84/174, f. 2r.  Downing to Bennet, 3/13 January 1665.  PRO, SP 84/174, f. 7r.  Downing to Bennet, 6/16 January 1665.
^1353	  NA, AA 2483.  RAvZ, 20 December 1664.
^1354	  NA, AA 2484.  RAvZ, 12 January 1665.  Five English prisoners from Banckert’s prize were borne aboard Zeeridder, 5-10 January.  See ZA, Rek. C 6989.1.  Adriaan Banckert, extraordinaries (July 1664-January 1665), 11 April 1665.
^1355	  ZA, Rek. C 6988.  Jan Jasperzsen van den Berge, State coachman, accounts (October 1664-April 1665), 10 & 12 January 1665.
^1356	  PRO, SP 84/174, f. 3r.  Downing to Bennet, 3/13 January 1665.  Downing also noted Dutch ‘skirmishing’ in the Downs area at about the same time as Banckert’s action.  See PRO, SP 84/173, f. 122.  Downing to Bennet, 30 December 1664/8 January 1665 [PRO Catalogue abstract].
^1357	  PRO, SP 84/174, f. 13r.  Downing to Bennet, 10/20 January 1665.  For the transfer back into Veere, see ZA, Rek. C 6989.1.  Adriaan Banckert, extraordinaries (July 1664-January 1665), 11 April 1665; NA, AA 2484.  RAvZ, 30 January 1665.
^1358	  PRO, SP 84/174, ff. 73r, 74r.  Downing to Bennet, 31 January/10 February 1665; ibid, f. 65.  De Bacquoy [De Ruyven] to Bennet, 31 January 1665. (‘Qu’on ne peut assez âmirer à Londres la hardiesse du Comandeur Bancker d’avoir êté avec quatre vaisseaux Zelandois ju’qu’a dans l’Anboucheure de devant Marigat, y visitant quelques vaisseaux neutres’.)
^1359	  PRO, SP 84/174, f. 79.  Downing to Bennet, 3/13 February 1665; ibid, f. 85.  De Bacquoy [De Ruyven] to Bennet, 4/14 February 1665; ibid, f. 95.  Downing to Bennet, 7/17 February 1665; ibid, f. 102r.  Dutch gazette, 9/19 February [English translation]; ibid, ff. 104r-106r.  Downing to Bennet, 10/20 February 1665; ibid, f. 113r.  Downing to Bennet, 14/24 February 1665; ibid, 123r.  Downing to Bennet, 17/27 February 1665; ibid, f. 133.  De Bacquoy [De Ruyven] to Bennet, 18 February 1665; ibid, f. 140.  Downing to Bennet, 21 February/3 March 1665.  The informant De Ruyven related Vice-Admiral Evertsen’s report that Banckert had two ships severely damaged, with the crews suffering severely from weather and plague.  See ibid, f. 149r.  De Bacquoy [De Ruyven] to [Bennet], 28 February/10 March 1665.  (‘apres son partement, renvoye deux démembrez par naufrage, ayant donc pris mer avec dix et y croisé queques jours sans y avoir pu remarquer, que journelement un tens tenpestueux, le [-] étoit revenu avec 7, les trois autres vaisseaux s’étant dispersez en mer à passe dix jours par la grande tenpete grandes neiges, presagent qu’ils êtais à l’oposite du Tron [Trou?] à cause qu’on y en voyoit trois, en que la maladie aumente journelement en la Flotte têle que la plus part de ses vaisseaux en sont extremement demunis’.)  Banckert’s target was the Scots coal trade.    
^1360	  ZA, Rek. C 6999. Prize money distribution for Zeeridder, 16 April 1666.  This payment was of one-sixth of the proceeds: 760fl in total was paid to the flagship’s crew.  The Lieutenant-Admiral of Zeeland at the time of Banckert’s cruise was Johan Evertsen; he had been replaced by Cornelis Evertsen de Oude (as a result of the recriminations after the defeat at Lowestoft) by the time of the payment of the prize money.
^1361	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.  Payroll of Veere, 29 January 1666; ibid, 6999.7.   Jacob van Gelcken, accounts (June 1665), 29 March 1666.  (‘om stucken geschooten’; ‘een sware gecompeneerde fractuere’)
^1362	  ZA, Rek. C 6988.  Antonij Andriessen (Leith), petition for compensation, enclosing Huybrecht Kakelaer’s certificate, 14 October 1665 (‘van Lijdt in Schotlant’); ibid, 6999.7.  Jacob van Gelcken, accounts (June 1665), 29 March 1666.
^1363	  PRO, SP 84/176, f. 161.  Witsen, Johan de Witt, Van Vryberghen & Schrieck [Fleet Deputies] to States General, 13/23 June 1665 [English translation in Downing’s hand].  According to the Zeeland Admiralty, Banckert’s squadron numbered 20 in total and included the Zeelanders Adriaan van Cruyningen, Sijmon Loncke, Jan Crijnssen and Jan A. Blanckert.  See NA, AA 2485.  RAvZ, 27 June 1665.  Their ships are uncertain at present.  De Jonge gives the light craft as three yachts, a fireship and three galliots.  See De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, II, 32.
^1364	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.  Payroll of Veere, 29 January 1666.  George was not paid off at the Texel – he sold his passport.  He also served aboard Zeeridder sometime in 1665, but when exactly is not yet known.  See ibid, 6999.3.  Payment of Zeeridder’s crew, 1665, [13 March 1666].  For Banckert’s return to the Texel, see PRO, SP 84/176, f. 89.  Downing to Arlington, 30 June/10 July 1665.
^1365	  ZA, Rek. C 6986.  Joris Morrissen (Leith), petition, 16 November 1665; NA, AA 2484.  RAvZ, 4 February 1665.  Thijssen had been ordered to increase his complement.  See ibid.  RAvZ, 5, 10 & 30 January 1665.  For the transfer to Veere, see ZA, Rek. C 6999.  Payroll of Veere, 16 October 1665.  Crijnssen, however, left again on 3 December to resume command of Prins te Paard.  See ibid, 6999.  Payroll of Tholen, 21 January 1666.
^1366	  Prins te Paard took three English prizes in the Bay of Biscay, 1 and 2 March and 18 April, but the last was retaken on the voyage home from La Rochelle.  See [ZA, Rek. C 6993].  On 11 June 1665 – just two days before Lowestoft – she took an English privateer (a snow).  Morris’ share of the latter was only just over 2fl.  See ZA, Rek. C 6999.2.  Prize money distribution for Prins te Paard, 30 April 1666.  He had to wait for the rest of the money.
^1367	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.  Payroll of Tholen, 21 January 1666.
^1368	  ZA, Rek. C 7003.  Andries Dougel (Wemys), petition, 12 January 1667.
^1369	  ZA, Rek. C 7009.  Abraham de Koninck, accounts, 17 January 1667.
^1370	  Johan was reinstated as the Lieutenant-Admiral of Zeeland following the death of his brother Cornelis Evertsen de Oude at the Four Days’ Fight.  
^1371	  PRO, SP 29/165, f. 2.  Clifford to [Arlington], 27 July 1666; Hainsworth & Churches, Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars, 151-2; Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 247.  Hainsworth & Churches give Evertsen’s death in error, as by the early afternoon of 4 August.  See Hainsworth & Churches, Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars, 152.
^1372	  [Image: Koninklijke Marine website.]
^1373	  NA, AA 2489.  RAvZ, 7 June 1666 (on Lieutenant-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen de Oude to Zeeland admiralty, 3 June 1666).  The other new ship was Walcheren.  Both were good sailers, though.  Roos quotes Evertsen reporting Tholen as ‘the slowest of the three’ new ships, but also lists these as Zierikzee and Veere as well as Walcheren – omitting Tholen.  See Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 242, citing NA, Collectie Evertsen, XI-3.  Zierikzee and Veere, however, were built in the early 1650s, though the former had major work done on her in 1664-5 that may have amounted to a partial rebuild.  The Zeelanders built five new capital ships during 1664-7: Walcheren, Tholen, Gekroonde Burg, Domburg and Oranje.  Only the first two were completed in time for the 1666 battles.
^1374	  This is the correct figure for the soldiers and marines.  See ZA, Rek. C 6993.  Banckert, request for payment of the soldiers’ mondkost, 28 August 1666, with enclosed certificate from Commissioner Pieter Boreel [muster master at Veere], 9 August 1666.  For the total complement, see Fox, Distant Storm, 384.  Banckert’s flag captain was Sijmon Loncke; the second captain was Pieter de Mauregnault.  Both must have been quickly exchanged as they later went to Surinam with Crijnssen (see below).
^1375	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.  Payroll of Tholen, 24 August 1666.  One source, seemingly copied verbatim from Peter Le Fevre, ‘Monck: St. James's Day Fight, 1666’, in Eric Grove (ed.), Great Battles of the Royal Navy: As Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth (1995), states that Banckert left ‘his officers and men behind’; presumably meaning all of them.  See http://www.deruyter.org/ENGLISH_SECTION_%20St.James'_Day_Fight.html.  The Dutch section of this (Dutch) website does not make this claim.  On the other hand, Raven made another mistake besides, claiming that Banckert took (all) his crew with him and ordered Tholen burnt himself.  See Raven, ‘De Banckerts’, 524.  (‘Hij stuurde zijn volk van boord en stak de bodem in brand.’)   Brandt simply said that Banckert was cut off, and had to leave his ship because she was sinking.  See Brandt, Leven en bedryf, III, 101.
^1376	  PRO, SP 29/166, f. 75.  Silas Taylor to Williamson, 4 August 1666.  Taylor had little or no knowledge of the Dutch language: see PRO, SP 29/305, f. 126.  Taylor to Williamson, 9 April 1672; idem, CSPD 1671-1672, 296.  See also Taylor to Williamson, 22 March 1672, ibid, 225.  It is not clear whether the quartermaster spoke directly to Taylor in English or whether an interpreter was used.  The quartermaster was either Bartholomeeus Pieterszoon (Brussels) or Bastiaan Adriaanssen (Veere).
^1377	  PRO, SP 29/165, f. 2.  Clifford to [Arlington], 27 July 1666.
^1378	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.  Olivier Rith (Kirkwall), petition, 21 August 1666; ibid.  Jan Rams (Aberdeen), petition, 30 August 1666; ibid.  David Rompel de oude [Leith], petition, 30 August 1666; ibid.  David Koster (Dartmouth), petition, 30 August 1666; ibid, 7003. Andries Dougel (Wemys), petition, 12 January 1667.  Adrijaen Karreman, one of the Veere elite, collected Dougal’s arrears against the latter’s debts.
^1379	  PRO, SP 29/165, f. 2.  Clifford to [Arlington], 27 July 1666.
^1380	  PRO, SP 29/166, f. 75.  Silas Taylor to Williamson, 4 August 1666.
^1381	  ‘Mr Pierce Surgeon General’s description of the late fight: August 1666’, J. R. Powell & E. K. Timings (eds.), The Rupert and Monck Letter Book 1666 (London, 1969), 269.  (‘in de gront geschoten’.)
^1382	  ZA, Rek. C 7009.  Huybrecht Kakelaer, accounts, 11 May 1667.  12 more escapees were also wounded.
^1383	  ZA, Rek. C 6993.  Adriaan de Hase, accounts (August-September 1666), 13 November 1666.  They were kept aboard Veere for 13 days.
^1384	  Rupert and Albemarle to James, Duke of York, 3 August 1666, Rupert and Monck Letter Book 1666, 118.
^1385	  PRO, SP 84/181, f. 43.  John Mercer to [Arlington], 9 August 1666 [New Style].  Banckert, however, did not receive his formal commission as Lieutenant-Admiral of Zeeland until 20 August.  
^1386	  NA, AA 2490.  RAvZ, 16 October 1666.
^1387	  ZA, Rek. C 6993.  Adriaan de Hase, account of various extraordinaries (August 1666), 13 November 1666, enclosing certificate from Adriaan Banckert, 9 November 1666; ibid, 6999.  Payroll of Tholen, 24 August 1666; NA, AA 2490.  RAvZ, 13 November 1666 (on De Hase’s petition).
^1388	  ZA, Rek. C 7009.  Huybrecht Kakelaer, accounts, 11 May 1667.  (‘een grote mortificatie op de bil’.)
^1389	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.1.  Joris Morris (Leith), petition, 20 October 1666.  (‘want hij het noodich van doen heeft; om wederom in zee te gaen met den voornoemden admijrael’.)
^1390	  ZA, Rek. C 6999.  Olivier Rith (Kirkwall), petition, 21 August 1666; ibid.  David Rompel de oude [Leith], petition, 30 August 1666; ibid.  David Koster (Dartmouth), petition, 30 August 1666; ibid.  Jan Rams (Aberdeen), petition, 30 August 1666.
^1391	  ZA, Rek. C 7017.  Jan Janssen (Scotland), petition, 25 October 1667.
^1392	  ZA, Rek. C 6994.  Andries Smidt (Dundee), petition, 28 October 1666; ibid, 6999.  Anderies Smit (Dundee), petition, 18 September 1666; ibid, 7019.  Andries Smithe (Dundee), petition, 10 December 1667.
^1393	  ZA, Rek. C 7018.  Jorys Morys (Leith), petition, 4 October 1667; ibid, 7033.  Prize money distribution to Goes [Dordrecht], September 1669.  [For the 1667 prizes see Murdoch & Little, forthcoming].
^1394	  ZA, Rek. C 6994.  Thomas Qualeth (Leith), petition, 15 November 1666; ibid, 6999.1.  Tomas Qualet (Veere [Leith]), petition, 23 October 1666; ibid, 7019.  Tommes Qualet [Leith], petition, 5 October 1667.
^1395	  ZA, Rek. C 6994.  Thomas Qualeth (Leith), petition, 15 November 1666.
^1396	  ZA, Rek. C 7019.  Thomas Qualet [Leith], petition, 10 December 1667.  For Zeeridder, see NA, AA 2492.  RAvZ, 28 September 1667.
^1397	  ZA, Rek. C 7019.  Prize money distribution for Zeeridder etc, 7 February 1668 [I]; Prize money distribution for Zeeridder etc, 7 February 1668 [II].  De Mauregnault must have been quickly exchanged after being taken prisoner on Tholen at the St James Day Fight.
^1398	  ZA, Rek. C 7023.  Thomas Qualet (Portsmouth [Leith]), passport, January 1669. 
^1399	  Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge (1628-1679) was the son of Johan Evertsen.  The death of his uncle Cornelis Evertsen de Oude in 1666 resulted in Cornelis de Jonge being known as plain Cornelis Evertsen and his cousin Cornelis Evertsen de Jongste as Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge.  For the sake of clarity in this study the two surviving men are always referred to by their pre-1666 epithets.  Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge was promoted Rear-Admiral in May 1666 and Vice-Admiral on 5 September 1666.  See De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, II, 64, 149.  For the Evertsen dynasty, see Roos, Twee Eeuwen, passim, especially the family tree and key, 458-466.  Image: http://www.rogierkoppejan.nl/cornelis%20evertsen%20de%20jongste.htm.
^1400	  ZA, Rek. C 6998.  Jacob de Leijncoert, Utrecht’s surgeon, accounts, 15 August 1665; ibid, 7009.  Jacob Pilsius, State surgeon at Flushing, accounts (1666), 25 April 1667; ibid.  Eeuwout van Dieshoecke, Flushing surgeon, accounts (1666), 2 April 1667.
^1401	  Brandt, Leven en bedryf, III, 147; De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, II, 150 (both give the prize as Loyal Charles, 56).  Evertsen’s crew later received a small tonnage and gunnage allowance (similar to prize money): they only received 50fl between them.  See ZA, Rek. C 7016.  Payment to Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge’s] crew [Zierikzee] for the burning and destruction of Royal Charles [sic], 27 February 1668.  This is not a list of the men, only of the total paid.  Note the different names given for the RN warship, also given as Charles.  See NA, AA 2490.  RAvZ, 14 October 1666.  For the correct name, see Fox, Distant Storm, 391.
^1402	  Sources: ZA Rek. C 6984.  Payroll of Utrecht, 16 October 1665; ZA Rek. C 6994.  Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen de Jonge’s crew [Utrecht], 20 April 1665; Payroll of Utrecht, 30 September 1665; Payroll of Utrecht, 15 January 1666; ZA Rek. C 6998.  Payroll of Zierikzee, 13 April 1666; Payroll of Utrecht and Zierikzee, 17 August 1666; Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jonge’s] crew [Zierikzee], 3 January 1667; Payroll of Zierikzee, 4 November 1667.
^1403	  ZA, Rek. C 6994.  Payroll of Utrecht, 15 January 1666.  Christiaanssen was stabbed to death (‘dood gesteke’) on 2 August 1665.  The Dutch fleet was then still at the Texel, but the exact circumstances of his death are unclear.  
^1404	  As with the other capital ships, the complement was allowed a third navigator in early 1665.
^1405	  Six Zeeland ships were allowed the extra gunner and mate in January 1665 – the most heavily armed, though they are not named in the source.  See NA, AA 2484.  RAvZ, 10 January 1665.
^1406	  For Evertsen’s service in command of Delft, 1659-1664, see Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 260-262; http://anglo-dutch-wars.blogspot.com/archives/2005_08_01_anglo-dutch-wars_archive.html.  Evertsen returned from Mediterranean service in January 1664; Delft was taken over by Jan Matthijssen.  It is unclear at present what Evertsen’s duties were in the interval up to July 1664.  The British veterans saw action when the privateer Colard (São Antonio, 40-42, 150 men) was taken, 21 March 1661 (not to be confused with the Flemish admiral Colard, taken by Jan Evertsen, 1639).  Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 260.
^1407	  ZA, Rek. C 6994.  Payroll of Utrecht, 15 January 1666.
^1408	  For John Charles see ZA, Rek. C 6910, ff. 273, 280.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (19 January 1658, 24 June 1658); ibid, 6920, ff. 239, 245.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (4 January 1659, 21 April 1659).  For Alexander Swain see ZA, Rek. C 6910, ff. 272, 276v, 278, 285.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (7 January 1658, 4 May 1658, 11 May 1658, 28 September 1658); ibid, 6920, ff. 239, 245v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (4 January 1659, 28 April 1659).  For David Thomson see ZA, Rek. C 6910, ff. 272v, 277, 280, 283v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (9 January 1658, 4 May 1658, 24 June 1658, 7 August 1658); ibid, 6920, ff. 240, 244v, 254v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (6 January 1659, 19 April 1659, 30 August 1659).  For Peter Thomson see ZA, Rek. C 6910, ff. 271v, 274v, 276v, 280v, 284v, 287v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1658 (5 January 1658, 2 March 1658, 4 May 1658, 3 July 1658, 4 September 1658, 4 November 1658); ibid, 6920, ff. 239v, 242v, 246v, 249v, 254v, 257, 259v.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1659 (4 January 1659, 3 March 1659, 5 May 1659, 5 July 1659, 1 September 1659, 1 November 1659, 3 January 1660).
^1409	  ZA, Rek. C 6860, f. 243.  Receiver-General’s accounts, 1653 (25 June 1653).
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^1493	  ZA, Rek. C 7044.  Payment of loopgeld (Flushing warships), [21 March 1672].
^1494	  ZA, Rek. C 8315.  Sander Swaen (Dysart), petition, 21 November 1672; ibid.  Davidt Thomassen (Dysart), petition, 14 November 1672; ibid, 8316.  Alexander Kerckhoudt (Peterhead), petition, 26 November 1672.
^1495	  ZA, Rek. C 8318.  Jan Beetman (Londonderry), death certificate [doodgeschrift] & proxy’s petition for payment, 11/17 October 1672.
^1496	  ZA, Rek. C 8315.   Willem Hunter (Hull), petition & passport, 10 October 1672; ibid.  William Joons, petition & passport, 8 October 1672; ibid.  Willem Hammer (Dover), petition & passport, 12 October 1672; ibid.  Jan Janssen (Isle of Man), petition & passport, 12 October 1672; ibid, 8318.  Pieter Adriaens (Bo’ness), petition & passport, 10 October 1672.
^1497	  ZA, Rek. C 8315.  Willem Broun (Kirkcaldy), petition & passport, 28 November 1672; ibid.  Pieter Bennit (Kirkcaldy), petition & passport, 28 November 1672; ibid.  Mattheeus Broun (Kirkcaldy), petition & passport, 28 November 1672; ibid.  Hersbel Mitselsen (Kirkcaldy), petition & passport, 30 September 1672; ZA, Rek. C 8316.  Jacob Bouma (Kirkcaldy), petition, 23 November 1672; ibid.  Thomas Broun (Kirkcaldy), petition & passport, 12 October 1672.
^1498	  ZA Rek. C 8319.1.  Payroll of Zierikzee, 7 November 1673.
^1499	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 8316.  Payroll of Simon Loncke’s crew [Delft], [28 Nov 1672]; ibid, 8317.  Payroll of Delft, 23 April 1672; ibid.  Payroll of Delft, 20 December 1672; ibid, 8318.  Payroll of Utrecht, [3 June 1673]; ibid, 8319.1.  Payroll of Utrecht, 18 October 1673; ibid, 8362.  Payroll of Utrecht, 30 October 1674. 
^1500	  Of the 54 crew paid the retainer (loopgeld) in March 1673, relatively few (13%) were foreigners, but most were German (9%).  See ZA Rek. C 8318.  General payment of loopgeld, 27 March 1673.
^1501	  ZA, Rek. C 8317.  Extraordinary payments, mondkost (Jan Wets), [17 August 1672]; ibid, 8319.7.  Jan Wedt (London), petition for compensation, certificated by Cornelis Pilsius, 15 October 1672; ibid, 8319.9.  Jacob van de Houve, petition & accounts (1672), 30 January 1673; ibid.  Pieter van de Putte, petition & accounts (1672), 24 December 1672; ibid.  Eeuwout van Dishoek, petition & accounts (1672), 17 October 1672.  For his convalescence, see ZA, Rek. C 8316.  Extraordinary payments, mondkost [Jan West/Wets], [26 September 1672]; ibid.  Extraordinary payments, mondkost [Jan Wesch], [16 November 1672].
^1502	  ZA, Rek. C 8317.  Jan Wib (London), petition & passport, 6 October 1672.
^1503	  ZA, Rek. C 8316.  Extraordinary payments, mondkost, [26 September 1672]; ibid.  Extraordinary payments, mondkost & maandgeld, 10 October 1672 [16 November 1672].
^1504	  ZA, Rek. C 8316.  Jan Meijkens Schotsman, passport, 24 October 1672; ZA, Rek. C 8317.  Thomas Spoenaer Schotsman, passport, 13 October 1672; ibid.  Eduwaart Dicksen [London], passport, 13 October 1672.
^1505	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.  Extraordinary payments & maandgeld, (mondkost), 16 September 1673; ibid, 8319.5.  Jan Seuisse [owner of hired frigate Goes], petition & accounts, enclosing list of 52 Zeeland wounded transported from fleet (23 August 1673), 25 October 1673; ibid, 8319.9.  Pieter van de Putte, petition & accounts (1673), 2 April 1674.  The hired frigate Goes is not to be confused with the big admiralty frigate of the same name.
^1506	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.6.  Eesaias de Coster, petition & accounts (1673), 20 January 1674.  These five men do not appear in the October payroll and are not included in Figure 8.4 above.
^1507	  Willem Witburgh (Leith), gunner aboard Andries den Boer’s snow/advice yacht, which it seems was not at Solebay.  See ZA, Rek. C 8317.  Payroll of Andries den Boer’s crew [unknown snow], 15 May 1672; ibid.  General payment of ducatons, 23 May 1672; ibid.  Willem Witburgh (Leith), petition, 12 October 1672.
^1508	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 8318.  Payroll of Delft, 27 May 1673; ibid, 8319.1.  Payroll of Delft, 7 October 1673; ibid, 8362 Payroll of Adriaan Banckert de jonge’s crew [Delft], 22 May 1674; ibid.  General payment of loopgeld, [2 June 1674]; ibid, 8363.  Payroll of Delft, 11 December 1674.  
^1509	  ZA, Rek. C 7023.  Extraordinary payments, 24 June 1669; ibid.  Payroll of Adriaan de Hase’s crew, [Zeelandia?], 31 January 1670; ibid, 7043.  Payroll of Delft, 27 May 1671; ibid.  Payment of maandgeld to Adriaan de Hase’s crew [Vlissingen], 30 November 1671. 
^1510	  ZA, Rek. C 7052.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 7 May 1672; ibid, 8317.  Payroll of Le Sagie’s crew [Vlissingen], 22 April 1672.
^1511	  ZA Rek. C 8315.  Thomas Hoor (Wexford), petition & passport, 6 November 1672; ibid, 8316.  Payroll of Sijmon Loncke’s crew [Delft], 30 November 1672; ibid.  Payroll of Delft, 20 December 1672; ibid, 8317.  Extraordinary payments, order to pay Thomas Hoor, 18 June 1672, [11 July 1672]. (‘sijn dienst wel en naer behooren waer genomen sijn voor den vyant als elders waer den noot soude mogen vereijst hebben’.)
^1512	  ZA Rek. C 8318.  Payroll of Bruijnvis, 15 February 1673; ibid.  Payroll of Adriaan Banckert de Jonge’s crew [Bruijnvis snow], 29 March 1673.  The Zeeland admiralty also gives Adriaan Banckert de Jonge commanding the snows Zeehond and Zwaluwe at this time, which is confusing.  See NA, AA 2498.  RAvZ, 23 & 31 January 1673.
^1513	  ZA Rek. C 8318.  Payroll of Delft, 27 May 1673; ibid, 8319.  Extraordinary payments & maandgeld, 16 September 1673; ibid, 8319.1.  Payroll of Delft, 7 October 1673.
^1514	  ZA Rek. C 8319.1.  Payment of ducatons, maandgeld & kostgeld, 27 November 1673; ibid.  Payroll of Matthijs Laureijnssen’s crew [snow], 28 March 1674.  He was paid maandgeld in September and November 1673.
^1515	  ZA Rek. C 8362.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 16 October 1674.  On promotion, he actually took a small pay cut in going to the normal wage for second master (from 23fl to 22fl).
^1516	  ZA Rek. C 8362.  Payroll of Vlissingen, 17 November 1674.
^1517	  Another 51 men came in from Middelburg on the day after Schooneveld I.
^1518	  ZA Rek. C 8318.  Extraordinary payments, maandgeld, [12 June 1673]; ibid, 8319.1.  Payroll of Delft, 7 October 1673.
^1519	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.1.  Payroll of Delft, 7 October 1673.  These men are not included in Figure 8.5 above.  Initial research has only touched on the POW lists for this period. 
^1520	  In De Ruyter’s case, it is interesting that a Zeeland navigator (Jacob Michielssen of Flushing) was transferred to a Holland ship, in this case the fleet flagship, though with the two battles taking place just off Zeeland, local knowledge would of course have been at a premium.  Delft’s remaining senior navigator, a Hollander, had also come from Utrecht.  The junior navigator – derde waak – was a Zeelander.
^1521	  Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 83; Third Dutch War, 29-30.  Anderson stresses that neither the British nor French knew these waters or had accurate charts.  Up-to-date Dutch charts were in English editions, at least, as illustrated here, but not the personnel with first-hand experience. 
^1522	  Colom, The lighting colomne or sea-mirrour, containing the sea-coasts of the northern, eastern and western navigation (1668).  South-east is ‘up’.  English language edition with Dutch charts as original, hence the title of this one, ‘De Cust van Vlaenderen’. 
^1523	  Maynard’s sister, Elisabeth Turner, was also in Zeeland.
^1524	  Colom, Atlas, or, Fyrie colom wherein are lively portrayed all the knowne coasts of the whole ocean (1668).  East is ‘up’.  English language edition with Dutch charts as original, hence the title of this one, ‘Pascaarte van de Wielinghe’. 
^1525	  Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 314.
^1526	  ZA, Rek. C 7043.  Payroll of Zeelandia, 20 February 1671; ibid.  Payroll of Utrecht, 23 October 1671; ibid, 8316.  Jacob Peijts (Dysart), petition, 31 January 1672.
^1527	  Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 284, 315.  Roos does not explain Evertsen’s delay.
^1528	  Unfortunately, the admiralty minutes are missing for this time.  It seems that much time was spent making extensive repairs to Utrecht; much time may have also been needed to fit out Zwanenburg.  See below on the Swede Jan Petersen.
^1529	  De Waard, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, xxii-xxiii, 1; Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 317.  De Jonge has 15 December.  See De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, II, 448.
^1530	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 7052.  Payroll of Utrecht, 7 May 1672; ibid, 8316.  Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste’s] crew [Zwanenburg], 26 October 1672; ibid, 8317.  Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste’s] crew [Zwanenburg] 3 May 1672; ibid, 8319.1.  Payroll of Zwanenburg, 22 December 1673; ibid, 8362.  Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste’s] crew [Zwanenburg], [?] April 1674.
^1531	  ZA, Rek. C 8316.  Extraordinary payments, maandgeld, (Tanneken Sarels, 26 October 1672), [16 November 1672].  This is a payment to the Norwegian’s landlady in lieu of his debt to her. 
^1532	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.7.  Cornelis Toomken (Brugge), petition for compensation, attested by State surgeons Cornelis Pilsius,& Eeuwout van Dishoek, & Evertsen, 7 December 1672; ibid, 8319.9.  Eeuwout van Dishoek, petition & accounts (1672), 17 October 1672; ibid.  Cornelis Pilsius, petition & accounts (1672), 1 December 1672; ibid.  Jacob van de Houve, petition & accounts (1672), 30 January 1673.  Toomken was under the surgeons for three months.  Janssen was treated for three weeks.
^1533	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.7.  Jan Pietersen (Calmar), petition for compensation, attested by State surgeon Cornelis Pilsius & Evertsen, 3 October 1672.  Petersen was treated at Flushing for four months by the State surgeon and for 36 days by the State physician.  See ZA, Rek. C 8319.9.  Cornelis Pilsius, petition & accounts (1672) 1 December 1672; ibid.  Pieter van de Putte, petition & accounts (1672), 24 December 1672.  For his convalescence, see ZA, Rek. C 8316.  Extraordinary payments, mondkost, [26 September 1672]; ibid.  Extraordinary payments, mondkost, [16 November 1672]
^1534	  ZA Rek. C 8318.  Alexander Crunng (Peterhead), petition & passport, 25 October 1672.
^1535	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.9.  Cornelis Pilsius, accounts (1672), 1 December 1672.
^1536	  ZA, Rek. C 8315.  Jacob Peets (Dysart), petition, 28 November 1672; ibid, 8316.  Extraordinary payments, maandgeld, 25 August 1672 & mondkost, [26 September 1672]; ibid.  Extraordinary payments, [16 November 1672]; ibid, 8318.  Jan Goel (Dysart), petition for payment, 31 October 1672; ibid.  Alexander Scrimser (King’s Lynn), petition for payment, 31 October 1672.
^1537	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.1.  Jacob Peets (Dysart), petition for payment, 24 September 1674.  Pates may have been left ashore in the New World.
^1538	  Hamer may have came from Evertsen’s uncle.  A seaman of similar name and the same origin declined winter service in late 1672 and asked for release from the Vice-admiral.  He may subsequently have changed his mind, but this needs further investigation.
^1539	  See, for example, De Waard, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, 3, 4.  In these very early incidents alone, 25 men were transferred as prize-crew.  Five of Evertsen’s men, unnamed, returned to Zeeland by early March 1673.  See ZA, Rek. C 8318.  Extraordinary payments, 5 March 1673, [8 April 1673].
^1540	  Individual payments were made, but these have not yet been found.  See ZA, Rek. C 8319.1.  Payroll of Zwanenburg, 22 December 1673.  If they had been transferred to Schakerloo this should have been marked, as it was for other ships.
^1541	  Individual payments were made, but these have not yet been found.  See ZA, Rek. C 8362.  Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste’s] crew [Zwanenburg], [?] April 1674.
^1542	  ZA, Rek. C 8362.  Payroll of Gekroonde Burg, men recruited in July 1674, 9 August 1674.
^1543	  De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, xlv-xlvi, 48, 49, 104-105.
^1544	  Adapted from De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, 104-105.  Crew figures here are nominal complements and exclude soldiers/marines.  For sources see Figures 8.10 & 8.11.
^1545	  Image: Maryland State Archives [http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/educ/exhibits/html/mpt.html]. 
^1546	  De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, 35-37.  (‘Dese voor verhaelde rapporten wel geconsidereert hebbende, is goetgevonden en geresolveert de rivier af te zeijlen’.)  Evertsen refers to ‘prenters’, using the English slang for ‘apprentices’, and ‘overloopers’.  See De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, 36.  The two Dutch flagships certainly drew too much water for the Nansemond: the English-built Zwanenburg drew 15.5 feet, Binckes’ Noord-Holland 14 feet.
^1547	  De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, II, 455.
^1548	  This cropped image is rotated, with north ‘up’: the Nansemond river is bottom left, Elizabeth river bottom centre, York river top centre.
^1549	  Goos, Sea Atlas; Hendrick Doncker, The sea-atlas, or, The watter-world shewing all the sea-coasts of y known parts of y earth with a generall doscription of the same: verie vsefull for all masters & mates of shipps & likwise for merchants newly sett forth (Amsterdam, 1660).
^1550	  Sources: ZA, Rek. C 8315.  Payroll of Daniel Thijssen’s crew [Zeehond], 15 November 1672; ibid, 8316.  Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste’s] crew [Zwanenburg], 26 October 1672; ibid.  Payroll of Evert Evertsen Franszoon’s crew [Surinam], 26 October 1672; ibid.  Payroll of Cornelis Eeuwoutssen’s crew [Sint Joris], 26 October 1672; ibid, 8317.  Payroll of Schakerloo, [18 May 1673]; ibid, 8319.  Payroll of Daniel Thijssen’s crew [Zeehond], [24 January 1674]; ibid, 8319.1.  Payroll of Zwanenburg, 22 December 1673; ibid.  Payroll of Evert Evertsen [Franszoon’s] crew [Surinam], 22 December 1673; ibid.  Payroll of Sint Joris, 22 December 1673; ibid.  Payroll of Schakerloo, [3 September 1674]; ibid, 8362.  Payroll of Cornelis Evertsen [de Jongste’s] crew [Zwanenburg], [?] April 1674; ibid.  Payroll of Surinam, [?] April 1674; ibid.  Payroll of Sint Joris, [?] April 1674.
^1551	  De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, xxxvii, 37-39.
^1552	  ZA, Rek. C 7044.  Payroll of Vissers Herder, [?] January 1672; ibid, 8316.  Jame Mackdull (Aberdeen), petition, 26 November 1672.
^1553	  For the location at these dates, see De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, 36, 38, 39, 49, 54-55.
^1554	  De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, lviii, 63; De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, II, 462-463; Roos, Twee eeuwen, citing ZA, SvZ 20.  NSvZ, 20, 25 July & 3 August 1674.
^1555	  Image: NMM.  See http://www.nmm.ac.uk/mag/pages/mnuExplore/PaintingDetail.cfm?ID=BHC0320. This is a sequential series of images of the pair in action.  It is worth noting that there seems no difference in size between the two ships.
^1556	  De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, 63.  (‘Al hoewel voorgeven hadden, dat niet meer als 160 coppen op hadden, verclaerden de Engelsche naderhant selve, dat over 300 coppen opgehadt hadde.’)
^1557	  News from the coast of Spain, Feb. 13: A  true relation of a brisk and bloody encounter which happened upon the 13th of February, between the Tyger frigot, Captain Harman, commander, and the Schaherleas of Holland, vice-admiral of young Evertson’s squadron, Pasqual DeWit, captain, near Cadize in Spain (London, 1674-9) [Wing (2nd ed.)/N1005A]; ibidem, in C. H. Firth (ed.), Naval Songs & Ballads (NRS, 1907), 83-86; An encomium, or Congratulatory poem occasionally written, upon the happy successes of Capt. Thomas Harman, commander of his Majestie’s friggate, the Tiger. With an exact relation of his late signal victory off Cadis (London 1674) [Wing (CD-ROM, 1996)/G62]; Heath, Late Intestine War, 595.  Dutch losses were magnified to 140 dead and 86 wounded.  The HMS Tiger website gives De Jonge’s figures of 50 killed, 70 wounded.  See http://hms-tiger.co.uk/Past%20History.htm.
^1558	  Joseph Allen, Battles of the British Navy (London, 1852), I, 72-73; John Campbell, Lives of the admirals and other eminent British seamen. Containing their personal histories, and a detail of all their public services (London, 1748), II, 324-325; John Charnock, Biographia Navalis (London, 1794), I, 335-336, reprinted in De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, [no page: 233]; Molloy, De jure maritimo et navali (London, 1701), 12-13.  Molloy put the Dutch crew at 380 men.  Schakerloo is known in some old British sources as ‘Schaerles’, ‘Schaerlaes’, or ‘Scharlais’.
^1559	  De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, 230, n2, quoting Clowes, History, II, 448-450: ‘the chief gallantry was displayed by the Dutch’, because they were heavily outgunned – despite equal manpower.
^1560	  Zwanenburg’s payroll does not indicate any sailors were transferred to Schakerloo.  Perhaps further research in the individual payments may shed more light here.
^1561	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.1.  Payroll of Schakerloo, 3 September 1674.  (‘verlopen en sonder passport aen de viand overgegaen’.)
^1562	  ZA, Rek. C 8364.  Payment of compensation to Schakerloo’s crew, 19 November 1674.  See discussion in Earle, Sailors, 57; also Barlow, I, 95.
^1563	  ZA, Rek. C 8315.  Jan Edick (Newcastle), petition & passport, 12 September 1672; ibid, 8318.  Willem Schlijter (Orkney), petition & passport, 19 October 1672.  
^1564	  ZA, Rek. C 8316.  Payroll of Evert Evertsen Franszoon’s crew [Surinam], 26 October 1672.
^1565	  ZA, Rek. C 8318.  Wouter Magepijn (Leith), petition, 22 April 1673; ibid, 8319.1.  Payroll of Zierikzee, [30 September 1673]; ibid, Payroll of Zierikzee, 7 November 1673.  For the taking of the prizes – the flyboat Isaac and Benjamin of London (John Plover, master), outbound for Virginia, and the barque St Maria of Boston (Robert Lesley, master), bound for Bilbao with fish – see De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, xxvii-xxviii, 3-4.  See also Roos, Twee eeuwen, 317, citing ZA, Rek. C 7152 [no item description].  It is uncertain which prize Magepijn was on – or when he returned to Zeeland.  Letters from the Zeeland admiralty commissioner in La Corunna would often have been carried home by the many Zeeland privateers based in the area.  One of these letters mentions a fish prize taken by Evertsen, reaching Middelburg by 22 March.  See NA, AA 2498.  RAvZ, 22 March 1673 (on Nicolaas van Hoorn (San Sebastian) to Zeeland admiralty, 6 March 1673).
^1566	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.  Thomas Freindell (London), petition, 11 November 1673. [It is still unclear exactly what Friend’s fate was.]
^1567	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.  Payroll of Zeehond, (May 1673); ibid.  Payroll of Daniel Thijssen’s crew [Zeehond], 26 July/9 September 1673; ibid.  Payroll of Daniel Thijssen’s crew [Zeehond], 24 January 1674; ibid, 8319.1.  Payroll of Zeehond, (23 October 1672-11 November 1673), 28 July 1674; ibid. 8363.  Payroll of Zeehond, 23 December 1674.  For the complement given previously, see De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, 104-105.
^1568	  ZA, Rek. C 8363.  Payroll of Zeehond, 23 December 1674.
^1569	  ZA, Rek. C 8318.  John Spar Schotsman, petition, 21 December 1672.
^1570	  De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, 54.  (‘in duijsent stucken geslagen’.)
^1571	  Zeeland admiralty to Evertsen, 19 January 1674, in De Waarde, Zeeuwsche Expeditie, 179.  Graham is given here as ‘Arij Grum’.  It is not known if he was the same man as a soldier in 1689.  See ZA, SvZ 1671, f. 75r.  Henry Graham, commission/instruction as company commander, 8 May 1689 (replacing William Stuart). [ISIS/Zeeuwen Gezocht]
^1572	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.7.  Robert Spens [Kirkcaldy], petition for compensation, 4 July 1672.  His signature is pretty good.  (‘van kints been af Uwe Edele Mogende [i.e. the Zeeland admiralty] te water heeft gedient en alle zeeslagen, geene uijtgesondert die diep inde dertig jaren sijn voorgevallen heeft bijgeweest en sich met alle couragie daer in gedragen, […] sijn sesendertig inregen dienst’.)
^1573	  ZA, Rek. C 8319.9.  Cornelis Pilsius, petition & accounts (1672), 1 December 1672; ibid.  Pieter van de Putte, petition & accounts (1672), 24 December 1672.  Pilsius treated him for 11 weeks, Van de Putte for 40 days; their expertise cost 30fl.
^1574	  ZA, Rek. C 8316.  Extraordinary payments, mondkost, [26 September 1672]; ibid.  Extraordinary payments, [16 November 1672].
^1575	  ZA, Rek. C 8318.  Robert Spens, petition & passport, 18 October 1672; ibid.  Robert Spens, petition, 31 May 1673; ibid, 8319.1.  Extraordinary payments, mondkost, [18 December 1673]; ibid.  Payroll of Orangeboom, 21 February 1674.
^1576	  I am indebted to Commander Poortvliet for allowing me access to this information. 
^1577	  ZA, Rek. C 7173.  Robert Spens (Kirkcaldy), petition, 24 May 1688; ibid, 7183.  Robert Spens, pension instalments, 4 April, 2 July & 3 October 1689, 5 January 1690.
^1578	  NA, AEA, 438.  Pay book of Gouden Leeuw, 1673.
^1579	  NA, AEA, 588.  Pay book of Hollandia, 1674.
^1580	  Image: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.  ‘Nachtelijk gevecht tussen Cornelis Tromp op de ‘Gouden Leeuw’ en Sir Edward Spragg op de ‘Royal Prince’ tijdens de zeeslag bij Kijkduin, 21 augustus 1673: episode uit de Derde Engelse Zeeoorlog (1672-74)’ [http://www.rijksmuseum.nl/assetimage.jsp?id=SK-A-2393].
^1581	  Black, European Warfare, 1494-1660, 13; Glete, Warfare at Sea, 55.
^1582	  Sources: all except 1700-9, see Appendix.  The 1700-9 figure relies on Poortvliet, Bemanningen, 9b-9c, passim, and is a preliminary for British only: no other foreigners were analysed, hence its absence from the rest of the thesis.  This sample was of 2463 men, smaller than all but one of the others.  See Methodology.
^1583	  Sources: (Thesis) see Appendix and Table 9.1 above.  (Bruijn) see Bruijn, Dutch Navy, 55, 133; Bruijn, Varend Verleden, 72, 169, 243.  Data for 1688-97 and 1700-9 is actually for 1694 and 1709 only, respectively.  (Francke) see Francke, Utiliteyt, 95; Francke, ‘Sware Equipage’, 121.  Roos’ data for 1667-70 is not included here.  See Roos, Twee Eeuwen, 280, and Chapter 5, Figure 5.1 above.  The 1600 British figure here obviously pre-dates the 1603 regal union and combines Bruijn’s figures for English and Scots.
^1584	  Sources: (contemporary estimates), see Chapter 1, Table 1.1.  Estimates in parentheses were for the whole maritime sector, rather than for the navy only.
^1585	  Ketting, Leven, werk en rebellie.
^1586	  Van Royen, Zeevarenden.
^1587	  Bruijn, Dutch Navy; Bruijn, Varend Verleden; Davids, ‘Maritime Labour in the Netherlands’; Glete, Navies and Nations; Glete, Warfare at Sea; Lucassen, ‘International Maritime Labour Market’; Van Royen, ‘National Maritime Labour Market’.
^1588	  De Jonge, Nederlandsche Zeewezen, III, 168-169.
^1589	  As H. H. Rowen pointed out.  See Rowen, John de Witt, 577.
^1590	  Rommelse, Second Anglo-Dutch War, 125.
^1591	  Van Bochove & Van Zanden, ‘Two Engines of Early Modern Growth’, 563-564.
^1592	  Capp, Cromwell’s Navy; Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins; Rodger, Command of the Ocean. 
^1593	  Clark, Seventeenth Century, 15.
^1594	  Fulton, Sovereignty of the Sea.
^1595	  Groenveld, Verlopend Getij; idem, ‘English Civil Wars’; idem, ‘Nadalen van neutraliteit’.
^1596	  Francke, Utiliteyt, 92; Francke, ‘Sware Equipage’, 119, 120; Ehrman, Navy in the War of William III, 115.
^1597	  Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II, I, 262.
^1598	  Rommelse, Second Anglo-Dutch War, 132-133.
^1599	  Clark, Seventeenth Century, 15, quoting Cunningham, The Growth of English Industry and Commerce (1882), Bk. V, cap. 2.
^1600	  Otte, ‘Zeeuwse zeezaken’, 146.
^1601	  Davids, ‘Maritime Labour in the Netherlands’, 67; Francke, ‘Sware Equipage’, 132, 133; Francke, Utiliteyt, 107; Van Zanden, ‘Revolt of the Early Modernists’, 623-624.
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